

FINAL REPORT
on
Strategic Responsiveness

Early and Continuous Joint Effectiveness - Across the Spectrum

April 2000

From a Conference Organized by

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

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The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

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Disclaimer

The material herein is an overview and synthesis of the conference proceedings and does not reflect the views of the United States Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., or The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.



Our conference, entitled *Strategic Responsiveness: Early and Continuous Joint Effectiveness – Across the Spectrum*, held on 2-3 November 1999 in Washington, D.C., produced lively debates and discussions on the full spectrum of security challenges confronting the United States in the early twenty-first century. This was the twenty-ninth annual conference on a topic of national security importance organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. and the International Security Studies Program of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. For this conference, we had the co-sponsorship of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment. We are grateful for their active support without which the conference could not have taken place.

The meeting brought together a distinguished group of panel speakers drawn from each of the military services, senior levels of government, Congress, the broader public policy community, and overseas. Over a two-day period, conference participants presented and discussed a diverse range of perspectives on our future national security strategy. Among the key issues, we examined present and emerging threats; the problems of maintaining military readiness while developing new capabilities for the future; the transformation of the Armed Forces for the world of the early twenty-first century; issues associated with coalition/allied operations; and the forthcoming 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Each of the panel sessions produced important insights and ideas on important national security topics and issues. This conference report is intended to summarize, synthesize, and build upon the themes and perspectives that emerged based on the discussions that took place. We hope that this report will contribute not only to the public discussion of vitally important national security issues but also to the thinking of those charged with the development of effective strategies and overall capabilities for the early twenty-first century. We also take this opportunity to express thanks to speakers and participants for their outstanding contributions to the conference on which this report is based.

John R. Galvin
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INTRODUCTION

A conference entitled *Strategic Responsiveness: Early and Continuous Joint Effectiveness – Across the Spectrum* was held in Washington, D.C. on 2-3 November 1999. The goal of the organizers and co-sponsors was to gain a more precise understanding of our national security priorities and to build a broader consensus as to our requirements across the broad security spectrum of military operations. In an effort to address the daunting challenges ahead for the Armed Services, the organizers and co-sponsors brought together a broad array of talent and expertise that included current and former policy makers, senior military leaders, members of Congress, internationally renowned security specialists, corporate executives, and the media. The diverse group of speakers and participants presented a wide range of perspectives, issues, and policy options.

Central to the conference were several basic premises. The United States will remain the driving force for peace, prosperity, and democracy. The United States faces an uncertain and increasingly complex international security environment characterized by new asymmetric threats such as weapons of mass destruction and information warfare. The Armed Forces must be prepared as a joint force to meet the new security challenges that will differ dramatically from those of the Cold War era. At the same time, the Services must be able to respond to threats and crises ranging from smaller-scale contingencies to major theater wars. The Services must also maintain power projection capabilities to support and enhance overseas presence, which will remain a critical component of U.S. strategy. The array of requirements and emerging challenges have compelled the Department of Defense to embark on a course intended to enhance the mobility and lethality of our Armed Forces.

“Strategic Responsiveness” must be an essential aspect of our future defense strategies. Strategic responsiveness is based on a joint military concept that would enable the Armed Forces to place an adversary at a decisive disadvantage through the rapid exploitation of the operational initiative before the opponent can act. The United States must be able to apply overwhelming military power based upon the rapid convergence of forces from all the Services wherever they are needed. Forming force packages that contain the correct combination of mission-tailored capabilities is a task essential to achieving victory in contingencies ranging from peacetime operations to full-scale conflict. For this purpose we must develop new strategies and capabilities.

In convening the conference, it was our intention to develop sound recommendations for the policy-making community and each of the Services through the exchange of views in an open, collegial forum. This report is a summary of conference findings and recommendations together with an analysis of panel presentations and discussions. Each session begins with summary points followed by a presentation of views expressed and an analysis of what transpired. The report closes with a concise conclusion highlighting the essential “take-away points.”



Strategic

- 1 ***America's national security and military strategies must help shape the evolving security environment of the new century if we are to maintain our position as a world leader.*** We must identify and prioritize the array of threats confronting the nation and dedicate the necessary resources in support of our national security strategy. The United States must pursue technological innovations that will allow us to develop new capabilities against a broad spectrum of threats. We must also exploit the information revolution and the revolution in business affairs to provide the flexibility to adapt to a rapidly changing world.
- 2 ***In light of America's numerous military engagements around the world, future intervention must become an object of national debate.*** An open and candid exchange will give us our best chance to ensure that sound decisions are made. Whenever possible, dissenting views must be allowed to flow forth to ensure that all sides of an issue are fully explored before an intervention is initiated. Our leaders must recognize that military force will be only one aspect of any solution and that future crises will require the sustained application of all elements of national power.
- 3 ***Procurement spending must continue to rise incrementally if we are to maintain our technological edge over potential adversaries.*** The Department of Defense (DoD) has reversed the declining trend in procurement budgets from the projected \$41-43 billion per year to a current budget earmarked to rise to \$60 billion by 2001. This upward trend must continue and Congress must ensure that necessary steps are taken to preserve our technological edge. Given current threats to our vital interests, the defense budget must make room not only for research and development (R&D), but also for upgrading and replacing existing systems. Our current missions must be balanced with the strong need to innovate – neither can be sacrificed.
- 4 ***We must make the difficult modernization decisions that may require forgoing some big-ticket items and purchasing other systems in smaller numbers.*** Pitting modernization against readiness creates false choices. Forcing trade-off decisions such as the mortgaging of future readiness for current readiness is counterproductive. Instead, defense planners must be prepared to make difficult choices in modernization programs. The United States must be able to generate necessary savings to maintain readiness while at the same time prepare for a true transformation. Rather than pursuing large-scale production runs that may be unaffordable under present budget constraints, we can save substantially by purchasing modern weapons in smaller buys.

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

- 5 ***The shrinking budget for defense R&D, particularly in the area of basic science, must be reversed.*** Technological innovation will remain the force behind the military's transformation. Beyond funding increases, the R&D process must shed its previous disconnected practices and become more integrated with service specific and joint requirements in order to maximize technological innovation.
- 6 ***A robust defense industry will be indispensable to the impending transformation of the U.S. Army and the other services.*** Declining defense budgets together with the post-Cold War defense industry consolidation have led to declining equity values and internal problems resulting from rapid downsizing for defense firms. By providing stable procurement budgets and rethinking its relationship with industry, the government can offer defense firms much-needed stability. Failure to do so is likely to produce a hemorrhage of scientific, engineering, and managerial talent and expertise to more profitable sectors, with adverse consequences for defense modernization and innovation. Steps to ease regulations and accounting rules, as well as greater efforts to procure defense-related items from commercial vendors, should be taken immediately.
- 7 ***The Armed Forces are saddled with an enormous, Cold War-era infrastructure that drains funding from the warfighters.*** Proposed base closures have encountered political opposition that has proved to be virtually insurmountable. Nearly forty additional bases should be closed, in addition to those that remain from past Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, to stem the loss of resources from our Services - resources that must be invested in future modernization needs.
- 8 ***The enormous consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents justify the increased effort and expense to prepare for this looming threat.*** The United States must press ahead with counterproliferation programs. A national missile defense (NMD) that protects all fifty states should be deployed as soon as technology permits. As required not only for NMD, but also for theater missile defense (TMD) to protect allies and U.S. forces deployed overseas, greater investment in research and development should be made. We must also heighten awareness of WMD threats among allies and friends and extend counterproliferation capabilities to them as well. Continuing efforts should be made to control "loose" Russian nuclear weapons and prevent the outflow of WMD technologies and capabilities.
- 9 ***The growing threat of chemical and biological weapons will force a transformation in the Armed Forces and put greater emphasis on increased cooperation between DoD and other governmental agencies.*** Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has already embarked on efforts to enhance civil support for



WMD contingencies and consequence management – coping with the consequences of a WMD terrorist incident – in the United States. Continuing efforts will need to be made to achieve maximum synchronization and cooperation among the various civilian and military authorities, including those at the federal, state, and local levels.

