A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO COMBATING ILlicit TRAFFICKING

JUNE 2010 | a joint report by

Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Centre de Politique de Sécurité, Genève
Center Zentrum für Sicherheitspolitik

IFPA
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
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A Comprehensive Approach to Combating Illicit Trafficking

JUNE 2010

REPORT PREPARED BY
INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

BASED IN PART ON A HIGH-LEVEL WORKSHOP ORGANIZED BY
GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY
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# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Elements of a Comprehensive Approach</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation at the Euro-Atlantic Level</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Capabilities for Combating Illicit Trafficking</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting an Agenda for Cooperation</td>
<td>xviii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Need for a Comprehensive Approach to Combat Illicit Trafficking</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Comprehensive Approach</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation at the Euro-Atlantic Level</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Responses to Trafficking Challenges:</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies, Capabilities, and Networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking in CBRN Materials and WMD Proliferation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Trafficking</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Laundering and Intellectual Property Crimes</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking in Conventional Arms and SALW</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking Modalities</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding and Adapting the Proliferation Security Initiative Model</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priorities and Opportunities for Enhanced Coordination</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-proliferation Planning as an Arena for Wider Collaboration</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation and Collaboration in Law Enforcement</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Covert Nuclear Trade</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CHAPTER 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting the Agenda for a Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Learning from the World Customs Organization’s Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priorities for a Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>Inventory of Key Anti-Trafficking Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B</td>
<td>Workshop Agenda, Participants, and Speaker Biographies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Values of Selected Transnational Trafficking Flows</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Instability - Key Transnational Threats</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Growth of Somali Piracy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Great Silk Road</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO’s CBRN Defense Reach-Back</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor (OAE)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO’s Network of Networks</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Instrument for Stability</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected OSCE Programs to Combat Human Trafficking in South Eastern Europe</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit Trafficking Incidents Involving Nuclear and Radiological Material</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Trafficking Incidents by Year</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICRI’s Knowledge Management System</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trends in the Cocaine Trade</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transnational Opiate Market</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Cocaine Trafficking</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Profile of Victims and the Purpose of Human Trafficking at the Global Level</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Human Trafficking</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of a Proliferation Financing Case</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized IP Crimes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report is based on extensive independent research conducted by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) on the multifaceted challenges posed by illicit trafficking and efforts to combat it, as well as on discussions held at a high-level international workshop on the topic organized in Geneva, Switzerland in September 2009 by IFPA and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). The initial idea for the workshop was the brainchild of Mr. Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director of the Nuclear Policy Directorate at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Mr. Roberts was also instrumental in securing NATO support for the meeting, and in facilitating additional support from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), without which the workshop could not have been organized. In this context, IFPA and GCSP wish to acknowledge with gratitude the personal support for this effort provided by Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud, head of the FDFA’s Political Affairs Directorate, and by Dr. James Tegnelia and Major General Randy Manner, USA, director and deputy director, respectively, of DTRA at the time of the meeting. DTRA also provided indispensable support for the research and analysis by IFPA that was required both before and after the workshop to produce the two key products called for at the end of the meeting – namely, an in-depth assessment of the prospects for developing a cross-organizational comprehensive approach to combating illicit trafficking, together with a first-ever inventory of major intergovernmental organizations and other anti-trafficking stakeholders who might credibly support such a strategy. This inventory, which highlights the mandates, programs, capabilities, and key points of contact of the various institutions surveyed, is included in this report as Appendix A.

The IFPA team would also like to thank Ambassador Dr. Fred Tanner, director of GCSP, for his support for and participation in the Geneva workshop, and for the outstanding support provided by his colleagues at GCSP. This includes, in particular, Katharina Vogeli, Khalid Koser, and Steven Haines, who served as session chairs; Asa Maria Granados, who managed all workshop logistics; and Sunjay Chandiramani and Nele Groosman, who helped with workshop logistics, served as rapporteurs, and drafted a short summary overview of the workshop discussions. Among IFPA staff, special thanks are due to Jack Kelly, who helped organize the workshop; Mikaela Joseph, who developed an initial draft of
a good portion of the inventory noted above; Bobby Anderson and Kathleen Kuehn, who helped draft parts of the report and, in Ms. Anderson’s case, contributed as well to the final draft of the inventory. Important editorial assistance was provided by Adelaide Ketchum, while Christian Hoffman and Christina Roberts provided the overall design and graphic art support.

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A Comprehensive Approach to Combating Illicit Trafficking

for more than $300 billion per year in trade and comprising a wide variety of products shipped over a complex web of interlocking transport routes, illicit trafficking constitutes a major security challenge that no single country or anti-trafficking organization could possibly manage alone. Indeed, the cross-border and transnational nature of the trade, combined with its diversity and the increasing agility and technological sophistication of the traffickers involved, demands a multilateral and multidimensional response from those who hope to combat it. An effective response, moreover, will require much closer coordination between the public and private sectors than exists today, as well as sturdier partnerships between and among the many national, regional, and international agencies – including a host of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – now charged with responsibility for one or another dimension of the illicit trafficking challenge. Indeed, pooling the expertise and resources of all the relevant stakeholders in support of an overarching comprehensive approach that leverages their collective capabilities is arguably the only way to make serious progress toward anti-trafficking goals.

Key Elements of a Comprehensive Approach

As for the specifics of a comprehensive approach, it must address several underlying characteristics of the current trafficking problem that are not widely understood and remain difficult to manage. First, in addition to the multi-product and inter-regional aspects of illicit trafficking noted above, a comprehensive approach must come to grips with the way in which many legal activities – including those performed by white-collar, middle-class collaborators – are intertwined with and help to facilitate illegal activities in the trafficking realm. Second, such an approach must also understand (and target) the many linkages that exist between and among the various trafficking streams for the shipment of drugs, small arms and light weapons (SALW), chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, counterfeit products, laundered money, and human beings, as well as the way in which control over the transit route for one type of commodity may allow traffickers to control the flow of other goods, both legal and illegal, that pass along the same route. Third, and on a related note, the anti-trafficking community must fully expect, and prepare for the prospect, that illicit traffickers will try to shift their shipments, if at all possible, from route to route – and from one form of transport to another – in order to avoid detection and interception. Closing off one trafficking flow, therefore, may simply trigger the opening of a new route in a less carefully monitored part of the world.

Further on this last point, in today’s globalized economy, illicit traffickers are increasingly inclined to base their operations in remote and poorly governed areas, where they can conduct business relatively free of outside interference. They appear to be especially partial to what the head of the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently referred to as “geographic blind spots” – that is, largely forgotten areas in failed or failing states that are “out of government control, and too scary...
for investors and tourists,” where radar, satellite, and other forms of surveillance are limited or non-existent. Operating from such locations, traffickers can run fleets of ships, planes, and trucks loaded with a mix of products with little fear of disruption. Many of these areas, moreover, are burdened with large numbers of unemployed youth who are often all too willing to provide the traffickers with a local workforce that has few alternatives to make money, and is likely to remain compliant. Hence, in addition to better surveillance and interdiction capabilities, any serious effort to stem illicit trafficking must also include a development component aimed at easing (if not eradicating) the socio-economic and political vulnerabilities in “blind spot” territories that traffickers seek to exploit.

As suggested above, yet another increasingly important dimension of illicit trafficking to bring under a comprehensive approach is the ever-expanding and more sophisticated use of technology by traffickers. Access to the latest technology, including satellite hook-ups, cell phones, and GPS equipment, is effectively what has empowered loose bands of poor, illiterate Somalis to capture ocean-going vessels operated and/or relied upon by the world’s richest and most powerful countries. So, too, cyber crime has allowed traffickers in remote areas to steal the identities of people half a world away, while also facilitating money laundering via lax banks and/or corrupt officials. In the not too distant future, access by traffickers to the technical skills and equipment necessary to handle CBRN-related materials could easily promote a growth in the trade of these key components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Getting a better handle on the many ways in which technology is likely to be used by traffickers and their fellow travelers in the years to come, therefore, will require input from a wide array of public- and private-sector technology experts. Equally important, a public-private initiative along these lines holds the best chance of discovering how the anti-trafficking community itself can leverage technology to detect and disrupt smuggling and related crimes.

There is also a need for much greater information sharing between and among anti-trafficking groups with regard to current and emerging trafficking routes, the products and services being trafficked along these routes, the number of traffickers using these routes, and the inter-relationships between and among these traffickers. Closer institutional collaboration on such matters would be particularly helpful within regions (and between adjacent regions) where illicit trafficking is well entrenched, but where intra- and inter-regional cooperation may be hampered by ethnic and sectarian rivalries, unresolved border disputes, and contrasting approaches to law enforcement. Important steps have been taken in this regard, including ongoing efforts to strengthen counter-smuggling capabilities along the infamous Great Silk Road via national and IGO support for the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) in Romania and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) in Kazakhstan. Similar initiatives can and should be pursued in other regions where traffickers now thrive.

Cooperation at the Euro-Atlantic Level

Institutionally, many of the primary IGOs engaged in combating global trafficking are components of the wider UN system, generally operating from and/or reporting to the UN’s main headquarters in New York City or one of its satellite offices in Geneva or Vienna. At the Euro-Atlantic level, however, there are three key regional organizations – namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – that also serve as umbrella groups for a number of important anti-trafficking programs and operations. Clearly, greater coordination between and among all three organizations would go a long way toward advancing a comprehensive approach to illicit trafficking focused on Europe and its immediate environs.

For its part, NATO has been a vocal advocate of adopting a comprehensive approach to address a growing number of less traditional security
challenges – including trans-border crime and illicit trafficking – since at least its 2008 Bucharest Summit. Key initiatives taken so far include the joint declaration signed in September 2008 by NATO and the UN to establish a framework for closer cooperation, ongoing steps to strengthen and expand NATO’s strategic partnership with the EU in areas of special common interest (such as CBRN defenses), and recent discussions between NATO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), triggered in part by NATO-IAEA exchanges at the September 2009 Geneva workshop on which much of this report is based, on plans for a joint nuclear forensics workshop and a joint nuclear incident response exercise.

As these last two points suggest, NATO has enjoyed a considerable degree of success in tackling the various challenges that may arise from illicit trafficking (or the threat thereof) in CBRN materials. Six initiatives, in particular, deserve special mention, including 1) the activation of NATO’s Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (COE) in July 2007; 2) creating the NBC Event Response Team and Deployable NBC Laboratory first showcased at the 2002 Prague Summit; 3) the first deployment of the CBRN Battalion, in support of the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens; 4) more recent efforts to establish a CBRN reach-back capability to support forward-deployed forces in Afghanistan; 5) an expansion of maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean via Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) to detect and disrupt terrorist activities at sea, including the potential smuggling of WMD-related components; and 6) the conducting of NATO’s first pilot course on CBRN-related maritime interdiction operations (MIOS) in October 2009 at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Centre in Crete.

As for the EU, both the European Council and the European Commission have taken a number of steps in recent years to strengthen EU mechanisms for dealing with illicit trafficking, with particular emphasis (as in the NATO case) on CBRN and WMD-related trafficking. In December 2003, for example, concurrently with the adoption of the European Security Strategy, the Council endorsed a European strategy to counter WMD proliferation, with a focus on strengthening global non-proliferation norms, assuring strict compliance with CBRN-related trade regulations, and boosting third-country capacities to halt and disrupt illicit activities. Perhaps the EU’s most important contribution to cooperative efforts to combat illicit trafficking can be found in the Commission’s Instrument for Stability (IFS), which took force in January 2007 with the objectives of strengthening the EU’s response to trans-regional threats (including illicit trafficking) and expanding EU cooperation on such matters with other institutional stakeholders.

In the counter-WMD realm, for example, the IFS has funded efforts to develop and enforce safeguards against CBRN trafficking, to improve the security of CBRN materials at civilian-run facilities, and to establish more effective export controls on sensitive dual-use goods. Toward these ends, substantial amounts of money have been set aside for anti-trafficking programs in Russia, Central Asia, and selected Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries and for border management assistance in Southeast Asia. With respect to other trafficking streams, IFS funding supports the fight against organized crime along the cocaine route (principally across the Atlantic) and along the heroin route (especially in the Black Sea basin and the Western Balkans), as well as efforts to prevent and combat terrorism and the illicit trade in SALW.

The OSCE, operating primarily as a conflict-prevention organization, has focused mostly on countering the destabilizing influences of illicit trafficking that could lead to or exacerbate conflict, especially involving the newly independent countries of Central and Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. With that specific geographic focus in mind, the OSCE has contributed in very useful ways to cooperative efforts to track and stem trafficking flows along the Great Silk Road and the Balkan Route, largely by promoting the introduction of enhanced border management systems among neighboring states. Institutionally, the OSCE has advocated, as NATO and the
EU have, the need for broader and more effective cross-organizational cooperation on anti-trafficking matters, emphasizing that this is one important way to overcome the limited mandates regarding scope and authority with which most IGOs and other stakeholders must contend. For example, in order to bring greater coherence to specific anti-trafficking operations, OSCE officials have suggested that groups of IGOs could join together to pursue “thematic missions” focused on a particular type or mode of trafficking, and that such missions could be led by a kind of “mini IGO” to which they would all assign task-specific experts.

