Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula

A Multilateral Workshop
part of the Building Six-Party Capacity project

February 17, 2006
Halekulani Hotel
Honolulu , Hawaii

8:30-8:45 Welcome and Introduction

Plenary Session 1
Security Assurances and Related Architecture

8:45-9:45 This is the first of three plenary sessions designed to involve the entire group in focused discussion to solicit broad input in preparation for the three breakout topics (security assurances, denuclearization and verification, and economic engagement). We are looking to build upon the progress made at the 2005 Shanghai workshop.

The goal of this plenary session and the other two is to lay the groundwork for more productive, smaller breakout sessions later in the afternoon. Given the size of the plenary group, we will focus on broad principles or key challenges that should be considered in more detail at the breakout session.

Key questions for this first session include:

• What steps can/should be taken to implement the mutual and multilateral security assurances mentioned in the September 19, 2005, Six-Party Joint Statement? How might bilateral and multilateral assurances (or components thereof) best be phased and coordinated? To what extent should they be mutual and reciprocal (i.e., go both ways between the DPRK and five-party countries)? Are the general principles currently agreed to – e.g., no intention to attack, respect for sovereignty, steps to normalize relations – sufficient to promote further progress? Are there any unintended consequences that need to be addressed?
• How and to what extent can security assurances and any associated mechanisms for implementation be linked to the broader process of achieving normalized relations? To the negotiation of a permanent peace regime on the Peninsula? Are there critical interim steps?
• How, to what extent, and at what point can/should progress in the security assurance realms be linked to and/or conditioned upon progress in the areas of denuclearization and economic cooperation? Might security assurances, for example, help establish necessary preconditions for success on the other two fronts (e.g., DPRK transparency on nuclear programs opening a path to effective verification of denuclearization)?
• What is the most practical and productive way to introduce a more formal six-party and/or wider regional security architecture (based on six-party initiatives)? On what issues and concerns might additional regional security cooperation along these lines be most usefully focused?
• To what extent can/should the group organize itself to help resolve disputes between the DPRK and the United States when one believes that the other is not living up to its security assurance obligations?

Plenary Session 2
Denuclearization and Verification Regime Principles

9:45-10:45 Since the 2005 Shanghai workshop, additional studies have been completed in the participating countries that highlight the complexity and time-consuming nature of a complete denuclearization and verification effort. Moreover, historic and contemporary case study analyses suggest that the functions of such regimes change over time, given changing technical and logistical requirements and (hopefully) the development of greater trust and familiarity. In terms of six-party/multi-party capacity building, this topic will probably be the most technically challenging and subject to the most dispute regarding rights, obligations, priorities, and findings. Key questions for this topic include:

• Given the September agreement in principle to establish a nuclear free Korea, can the parties begin now, in advance of North Korea’s nuclear disclosure, to design an objective group process for evaluating that disclosure and moving forward with dismantlement? Can/should that process begin independent of the six-party meetings, since those meetings are still relatively infrequent and often do not involve the necessary technical expertise (or the IAEA, for example)?
• What precisely is required for a full and accurate disclosure regarding the DPRK’s nuclear assets and programs? Program-wide, what are the likely critical steps and technical/logistical requirements in a North Korean denuclearization process? What are the probable associated timeframes?
• Since a great deal of planning work will be necessary ahead of the decommissioning process for the DPRK’s 5MWe reactor and related facilities, would it be helpful (and feasible) for a technical committee of some kind to begin developing a decommissioning plan, including what is called a “characterization” of the reactor (e.g., an assessment of structural and safety hazards, a review of legal, institutional, and technical constraints on various options, etc.)? Might this be done in parallel with the planning for South Korea’s electricity proposal (i.e., a “plan for a plan” in the spirit of “action for action”)?
• What do lessons learned from past and current denuclearization and verification efforts (e.g., Ukraine, South Africa, Libya, Iran) suggest with regard to key tasks, preferred formats and procedures for implementation, the role of intelligence sharing and the use of intelligence so gained, and the prospects for increased compliance and mutual trust as the process unfolds? How might the five parties (i.e., all but the DPRK) best educate themselves and then the DPRK on useful lessons learned?
• How can we begin to reconcile or harmonize various national approaches to denuclearization and verification? Might the five parties and/or the UN P-5 nuclear powers play a key role in the denuclearization/verification processes, and, if so, at what point in time? At what point and how should the IAEA be brought into the overall process?

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