- 10 ***U.S. military operations will continue to derive greater legitimacy from multinational participation and the unique contribution of our allies will continue to be a decisive planning factor.*** In light of the continuing decreases in defense budgets among NATO-European countries, however, long-term allied interoperability will not be achievable. If the present downward trend is not reversed, our allies will be even less capable of contributing effectively to alliance/coalition operations. Further efforts must be made to encourage European allies to invest in modern defense capabilities for the twenty-first century.
- 11 ***The Armed Forces must relentlessly pursue joint capabilities and platforms and make greater efforts to shed redundancies.*** The development of joint doctrine and training, especially at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level, will help bind capabilities and platforms together. The DoD is also investing in JFCOM as the lead agency to conduct joint experimentation and determine future requirements. At the same time, we must recognize that some level of overlap and redundancies will be required to provide maximum depth to joint operational capabilities.

Operational

- 12 ***The Army has proclaimed that “everything is on the table” as it pursues transformation.*** If the Army is to transform into a more responsive and strategically dominant force, it must be willing to make tradeoffs. However, there are legacy systems that have served the Army well and have the capability to be decisive on future battlefields under the auspices of “campaign forces.” As decisions are made to determine which Army programs should be cut, which weapon systems are no longer relevant, and how units are to be structured for the future, the utility of all current and planned systems must be dispassionately evaluated. The Army’s war-fighting requirement demands that current capabilities be maintained until an adequate replacement in the form of the projected “objective force” is available.
- 13 ***The current Army vision to be able to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world in four days, a division in five days, and five divisions in thirty days does not go far enough.*** Given the virtually limitless possibilities for technological advancement and innovation in the next twenty-five years, our goal should be to deploy a brigade on the ground anywhere in the world within two days. This

takes into account not only the need to have a forcible entry capability but also to maintain the required logistics. Greater technological efforts should be especially focused on the requirements directly related to versatility, lethality, agility, and sustainability.

- 14 *Land-based fire support has been allowed to atrophy in the Marine Corps.*** A recent review of Marine Corps ground-based fire support systems strongly suggests that post-Cold War artillery cuts have left the Marine Corps with serious deficiencies in this area. The HIMARS rocket system (which the Army plans to field for its light divisions) is a potential solution in conjunction with the expected fielding of the light weight 155-millimeter howitzer. These expeditionary systems will allow the Marine Corps to gain the maximum fire support in the early phases of a combat operation.
- 15 *Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) would provide an ideal test bed for experimenting with concepts that could be subsequently extended to the wider joint arena.*** MAGTF's are uniquely suited for experimentation due to their inherent capabilities as self-contained task organized units. Because each MAGTF consists of a headquarters, ground combat, aviation, and combat service support element, it can adequately simulate the other military Services (using similar equipment, tactics and procedures), without requiring the large scale participation of the other Services.
- 16 *Even less in the early twenty-first century can the Air Force make the strategic assumption that forward basing will be available or accessible in future operations.*** We must assume that future adversaries will resort to access denial tactics, including the threat or use of WMD to impede the utilization of ports or airfields. Our allies may also be coerced into denying access to their bases. Therefore, the Air Force should reassess its reliance on tactical platforms and fully embrace the development of longer-range capabilities. Using the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) as a management tool does not solve the nodal attack problem that currently exists and will continue as long as forward basing remains an operational planning imperative. The Air Force must look beyond the current dependence on nodes to launch operations and concentrate on strategic platforms.
- 17 *The Navy must prepare for and invest more fully in littoral operations.*** Future joint missions will require that naval forces work more and more closely to shore - they must be well positioned to take advantage of the growing precision of joint weapon systems and sensors in order to project power deeper inland. Although the Navy has devoted considerable effort to mine warfare and littoral anti-submarine warfare techniques, higher priority and investment must be given to such capabilities in this transformed security setting of the early decades of the twenty-first century.



Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

Transforming National Defense in the 21st Century

- Future defense transformation as set forth in the last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR-97) remains inadequate.
- According to the National Defense Panel (NDP), a congressionally mandated independent study on U.S. defense and national security, a more radical approach to preparing for the future is necessary.
- The NDP determined that current force structure would be inadequate to defend national interests twenty years from now. A new strategy that considers new capabilities is desperately needed.
- A commitment to doctrinal changes, jointness, and technological innovation will be the key to a true transformation for the Armed Forces.

Analysis

Despite the fact that the Defense Department has accepted transformation as a fundamental policy goal, future plans mandated by the 1997 QDR were essentially a restatement of the status quo. Nevertheless, the current force structure of the Services will become increasingly less able to deal with new threats in a rapidly changing security environment. The periodic crises and overseas deployment decisions of recent years have inhibited the formulation of a military strategy designed to address future threats sufficiently. The Services are mired in high readiness, operations and maintenance costs while modernization programs have lagged behind. Most notably, the defense budget for science and technology, the basis for military innovation, has dropped to a precipitously low level.

Without fundamental changes, the current force structure and level of readiness will be unsustainable. Unless the Defense Department takes action now, our forces will be smaller and less modern. The “alternative worlds” described by the NDP provide a more forward-looking prescription for the transformation of America’s military strategy. The Panel posited four distinct and plausible futures (international stability, baseline projection of the current international order, classic balance of power between hostile alliances, and chronic chaos) that might influence security planning in 2010-2020. According to the NDP, while the range of potential threats has grown substantially, our ability to develop forces to defeat these threats has also increased. If we act now, time is available to prepare for the future. In order to exploit this window of opportunity, the United States must reevaluate the military’s approach to transformation.

OPENING PRESENTATION



OPENING PRESENTATION

In light of existing political and military constraints, the current doctrine of applying overwhelming force is not likely to be a feasible option in most future conflicts. Instead, the Services will be constrained in the use of force to attain political and military objectives. This will require greater lethality and also a better understanding of enemy vulnerabilities. Future military operations will be based on joint and combined operations. In order to achieve true jointness, the Services must clarify the priorities of *Joint Vision 2020* and accelerate its implementation. The Defense Department must also improve the process by which future military requirements are identified. Current efforts undertaken by the newly formed JFCOM are spearheading a new path for QDR resource decisions. This command must be given sufficient resources to succeed with the complex tasks assigned to it.



Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT), Senate Armed Services Committee, discusses the need for forward looking and innovative defense strategy.

***Understanding the Implications
of the 21st Century Challenges***

- Accelerating technological change, together with the emergence of new actors and issues, will continue to transform the twenty-first-century security environment.
- Domestic politics – particularly the expectation of casualty-free warfare – will increasingly constrain the United States in the use of military capabilities overseas.
- A fundamental reassessment of the roles and missions of the Services is needed to guide future force development and decision making concerning intervention.
- Although information dominance will be indispensable, it is not a substitute for preponderant power on the ground. Therefore, the United States must maintain adequate forces equipped and prepared for a wide variety of tasks.
- The Armed Services face the risk of strategic overextension, the cumulative effect of the numerous small-scale military operations that have characterized the post-Cold War period.
- The United States, the only power with global reach and responsibilities, will continue to bear most of the military burden on behalf of the international community.

Analysis

This new century will introduce forces bent on terror and destruction that stem from the interaction of mass democracy with post-Industrial Revolution social conditions. Although information technology will undercut authoritarian regimes, the widespread notion that democratization is a cure-all for the world's ills is unfounded. The wars in Yugoslavia, the current predicament of Russia, and other problems with abrupt democratization provide evidence to support this theory. Lacking certain prerequisites such as a vigorous middle class, many countries quickly degenerate into “hybrid regimes” – oligarchies operating behind the façade of democracy. A gradual transition from authoritarianism to representative governments would help solidify popular support for democracy based upon growing public participation, market economies, and rule of law. More likely, however, in the years just ahead will be the emergence of greater numbers of regimes lacking the political, legal, and economic requisites for democracy. Such regimes will

PANEL ONE

face conditions in which ethnic conflict, lawlessness, civil strife, terrorism, and political fragmentation will be rampant.

The proliferation of WMD and delivery systems will place frightening new weapons in the hands of rogue states and non-state antagonists, allowing them to confront the United States with asymmetric means. Unable to challenge directly the overwhelming military power of the United States, hostile actors will make use of such capabilities. The spread of information technology, expertise, and the ability to procure WMD will permit a broader range of actors to possess such weapons.

The primary threats to U.S. interests will take two forms. First, North America is increasingly vulnerable both to missile attack and to terrorist action. While the probability of WMD strikes remains low, they directly threaten vital U.S. interests – the security of the United States itself. Second, WMD-equipped actors could target American forces or those of allies. The fear of such attacks could either deter U.S. intervention or intimidate allies into opting out of future coalitions. More disturbing, accelerating technological change will contribute to the complexity of the future security environment. The proliferation of information technology will link people as never before, while providing a new basis for empowerment. The outgrowth of this process is increasingly a set of “distributed global competitors,” state and non-state actors scattered around the world but linked electronically via the Internet and other means. Preparing to counter such asymmetric strategies is critical to U.S. defense strategy in the twenty-first century. Defense planners must maintain conventional power, measured in numbers of personnel and military hardware, even as they maximize benefits from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and develop measures to counter



Left to right: Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA (Ret.), former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Mr. Robert D. Kaplan, Journalist and Author, Dr. Richard A. Falkenrath, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Senator John Warner (R-VA), Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, address major security challenges of the twenty-first century.

and otherwise cope with asymmetric warfare. The Armed Services must remain engaged in the “right-sizing” of forces, based on the appropriate mix between traditional military equipment and new systems spawned by the ongoing RMA.

Domestic politics, particularly public expectations of casualty-free warfare, will be a major limiting factor on America’s engagement in the world and possibly undercut U.S. staying power in potential conflict flashpoints. Such a preoccupation on our part will give added incentive to those who seek to preclude or limit U.S. intervention by threatening or actually inflicting casualties on our forces. The countervailing and conflicting requirements of U.S. global strategy and the persistence of a strategic culture that contains minimal tolerance for casualties will produce a growing dilemma for the United States as a twenty-first century superpower. It will therefore be especially important for policy makers to muster broad public support for U.S. national security strategy.

Another issue that must be addressed more effectively is the overextension of our Armed Forces. The cumulative effect of the numerous small-scale contingency operations and accompanying high operational tempo on our military personnel has adversely effected retention and recruiting. Equipment shortages in Operation Allied Force in 1999, including cruise missiles and electronic-warfare aircraft, were ominous signs. Moreover, the willingness and ability of allies to reduce the military burden on the United States remains in serious doubt. Despite disparities between U.S. and European military capabilities dramatized by the Kosovo campaign, there is scant evidence that NATO European countries will boost their defense budgets to redress this imbalance. The United States will likely continue to shoulder the bulk of the military burden on behalf of the international community, but this must change if we are to meet our many commitments.

Department of Defense for the 21st Century

- The U.S. military is transforming from a heavy, forward-deployed force of the previous decade to more a mobile, rapidly deployable force as set forth in *Joint Vision 2010*.
- The Department of Defense is continuing to strive for a balance between the demanding elements of *shape*, *respond*, and *prepare* as embodied in our national security strategy.
- The United States must devise a realistic strategy that ensures long-term interoperability in joint and combined operations.

Analysis

Despite tremendous progress, difficult tasks confront the United States military as it prepares for the uncertain future. First, we must maintain a balance between the three major elements of our overarching national security strategy – *shaping* world events, *responding* to threats and crises, and *preparing* for the future. For instance, the Department of Defense must ensure that it does not invest in readiness at the expense of procurement while remaining capable of handling a spectrum of missions ranging from war to peacekeeping operations. Operation Allied Force is testimony to the operational flexibility of NATO to engage in warfighting, humanitarian, and peacekeeping missions. Second, we must craft a realistic long-term strategy that ensures interoperability between our Services and our allies. Indeed, the Kosovo crisis highlighted the centrality



Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen discusses the adaptation of the Department of Defense for the twenty-first century.

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of coalitions in future conflicts. Third, due to the rapidity of change in the evolving security environment, the most important hedge against uncertainty is to maintain a decisive edge for our military.

The Department of Defense must provide the Services with the necessary organizational tools to excel with innovation. In order to pursue the military's transformation strategy, the Services should reward creativity in the ranks. We must also devise flexible and creative procurement and investment strategies by leveraging private sector practices. For example, the production concept of "just in time" and logistics techniques of companies such as Federal Express are being incorporated into the military's conduct of business. Such progress would represent an important step forward in fostering creative tension within DoD itself and between DoD and the contractor community.

***Perspectives on a 21st Century National Strategy
and the Role of Military Power***

- As a result of advances in technologies and the proliferation of capabilities to states and non-state actors, the spread of threats and risks to American security will become more complex and diffuse.
- The economic impact on and relevance to security will grow as globalization, commercialization, and technological innovation accelerate.
- While technological innovation may have altered the means for the conduct of warfare, the essence of war has not changed. Conflicts will be unpredictable, protracted, and fraught with the potential for casualties.
- Jointness and interoperability are indispensable to future U.S. military operations.