Additional Capabilities for Combating Illicit Trafficking

In addition to these three Euro-Atlantic organizations, the Geneva workshop examined the programs and capabilities of a wide range of IGOs and other groups that are working individually or in concert to stem illicit trafficking. Key observations and conclusions from this discussion, grouped according to specific types and modes of trafficking, include the following:

**Trafficking in CBRN Materials**

- Established in 2004 to help combat non-state-actor access to WMD components and their means of delivery, the UN's 1540 Committee will continue to play a central role in promoting a common, UN-wide framework for ensuring the security and regulating the export of WMD-related materials and technologies. Capability-wise, it is designed to serve as a clearinghouse, matching specific member-state requests for assistance with particular national or institutional offers of aid.
- In an effort to predict future incidents of CBRN trafficking in high-risk regions, the UN’s Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has developed two CBRN data sharing and analysis tools that focus on Southeast Europe and the Caucasus and on North Africa and the Middle East. In this way, UNICRI hopes to teach participating countries how to identify vulnerable borders and transport links, evaluate capability gaps, and promote collaborative solutions with neighboring states to CBRN trafficking threats.
- By expanding its access to procurement inquiries from suspicious customers, as well as the export denials such inquiries may precipitate, the IAEA has taken steps to improve its ability to detect and eventually shut down any covert trade in nuclear materials and technologies. Together with the IAEA's safeguards for declared nuclear facilities, this initiative, though still dependent on the voluntary participation of nuclear traders, promises to become a key barrier to would-be proliferators, be they state or non-state actors. IAEA efforts to promote the deployment of various types of radiation detectors along borders deemed to be especially susceptible to nuclear smugglers should add yet another important (but so far underutilized) layer of defense.
- Since illicit trafficking in biological agents may manifest first as a health-related event, the Bio-Risk Reduction Program of the World Health Organization (WHO) – which has developed specialized surveillance systems for specific diseases and maintains rapid-response packages for high-consequence pathogens – stands out as a critical bio-security tool. Given that the activities of this program often overlap with those of other IGOs operating in the field in cases where the food chain may be affected, counterfeit medicine may be involved, or human trafficking is part of the mix, the WHO remains particularly supportive of a cross-organizational, comprehensive approach, as do most bio-risk responders. A case in point is the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), a WHO-led early warning and health security system that links together a variety of medical, emergency response, and UN-affiliated groups.
An often unappreciated dimension of bio-related trafficking challenges is the risk associated with zoonotic diseases (illnesses caused by infectious agents transmitted between or shared by animals and humans), which can be spread by both the legal and illicit trade in animals or animal products. To guard against the transfer of animal-borne infectious diseases, the World Organization for Animal Health (or OIE) has developed and seeks to enforce international trade standards and safeguards to ensure that the cross-border commerce in animals and animal products is conducted in a safe and sanitary manner. The OIE also works closely with the WHO to improve global early warning of zoonotic events, and it recently launched the World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) to promote the worldwide exchange of zoonotic data.

As for chemical weapons (CW)-related trafficking, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), charged with implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and destroying declared CW stockpiles, seeks to ensure as well that dual-use chemicals and their precursors are used strictly for peaceful purposes. Toward that goal, it has established close working relationships with the UN’s 1540 Committee, UNICRI, the World Customs Organization (WCO), EUROPOL, various NATO agencies, and other CW stakeholders. The OPCW also launched in 2008 a new version of its Knowledge Management System, which allows states to share CW-related information and expertise, disseminate best practices, and identify areas of common interest, with a particular focus on combating illicit CW trafficking in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus.

Other national and international mechanisms identified as being especially helpful in stemming illicit trafficking across the CBRN spectrum included the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities and the International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) managed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched by the Bush administration in 2003, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) spearheaded in 2007 by Russia and the United States, all of which are discussed in detail in the main report. In support of the GICNT, DTRA also maintains a secure information-sharing mechanism known as the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP), which serves as a virtual repository for useful publications, briefings, and lessons learned on GICNT-related issues.

No doubt, these and related efforts to secure nuclear materials around the world – and to guard against their potential diversion to terrorist groups – received an additional boost from the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. on April 12-13, 2010 and attended by forty-seven countries. As part of an agreed work plan, various participating nations promised, among other initiatives, to eliminate existing stocks of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, to develop nuclear fuels that would be less proliferation prone, to convert research reactors that currently rely on weapons-usable materials, to undergo IAEA-led peer reviews of nuclear security measures at selected national facilities, and to install radiation detectors at major ports to help prevent nuclear-related smuggling.

Drug Trafficking

The UNODC remains the primary international agency for dealing with the drug trade, preparing in-depth assessments of key routes and trafficking organizations, detailing their interconnections with other criminal activities, and offering advice on various ways to attack both the supply and demand dimensions of the problem. Moreover, via its direct
support for the SECI and CARICC initiatives, the UNODC has been at the forefront of efforts to promote counter-drug operations at the regional and cross-regional levels.

- Along with the UNODC, the EU’s Maritime Analysis Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N) has developed into one of the most successful and innovative counter-drug organizations at the regional level, focused as it is on detecting – and then providing law enforcement agencies with actionable intelligence about – small ships and aircraft engaged in the transatlantic drug trade that are not fully regulated by the national customs authorities of EU member states. The secret of the MAOC-N’s success lies largely in the fact that it maintains a bureaucratically light structure, insists on complete transparency among its staff, and is brutally honest about what it has done right and where it has failed. Though less agile, EUROPOL provides additional capabilities for counter-drug support at the EU level.

- At the global level, INTERPOL supports counter-drug operations via a real-time, secure database and communications system known as I-24/7, which can issue within minutes drug alerts and time-sensitive information (including photos) related to traffickers and new trafficking schemes. Among other services for member states, INTERPOL also hosts workshops and training exercises to build enforcement capacity in countries that can not yet operate at twenty-first-century policing standards.

- To help counter the increasingly transnational nature of the drug trade, its links to other trafficking streams, and its growing reliance on the internet and other information-age tools, INTERPOL established its Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2008, a main objective of which is to create lasting partnerships between law enforcement agencies and information technology (IT) companies such as Microsoft to develop innovative IT solutions to high-tech crime, including (but not limited to) drug trafficking. The GSI also aims to build connectivity between INTERPOL and its national affiliates and all the other IGOs with which they most often collaborate.

Human Trafficking

- Since the 2003 UN protocol defining human trafficking as a crime, numerous IGOs, including the UNODC, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have developed programs to tackle one or another aspect of the problem. However, while most UN member states have endorsed the protocol, close to 50 percent of those who have done so have not yet reported a single conviction.

- Lack of protocol enforcement is tied in part to ongoing debates over whether or not trafficked people who are moved across international borders are by definition refugees and able to claim the international protections that come with that status. Determining who is and is not a real victim of trafficking (VOT) is particularly difficult to do when it comes to the forced-labor dimension of human trafficking, since labor exploitation is more subtle, more ambiguous in terms of illegality, and harder as a result to confirm. The ILO is leading the charge in raising awareness about this particular problem, and it has joined hands with the IOM and UNHCR to help VOTs who may be falling through the cracks of current protection frameworks, including those who may qualify for asylum as refugees or for protective relocation if they do not meet the refugee definition.

- Again, given its global reach, INTERPOL plays a wider-ranging support role, geographically speaking, in combating what it often calls “people smuggling.” INTERPOL’s Expert Working Group on Trafficking in Human
Beings has produced a heavily relied-upon manual on best practices for detecting and investigating all forms of human trafficking, including the trade in human organs. The IOM, ILO, UNHCR, and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), however, remain the primary IGOs for humanitarian (as opposed to law enforcement) support to VOTs, providing essential assistance for their rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration into society.

Money Laundering and Intellectual Property Crimes

- Since many banks lack an in-house ability to detect and take appropriate action against money laundering, national watchdog groups – such as Switzerland’s Association Romande des Intermédiaires Financiers (ARIF) – as well as multinational IGOs can serve as vital intermediaries between banks and national governments, and among banks themselves, in helping to combat illicit trafficking in the financial sector. Not surprisingly, INTERPOL looms large as an IGO here as well, working through its Anti-Money Laundering Unit to facilitate information sharing between and among financial intelligence and financial crime investigators. This same unit also supports an international network for tracing, freezing, seizing, and confiscating the proceeds from criminal activities.

- The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an anti-laundering group created by the 1987 G-7 Summit in Paris, develops and promotes policies at the national and international levels to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in accordance with what it calls its 40+9 Recommendations (the forty dealing with money laundering and the nine with terrorist financing). Recently, the FATF was tasked as well with helping to track and disrupt proliferation-related financing, and it continues to enlarge its jurisdiction by adding new members (including other IGOs) and by encouraging the formation of what have been dubbed FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group.

- The UNODC also contributes to the fight against money laundering, mainly via the Global Programme Against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and Financing of Terrorism (known as the GPML), established in 1997. Since that time, the mandate of the GPML and the UNODC has broadened to cover money laundering activities beyond those tied to drug trafficking (which was the original focus), the primary aim being to assist UN member states to ratify and implement common anti-laundering standards, including the FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations. Toward this end, the UNODC also manages the International Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN), an internet tool that includes a database on all relevant anti-trafficking legislation and regulations.

- In addition to money laundering, financial crimes also include intellectual property (IP) crimes, ranging from sales of counterfeit designer goods to counterfeit vaccines and medicines that may pose major health and safety hazards. Perhaps the central IGO combating IP crimes is the UN’s World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which actively promotes the adoption of IP legislation, standards, and procedures aimed at, among other objectives, enforcing IP rights and developing more effective IP systems worldwide, especially in the developing world. To help set in place IP networks able to identify and respond to IP-related criminal activities, WIPO works closely with INTERPOL, the WHO, the WCO, and other groups concerned about counterfeiting and similar IP violations to create strategic alliances and to encourage cooperation between regions and among key national players, including judges, prosecutors, customs officials, and police.
Money laundering and IP violations also highlight the growing importance and use of cyberspace as a medium for illicit trafficking (such as the sale of counterfeit goods over the internet), complementing the traditional air, sea, and land routes. As a result, cyberspace is clearly emerging as an important fourth dimension in the campaign to combat illicit trafficking, as reflected in ongoing national and international-level strategic debates and reorganizations to address cybersecurity needs. The Pentagon’s new Cyber Command and the anticipated incorporation of cyber concerns into the new NATO Strategic Concept are but two prominent examples. Yet another is INTERPOL’s effort to counter the misuse of internet technology and improve online security by means of its GSI program mentioned earlier, which was designed in part to tackle transnational crime networks that operate increasingly across geographical borders via cyberspace.

**Trafficking in Conventional Arms and SALW**

- With the 2001 passage of the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW, minimum global standards for tracking and regulating SALW flows began to take shape. To promote this process, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) underwrites research on SALW challenges (including trafficking trends), reports on progress made by UN member states toward implementing the Programme of Action, and provides national experts with technical resources and data organized in standard format that would not otherwise be available.
- In addition to UNIDIR, the Geneva Process on Small Arms – particularly its Small Arms Survey – plays an influential role in tracking and promoting implementation of the Programme of Action, developing in the process a more accurate and comprehensive database on the production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of SALW around the world. The Small Arms Survey, established in 1999 with support from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, has been especially helpful in ranking the relative utility of efforts to control SALW trafficking on a region-by-region basis. The UN has also sought to define and introduce international standards for the control of small arms via a multinational, interagency consultative process called the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA).
- Parallel to the efforts tied to the UN, the European Council has developed its own strategy for combating the unregulated trade in SALW, with a special emphasis on SALW problems in Africa. In an effort to channel its energies toward parts of the problem where it could have the most impact, the European Council has also endorsed an EU program that focuses on disrupting the illegal transport of SALW by air. This program also provides training for customs agencies and other groups responsible for border control and the management of national weapons stockpiles. Stockpile management and security are viewed as especially important, given that aging stocks of arms, ammunition, and explosives no longer useful to or needed by the local military are exactly what terrorists, organized crime groups, and proliferators want to acquire to launch attacks, seize power, build improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and use as currency to traffic other items such as drugs, humans, and CBRN materials.
- Largely because of concerns over stockpile management and security, DTRA continues to assist numerous foreign governments with the security, safety, and proper administration of state-controlled SALW and ammunition stockpiles. In 2003, moreover, DTRA helped the OSCE to launch a training program to promote best practices and procedures for securing SALW from the time of...
manufacture to their eventual destruction. DTRA has also participated in OSCE-led SALW assessments in Kaliningrad and Cyprus that led to the destruction of 324 SA-7 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), supported multiple OSCE seminars in Moldova focused on stockpile security and management, and assisted in no fewer than nine SALW destruction operations in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

**Trafficking Modalities**

- In addition to targeting different types of illicit trafficking, IGOs and other anti-trafficking organizations can help to improve national and international controls over specific methods of transport exploited by traffickers, including the criminal use of cyberspace, as well as illicit trafficking by air, sea, and overland routes. For example, the International Air Transportation Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) have all helped the airline industry to introduce common standards for air cargo security. Further steps to counter smuggling via the global air transport network will no doubt emerge from the EU’s earlier-mentioned focus on air-delivered SALW, the MAOC-N’s ongoing efforts to monitor small planes, the PSI’s recent decision to pay more attention to illicit trafficking by air, and the recently launched joint project by the WCO and INTERPOL—dubbed Project AIRCOP—to link airport-based customs services with real- and near-real-time law enforcement data on suspected traffickers.