Analysis

The absence of a direct and immediate threat to U.S. national interests affords a unique opportunity to shape and prepare for the future. For example, continued economic primacy will be an essential prerequisite to maintaining America's global influence. The United States must exploit the opportunities arising from economic globalization and interdependence. Given the prevailing trends in commercialization, the Armed Forces will have to leverage technology, equipment, and logistics from the private sector. By incorporating still more modern business practices, the DoD can become more responsive, flexible, and efficient. In particular, the military will need to adapt business innovations such as the greater use of e-commerce and other on-line capabilities to speed and streamline its acquisition practices. The Department of Defense will have to expand its purchase of technologies and equipment from the commercial sector if it is to benefit as fully as possible from the information revolution.

*Admiral Joseph W. Prueher,
USN (Ret.), former
Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Command, and
then-Ambassador designate
to the People's Republic of
China, discusses the role of
preventive defense as a
central element of national
power.*



Given the major advances in technology, the capabilities of potential adversaries will increase in both sophistication and lethality. New asymmetric threats and the growing ability of states and actors other than states to threaten the American homeland and U.S. forces abroad must be integrated into U.S. strategic thinking. Indeed, the United States has already suffered terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Moreover, our adversaries will be increasingly able to strike our allies with WMD as weapons of first, rather than last, resort. We must increase drastically our efforts to deter and defeat the use of WMD in all its forms.

Despite the relative lack of public focus on security issues, military force will remain a critical instrument of statecraft. The essence of war will remain unaltered. Soldiers will have to engage in combat on the ground and casualties will undoubtedly mount. The threat or actual use of force must always be an extension of the national will, with clearly defined military and political objectives. Developing cutting edge military capabilities will be of continuing and sustained importance to maintaining current readiness and preparing for future operations.



Former Senator Warren Rudman, Co-Chair of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, describes the Commission's most recent report.

The United States may be able militarily to act unilaterally in the future but the political costs of such action may often be prohibitive. Alliances and coalition operations will continue to characterize American engagement in major overseas crises and conflicts. However, coalitions may exert major limitations on our ability to achieve political and military goals. As in the case of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, democracies and alliances comprised of democracies will use force only as a last resort. The requirement for consensus within an alliance reduces the likelihood of a timely response. In spite of the compelling need for greater interoperability in combined operations, the technological gap is widening between the United States and its allies. Top-heavy command structures and logistical redundancies have impeded alliance

PANEL TWO

operations. Unless both sides take timely action to remedy such shortcomings, our combined military effectiveness will continue to suffer.

In addition to the transatlantic gap in advanced military technologies symbolized by the RMA, differing acquisition practices and timetables for procuring new systems, together with falling defense budgets, have been major obstacles to alliance interoperability. National restrictions on technology transfers; political barriers to purchasing foreign equipment; the inability to halt the downward spiraling of defense budgets in Europe; and technology gaps among European countries themselves, taken together, impede efforts to redress technology disparities. At the same time an even larger challenge is to gain a consensus on how the forces will be organized around common objectives. While technological interoperability among allies is critical, in the end it is people who determine how well coalition partners cooperate. At the present time, there is virtually no single piece of equipment that is shared by all NATO members. The perpetuation of debates on burden sharing could lead to a dangerously counterproductive bean counting exercise intended to demonstrate how much each side has contributed to a common cause. It should be kept in mind that the vast preponderance of ground forces both in Bosnia and Kosovo is provided by countries other than the United States.



General Klaus Naumann, (Ret.), former Chairman, Military Committee, NATO, underscores the importance of alliance and coalition operations.

Anticipating Today the Essential Capabilities for Tomorrow

- The greater precision and lethality flowing from the RMA will be the hallmarks of our future forces. It is critical to balance the RMA with traditional military power, measured by end strength and some “low-tech” weaponry (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, aircraft, and ships).
- Although the U.S. force structure must be tailored to emerging missions (counter-terrorism, WMD proliferation, homeland defense), the complexity of the emerging security environment requires capabilities that can adapt to a variety of conflict scenarios.
- Reducing infrastructure, bringing the force structure in line with strategic requirements, and adopting more efficient logistics, personnel, and administrative practices are the keys to freeing up needed funding for modernization.

Analysis

A strategy of preventive defense demands a reorientation of the traditional U.S. approach to military affairs. It is a strategy focused on taking the necessary steps now to avert or minimize future potential threats to U.S. national interests. The effort to prevent WMD proliferation in the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is illustrative of preventive defense. While the success of the RMA in improving traditional military capabilities is promising, our ability to initiate a “parallel RMA” to counter looming asymmetric threats leaves much to be done. The practice of assigning new missions to existing forces is no longer appropriate in a transformed security setting. New threats, especially those categorized as threats to vital interests, but also the other types of contingencies for which military forces are deemed necessary, call for a reorganization of the Department of Defense. Such an undertaking would require a fundamental revision of the 1947 National Security Act, perhaps along functional lines. There are several areas that fall outside the existing DoD organizational hierarchy: asymmetric warfare, joint information technology development, joint procurement, homeland defense, and peace enforcement, as in Bosnia and Kosovo. To execute such sweeping reforms, the Department of Defense would have to reverse the steep decline in R&D spending and exploit commercial technology more effectively. Despite the lack of public clamor for defense reform, the national security community should act now to take fullest account of the fundamental transformation shaping the global security environment.

PANEL THREE

Although two nearly simultaneous wars are not the most likely contingencies confronting the United States in the near future, the possibility of such conflicts remains sufficient to justify the presence of necessary U.S. military capabilities. The Armed Forces must have the strategies, doctrines, and forces needed to execute the full range of likely missions within the concept of Strategic Responsiveness. The principle of integrated military command based on the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, as demonstrated by NATO, will be a cornerstone of U.S. operations spanning the range of plausible conflict scenarios. Retooling our Armed Forces will demand (a) greater organizational flexibility; (b) improved agility and rapid-deployment capabilities within the warfighting commands; and (c) expanded support to the activities of law-enforcement agencies, civil authorities, and international organizations. Developing these roles and further refining those of our joint civil-military staffs would improve U.S. efficiency in responding to future contingencies.

Understanding the basic military lessons from Operation Allied Force gives the Armed Forces an important perspective for the future. First, the experience of the U.S. Air Force exposed shortfalls in sustainability and modernization that plague all of the services. The force structure is too small and is aging rapidly because of inadequate R&D and procurement. While it is important to improve flexibility, sizing the force correctly is also a central element of adapting to the early twenty-first century security setting. For instance, the United States emphasizes the use of stealth aircraft in order to minimize casualties; yet there are fewer than seventy-five of these aircraft in the entire Air Force inventory. The escalating demands for precision weaponry have depleted the inventory. Shortfalls in cruise missiles and precision guided munitions during Operation Allied Force illustrate the degree to which the procurement cutbacks of the 1990s have eroded U.S. early twenty-first century military readiness.

Improved cooperation between the military and the private sector is crucial to successful technological advancement and logistical development in the Services. While the RMA will bolster the capabilities of the warfighters, a Revolution in Business Affairs is needed to streamline logistics and infrastructure. Improving the defense acquisition process is critical. The current acquisition system is an artifact of the relatively predictable threat environment of the Cold War. To accelerate the process of designing and fielding weapons, the United States must be able to: (a) anticipate the essential capabilities that will be needed tomorrow; (b) translate these capabilities into concrete operational requirements; (c) determine what technologies should be exploited to fulfill these requirements; and (d) dramatically shorten the lead time from R&D to the deployment phase.

PANEL THREE

The U.S. Services must abandon centrally planned Future Years Defense Plans and move instead to milestone-driven programs that harness private sector business dynamics. Competition among defense contractors will remain a key element in developing new systems rapidly and at reasonable cost. Modernization funding must be boosted. Shedding unneeded infrastructure and placing greater emphasis on outsourcing activities such as accounting and finance would enhance efficiency and reduce duplication of effort with the DoD and the Services. The traditional twenty-year lag between the identification of a requirement and fielding a weapon system is clearly unacceptable in a dynamic security environment in which technologies are changing so rapidly that today's innovations become tomorrow's obsolete systems. Force planners are faced with problems brought about by the increasing obsolescence of equipment. The Armed Forces should purchase modern weapons in smaller buys rather than pursuing large-scale production runs that may be unaffordable under present budget constraints and, in any event, may be rendered obsolete by rapidly changing technologies. This approach to modernization must be designed in such a fashion that it does not impede combat efficiency by creating a force made up of a mix between newer and older systems. The less desirable alternatives may be a force consisting only of older systems.

General Henry H. Shelton

Beyond Joint Vision 2010

- Policy makers must establish priorities among competing claims on U.S. military resources.
- Future crises will require the sustained application of all elements of national power; military force will be only one aspect of any solution.
- Inaugurated by the new Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Joint Forces Command will promote joint experimentation and help the services to prepare for asymmetric challenges.

Analysis

The security challenges of the twenty-first century will be at least as great as those faced by the United States in the 1990s. A clear, long-term perspective on the security environment and potential uses of military force is a pivotal element in U.S. military doctrine for the twenty-first century. Iraq and North Korea represent the most serious short-term threats to regional stability. In the long term, U.S. foreign policy success will hinge on our relations with China, Japan, Russia, and Iran, the states whose future evolution will have the greatest impacts, respectively, on the security of East Asia, Europe, and Southwest Asia.

Emerging powers are only part – albeit the most important part – of the post-Cold War security setting. Because of their humanitarian component, many such crises appeal to what Abraham Lincoln called “the better angels of our nature.” Force is a tempting option in these cases because the U.S. Armed Forces are readily deployable. Yet the use of force to promote peace and stability often carries unintended consequences. U.S. policy makers must carefully weigh the decision to place U.S. prestige, leadership, and lives at risk in an attempt to resolve such conflicts. The decision to use force is sometimes appropriate, as in Kosovo. Operation Allied Force, however, was in many ways a unique case that should not be viewed as a universal model for humanitarian intervention. A relatively blunt instrument by itself, military force should always be used in concert with the other elements of national power to attain U.S. political objectives. Policy makers must craft political objectives supportive of the national interest and determine whether these goals are attainable by force or more appropriately by other means. These objectives should also be important enough to offer a reasonable prospect of sustained public support. The United States should refrain from threatening the use of force unless we are prepared to carry out such a threat. A failure to back public statements of intentions with actions would jeopardize U.S. credibility and encourage aggression by potential adversaries.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The unsettled security landscape of the early twenty-first century demands a transformation of the current military structure into a truly joint force. Harnessing the capabilities for two nearly simultaneous regional wars remains the focus of U.S. military strategy. While the existing force structure is sufficient to prevail under these circumstances, there must be an adequate surplus of forces to hedge against unexpected contingencies. In the future, victory will go to the force that best adapts itself to changing conditions. To uphold the present strategy, while the United States transforms its military forces, it will be necessary to deepen jointness, integrate new technologies, and maintain the current high quality of military personnel.

The newly revised UCP represents an important step towards this future joint force. The UCP designated the newly activated JFCOM as executive agent for “joint experimentation.” Under the aegis of joint experimentation, JFCOM will supplement the efforts of the services to develop operational concepts, doctrines, and technologies more appropriate to the new security environment. The new command thus will help to minimize redundancy and interservice rivalry while bolstering the cohesion of future joint operations. JFCOM’s efforts will also improve the ability of the Armed Forces to counter the asymmetric strategies currently being developed by U.S. adversaries. Intended to stimulate innovation, this new approach to force development will enhance the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to dominate the spectrum of conflict and realize the vision outlined in *Joint Vision 2020*.

*General Henry H. Shelton,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, delivers the keynote
address entitled Beyond
Joint Vision 2010.*



Serving the Nation in the 21st Century

- Our Armed Forces should not sacrifice the depth of joint capabilities by excessive zeal for eliminating redundancy, for some degree of overlap is critical to assure success in joint operations.
- Reducing the Army's logistical support requirements and providing greater strategic lift are the key to strategic responsiveness.
- The Marine Corps is reviving the Expeditionary Brigade concept to bolster its versatility and enhance the ability of Marine units to function in joint and combined operations.
- The Navy will adapt its capabilities for control, attack, and sustainment to a battlespace defined by dispersed, networked forces featuring vastly improved sensor and weapon ranges.
- The Air Force must attain full aerospace integration and build upon its expeditionary tradition.

Analysis

Joint forces must draw on the unique contributions of each service and be able to function in tandem with allied/coalition forces. Especially in operations other than war, U.S. military forces must be able to work with civilian government agencies and non-governmental organizations. By setting forth the basic interoperability objectives, the joint strategic vision will provide a baseline for reshaping service capabilities for the next joint operating environment. Synchronization, integration, and efficiency will be defining characteristics of future U.S. operations. The importance of forging a joint strategic vision is undeniable, but that vision must balance the capabilities of the armed services in order to meet defense requirements with minimum redundancy and waste. Balancing modernization with near-term readiness is another part of the equation. Because the demand for forward-deployed forces and power projection will increase to unprecedented levels, our Services must have greater capacity for rapid growth and adaptation.

The Army

The Army's most important mission remains to close with and destroy an enemy force. It is a task that no other service can replicate. There is no substitute for a rapid, deployable land power – a force that adversaries cannot ignore and only the presence of the Army in sufficient numbers can assure that circumstances on the ground can be changed to meet U.S. national security goals. This includes


not only the separation of hostile forces but also restoring and preserving the peace in the post-conflict setting. Yet the Army presently lacks sufficient mobility and agility to arrive at the scene of a conflict with overwhelming combat power quickly enough. The Army's overly centralized structure impedes rapid deployment and current efforts are too limited in scope.

The hallmarks of a more strategically responsive Army must include maximum deployability, versatility, agility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. The Army will develop the command and control, communication, and intelligence (C³I) capabilities necessary to allow its forces to shift missions quickly along the conflict spectrum while reducing their combat-support and combat-service-support requirements. Reducing the support and logistics "tail" - which comprises 90 percent of the Army's lift requirements and inhibits mobility - will create a more efficient force. This will require future Army equipment to be designed for transport by C-17 aircraft to the theater of operations. The Army equipment must also be compact enough to permit C-130 aircraft to shift assets and materiel quickly within a given theater. Finally, the Army must continue its efforts to dramatically reduce each unit's repair parts stockpile by standardizing equipment components as fully as possible.