- As illustrated by the Somali pirates, even in heavily traveled sea lanes with dedicated naval patrols, it is difficult to detect and interdict illicit activities at sea by dedicated criminals piloting small, fast, GPS-aided boats. Closing these and similar gaps elsewhere in maritime security, therefore, has become a rising priority for the anti-trafficking community. In addition to MAOC-N’s operations along the Atlantic approaches to Europe, FRONTEX, an EU agency charged with coordinating security measures for the external borders of EU member states, has joined forces with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) to explore potential synergies between their respective maritime surveillance and information systems, to coordinate in the area of inspections at sea, and to explore future opportunities for collaborating on the security of external maritime borders. Based on recent immigration flows (including illicit trafficking in human beings), particular attention will be given to improving situational awareness and joint surveillance operations of maritime traffic originating from West and North Africa and passing through the Aegean Sea region.

- Meanwhile, NATO’s Allied Maritime Component Command in Naples is exploring ways to share the data it develops on suspicious trafficking activities in the Mediterranean Sea with national and international law enforcement agencies, including INTERPOL and EUROPOL. Ideally, this information could be transmitted to IGOs and civil authorities via the OAE’s Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS), which could provide an extremely useful supplement to the communication networks developed by FRONTEX and its partners. Allied anti-trafficking capabilities in the maritime realm will likely get an additional boost from NATO’s endorsement of a new maritime security operations (MSO) concept, which seeks to address less traditional missions of rising importance, such as combatting illicit trafficking. When appropriate, interdictions at sea will be facilitated as well by the various ship-boarding agreements negotiated between flag-of-convenience countries and PSI member states.
• IGOs and other stakeholders with special expertise in border control – such as FRONTEX, the WCO, and the OSCE – also play a key role in securing Europe’s external land frontiers. FRONTEX, for example, helps to train national border guards in accordance with a common core curriculum keyed to the requirements of the EU’s new Integrated Border Security (IBS) system. In addition, FRONTEX keeps national border guard communities abreast of new technologies and products that may be especially helpful in securing their frontiers, and it makes an effort to solicit from the guard communities suggestions for border security research that address their specific concerns. Looking to the future, FRONTEX is developing what it calls “pre-positioned and pre-structured intervention packages” that could be rapidly deployed to EU borders where an increase in technical and operational assistance is urgently required. The detection of illicit cross-border trade will also be improved by regular updates to the WCO’s Customs Enforcement Network (or CEN), which maintains an up-to-date database on customs offenses and seizures, a picture exchange illustrating new concealment methods, and a number of customs-to-customs communications systems.

Setting an Agenda for Cooperation
Clearly, developing and implementing a successful comprehensive approach to combat illicit trafficking will depend in large part on the opportunities that exist (or can be created) to foster closer collaboration between and among the host of agencies, organizations, and other institutional stakeholders now charged with responsibility for preventing and impeding trafficking flows. Without the benefit of increased cross-organizational, public-private, and civil-military cooperation, anti-trafficking authorities are likely to falter in their efforts to redress troubling institutional weaknesses, to leverage existing IGO assets and infrastructure more effectively, and to close capability gaps in anti-trafficking operations. Steps that should be taken to advance institutional collaboration among anti-trafficking organizations include the following:

1. **Establish an integrated approach to data collection and management.** There is a clear need to gather and integrate into a central data exchange the various databases on different illicit trafficking streams that already exist on the websites of a number of the IGOs and other institutional stakeholders discussed in this report. While separate files on specific types and methods of trafficking should still be maintained, it would be ideal if they could all be accessed as well via a single comprehensive website or internet-based information portal. It would be better still if the individual subject matter databases could be cross-referenced according to keywords that reflect the real-world interconnections between and among particular trafficking streams. Lessons learned by DTRA in building and refining the GIIP, by the OIE in designing the WAHID system, and by the WCO in establishing the CEN network could point the way to new and more effective IT-based methods for collecting, consolidating, organizing, storing, and sharing data from diverse communities on issues of common concern.

2. **Create an inventory of anti-trafficking organizations and their capabilities.** Any comprehensive portal along the lines described above should also include an inventory of the primary anti-trafficking organizations (IGO or otherwise) now in existence, together with a listing of their specific capabilities to help combat illicit trafficking, whether in the areas detection and interdiction, communication and information-sharing, law enforcement training, population protection and consequence management, or some other aspect of anti-trafficking operations. The organizational survey appended to this report is a useful first step toward producing such an inventory, but it needs to refined and expanded. To the extent feasible and appropri-
ate, it would helpful, for example, if certain key enabling capabilities maintained by these groups could be organized according to function, terms of availability, and geographic location and/or area of preferred operation. The inventory should also include a roster of key personnel and points of contact at each institution, including telephone numbers and email addresses.

Identify key capability and expertise gaps and potential solutions via broader collaboration. An organizational inventory as described above would also help to highlight known and impending capability gaps and shortfalls. This information could then be used as a starting point to ensure that sufficient resources will be available to support a comprehensive approach to combating multiple streams of illicit trafficking concurrently over the long haul. Focusing again on key enabling capabilities (for example, in the early warning, detection, communication, interdiction, and cyber security realms), the analysis should identify opportunities for resolving capability gaps and shortfalls via cross-organizational collaboration.

Develop, in particular, better and more closely coordinated tools for information and intelligence sharing. Without question, access to up-to-date intelligence on trafficking trends that is provided in a timely and actionable manner is now and will remain critical to successful anti-trafficking operations. Hence, greater efforts should be made to improve – and to expand institutional participation in – key information-sharing and real- or near-real-time communication tools that are already in use, such as INTERPOL’s I-24/7 system, the MSISIS ship-tracking system developed in support of NATO’s OAE operation, the MAOC-N’s intelligence alerts regarding the movements of drug traffickers, and WHO’s GOARN network for bio-related early warning and emergency response. These and similar mechanisms for ensuring transparency across organizational divides and for mobilizing diverse groups to cooperate on common tasks are the essential glue for a comprehensive approach and strategy.

Focus on routes rather than individual items trafficked. Based on the findings detailed in the main report, it would appear that an emphasis on monitoring the major trafficking routes preferred by traffickers, as well as changes in those preferences when a particular route becomes less secure or cost-effective for traffickers, is a more effective approach to combating illicit trafficking than a more narrow focus on specific product streams. A focus on routes is warranted, moreover, in view of the interconnections between and among various trafficking schemes, and the fact that the most popular routes almost always support multi-product trafficking flows. This in itself would seem to argue for a coordinated, comprehensive approach among anti-trafficking organizations that would allow them to pool their capabilities, thereby boosting the overall prospect for detecting and disrupting illicit trafficking activities that are increasingly intertwined. The UNODC’s recent initiatives to map key regional and cross-regional trafficking flows and to highlight inter-relationships are a very welcome step in this direction.

Tap the private sector (especially though not solely in the IT realm) on a more sustained basis, as well as leveraging government-led and financed R&D, to help develop innovative, durable, and user-friendly technology solutions to trafficking challenges. Given the agility, global reach, and increasing technological sophistication of traffickers, anti-trafficking organizations must do a better job at exploiting to their own advantage new technologies for detection, information sharing, border control, and consequence management, to name just a few key tasks. On the nuclear-related trafficking front, there is a particular need to field greater numbers of more reliable radiation detectors, especially radia-
tion portal monitors (RPMs) to deploy at key checkpoints at border crossings, airports, and seaports. At the broader CBRN level, however, technology solutions need to reflect the fact that the legal trade in dual-use items must be protected, and that the overall CBRN-related security challenge is shifting from one of primarily controlling the commerce in sensitive materials and equipment to one of managing the diffusion of critical CBRN knowledge to would-be proliferators, including those who may choose to remain just below the threshold of an outright weapons capability. Regular private-public sector brainstorming on how best to leverage technology to cope with – and ideally reduce – the likely spread of such knowledge-based risks, in addition to the covert transfer of sensitive materials and equipment, is an urgent priority.

**Promote broader institutional partnerships both along and across issue-specific and geographic lines.** Encouraging IGOs and other anti-trafficking institutions to establish effective cooperative relationships with each other, including a deeper appreciation of one another’s goals and mandates, capabilities and skills, and operational cultures, is arguably as important as closing capability gaps and acquiring new technologies. It is, in this sense, the depth and functionality of the relationships forged between institutional stakeholders that are likely to work together, as much as the pooling of their specific capabilities, that will determine the success or failure of future anti-trafficking operations. As demonstrated in current efforts underway by Mexico and the United States to counter the drug trade, it is especially important to promote closer civil-military coordination as a key component of a comprehensive approach to combating illicit trafficking overall; effective collaborative ties built between, for example, the law enforcement community on the civil side and military units and technical support teams can add real value to anti-trafficking opera-

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The challenge posed by illicit trafficking is both complex and multifaceted, covering a wide variety of criminal activities that are often intertwined. Such trafficking may involve the illegal trade in drugs, small arms and light weapons (SALW), and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and technology, as well as the smuggling of human beings and/or human organs, trade in counterfeit products, and the laundering of profits. State and non-state actors engaged in such efforts, including rogue regimes, terrorists, organized crime groups, and, thanks increasingly to technology, even individuals, are better coordinated and more globally connected than ever before, allowing them to have a far greater impact than they would have had in any other era. Moreover, illicit operations are often integrated with and facilitated by a host of perfectly legitimate activities, making it difficult to cull one from the other. For these and related reasons, national authorities, along with regional and international organizations, charged with responsibility for combating illicit trafficking in all its many guises are reaching the conclusion that developing a comprehensive approach to the problem – one that pools the skills and capabilities of a wide range of institutional stakeholders – is arguably the only way to make serious progress toward anti-trafficking goals.

A Comprehensive Approach
As for the specifics of such an approach, there are, according to a senior United Nations (UN) official with a leadership role in anti-trafficking operations, at least seven different dimensions of the trafficking problem that would need to be considered to achieve the best results. First, as alluded to above, such an approach would need to cover the gray area between licit and illicit trade, understanding that there are many shades of gray to contend with that complicate efforts to track the connections between and among organized crime, trafficking activities that may or may not be legal, and sources of corruption that create an environment for both. Second, and on a related note, given the broad range of actors often involved in illicit trafficking activities, the anti-trafficking net must be cast very widely. Besides the stereotypical image of a sinister criminal, white-collar and middle-class criminals and collaborators play key support roles in most trafficking enterprises. This would include corrupt government officials, lawyers who keep traffickers out of jail, business entrepreneurs and real estate agents who help to invest traffickers’ profits, accountants who manage their investments, and credit rating agencies that help traffickers maintain the appearance of being credit-worthy individuals and organizations. Yet a third aspect of illicit trafficking is the sheer variety and scope of the goods that are trafficked. Again, as noted above, this includes a wide range of legal and illegal exchanges involving drugs, timber, oil, blood diamonds, counterfeit goods, human organs, minerals, cigarettes, chemicals, radiological waste, and even human beings. The volume and diversity of goods involved also makes the trafficking business virtually impossible to measure, but conservative estimates suggest that it nets at
least $300 billion a year, equivalent to the twentieth-largest economy in the world (just after Switzerland). Moreover, by controlling the transit route for one type of commodity traffickers are easily able to control the flow of other goods, both legal and illegal, over the same route, so what may begin as a single-product trafficking scheme almost always becomes a multiple-product business. To cite but one example of the interconnectedness among trafficking activities, the UN official pointed to how the smuggling of SALW into East and Central Africa helps to create the conditions for conflict, which may prompt the illicit extraction and shipment of valuable minerals and other raw materials, which depends, in turn, on forced labor (including that of children), which promotes some of the worst forms of human slavery.

Fourth, as this same UN official emphasized, trafficking is generally a trans-national activity in which a number of territorial borders are crossed, involving a mix of land, maritime, and air transportation links. It is, in essence, an interstate and international phenomenon executed via multiple modes of transit, often moving from one mode to another when a particular route is blocked. Clearly, this requires a multidimensional and multilateral response by anti-trafficking authorities, but the track record on this score so far is rather disappointing. Bilateral cooperation between neighboring states has yielded some good results, but when more than two states are involved, effectiveness drops sharply. In addition, international legal mandates aimed at disrupting organized crime at the global level are still quite new, and their implementation is spotty at best. Developing mechanisms to promote multilateral cooperation, therefore, remains a top priority, both in terms of multinational collaboration and collaboration among international organizations (IOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other institutional stakeholders.

Fifth is the geographic reach of illicit trafficking and the issue of how the many vulnerabilities of victimized communities and weak countries combine to create global opportunities for traffickers to thrive. Indeed, since illicit traffickers usually seek the path of least resistance as a way to minimize risk and maximize profit, they are inevitably drawn to countries and regions where underdevelopment, poverty, conflict, and inadequate governance allow them to operate more freely. At the same time, the process of globalization has allowed traffickers to disperse their operations and build cross-border and cross-regional networks that function quite efficiently and with minimal exposure to governmental oversight. As the map on page 4 illustrates so strikingly, it would appear that these networks are being designed as well to take advantage of what the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently referred to as “geographic blind spots” – that is, largely forgotten areas that are “out of government control, and too scary for investors and tourists.”
where radar, satellite, and other forms of surveillance are limited or non-existent.