The Army must become not only more mobile, but also more lethal. The distinction between light and heavy units must be erased in the transformation process. If it is to harness the potential of advanced technology, the Army must immediately focus on fielding smaller, lighter, more lethal, more survivable, and more fuel-efficient combat vehicles. Technologies must be pursued that enhance survivability by providing low-observable protection against enemy fire, as well as capabilities for long-range target acquisition, deep targeting, early attack, and first-round kills. Future artillery systems should be able to achieve first-round kill using smaller-caliber guns to reduce the heavy burden of resupply. An all-wheeled vehicle fleet will provide a solution to the Army's mobility dilemma by reducing lift tonnage by 50 to 70 percent compared to heavy tracked vehicles.

The Army currently anticipates that the outcome of this retooling process will be the ability to deploy a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours; a division within 120 hours; and 5 divisions within 30 days. The question remains whether the capability to put a Medium Brigade on the ground in four

General Eric K. Shinseki articulates a transformation strategy for the Army for the twenty-first century.



days is *fast enough*. Technological advancements and innovation in the coming years could make an even more rapid deployment possible for the initial entry force. Nevertheless, speeding the deployment pace further will give the national command authority a genuine deterrent by assuring that U.S. ground forces can reach the scene of a crisis before an adversary can properly react. Such a responsive force will confer on the United States a pronounced advantage wherever it must intervene. When the Army attains this level of strategic responsiveness our political leaders will have a range of ground options more akin to a variable rheostat than an on-off switch.

The Marine Corps

The Marine Corps has historically been our nation's most expeditionary service. As the Marine Corps plots its course for the future, its vision must remain consistent with the operational concepts of expeditionary warfare. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) concept will be revived in an effort to enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to take part in joint expeditionary operations. The new MEB would be able to deploy rapidly and marry up with the prepositioned equipment carried by maritime squadrons based overseas. However, the Marine Corps currently lacks the force structure to equip the new MEB with a fully independent headquarters.

The future joint force must be more sustainable and versatile. The Marine Corps fits into this future force in three important ways. First, the prepositioning concept provides the Marines with a generous measure of sustainability. The lift cost of sustaining a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of 16,000 Marines for 30 days would come to 250 C-141 equivalents. Yet a single maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) ship can provide the same support. Second, the occasional demands for long-term U.S. military commitment call for endurance of the type provided by the Army and the Air Force. Sustainability takes on even greater importance during such extended missions. And third, the future force will clearly be an expeditionary force that is capable of both combined-arms warfare and lesser missions. This expeditionary approach begins with the Marine Corps. Forces must be versatile enough to transition from relief operations to combat operations without missing a beat. They must be sustainable enough to reach the battle with everything needed to get the job done.

The Navy

Sea control is a familiar concept to Navy strategists, since this has been the service's traditional contribution to joint warfighting. Sea control assures the flow of power-projection forces to a theater of operations and guarantees access to the oceans over which the vast majority of the world's commerce still flows. But

the new battlespace includes not only sea control, but also airspace, cyberspace, and land control. Battlespace control encompasses defeating the attempts of an adversary to deny U.S. forces access to forward operating areas. Missiles, mines, minesweeping, and submarines are inexpensive and potent means available to prospective opponents and will remain so. The time and effort the Navy has devoted to mine warfare and littoral antisubmarine warfare techniques represent an excellent start but fall short of what is necessary given the future international security landscape. Future missions and interventions will require the Navy to act in direct support of ground forces as a routine matter. This support will manifest itself through close air support and upgraded, precision naval gunfire. The Navy must expand its battlespace beyond littorals and beach operations further inland, but also – and most importantly – the Navy must remain dominant in littoral and beach operations. In the realm of battlespace attack, as naval forces capitalize on the growing precision of joint weapons and sensors, they must stand ready to project power deep inland. Connecting and improving sensor and targeting systems would allow these forces to pinpoint mobile targets in real time, thereby accelerating the tempo of combat operations dramatically. Sea-based logistics, in concert with strategic airlift, will be the key to sustaining joint and coalition forces throughout the battlespace.

The Navy's role in joint strategy is to contribute to forward-deployed forces as a basis for other instruments of U.S. national power - diplomatic, political, and economic - to foster stability and shape the security environment in regions of major U.S. national interest. Sea control will remain the critical prerequisite for forward presence. In the future, however, the Navy will strive to dominate a second operating domain: cyberspace. Future maritime dominance will require a shared, real-time understanding of the battlespace. Rapid improvements in information technology promise to equip dispersed, mobile naval forces with preemptive information superiority.

The Air Force

The past year has witnessed two major applications of U.S. military force – Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force – both of which had relied heavily on air power. These operations have helped to shape the Air Force's vision of its future role in the Joint Force. The Air Force leadership must build on existing core competencies such as aerospace superiority, global attack, global mobility, information superiority, precision engagement, and agile combat support. Determining how these competencies fit into twenty-first-century national security objectives is their primary intellectual task. Preparedness, readiness, modernization, equipment, and the future strategic concept will be particular areas of focus.

PANEL FOUR

The Air Force is now challenged to assess whether its current training plans will develop the necessary leadership qualities to lead a transformed service. Identifying shortfalls between the present force and future requirements is the Air Force's greatest challenge. In the future the reliability of our allies is not assured and, as such, planning for the unimpeded use of forward bases is a flawed assumption. The Joint Forces and Air Force especially must prepare to operate with greater self-sufficiency. The tenets underlying U.S. Marine expeditionary forces - lean, mobile, and lethal - will serve as a model for the Air Force. Above all, the USAF leadership will seek to innovate and experiment with new concepts and force structures. The challenge will be to craft a truly expeditionary aerospace force suited to a new security environment that can function over long periods, if necessary without depending upon forward basing as an operational necessity.

The Joint Force

We must combine the efforts of each Service to build a more effective Joint Force. At the same time, expanded R&D and procurement budgets on the part of NATO European and other allied governments are essential to interoperability within a combined force for allied/coalition operations. Greater sharing of technology such as precision weaponry may be part of the solution. As we endeavor to heighten the level of joint cooperation and interoperability we should remain skeptical of excessive zeal in the quest to eliminate all redundant capabilities. Some degree of overlap is critical to maintain the depth of the joint operating capability. Striking a balance will be a crucial function of the newly activated JFCOM, which was assigned the task of joint experimentation.



From left to right: General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Admiral Donald L. Pilling, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, General Lester L. Lyles, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and General James L. Jones, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

Redefining Defense: Preparing U.S. Forces for the Future


- The services must continue to foster a culture of innovation by constantly reassessing current thinking, structures, and doctrines.
- The services must develop an environment that attracts and retains the highest quality personnel—people are the most important element in military transformation.
- Private sector business practices offer great potential for promoting revolutionary innovation within the services.
- The willingness of the Armed Forces to engage in experimentation both on technological and organizational levels will be critical for the military's transformation.

Analysis

New elements in warfare such as information systems, space operations, and weapons of mass destruction are likely to increase the problems inherent in planning and preparing for future conflicts. Nevertheless, the Services must foster a culture that encourages innovation and adaptation in order to sustain America's military primacy across a broad spectrum of conflict in support of national security.