Operating from such blind spots, traffickers can run fleets of ships, planes, and trucks loaded with a mix of products with little fear of detection or disruption. South American drug cartels, for example, are increasingly pushing into West Africa, where free-trade zones and poorly monitored transport routes let cargos pass relatively unchecked. During a recent visit to West Africa, the head of the UNO-DC was told by a senior government official in one country that he knew of at least nineteen unregistered flights that had landed in his country over the past few weeks, all of which could have been (and probably were) carrying illicit freight. Failed states such as Somalia also offer the prospect of fairly remote bases of operation from which to conduct criminal activities with little if any interference from local authorities. As a result, cocaine from Colombia and heroin from Afghanistan, quite often coupled with illegal arms shipments and other contraband, are being smuggled more and more frequently through the Sahel and the Horn of Africa to Europe and beyond. Furthermore, the large numbers of unemployed youth in both the Sahel and the Horn provide traffickers with an all too willing local workforce that has few alternatives to make money. Hence, any effort to stem illicit trafficking needs to be based on a thorough understanding of how socio-economic and political vulnerabilities in poverty-stricken and poorly governed countries both attract and facilitate trafficking activities, creating in the process new patterns of global trafficking.

Sixth, while the immediate costs of illicit trafficking – such as drug-related killings, child slavery, and terrorist access to advanced military technologies – may be obvious to all, the broader costs of multi-stream trafficking activities as described above are rarely fully appreciated. There are, for example, significant economy-wide costs to countries victimized by trafficking, including the negative impact that trafficking has on foreign investment, tourism, and domestic saving (all of which impedes economic growth), the theft of natural resources by traffickers, and a likely increase in “brain drain” as the more educated and skilled elements of countries undermined by trafficking seek brighter and safer horizons elsewhere. Environmental costs brought about by trafficking might include unregulated timbering (contributing to the steady disappearance of the world’s rainforests), oil and chemical spills tied to the illicit tapping of pipelines, and the illegal dumping of radiological wastes. Arguably the most saddening of all, however, and perhaps the most difficult to quantify, are the human costs of trafficking, including the fate of those tricked into selling their organs or their bodies, migrants seeking a better future who are left to die in the desert or out at sea, sick people who die from fake medicine, and, as mentioned already, children recruited as child soldiers. Taken together, these costs add up to enormous individual and collective tragedies, and national and international responses to them must be multi-pronged and pursued in a coordinated manner.

Finally, a seventh and increasingly important dimension of illicit trafficking to bring under a comprehensive approach is the ever-expanding and more sophisticated use of technology by traffickers. Access to the latest technology, including satellite hook-ups, cell phones, and GPS equipment, is effectively what has empowered loose bands of poor, illiterate Somalis to capture ocean-going vessels operated and/or relied upon by the world’s richest and most powerful countries. Cyber-crime, moreover, has allowed traffickers in remote areas to steal the identities of people half a world away, while also facilitating money laundering via lax banks and/or corrupt officials. In the not too distant future, access by traffickers to the technical skills and equipment necessary to handle CBRN-related materials could easily promote a growth in the trade of these key components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Getting a better handle on the many ways in which technology is likely to be used by traffickers and their fellow travelers in the years to come, therefore, will require input from a wide array of public and private sector technology experts. Equally important, a public-private
The Need for a Comprehensive Approach

A successful strategy that takes a comprehensive approach to the above seven dimensions of illicit trafficking must, whatever the products or services being trafficked, be based on a team effort, one that brings together the many agencies and organizations that are now engaged in one or another anti-trafficking effort, but may not yet have a full picture of what everyone else is doing, or of how they may all reinforce each other. In particular, greater information sharing between and among these various groups with regard to trafficking routes, the products and services being trafficked along these routes, and the number of traffickers using these routes (and the inter-relationships among the traffickers) will be key to setting in place more effective efforts to slow and/or interdict trafficking flows. Beyond this, however, two other types of initiatives, both of which are entirely consistent with taking a comprehensive approach, would also appear, the UN official argued, to be central to wider success in the anti-trafficking realm – namely, promoting closer collaboration among anti-trafficking organizations at the regional and cross-regional levels, and, as noted above regarding technology, soliciting broader private sector support, including from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for government-led anti-trafficking campaigns.

Developing an interconnected network of regional and cross-regional centers for intelligence sharing and for exchanges on lessons learned and best practices in combating illicit trafficking remains an important component of a successful comprehensive approach. The efforts of the Vienna-based UNODC to strengthen the surveillance and enforcement capabilities of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative or SECI (slated to transform into the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center, or SELEC) in Romania and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) in Kazakhstan – and to

THE GROWTH OF SOMALI PIRACY

Piracy Incidents Attributed to Somali Pirates in 2009

Reported Piracy Attacks by Location in 2001-2009

initiative along these lines holds the best chance of discovering how the anti-trafficking community itself can leverage technology to detect and disrupt smuggling and related crimes.
encourage closer ties between the two organizations – are certainly improving the prospects for halting illicit trafficking and related trans-border crime between Central Asia and Southeast Europe, much of it travelling along the infamous Great Silk Road and the Balkan Route. Similar initiatives to build anti-trafficking capacity at the regional and inter-regional levels are also moving forward (and beginning to bear fruit) in Southeast Asia via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in the Arabian Gulf region via the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), and in Central and South America (including the Caribbean) via the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

As for private sector contributions, much more can be done beyond the efforts mentioned already in the area of public-private technology cooperation. At the individual company level, for example, more business leaders could take steps to follow the leads established by such companies as The Gap and Microsoft, both of which have committed significant resources to try to keep products made by slave and/or forced labor out of the global supply chain. At the broader, multilateral level, international business groups such as the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Illicit Trade are poised to provide critical strategic advice and technical assistance to those working in the public sector by pooling relevant private sector experiences and expertise, identifying major knowledge gaps, and proposing measurable solutions. So, too, local civic groups, religious organizations, and various media outlets are likely to prove instrumental in raising overall public awareness about the costs and consequences of illicit trafficking, and in mobilizing public support for anti-trafficking campaigns.

Cooperation at the Euro-Atlantic Level

Institutionally, many of the primary IGOs engaged in combating global trafficking are components of the wider UN system, generally operating from and/or reporting to the UN’s main headquarters in New York City or one of its satellite offices in Geneva and Vienna. At the Euro-Atlantic level, however, there are three key regional organizations – namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – that also serve as umbrella groups for a number of anti-trafficking programs and operations with a specific focus on Europe and its immediate environs. Before delving too deeply into the individual efforts and capabilities of any one IGO, therefore, participants at the September 2009 IFPA-GCSP workshop in Geneva focused first on how NATO, the EU, and the OSCE viewed the overall problem of illicit trafficking, and on how likely they were to support the idea of a comprehensive approach to combat it. Clearly, greater coordination between and among all three organizations and their sub-elements would go a long way toward advancing such an approach.

For its part, NATO, a senior Alliance official noted, has been a vocal advocate of adopting a comprehensive approach to address a growing number of less traditional security challenges – including trans-border crime and illicit trafficking – since at least its 2008 Bucharest Summit. Based on NATO’s experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan, the Bucharest Summit Declaration acknowledged that NATO alone could not manage these challenges successfully, and that the international community as a whole needed to make a greater effort to coordinate the wide array of civil and
military capabilities available to it to contain conflict and encourage regional stability. Toward that end, the declaration endorsed an action plan to develop and implement NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach that would promote civil-military cooperation (CMCoord) among a broad range of global actors, including, as appropriate to the task at hand, the UN and other IOs, IGOs with a particular regional and/or functional focus, NGOs, and even private sector/corporate stakeholders.

Key initiatives taken in support of the action plan include the joint declaration signed in September 2008 by NATO and the UN to establish a framework for closer cooperation between the two organizations, especially with respect to civil support and capacity-building operations in countries (Iraq and Afghanistan, for example) where they are both deeply engaged. Other efforts of note include ongoing steps to strengthen and expand NATO’s strategic partnership with the EU by setting in place mechanisms to share capabilities and to promote coordination in areas of particular common interest, such as CBRN defenses and non-proliferation. Still other examples would include recent discussions between NATO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), triggered in part by NATO-IAEA exchanges at the Geneva workshop, on plans for a joint nuclear forensics workshop and a joint nuclear incident response exercise.

As the last two points above suggest, NATO has enjoyed a considerable degree of success in tackling the various challenges that may arise from illicit trafficking (or the threat thereof) in CBRN materials. In this regard, four initiatives deserve special mention:

• The activation of the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (COE) in Vyskov, the Czech Republic, in July 2007 to help improve CBRN defense capabilities and interoperability among NATO member states via multinational education, training, and exercises. This includes the development and validation of new concepts, doctrines, and procedures for CBRN defense, and the sharing of lessons learned with other CBRN groups and experts operating outside of NATO structures. Additional training on how best to defend against CBRN terrorism is also available to both NATO-affiliated groups and non-NATO IGOs and NGOs via NATO's COE for Defence Against Terrorism based in Ankara, Turkey.

• NATO's ongoing support for the development of a variety of rapid response teams to detect, identify, and counter potential CBRN use. This would include creating the NBC Event Response Team and Deployable NBC Laboratory first showcased at the 2002 Prague Summit, the CBRN Battalion first deployed in support of the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens and NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit, and more recent efforts – following requests for additional assistance from NATO counter-drug units operating in Afghanistan – to establish a CBRN reach-back capability (based in part
on a CBRN fusion center) to link forward-deployed forces with comprehensive technical and scientific support and advice from expert teams based back in NATO Europe.

- The continuation and expansion of Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), a multinational maritime operation begun in October 2001 with a focus on deterring, disrupting, and defending against terrorist activities in the Mediterranean Sea. Allied expertise developed via OAE – including in the CMCoord area – has proven to be of particular value to wider efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking and the smuggling of WMD-related components. Especially helpful in this context has been the participation of NATO partner countries (including Russia) in OAE operations since 2004, and the development of an information/intelligence-sharing network accessible to all OAE participants.

- Building on the OAE experience, the conducting of NATO’s first pilot course on maritime interdiction operations (MIOs) in October 2009 at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Centre (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Crete. The primary goal here is to provide training to NATO personnel and non-NATO partners on various aspects of CBRN-related MIOs, emphasizing political, legal, doctrinal, operational, and tactical considerations.

Together with reinforcing programs undertaken by (among other entities) the NATO Defence College in Rome, the NATO School at Oberammergau (Germany), the Joint Warfighting Center in Stavanger (Norway), and the NATO Training Group based at NATO headquarters in Brussels, these four initiatives serve as key links in the Alliance’s broader effort to create a “network of networks” aimed at denying would-be proliferators easy access to WMD components, while at the same time providing NATO and non-NATO partner countries (as well as other selected IGOs, NGOs, and national agencies) with critical skills and capabilities in the area of CBRN defenses. This would include training and education in such diverse mission areas as force protection, medical response, consequence management, and support to civil authorities, as well as with respect to the interdiction of illicit trafficking when and where necessary.

A senior official from the European Commission pointed out at the Geneva workshop that the EU has also been quite active on a number of anti-trafficking fronts, especially in efforts to halt illicit trafficking in CBRN materials, drugs, and SALW, and to fight organized crime and terrorist activities that might facilitate such trafficking. Echoing comments made by the UN official cited above, the European Commission representative went on to stress that it was becoming increasingly important, given current trends toward globalization, to

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**EVOLUTION OF NATO’S OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>OAE patrols begin in Western Mediterranean as a response to 09/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Sharing of networks begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Multiple source integrated picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>November Riga Summit affirms anti-terrorism role of OAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Continued growth of the network Outreach to non-NATO, business, and law enforcement groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2 Russian ships 3 Ukrainian ships participating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Common Operational Picture Less platforms More network and info sharing Standby units and surge ops Network contribution has grown to 62 nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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To deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorism
track the changing nature of multi-product trafficking flows along preferred smuggling routes, rather than to focus on the trafficking of single products of concern. Traffickers, he argued, are first and foremost economic actors who can and do adapt very quickly, often remaining several steps ahead of anti-trafficking groups, shifting operations from one location to another fairly easily, and shipping whatever products make them the most money via whatever route (or method of transport) is least likely to be disrupted. For these reasons alone, a more comprehensive approach to trafficking, workshop attendees stated, linking EU structures with other national and international stakeholders, especially civil agencies operating under or in support of the UN system and/or the OSCE, was preferable. This, it was added, is the best way to create a community of practitioners dealing with similar challenges via a synergistic, trans-regional approach.

In recent years, both the European Council and the European Commission have taken a number of steps to strengthen EU mechanisms for dealing with illicit trafficking, with particular emphasis (as in the NATO case) on CBRN and WMD-related trafficking. In December 2003, for example, concurrently with the adoption of a European Security Strategy, the Council endorsed a European strategy to counter WMD proliferation, with a focus on strengthening global non-proliferation norms, assuring strict compliance with CBRN-related trade regulations, and boosting third country capacities to halt and/or disrupt illicit activities. In December 2006, the European Council adopted a proposal, developed by the European Commission and the non-proliferation advisor to the EU’s High Representative for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to promote consistent implementation of the EU’s WMD strategy through a WMD monitoring center. This was followed in December 2008
by the Council's approval of what it called “New Lines of Action” to improve the WMD strategy and make it more operational. Among other measures, this included pledges by the Council, the Commission, and EU member states to intensify efforts to stanch proliferation flows and financing, to prevent the transfer of WMD-related know-how to potential proliferators, and to work more closely with international organizations and third countries to tighten export controls for WMD-relevant components. Toward these ends, various EU offices and agencies, it was noted, continue to provide important anti-trafficking support to the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee, among other groups.

Perhaps the EU’s most important contribution to cooperative efforts to combat illicit trafficking can be found, the European Commission official stressed, in the Commission's Instrument for Stability (IFS), which took force in January 2007 with the combined aims of 1) providing rapid, flexible, adequately funded crisis response assistance to third countries; 2) developing longer-term EU programs to counter trans-regional threats, including weapons proliferation and related trafficking; and 3) promoting capacity building among IOs, IGOs, and other institutional actors with a crisis prevention or crisis response mandate. Funded to the tune of €2.062 billion over the 2007-2013 timeframe, the IFS currently allocates €1.587 billion to short-term crisis response projects and €384 million to long-term projects, including, in the latter category, €266 million to the non-proliferation of WMD (considered priority 1) and €118 million to trans-regional threats to security (deemed priority 2). These two long-term project areas, it was noted, will be especially helpful in addressing the political, military, and socio-economic conditions noted earlier in this chapter that tend to facilitate illicit trafficking.

With regard to priority 1 initiatives, the primary focus has been on risk mitigation and preparedness related to CBRN materials or agents and their means of delivery. In addition to providing support for converting weapons-related facilities to civil use in the former Soviet Union (and for retraining CBRN scientists and engineers for alternative pursuits), projects funded to date have concentrated on efforts to develop and enforce safeguards against CBRN trafficking, to improve the security of CBRN materials at civilian-run facilities, and to establish more effective export controls on sensitive dual-use goods. In this context, substantial amounts of money have been set aside for anti-trafficking programs in Russia, Central Asia, and
selected Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries and for border management assistance in the ASEAN region. As for priority 2 projects, IFS funding has been directed mainly toward efforts to fight organized crime along the cocaine route (principaliy across the Atlantic) and along the heroin route (especially in the Black Sea basin and the Western Balkans), as well as in support of measures to prevent and combat terrorism and the illicit trade in SALW.

Finally, after the NATO and EU presentations at the Geneva workshop, a senior official from the OSCE identified a number of key guidelines that he felt should shape anti-trafficking efforts, based on lessons learned from his own considerable experience in the areas of crisis management, bilateral intelligence sharing, and border security management. He concurred, for example, with the comments made by others that globalization was transforming traditional trafficking dynamics (rendering them more difficult to track and disrupt), but he stressed as well that it was still primarily local conditions – including geography, terrain, and climate, as well as specific political-military and socio-economic factors – that would determine the success or failure of traffickers as they move from one region or route to another, whatever the overarching global trends. For those seeking to combat illicit trafficking, therefore, he argued, there is no standardized approach that could be applied across the board. Hence, he went on to suggest, while it was important to be “global savvy” insofar as trafficking operations are concerned, it was equally important to understand how the specific circumstances that prevail in particular areas targeted by traffickers may influence trafficking flows and attempts to shut them down. This was a reality that OSCE border management teams working in the field along various vulnerable frontiers had learned the hard way.

Managing the interplay of local and global conditioning factors is complicated further, it was noted, by the diversity of national and international public and private structures and agencies tasked with addressing trafficking challenges. For this reason alone, cooperation and coordination across these various organizations would be essential to any effort to maximize their overall impact on global trafficking flows. With this in mind, the OSCE representative offered three key recommendations on the way forward for international anti-trafficking initiatives. First, and foremost, he argued that efforts to counter illicit trafficking must without question be broad and comprehensive in order to succeed. If IGOs and other stakeholders continue to operate solely within their defined mandates (with regard, for example, to issue and regional focus), they will continue to have limited success. Of course, changing formal institutional mandates to make them broader and more adjustable would be, it was acknowledged, an extremely difficult task. Therefore, rather than proposing a rewriting of existing mandates for individual organizations, mandate limitations should be overcome, it was further argued, via more effective cross-organizational cooperation, since together the principal anti-trafficking groups have sufficient collective mandate coverage to do what is necessary.

To this end, and harkening back to his comments regarding the importance of appreciating local versus more global dynamics, the OSCE speaker’s second recommendation stressed the need to avoid a cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all approach to trafficking challenges. Instead, anti-trafficking operations must be tailored to the specific political-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions of the situation in which they are being carried out, understanding that the impact of each of these factors will vary from case to case. At the same time, every effort should be made to avoid giving undue attention to any one factor over the others. Too often in the past, IGOs and other groups seeking to combat illicit trafficking have focused almost exclusively, he argued, on the political-military dimension of trafficking challenges, and, while this was perhaps understandable since the security implications of trafficking tend to attract greater national and international attention, such a focus inevitably fails to provide a full
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project/Activities</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>OSCE Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBANIA</td>
<td>Law enforcement (Ministry of Public Order) Provision of adequate screening for victims of trafficking (VOTs) (OSCE country office)</td>
<td>Training for the police provided by French, Italian, and British police to strengthen anti-trafficking structure Establish a team to assist national police to screen VOTs returned to Albania Improve national police capacity to deal with VOTs</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Cooperating partner</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Assisting Albanian Government in the implementation of National Anti-trafficking Strategy (OSCE country office)</td>
<td>Provide legal counseling to victims returned from Western European countries; Provide legal training to staff working in the Linza government shelter Provide technical assistance in drafting Anti-Child-Trafficking Strategy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finished 2002-2003</td>
<td>Donor</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BiH)</td>
<td>Decision on the procedures and ways of coordinating the activities to suppress human trafficking and illegal migration in BiH (BiH Council of Ministries)</td>
<td>The State Coordinator was appointed, and a procedure for coordinating activities with regard to anti-trafficking was established</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training (Centers for Education of Judges and Prosecutors)</td>
<td>Training of judges on trafficking on practical application of the new Criminal Procedure Codes to fight human trafficking, and on the application of international instruments</td>
<td>Sept 2003</td>
<td>Cooperating partner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct support to the Office of the State Coordinator on Anti-Trafficking</td>
<td>Capacity building of the Office of the State Coordinator on Anti-Trafficking Technical assistance and support for individual activities, such as roundtables, awareness-raising activities, etc.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Donor</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(in part by Icelandic Permanent Delegation to the OSCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACEDONIA</td>
<td>Transit Centre for Trafficked Persons (Ministry of the Interior)</td>
<td>Reception and transit center for irregular migrants and trafficked women</td>
<td>Ongoing since March 2001</td>
<td>Cooperating partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police Department against organized crime and human trafficking</td>
<td>Specialized Police Task Force to combat trafficking with representatives in most districts of Macedonia</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2000</td>
<td>Cooperating partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal reform (Ministry of Justice)</td>
<td>Harmonization of anti-trafficking legislation (amendment of the criminal code) with international and European standards</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Cooperating partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical coordination of anti-trafficking responses (OSCE mission to Moldova)</td>
<td>Coordination &amp; information sharing in cooperation with NGOs and IOs Maintaining an up-to-date electronic database on anti-trafficking projects</td>
<td>2002-ongoing</td>
<td>Donor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance to the Government (OSCE mission to Moldova)</td>
<td>Monitor and advocate the development of a comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategy</td>
<td>2001-ongoing</td>
<td>Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening protection and assistance to VOTs, adults and minors (OSCE mission to Moldova)</td>
<td>Capacity - and institution-building project: Development of victim and witness protection measures, and of national referral mechanisms to protect and assist VOTs, adults and minors</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERBIA</td>
<td>National Team and Plan of Action (Ministry of the Interior)</td>
<td>Serbian team to combat trafficking established National Plan of Action for the fight against human trafficking adopted Participation in Stability Pact Task Force for Trafficking (SPTF)</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Cooperating partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training (Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Policy)</td>
<td>Organized education for 46 centers for social work and 17 centers for children without parental care on the issue of trafficking</td>
<td>July 2002 Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency for Coordination of Protection of VOTs in Serbia (Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Policy)</td>
<td>Agency established Key task: prescreen possible victims and their needs and, based on that, organize necessary assistance, including preparation of return to country of origin; monitoring of the process of reintegration of local victims in the country; organizing seminars and training for social workers on human trafficking</td>
<td>Dec 2003 Ongoing</td>
<td>Donor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Barbara Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), March 2005
picture of the overall trafficking situation. For its part, the OSCE has sought to incorporate and coordinate operations in all three dimensions – or “pillars of security,” in OSCE parlance – recognizing that problems with regard to any one pillar can lead to instability for the other two.

The OSCE speaker’s final recommendation was that organizations and agencies tasked with performing anti-trafficking operations should do so via a “principles-based” strategy with three key principles uppermost in mind: the need for cross-dimensional situational awareness, a clear and common sense of purpose, and a real commitment to cooperation at the operational level. With regard to situational analysis, he stressed again the importance of developing an understanding of the interrelationships and interactions between and among the various conditioning factors noted above that influence and shape illicit trafficking. Toward that end, the OSCE has tried to facilitate this by creating “thematic” units to address different types of trafficking (such as human trafficking), diverse modalities of trafficking (for example, border security training for overland routes), and specific threats and challenges (such as strategic police matters). In the future, it might be helpful, the speaker argued, if other IGOs could join together to pursue “thematic missions” led by a kind of “mini IGO” structure to which they would all assign issue- and/or task-specific representatives.

As for the greater “clarity of purpose” principle, he emphasized the need to establish clear and common definitions of trafficking threats, challenges, and approaches to combating them. OSCE officials tend to believe that building such a common lexicon will help all stakeholders to identify common trafficking-related goals and challenges, thereby paving the way to broader institutional cooperation in areas of shared concern. Identifying areas of commonality will also help the OSCE and its potential organizational partners to track and categorize the capabilities and resources that they can each bring to bear to address various trafficking threats and challenges. More fundamentally, a common goals and capabilities assessment will help anti-trafficking organizations to determine why and when initiatives to combat one or another type of trafficking might be better handled by one or two groups versus a wider network of several groups.

This last point led to the third principle of merit, namely, making a more serious effort at cross-organizational cooperation at very pragmatic levels. Such cooperation, the OSCE speaker noted, is easier to talk about than to accomplish, and it requires both a willingness to share information and the political will to work in partnership. To be most effective, it would also require, as others had pointed out already, a commitment by anti-trafficking organizations to provide mutual support through a pooling of resources, so as to maximize their collective impact. Pooling capabilities, he went on to argue, would also allow these organizations to remain more responsive and adaptable, attributes that were becoming increasingly important as the trafficking environment has become volatile and uncertain. As a step in this direction, the OSCE introduced the Border Security and Management Concept in 2005, which requires participating states to commit at the highest political level to support cooperation on a whole range of border-related security issues, including terrorism, organized crime, and illicit trafficking. The concept, moreover, made clear what capabilities and resources the OSCE could bring to cooperative programs, ranging from joint training and personnel exchanges to intelligence sharing programs (but remaining short of active OSCE policing within national territories).

**Conclusion**

Building a “network of networks” in support of a comprehensive approach to illicit trafficking would seem to be a highly desirable, if rather daunting, objective. A key challenge will be convincing the various IGOs and other stakeholders involved to change the way they operate, and even then differences in operational cultures will likely complicate coordination efforts by anti-trafficking organizations who rarely if ever work together. On the plus side,
however, given that many such organizations now find themselves in a budget environment of zero real growth, collaboration could be one very useful way to cut costs. If the private sector could also be more effectively tapped, the cost savings of a comprehensive approach, it was said at the Geneva workshop, could be even greater.

Taking all the above into account, a senior Swiss foreign ministry official closed the opening session of the workshop by concluding that the international community would pay a very high price if it continues with a “business as usual” approach. Coherence, coordination, and “complementarity,” he argued, must replace loose and often haphazard efforts at cooperation in order to prevent major trafficking-induced disasters. With these aims in mind, he called for greater collective efforts to make progress along three pathways to success. The first would be to promote broader knowledge about (and understanding of) the overall phenomenon of illicit trafficking, in part through more frequent exchanges among anti-trafficking officials, academic experts, NGOs, and other elements of civil society. This might usefully include a follow-on to the Geneva workshop with wider institutional participation.

The second pathway would be to work harder at actually implementing the various anti-trafficking regulations that are already on the books. The international community has endorsed a raft of global and regional agreements, conventions, regimes, and cooperative schemes, but so far it has not lived up to its obligations in the area of implementation. Clearly, more could be done to make those regulations that do exist more binding, to monitor their implementation, to extend their application to all relevant parties, and to globalize best practices. IGOs and other international organizations could also do more to support willing member countries with relevant anti-trafficking know-how and expertise, and to provide incentives to pool their skills and capabilities with other organizations.

Similar to current discussions in support of a new arms trade treaty, a third pathway to success could involve more concerted efforts to enlarge and strengthen existing legal frameworks by negotiating new accords and by closing loopholes. It could be argued, of course, that while encouraging and executing such reforms remains primarily the province of sovereign nation-states, IGOs can certainly help to move things along by raising public awareness, supporting negotiations, and providing appropriate platforms to help advance negotiations.