In order to promote innovation, the military must embrace the revolution in business affairs. Much like a large commercial entity with multinational dimensions, the Department of Defense must embrace practices of the most successful business corporations wherever reasonable and possible. In particular, the DoD must benefit from approaches that can enhance its success as a military organization. The rapid developments in e-commerce, outsourcing, commercialization, and globalization will fundamentally transform and improve the military's conduct of business. The resulting increases in efficiency will help free up greater resources for modernization. As the DoD adopts modern business practices, it must become an agile and responsive organization that can more easily adjust to rapid and sudden changes in an uncertain secu-

*Dr. Edward L. Warner III,
Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy and
Threat Reduction, discusses
the transformation of the
U.S. military as Dr. Michael
O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow,
The Brookings Institution,
looks on.*



PANEL FIVE

riety environment. An automobile company can bring a concept to production within two years while a computer company can change its manufacturing requirements in an even shorter period. In contrast, it takes the military many years to begin the production of new systems. Each of the Services must take steps to become more capable of rapid innovation and adaptation to the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

Successful innovation and transformation stem largely from a willingness to experiment with new technologies and organizational structures. The Services must develop a culture that promotes experimentation. One major inhibitor to successful experimentation is the continued disconnect between the vision of Service requirements and developments in science and technology. The establishment of battle laboratories and studies on next generation requirements have already yielded substantial results. However, to further enhance experimentation, the services must engage in a joint approach. The Joint Forces Command is now spearheading a forward-looking effort on joint concepts and experimentation. The combatant command has explored key tasks including leadership reform from a joint perspective and examined critical enablers such as command and control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR). In the past, systems were developed based on the requirements of a specific Service and then modified for joint compatibility. One of the main objectives of JFCOM is to examine ways to develop a process that would field joint rather than Service specific capabilities. Each of the Services must test new approaches to joint acquisition. Above all, the Armed Forces must abandon the zero-defect concept and accept the possibility of failure as a necessary part of the process of innovation.

Dr. John H. Hamre

Setting Defense Priorities for a 21st Century Transformation

- Corporate downsizing and the American inclination to invest in unproven high-tech companies because of their rapid stock price appreciation in anticipation of future earnings, rather than defense firms with proven earnings records, should be viewed with concern because of the effects on the defense industrial base.
- The U.S. government should abandon counterproductive practices that damage the relationship between government and defense industry.
- More stable defense budgets and vigorous efforts to streamline and greatly shorten the acquisition process are essential to preserving a vibrant defense sector.
- Transatlantic defense collaboration will reinforce interoperability while helping to diminish defense budget cleavages between the United States and Europe.
- A European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) will help to reinforce transatlantic relations to the extent that it fields robust capabilities and does not undermine NATO, de-couple the United States from European security, or duplicate existing capabilities.

Analysis

A robust defense industry will be indispensable to the transformation of the U.S. Army and the other services. The “herd mentality” that has impelled many Americans to invest heavily in unproven high-tech companies based largely on their expected future earnings could damage the defense industrial base. Equity prices for such companies have risen quickly, while defense companies with proven earnings records have suffered sharp declines in their stock valuation. The quest for higher short-term profits could induce defense companies to reduce R&D spending or possibly even to get out of the defense sector altogether. Corporate downsizing could result in a hemorrhage of scientific and managerial talent. This shortsightedness could have severe repercussions for the future of the U.S. industrial base. A fundamental rethinking of the relationship between government and industry should be undertaken in order to compensate for such negative trends. Innovations could include easing regulations and accounting rules, as well as greater efforts to procure defense-related items from commercial vendors. U.S. national security will ultimately rest on the preservation of a thriving, profitable, and innovative defense industry.

LUNCHEON ADDRESS

There are several “first principles” for maintaining viable defense firms. First, more stable defense budgets must prevail over the rollercoaster budgeting of the past fifteen years. We must avoid the tendency of legislators to take contradictory actions. During the FY00 budget debate, for instance, Congress first passed an authorization bill that boosted spending, followed by an appropriations bill mandating across-the-board spending cuts. Stabilizing procurement budgets will be particularly critical in the future, since the acquisition community has borne the brunt of the drawdown over the past decade. Severe reductions in procurement threaten the base of engineering and design expertise that sustained the United States during the Cold War. We must improve the acquisition process by adopting approaches such as multi-year contracts to assure greater predictability and stability for defense firms. The government should avoid such acquisition practices as fixed-price development contracts that place excessive risk on the private sector, thus creating an inequitable partnership between government and industry. Acquisition decisions should be coordinated across service lines in order to prevent a decision by one service or civilian agency from undercutting the industrial base on which the other services rely. Finally, maintaining competition in the defense sector is essential to promoting innovation and mitigating costs. While some defense consolidation was an inevitable outgrowth of the drawdown, the Department of Defense is now less inclined to approve future mergers and acquisitions.

The recent trend toward international alignments of defense firms deserves further scrutiny. The technological gap between the U.S. and NATO European armed forces was highlighted by Operation Allied Force. This suggests that greater international defense industrial collaboration could be part of the solution. However, there are two nearly insuperable (at least over the short term) obstacles



*Deputy Secretary of Defense
John J. Hamre urges a more
stable defense budget to
sustain a robust defense
industry.*

to transatlantic mergers and acquisitions. First, the U.S. and NATO European governments have not yet developed the infrastructure needed to manage the industrial security problems associated with transatlantic defense industry consolidation. Second, the companies themselves are not freely prepared for the inevitable turmoil associated with such a mammoth undertaking. Indeed, transnational defense mergers have encountered severe difficulties even within Europe. Nonetheless, greater international collaboration could help to buttress NATO interoperability and prevent the emergence of a Fortress Europe and a Fortress America. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic should encourage defense industrial cooperation wherever it has genuine merit.

The DoD's estimated annual budgetary goals in procurement and R&D are too low to maintain long-term technological superiority. A combined goal of \$90 billion has been established for these two areas. Of this total, \$60 billion would be designated for procurement and \$30 billion allotted to R&D. These goals will likely be met and they will probably be exceeded in the out years of the next Future Years Defense Plan. Procurement spending could range as high as \$73 billion in these years. Effort to modernize the force should not be sacrificed to fund short-term operations and readiness, as has often been the case in the past. Modernization is the best way to preserve U.S. military strength in the rapidly changing security setting of the early twenty-first century.

***Realizing True Jointness in the QDR Process and Product –
How We Do It Right***

- The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review will be a critical vehicle for reassessing the future of U.S. defense strategy.
- While the 1997 QDR produced important results, the next review must be much less cautious and far more forward looking.
- Innovative strategic thought must drive the review process in order for the QDR to serve the nation's national security interests and needs.
- The assumptions, analyses, and conclusions embedded in the previous QDR need to be challenged in order to produce a new QDR that is truly driven by strategy and twenty-first century national security requirements.