Finally, in addition to making progress along these three pathways, this same Swiss official proposed that the anti-trafficking community ought to consider developing an overarching comprehensive approach that would integrate and oversee the various individual comprehensive approach-strategies developed for specific trafficking challenges. Needless to say, this would be a highly complex “systems of systems” to manage, requiring a good deal more than simple exchanges of information and loose cooperation between and among its constituent parts. Apart from identifying common goals, moreover, it would require the participating organizations to be far more aggressive than they have been so far in identifying and resolving potential operational differences, so as to arrive at solutions that can then be more effectively implemented in concert. The question that remains, of course, is the degree to which current practice among the primary anti-trafficking IGOs is likely to facilitate or discourage such cooperation, and it to this issue that we now turn.
Having discussed the overall problem of illicit trafficking in its many guises and the basic need for a comprehensive approach, participants at the Geneva workshop used session 2 to explore various institutional responses that have emerged to address the unique challenges presented by different types of illicit trafficking and by the various transport modalities used by traffickers to ship their products. In this way, participants were able to become more familiar with the efforts of other organizations that may be in similar anti-trafficking fields, and to identify both commonly shared and more unique experiences. Particular attention was given to the strategies, capabilities, and institutional networks that different IOs and IGOs have developed to combat specific types of illicit trafficking, such as the illegal trade in CBRN materials, drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms sales, and money laundering. Not surprisingly, this discussion uncovered a diversity of approaches and methods used to combat illicit trafficking challenges. Many organizations target specific flows or modalities of trafficking (for example, trafficking via air, maritime, or overland routes), or even subsets within these categories, such as the efforts made by the EU-affiliated Maritime Analysis Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N) to track mainly small ocean-going ships or small aircraft not fully regulated by the national customs authorities of EU member states. Other organizations seek to remedy particular gaps or shortcomings in existing anti-trafficking systems by focusing on specific political-military, eco-environmental (including health-related), or human security (for example, forced labor and victim protection) aspects of illicit trafficking, or on an especially egregious type of illicit flow, such as sex trafficking. So, too, different organizations may operate within quite different geographical boundaries, working at local, national, regional, or international levels, each of which may lead in turn to situation-specific strategies. All that said, sharing their experiences both in the field and at the policy planning level, it was agreed, seemed to be a sensible way to develop a more complete picture of what more can and should be done by anti-trafficking organizations, and to identify opportunities for cross-organizational collaboration and for developing interdisciplinary best practices that all could use.

Trafficking in CBRN Materials and WMD Proliferation

Clearly, trafficking in CBRN materials to state or non-state actors constitutes an especially serious threat to international security, one that has the potential to become much worse without more successful efforts to prevent and, if need be, interdict CBRN-related trafficking. In particular, the threat of access by a non-state actor (i.e., al-Qaeda) to CBRN materials and technologies has triggered rising concern about the possibility of WMD terrorism, especially in light of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. And while efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD-related
materials to state-level proliferators may also work against non-state actors, preventing terrorist access to such materials requires as well an additional set of tools tailored for just this contingency. Numerous IOs and IGOs, therefore, have begun to fashion initiatives aimed at filling the gaps in existing non-proliferation and anti-trafficking regimes that could be exploited by terrorist elements and/or their state sponsors. Among the steps taken so far are broader institutional efforts to secure vulnerable materials and facilities, to enhance international capabilities to detect suspicious transshipments, and to build up national capabilities to apprehend and prosecute terrorists, and those affiliated with them, when security measures alone fail.

By way of illustration, workshop attendees pointed to the 2004 passage of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1540, which seeks, via programs promoted by the 1540 Committee that it created, to contain and reduce the threat of non-state-actor access to WMD materials. The committee hopes to achieve these objectives by supporting national efforts to establish a common set of UN-approved legal and safety standards for the storage, export, and transit of WMD-related materials (and their potential delivery vehicles) that would be legally binding on all UN member states. According to a member of the Group of Experts that supports the 1540 Committee, the overall goal of the committee is not to track or blacklist any specific person or entity, but to set in place a more universally accepted regulatory framework to guarantee the physical protection, as well as the secure movement and handling, of CBRN/WMD-related materials and technologies. A critical tool for moving in this direction, it was said, is UNSC resolution 1810 (passed in 2008), which urges member states, IOs, and IGOs to inform the 1540 Committee about specific capabilities they have that could help in the implementation of 1540 proposals. In this way, it was further noted, the 1540 Committee could play a useful “clearing-house” function, matching specific member-state requests for assistance with particular national or institutional offers of aid. Useful cooperation along these lines has already been established between the committee and the EU, the OSCE, the UNODC, and the World Customs Organization (WCO), among other stakeholders, and ties with NATO are being cemented. More could be done, nonetheless, to develop a larger roster of key points of contact for national and international assistance, as called for by resolution 1810.

Discussion then turned to the need to recognize, and adapt the regulatory environment to, the differences that exist between chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear materials in terms of their composition, unique vulnerabilities, and potential misuses, all of which will help determine the best strategies for their control. For example, as noted by a senior representative from the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), it is often quite difficult for national authorities, such as customs agents and border police, to distinguish between legal and illegal...
chemical or biological substances, since the materials and equipment necessary for creating and handling a chemical or biological agent or toxin frequently have other legitimate purposes, such as agricultural, medical, or research. Efforts to monitor the transfer of chemical and biological substances, therefore, need to include more effective measures to separate bio-chemical trade that may be tied to illicit activities from trade that may be perfectly legitimate and, in fact, essential. At the same time, compared to nuclear and chemical materials, biological toxins, it was stressed, can be converted into weapons via much smaller production facilities, making illicit biological weapons production even more difficult to detect and track. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that national authorities, including U.S. President Obama, are placing renewed emphasis on bio-security programs, as well as on nuclear safety and security enhancements.

In the nuclear arena, however, it was noted by a senior representative from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the control and regulation of nuclear and radiological materials are being complicated by the broader dissemination of commercial nuclear energy technology. Growing global energy demands continue to increase interest in nuclear power plants, particularly in view of ongoing concerns with regard to future fossil fuel resource scarcity. As a result, nuclear and radiological materials and related technology are being more widely dispersed, increasing as a result the opportunities for WMD-related trafficking and expanding the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. Indeed, according to the IAEA, since 1993 there have been over sixteen hundred reported incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear/radioactive materials, although mostly at very low levels. Moreover, the number of nuclear facilities and locations managed within the IAEA safeguards system already exceeds eleven hundred, and there are a very large number of radioactive sources in most countries with nuclear programs that operate as part of this system. Concerns over the potential diversion of nuclear materials from civilian research and scientific centers have become especially worrisome, given that security measures at these facilities are often less rigorous than those at major nuclear power plants, not to mention at military-related facilities. With such concerns in mind, the international community in recent years has approved a number of binding and non-binding conventions to help ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials, including UNSC resolution 1540 and additional protocols for IAEA safeguards, but many of the directives and guidelines tied to these conventions have yet to be fully or consistently enforced.

Because of the unique characteristics of individual CBRN materials, moreover, many IGOs and other international agencies have developed technical expertise and monitoring programs targeted on a particular type of material. The international community, for example, has promoted multiple conventions with item-specific safety standards and regulatory frameworks, including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which is still being negotiated. Further, the IAEA, acting as “the world’s nuclear inspectorate,” has established a range of safety and security standards for nuclear materials, assisting nations with efforts to upgrade to those standards and developing state capacities to respond to emergency situations. At the same time, the IAEA combats proliferation by verifying that states are not pursuing nuclear weapons programs and otherwise promoting the application of nuclear science and technology for other than peaceful purposes. The IAEA has amassed over fifty years of experience implementing, through its multifaceted programs, what was referred to by one senior IAEA official at the workshop as a “vertical approach” to nuclear security aimed at securing radiological and nuclear materials – and blocking their illicit transfer – up and down domestic supply lines and decision-making chains within participating states. When the IAEA’s vertical approach is linked to a horizontal approach embracing the programs of other anti-trafficking organizations, nuclear safety and security would be, it was
suggested, advanced still further, all of which argued for a truly comprehensive approach.

With regard to biological hazards, a representative from the World Health Organization (WHO) described how that organization has taken on very specific responsibilities for addressing potential health risks caused by biological sources (such as viruses). In this respect, WHO seeks to protect not only humans, but agriculture as well, by setting standards and obligations for its member states to restrict the transport of potentially dangerous biological specimens and to control the cross-border spread of disease. In addition to providing technical assistance to help states meet these obligations, WHO also collects data and keeps its member states informed about potential biological risks that may affect them. During actual outbreaks or other health-related emergencies, WHO also provides crisis management support and advice. This led another participant with significant experience in biological risk reduction to note, on the other hand, that such coordination, together with the implementation of more stringent transfer standards, could at times unnecessarily restrict the transit of biological materials. In this context, he pointed in particular to recent restrictions on the shipping of H1N1 samples necessary for scientific study, restrictions that led to the unintentional slowing of vital medical research. As a result, he emphasized, proportional regulations and requirements were necessary that would permit continued scientific and commercial exchange, while still imposing adequate oversight, perhaps through regulatory impact assessments. On a somewhat related note, a senior representative from UNICRI added that the emphasis on creating special programs for securing specific CBRN materials had also frequently led to a disconnect between the three main program areas (nuclear, chemical, and biological) and to a fragmentation of responsibilities at the national and international levels.

The discussion then explored other IGO approaches that, rather than developing CBRN specialties, target specific geographic areas of high vulnerability, often based on programs that require substantial regional expertise and intercultural skills (such as language skills, knowledge of diverse national regulations and bureaucratic processes, and familiarity with the “operational cultures” of strategically important countries). For example, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the lead agency in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) on issues of non-proliferation and combating WMD, has often taken a regional approach in its efforts to counter and reduce CBRN risks. Since 1991, DTRA’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has provided technical and operational expertise to secure and oversee the storage, transport, and destruction of nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and their delivery vehicles based primarily in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Moreover, with the expansion of the program’s mandate in 1993, CTR efforts grew to include all WMD materials and weapons, not just those that were nuclear. To cite just one major project along these lines, under the CTR’s Chemical Weapons Destruction Program, DTRA teams operating from the Shchuch’ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) began in March 2009 to destroy the chemical munitions stored at Russia’s Planovy military base, an effort set for completion by 2012.
Similarly, DTRA’s International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), which it implements in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice (specifically, the FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection bureau, have traditionally followed a regional format that focuses on capacity building in the FSU, including the Baltic countries, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. For the most part, ICP programs provide technical and operational support (including training) to local coast guards, border guards, frontier police, hazmat experts, and other relevant specialists in vulnerable countries to help them deter, detect, investigate, and respond to the trafficking of WMD-related materials across international borders. DTRA also provides substantial anti-trafficking support to the Black Sea region as a whole through its Counter Smuggling Network Initiative, which it initiated in 2008 with the aim of creating an operational police network around the Black Sea area that would link together the various law enforcement agencies of the Black Sea countries to target transnational criminal organizations that engage in all forms of illicit trafficking. Toward that objective, DTRA is working in cooperation with the OSCE, whose support of this particular initiative helps to ease any political sensitivities over the project within the region, and with the Turkish National Police, who appear to enjoy a solid reputation for professionalism in the greater Black Sea area and in the Turkic-speaking parts of Central Asia. With twenty countries, including Russia and Iran, now engaged to one degree or another, the long-term plan is to create an integrated anti-trafficking network spanning all the major smuggling routes from Eastern Europe to the Afghan and Pakistani borders.

In spite of these and other reinforcing efforts toward securing CBRN materials and combating their illicit transfer, an IAEA representative noted that a large percentage of these materials remains improperly and inadequately safeguarded at numerous locations around the world. In explanation, she stressed that maintaining the necessary, high-level security of CBRN materials is ultimately a national responsibility, and that there is often a lack of political will to enforce agreed-upon measures. Although there was no general consensus on how best to address this lack of political will, most workshop participants seemed to agree that a key step in the right direction would be to improve connectivity between national, regional, and international approaches as a way to establish better vertical and horizontal integration of efforts. As part of this approach, discussion turned to the importance of establishing flexible mandates that would provide IGOs and other stakeholders with a greater degree of operational freedom and that would foster innovation. For example, UNICRI, originally established to support UN efforts to prevent and control juvenile delinquency and adult criminality, has been able to interpret its mandate broadly and expand its responsibilities accordingly, developing a multidimensional applied research program organized around four major work areas: emerging crimes (including money laundering) and anti-human trafficking, security governance and counter-terrorism (including CBRN issues), justice reform (including capacity building in the judicial arena), and postgraduate training. Encouraging a similar flexibility among other IGOs so that they could more easily adapt and respond to evolving demands would be, it was suggested, the sensible way to proceed.

As for specific programs to counter the trafficking of CBRN materials and WMD, UNICRI has developed two regionally focused information-sharing and analysis tools – one centered on Southeast Europe and the Caucasus and the other on North Africa and the Middle East – that are designed to improve cross-border, multinational communication with respect to CBRN trafficking. Known respectively as Knowledge Management System (KMS) 1 and KMS 2, both mechanisms collect and compare all available data on illicit CBRN transfers at the national and regional levels, paying especially close attention to the various modalities through which CBRN materials may be illegally acquired.
and/or traded. In this way, UNICRI hopes to identify and track emerging CBRN smuggling trends in both regions, highlighting particularly vulnerable borders and transport links and, to the extent possible, predicting the likely location of future incidents. Pooling the expertise of national experts with that of regional organizations and IGOs, the KMS systems aim to help the authorities in participating countries learn how to assess capability gaps, evaluate the relative success or failure of anti-trafficking strategies adopted, and develop collaborative solutions with their counterparts in neighboring states. In addition, the KMS data banks are expected to maintain updated lists of key CBRN specialists in both regions, as well as suggestions for best practices in combating illicit CBRN trafficking and scenario-based exercises for honing those same practices.

Partly in response to the KMS discussion, a number of workshop participants argued for developing more comprehensive and integrated policy approaches across the CBRN spectrum, particularly with respect to information sharing and analysis. Several lamented in particular the lack of an overarching standard for CBRN-related data collection and analysis, arguing that there was actually an overabundance rather than a lack of available information that made it all the more essential to develop a common system capable of absorbing and processing that data into actionable intelligence. In this respect, some participants noted that while a significant amount of expertise does exist in the overall CBRN area, and even though there was already some useful organizational cooperation for information collection, there was still a wide-ranging fragmentation of responsibilities and a low level of coordination among national and multinational groups trying to counter CBRN trafficking. According to one attendee, there appeared to be a distinct “lack of ownership” among key stakeholders that continues to stymie concerted action and discourages accountability with regard to the enforcement of safety and transit regulation standards. Viewed from this angle, a truly unified anti-trafficking strategy for CBRN materials and WMD components, participants agreed, would require the introduction of substantially improved procedures for information sharing and analysis across CBRN disciplines, as well as across borders, in combination with the adoption of appropriate national control mechanisms to give individual participating states real ownership of the process within their borders.

Two other international initiatives were also mentioned as being particularly important to any discussion of combating illicit trafficking in CBRN materials and WMD – namely, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Announced by U.S. President George W. Bush on May 31, 2003, the PSI was created to operationalize and augment existing multilateral efforts to interdict at sea, on land, or in the air illicit and/or destabilizing shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and any related materials or technology. To this end, PSI seeks to build the capacity of each member state’s national legal authorities and to increase cooperation and intelligence sharing among participating nations, in order to enable them to track and intercept such shipments.
While the PSI primarily aims at interdicting WMD transfers between and among state-level actors, the GICNT targets proliferation pathways to sub-state and terrorist actors. With this specific goal in mind, the GICNT focuses on helping member states to secure potentially vulnerable weapons and materials, to strengthen national detection systems, and, in the event that these two layers of defense fail, to have close at hand effective emergency response, consequence management, and apprehension capabilities. Unlike many other nuclear safety programs (such as CTR efforts), moreover, the GICNT primarily targets the safety and security of civilian rather than military nuclear facilities and materials. In addition, it provides members with an important information-sharing tool through the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP), which is used by seventy of the GICNT’s current seventy-nine state partners.

Both GICNT and PSI, which are discussed in more detail later in this chapter and in chapter 3, already make significant contributions to combating CBRN material and WMD proliferation, and they can be leveraged to even greater effect, it was argued, as part of a comprehensive approach to illicit trafficking. Moreover, with respect to the specific task of preventing terrorists from gaining access to weapons-relevant nuclear materials, the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. on April 12-13, 2010 and attended by forty-seven countries appears to have been a major step in the right direction. As part of an agreed post-summit work plan, various participating nations promised, among other initiatives, to eliminate existing stocks of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, to develop nuclear fuels that would be less proliferation prone, to convert research reactors that currently rely on weapons-usable materials, to undergo IAEA-led peer reviews of nuclear security measures at selected national facilities, and to install radiation detectors at major ports to help prevent nuclear-related smuggling. Progress toward these and related nuclear security goals will be evaluated at the next summit meeting, currently slated to be held in the Republic of Korea in 2012.

Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking, of course, is another pervasive form of illicit trafficking that remains highly profitable and extremely difficult to control, despite increasing efforts by the international community to contain and then reduce it. As noted in chapter 1, moreover, it is a phenomenon that undermines the governance of many nations and creates significant health and socio-economic costs. In addition to weakening states where it takes root, the drug trade’s destabilizing effects are simply enhanced by the interconnection between drugs and other forms of illicit trafficking, organized crime, and, of perhaps greatest concern, terrorist threat financing efforts. One participant from the UNODC saw the growing links between terrorism and the drug trade, particularly in Afghanistan, as perhaps the single most important reason for renewed international efforts to combat the problem. To a degree, she also expressed concern that this increased attention was, as a result, too “securitized,” or military-focused, in its approach, with the security-related effects of the drug trade (border control issues, links to terrorism and illegal arms deals, etc.) taking greater priority than was prudent over such other important aspects of the counter-drug agenda as providing alternative work to poppy farmers and working with addicts to reduce health challenges and reduce demand. The securitization of the drug trade issue has led, she went on to argue, to an over-reliance within the international community on the apprehension and prosecution of criminal elements when combating illicit drug trafficking, as opposed to educational and development-minded measures that might lower incentives at the local level to even get involved in drug-related operations in the first place.

In answer, several participants emphasized the need to approach illicit drug trafficking as both a supply and a demand issue that includes a wide spectrum of actors and challenges, some of whom (and which) did in fact require a military or security-minded response. Among the many communities affected by the drug trade are vulnerable rural populations, such as opium farmers in
Afghanistan, forced to produce illicit substances in the absence of alternative livelihoods; law enforcement agencies tasked with detecting, disrupting, and dismantling illicit networks; drug users and those who try to help them deal with HIV/AIDS infection; and the managers of drug awareness programs that may eventually cut global demand. Nearly all participants recognized that a successful, comprehensive approach to combating illicit drug trafficking must incorporate energetic efforts at each of these points along the supply-demand continuum. A senior delegate from the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N) viewed such a full-spectrum strategy as particularly important, given the speed with which drug cartels and drug routes shift in order to avoid capture and to take advantage of cross-border security gaps. As noted earlier, for evidence of this agility among traffickers one need only consider the recent emergence of West Africa as a major drug hub in the transit route from Central America and the Caribbean onward to Europe.

Not unlike other forms of illicit trafficking, the drug market is highly complex, with many variations to the supply-demand dynamic. Although the drug trade as a whole is now one of the largest global, transnational industries in the world, certain drug markets remain quite regionally based in terms of production and sale. For example, according to the 2007 UN World Drug Report, drugs such as marijuana, which can be produced in almost any climate, are sold primarily within local regional markets. Production of other types of drugs, on the other hand, can be regionally based but still feed primarily into a global market through various inter-regional transit routes; take, for example, opium produced in Afghanistan and shipped to foreign markets along the Great Silk Road and its tributaries. From a demand perspective, moreover, certain countries and regions experience far greater domestic demand than others do for specific types of drugs, and they may also have a greater capacity to purchase them. Together, these diverse characteristics of the drug trade create a complex pattern of supply and demand, one that has grown larger and more complicated by the opening of more borders in the wake of the political and economic changes that have occurred over the past two decades. With no one containment strategy suited to all trafficking challenges, workshop attendees argued that the anti-trafficking community needs to maintain a well-equipped toolkit that can support a wide spectrum of approaches in support of a variety of objectives.

Perhaps for this reason, many IGOs choose to focus on particular regional flows to target specific,
relatively local drug production, transit, and/or demand-related issues, an approach that requires, in turn, the development of region-specific expertise with regard to cultural, language, and political/legal systems. It also requires the establishment of lasting cooperative relationships with key regional stakeholders, including law enforcement officials, customs agents, border guards, and the like. The MAOC-N, for example, was created to deal with a unique European challenge – the lack of border controls within the EU, which increases the responsibility of the EU’s coastal countries to monitor points of entry and interdict illicit flows. Organizational, MAOC-N pulls together anti-drug professionals from seven EU countries to provide a “bureaucratically light and operationally agile” means of combating illicit trafficking, in particular the transatlantic trade in cocaine. It does this by monitoring small vessels and aircraft entering Europe that are not required to report to national customs agencies. As an interagency and multinational coordination centre, MAOC-N then communicates actionable intelligence to law enforcement agencies such as INTERPOL, EUROPE, and/or their national-level components, and it assists as well in coordinating actual interdictions. A senior MAOC-N official noted that the successes of this organization were in large part due to its early acceptance as an appropriate regional coordinator by local law enforcement, military, and other interdiction enablers. This acceptance, in turn, is attributed primarily to MAOC-N’s promotion of robust partnership cooperation agreements, its support for complete transparency among key staff, its decision to involve all member countries on an equal footing in any actions taken, its tradition of brutal honesty regarding successes and failures (admitting mistakes as they occur), and the consequent confidence that others had (or developed) for MAOC-N’s standard operating procedures and for the likely effectiveness of its integrated and responsive intelligence platform.

That said, there are, it was acknowledged, certain limitations to operating solely or principally at the regional level. First, even among the EU countries where MAOC-N operates, cultural and language differences can still complicate its operations. Second, differences in national security classifications and diverse standard operating procedures for drug-related operations at the national level can hamper timely multinational action. And third, a “one region” approach to anti-trafficking, particularly with respect to the drug trade, can rarely eliminate the overall problem. While a number of drug trafficking routes have shifted in recent years from the Caribbean and the Atlantic to the Pacific (in part thanks to MAOC-N’s success), they are just as likely to shift back as those new routes are shut off by more effective anti-drug policies. Only by maintaining a broader perspective, therefore, can the drug trade’s increasingly globalized supply networks be fully addressed. As a result, while region-specific strategies still hold great value in highly vulnerable areas such as Central and South Asia, the Balkans, and Central America and the Caribbean, a number of IGOs and national agencies choose to operate as well at a more transnational and inter-regional level, seeking to piece together a bigger picture of drug route connections, establish cooperative links between and among counter-drug agencies in adjacent regions.
2007 Cocaine Trafficking

Source: UNODC Annual Reports and Questionnaire Data

Countries reporting seizures of more than 10 kg in 2007:

- United States of America: 148
  - Canada: 2.7

Main Trafficking Routes and Color Coding for Trends:
- Increase (>10%)
- Decrease (<-10%)
- Stable (+/-10%)

Other Trafficking Routes:
- No cocaine seizures reported to UNODC (2003-2007)

Seizures in metric tons, color coded for trends:

- Central America: 9.7
- Ecuador: 25
- Peru: 14
- Colombia: 195
- Mexico: 48
- Venezuela: 0.2
- Suriname: 0.2
- Guyana: 0.2
- Near and Middle East: 0.2
- Japan: 0.6
- Australia: 0.2
- Thailand: 0.2
- Malaysia: 0.1
- Tunisia: 0.2
- Morocco: 0.2
- Cape Verde: 0.5
- Nigeria: 0.6
- Angola: 0.5
- South Africa: 2.0
- Kenya: 0.03
- Namibia: 0.03
- Senegal: 2.5
- Algeria: 0.02
- Burkina Faso: 0.02
- Togo: 0.02
- Benin: 2.0
- Guinea: 0.3
- Ghana: 0.3
- Brazil: 11
- Chile: 11
- Bolivia: 10
- Argentina: 8
- Uruguay: 0.8
- Paraguay: 0.8
- United States of America: 148
- Canada: 2.7
- West Central Europe: 79
and identify common or, conversely, unique local conditions that make particular states or regions more susceptible than others to drug production, transit, or demand. Efforts alluded to earlier by the UNODC, the OSCE, SECI, CARICC, and DTRA to establish a network of cooperative law enforcement and counter-smuggling activities in the greater Black Sea region – tying together Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe – were pointed to as excellent examples.

As part of its Global Security Initiative (GSI) announced in 2008 in response to the growing sophistication of transnational criminals, INTERPOL, the largest international police organization in the world, is seeking as well to establish the framework for a comprehensive strategy better able to combat the activities of today’s internet-savvy, cross-regionally oriented, illicit traffickers, including those operating in the drug realm. Toward that end, INTERPOL is expanding the quantity and availability of information that it shares with national authorities through its National Central Bureaus (NCBs), with an emphasis on wider connectivity and innovative tools to secure physical and virtual (that is, cyber-related) borders. In addition to collecting and analyzing data from member countries worldwide in order to identify new drug trafficking trends and the linkages between reported cases, INTERPOL maintains a real-time, secure database and communications system known as I-24/7, which can issue drug alerts and distribute within minutes time-sensitive information and images related to suspected traffickers and new trafficking schemes to INTERPOL’s NCBs and other participating national agencies. INTERPOL also helps to coordinate international drug investigations and organizes conferences and workshops on the latest investigation techniques, focusing in particular on building enforcement capacity among countries that lack the financial, technical, and human resources to cope with the challenges posed by twenty-first-century drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs.

In spite of these and other significant initiatives, participants agreed that efforts to combat drug trafficking have continued to suffer from the unwillingness and/or inability of many countries to actually implement national commitments and international standards. This is illustrated most graphically, workshop participants said, by the current situation in Mexico, where President Calderon’s crackdown on drug-related criminal networks has triggered a degree of violence that has spilled over the U.S.-Mexican border and raised concerns within the U.S. intelligence community about Mexico’s possible drift toward “failed state” status. In addition to the weaknesses of Mexico’s law enforcement community due to pervasive corruption and intimidation, the sheer scale of the drug trafficking problem has overloaded Mexico’s customs and border control capabilities, which are only able to regulate about 50 percent of the drug-related shipments entering or exiting the country. Efforts to eliminate the drug trade in Afghanistan, a major nexus for both the European and the Southeast Asian drug trades, and a primary source for terrorist financing, have struggled as well with similar challenges.