Analysis

The forthcoming QDR will serve as the primary vehicle for a fundamental reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and priorities for the next administration. Therefore, this strategic reappraisal must challenge present assumptions, analysis, and conclusions. In order to benefit from the QDR process, the U.S. government and the broader defense community must undertake several critical tasks. First, we must harness the intellectual capital now and provide a framework for identifying key issues and assessing our range of options. Second, we must draw upon the useful lessons learned from the 1997 QDR. Third, the civilian leadership must be actively engaged in the process at an early stage, providing guidance and articulating priorities. And fourth, strategic principles set within the new security environment of the early twenty-first century must guide and drive the review.

The QDR provides a framework for developing defense strategy by: identifying and prioritizing national interests and threats; allocating resources in accordance with those priorities; and reconfiguring the force structure based on the resource decisions. The 1997 QDR identified many of the emerging security trends and defense priorities in the post-Cold War era. The review foresaw small-scale contingencies as a priority and for the first time addressed extensively asymmetric threats as a new challenge. Criticisms have included its overly cautious analysis, its failure to prioritize adequately the military's missions, and its budget-based rather than strategy-driven approach. The next QDR must prioritize America's national interests and threats through a concerted effort between civilian and military leaders as fully as possible. The impact of commercial globalization on acquisition practices must pervade the QDR


process. The next QDR must match resources with mission requirements. In this resource allocation process, many Cold War defense systems that are no longer needed must be discarded. For instance, the need to invest and acquire counterproliferation capabilities for missions ranging from missile defense to consequence management are now greater than ever given that WMD use is among the most likely threats to the United States and its forces abroad.

The 1997 QDR was organized around strategy, force structure, and modernization. While this was a useful approach to understand and shape the debate, different methods have been suggested. For example, the General Accounting Office has recommended a mission-based template while some foreign policy experts have constructed a range of strategic paradigms that might unfold in the next twenty-five years as the basis for security planning. Alternative worlds ranging from multipolarity to chaos could determine the key requirements for the Armed Forces. A more novel methodology that focuses on the fundamental assumptions underlying the current defense strategy has also been proposed. The following factors illustrate the compelling need for reassessing the assumptions of the previous QDR:

- Congress has challenged the DoD's approach to defense, particularly in the area of resource allocation.
- Defense strategy must move beyond a Cold War paradigm to reflect as fully as possible the new security landscape.
- The QDR must shift from a Service-centric perspective toward a decidedly joint approach.
- New assumptions are required to help identify the most pressing issues confronting the United States in framing force structures based on national security strategy.

Future missions are not likely to resemble those of the Cold War and new requirements such as missile defense, homeland defense, and information operations must be central to the debate. Future conflicts will not necessarily resemble the two major theater wars (MTW) scenario envisioned by the last QDR. Further, the last review neglected the changing role of NATO and failed to anticipate contingencies such as Operation Allied Force. This deficiency in addressing con-

Left to right: Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. David S. C. Chu, Vice President, Army Research Division, and Director, RAND Arroyo Center, RAND Corporation, Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Director, International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, discuss the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.



PANEL SIX

flicts beyond the MTW construct was particularly glaring given that the airpower used in that campaign resembled what would have been required in a major theater war. Declining public support for smaller-scale contingencies, such as the operations in Haiti and Bosnia, may erode our ability to cope with MTWs. Future opponents will not operate according to our standards and expectations of short wars and few casualties, making the commitment to a MTW more complex and perhaps more difficult. The level of U.S. forward-deployed forces overseas should be considered in the next QDR. Some have questioned whether U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia presently totaling one hundred thousand respectively is essential for the future. New technologies will decrease reliance on manned platforms to deliver munitions and enable the United States increasingly to execute the same missions with robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles.

New equipment in the future will not necessarily lead to lower operating costs. The Department of Defense must consider the financial impact of new platforms in order to prevent the diversion of modernization funds to support operations and maintenance costs. Given that the defense budget will probably not remain at current levels in real terms in the coming years, a fundamental reassessment of how the DoD allocates resources is sorely needed. Last but not least, the driving force throughout the QDR process must be national security needs in a changing global setting in which the United States must prepare for a spectrum of contingencies and threats.

The strategies and force structures set forth in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review have become increasingly unsustainable and outdated. As presently constituted, the ability of our Armed Forces to support the national security strategy of shaping the security environment, responding to threats to important interests, and preparing for the future is seriously in doubt. The exacting demands of cyclic crises and small-scale contingency operations have left the Armed Forces mired in high operational tempos with rising operations and maintenance costs. Our focus on the numerous military engagements worldwide today, however important they may be, impedes efforts to develop new capabilities to counter emerging threats. This severe mismatch between the current strategy and future requirements must be corrected – it will require a transformation in our Armed Forces. Innovative approaches to formulating new strategies and sustaining resources will be necessary to bring about such a transformation in the rapidly changing security environment of the twenty-first century.

Our Armed Forces must fulfill three highest priority operational imperatives if they are to effectively meet emerging challenges:

Near-Term Readiness: The Department of Defense is overwhelmed by the sweeping demands of the current national security strategy. The numerous military interventions abroad have severely challenged our ability to respond adequately to other possibly larger-scale contingencies. Although militarily successful, Operation Allied Force revealed important shortfalls and deficiencies in near-term readiness that must be remedied, while severely challenging the key assumption underlying the 1997 QDR that the United States could fight and win two nearly-simultaneous major theater wars. At a minimum, near-term military readiness will require additional and sustained funding for operations and maintenance, weapon and equipment upgrades for tried and true systems, and greater precision munition inventories.

Taking Care of People: The Services must continue to attract and retain the highest quality personnel in order to remain the world's most effective military force. Problems of recruitment and retention must be addressed as urgent priorities. Ensuring that the best and brightest join and remain in the military starts with quality of life improvements, including better pay, more predictable deployment cycles, and rigorous training focused on key tasks. While the Department of Defense recently addressed the pay issue, the other two problems persist. The current unacceptably high operational tempo is placing severe strains on families and morale. To prevent shortfalls on the proving ground from becoming disasters on the battlefield, training at our bases and national training centers must improve. We must tailor skills to meet specific contingencies while we train our forces against the backdrop of uncertainty and strengthen our ability to attract and retain personnel for the twenty-first century Armed Forces

CONCLUSIONS

Preparing for the Future: Based on the changed global security setting of the new century and emerging challenges, the United States must devise a defense strategy that accelerates modernization while maintaining force readiness across the security spectrum ranging from high to low intensity contingencies. To support such a strategy, we must develop innovative operational concepts as well as leverage emerging developments in science, digitization, and space technologies. We must achieve greater overall military effectiveness by maximizing responsiveness, lethality, agility, deployability, mobility, and interoperability. We must recognize joint and allied capabilities as critical force multipliers. Major investments in integrative technologies will be needed to enhance the performance of next-generation platforms across the Services and to improve our ability to work more closely with allies and coalition partners. Joint and combined operations, however, will be made more complex and challenging by the growing transatlantic and transpacific gaps in capabilities resulting from the Revolution in Military Affairs. Our resource allocations must be targeted on equipment, manpower, and technology to ensure that the Armed Forces can carry out current responsibilities and prepare for future challenges. Last and most importantly, securing broad public support and understanding of our national security strategy will require a clearly articulated vision of the military's mission priorities and force structure requirements. This report, together with the conference on which it is based, is an effort to articulate these priorities and requirements.