Implicit in this discussion was a recognition of the fact that a good many governments have only a limited ability to enforce anti-trafficking initiatives after signing them, even when sufficient political will to do so is present. This is a weakness whose negative implications are surely compounded by the increasing sophistication and agility of the major DTOs. Still, greater efforts to build political will among local authorities and to back it up with increased technical assistance and training for counter-drug operatives could, it was suggested, bear fruit over the longer term. This was, after all, the objective of the Merida Initiative and recent “beyond Merida” efforts that now guide U.S. anti-drug and broader security cooperation programs with Mexico, and similar interagency-type efforts, it was suggested, would work on other “drug war” fronts.

Human Trafficking
Human trafficking is a multi-billion dollar business that impacts and involves citizens from nearly all countries in the world. It is a particularly difficult
challenge for law enforcement authorities to manage, however, because it requires an additional set of capabilities and initiatives that go beyond those found in the standard toolkits of local police and border guard units. Especially important in this regard is a capacity to identify, sympathize with, and then assist the victims of trafficking, who are generally referred to as VOIs by the IGOs who are dedicated to helping them. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2006 Resource Book for Law Enforcement Officers on Good Practices in Combating Child Trafficking calls these additional areas of required expertise the “3 Rs” for their focus on rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration operations, all three of which must be added to the law enforcement community’s general trafficking repertoire of the “3 Ps”: prosecution, protection, and prevention. These 3 Rs, it was acknowledged, can prove to be very hard for law enforcement officers to implement, as they are often ill equipped to deal with the special needs of victims of trafficking, needs that can include but are not limited to language interpretation, psychological counseling, and legal aid. This difficulty is compounded, moreover, by the reluctance of many trafficking victims to seek out and appeal for help from local authorities for fear that they will be punished or otherwise mistreated for having participated, however unwillingly, in the various illegal activities associated with the transnational traffic in human beings. Sometimes, workshop participants noted, fear of punishment runs so deep that it prevents those who are being trafficked in unsafe conditions (for example, in unventilated trucks or unseaworthy ships) from calling out for help, even when their lives are put in danger.

As a senior official from UNODC explained it, many national legal systems have long lacked the legislative and other institutional mechanisms that are required to detect, apprehend, and successfully prosecute suspected human traffickers. It wasn’t until 2003, after all, that international agreement was finally reached on a common definition of human trafficking, as outlined in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. This document provided for the very first time a legal basis for national reforms among UN member states to define human trafficking as a criminal offense to be investigated and prosecuted. Since that time, a number of IGOs have also sprung up for the sole purpose of identifying and helping populations vulnerable to trafficking, particularly in the less developed world, as well as to help identify, apprehend, and successfully prosecute the perpetrators. Many of these institutional efforts have been focused on building greater awareness among vulnerable populations and on formulating the necessary legal frameworks worldwide to deal with VOIs and their traffickers. However, despite the successes that these organizations have had in getting a majority of the UN’s member states to adopt at least rudimentary legislation declaring human trafficking illegal, 40 percent of those countries, according to the February 2009 UNODC Global Report of Trafficking, have not reported a single conviction to date, and the remaining 60 percent have had fewer than ten convictions a year. The general consensus was that, in addition to an overall lack of political will to enforce the law on this point, the limited success achieved so far in prosecuting traffickers can be traced to a continued lack of understanding on the part of victimized populations and local law enforcement officials alike that human trafficking is indeed a serious crime. In some situations, there may also be considerable uncertainty about who should be treated as a victim of trafficking rather than as a refugee entitled to asylum rights, and how a decision in that regard could alter the treatment of VOIs by the international community.

Moreover, there is a particular lack of understanding, it was argued, about the forced-labor aspects of human trafficking. In part, this may be tied to the fact that it remains extremely challenging to combine, and deal collectively with, the criminal justice aspects of human trafficking and questions of labor-related injustice. A key problem here is that labor exploitation tends to be more subtle, more ambiguous in terms of illegality, and far
more difficult, as a result, to detect and confirm. As a representative from the International Labour Organization (ILO) explained it, forced labor often involves the confiscation of passports, deception, threats, and coercion, and its perpetrators exploit “gray area” loopholes in various national labor regulations as a way to underpay and overwork contract laborers. Many victims of such practices often find themselves held in slavery-like conditions, forced into agricultural, construction, domestic service, and other labor-intensive jobs with no way out. The ILO, therefore, has become the primary IGO leading the charge to raise global awareness about these and similar labor exploitation issues, working with nations to eliminate forced labor through policy reform and via capacity building efforts among law enforcement and labor market institutions. Toward these ends, the ILO embraces both a vertical and a horizontal comprehensive approach to anti-trafficking, partnering with local governments, employer organizations, businesses, and worker organizations at the national level, while working as well with international agencies – such as the IOM and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – to promote broader awareness of forced labor abuses, and to improve institutional capabilities to detect and redress such abuses. For their part, the IOM and UNHCR have formed a special partnership for the protection of VOTs who appear to be falling through the gaps in existing protection and assistance frameworks, including those who may be eligible, as mentioned above, for asylum and/or are in need of resettlement.

Despite some obvious differences in focus, efforts to combat sex trafficking and forced labor involve many of the same approaches and face many of the same challenges, especially in terms of data collection and analysis, the promotion of policy reform, and the need for capacity building among relevant anti-trafficking groups. Data collection in particular poses a special challenge, because information is so widely dispersed among different IGOs and national agencies, and it remains relatively unstandardized, making it less usable for the purposes of conducting analytical comparisons. The UNODC, which combats both drug and human trafficking flows, has tried to address this problem through its own data collection and research efforts and by implementing capacity-building and monitoring programs in vulnerable UN member states. Pooling data from various field offices, the UNODC also publishes reports identifying key countries of origin, transit, and destination with respect to human trafficking, including sex-related trafficking and the illicit trade in human organs. Like the ILO, the UNODC also seeks to raise public awareness through media programs and via direct assistance to local populations and organizations in both origin and destination countries in

### Reported Profile of Victims and the Purpose of Human Trafficking at the Global Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Exploitation Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Forced Labor</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Forced Labor</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Forced Labor</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Forced Labor</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the sum of percentages is over 100 because one source can indicate more than one victim profile or form of exploitation.
in order to achieve the 3Ps and the 3Rs. In this way, the UNODC and likeminded organizations such as the ILO are able to play a useful and constructive role as middlemen between law enforcement and human trafficking victims, often aiding in the identification and location of victims, providing support for victim recovery services, and identifying potential traffickers.

Given its global reach, INTERPOL can also play an important role in stemming human trafficking and what it calls “people smuggling,” providing technical assistance and training to law enforcement agencies, facilitating intelligence sharing among them, and assisting in investigations. INTERPOL’s Expert Working Group on Trafficking in Human Beings, for example, meets annually to raise awareness about current developments in the field, promote prevention programs, and develop specialized training materials. Its manual on best law enforcement practices contains a wealth of useful information on how best to detect and then investigate human trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labor, domestic servitude, and organ removal. Moreover, given these quite varied reasons for human trafficking, IGOs providing assistance to VOTs need to understand, it was noted by a senior representative of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), that human trafficking flows are composed of a very mixed VOT population, some of whom are legitimate refugees and/or asylum seekers, some of whom have paid to be smuggled across borders, after which their links to the traffickers come to an end, and some of whom have been trafficked for the purposes of forced labor or prostitution. Each VOT stream, therefore, will require a somewhat tailored response.

**Money Laundering and Intellectual Property Crimes**

The financial sector hosts other forms of illicit trafficking that, for the purposes of discussion, were
broken down at the Geneva workshop into two main categories: money laundering and intellectual property (IP) crimes. Initial discussion primarily focused on the nature of money laundering and ongoing efforts to combat it and, through combatting it, minimize as well financial support to terrorist groups. It was stressed that money laundering is often linked to other forms of illicit trafficking, especially terrorist financing, so efforts to thwart money laundering are also potential tools for detecting, disrupting, and dismantling illicit trafficking activities more broadly. As a workshop participant from the Association Romande des Intermédiaires Financiers (ARIF), Switzerland’s primary agency for fighting money laundering, explained, financial systems are being misused by criminal and terrorist networks for both the “whitewashing” and “blackwashing” of funds. In this context, whitewashing refers to a process by which illegally obtained money such as drug-related profits is made to appear legitimate, whereas blackwashing is a process by which legally obtained property or money, such as funds raised by charities, is used to fund terrorist and other radical groups or illicit activities.

During the workshop discussion, three major points were identified where IGOs and national governments can seek to disrupt the money laundering cycle: at the source of the money (be it legitimate or illegitimate), during the movement of money (through the financial system, by physical movement, or via the international trade system), or when the money is used. However, the representative from ARIF noted that is still quite difficult to interfere with this process at any one of these three points, given the complexity of money laundering pathways, the varying degrees of national, regional, and international regulations with regard to financial flows, and the differing degrees of transparency and oversight that exist at all three stages of money flow. So, too, the overall lack of transparency that prevails in the financial sectors of many countries creates additional obstacles to the detection of laundering schemes, and several participants noted that many banks and financial institutions generally lack awareness and expertise about the best practices to use to prevent – and key

### MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

- **Money laundering**: Disguise of origin of assets illegally earned
  - Infiltration into legal financial system
  - Washing from black to white

- **Financing of terrorism**: Disguise of destination of assets legally earned
  - Infiltration into legal financial system to finance illegal activities
  - Transforming from white to black

warning signs to help detect – money laundering activities. These shortcomings were viewed as understandable, if nonetheless regrettable, because many banks are simply not set up to perform what are in effect law enforcement duties to uncover illicit financial transactions. Although companies in the banking sector often provide data to law enforcement agencies on possible laundering activities, they themselves generally lack an in-house capability to analyze that data and take appropriate action based on such an analysis. Perhaps most importantly, they must always balance security concerns with their need to maintain commercial viability.
IGOs, therefore, have come to play an important role as intermediaries between governments and banks, and among different financial organizations themselves, in an effort to increase anti-trafficking communication and coordination within the financial sector. INTERPOL is one such organization, which, through its Anti-Money Laundering Unit, works to promote and facilitate information sharing among financial investigators, such as financial intelligence units and financial crime units. More specifically, the Anti-Money Laundering Unit identifies points of contact through the Camden Assets Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN), an informal international network for tracing, freezing, seizing, and confiscating proceeds from criminal activities. The UNODC is another IGO that has responsibilities for combating money laundering under the auspices of the Global Programme Against Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and Financing of Terrorism (commonly known as the GPML), which was established in 1997 in response to the mandate given to the UNODC through the 1988 UN Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Initially focused on tracking drug trade-related profits, the mandate of the GPML (and the UNODC’s own anti-money laundering unit that seeks to enforce it) was broadened in 1998 by a special session of the UN General Assembly to cover all money laundering activities (not just those tied to drug trafficking), an expansion of authority that was strengthened still further by the adoption of a 1999 international convention to suppress terrorist financing, a 2000 UN convention against transnational organized crime, and a 2003 UN convention against corruption. Leveraging these various documents, the GPML aims to assist UN member states to ratify and implement international standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, including the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an anti-laundering group created by the 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris.

Operating as an intergovernmental policymaking body (as opposed to a formal IGO) with thirty-four members and a small secretariat housed at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris, the FATF develops and promotes policies at the national and international levels to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in accordance with what it calls its 40 + 9 Recommendations (the forty dealing with money laundering and the nine with terrorist financing). With these basic goals in mind, the FATF monitors member-state progress on implementing these recommendations, reviews and reports on various money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and countermeasures, and coordinates with other international bodies on ways to strengthen the global financial system against misuse by criminals. Recently, the FATF was tasked as well with helping to track and disrupt proliferation-related financing, and it continues to enlarge its jurisdiction by adding new members and by encouraging the formation of what have been dubbed FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs). With thirty-three national members, two regional institutional members (the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council), five associate members (including the Council of Europe’s anti-money laundering group known as MONEYVAL), eight FSRBs (such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group), and a host of IGO observers, FATF can now boast well over 180 jurisdictions, all working to set in place a common set of standards to discourage and control illicit financing activities. This work, moreover, is being further facilitated by the International Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN), a UNODC-managed internet tool that includes a database on relevant anti-trafficking legislation and regulations.

In part as a result of these regional and international initiatives, more robust national-level institutional responses have come to the fore. ARIF, for example, is actually a private Swiss non-profit, founded in order to facilitate the cooperation of private financiers with Switzerland’s Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Financial Sector (MLA). As a “self-regulatory organism,” ARIF provides internal
controls for its members, helping them to detect and prevent financial fraud. In this capacity, ARIF brings to bear enforcement and analysis skills that the banking sector lacks but nevertheless requires in order to comply with Swiss law. Taken as a case study, ARIF illustrates the importance of connecting national legislation with effective private efforts in the banking sector to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Moreover, while ARIF only operates within Switzerland, it is an interesting model of private-public cooperation with potential applications to other nations and regions, provided that it is properly tailored to suit the non-Swiss financial/legal environments therein. As a first key step, a representative from ARIF at the workshop called for more far-reaching efforts to study and compare the many different financial systems and criminal codes that now exist at the national level with regard to money laundering (especially insofar as corporate liability is concerned), if ARIF-like efforts to combat money laundering are to succeed elsewhere.

As a representative from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) noted, financial crimes are not limited to money laundering, but also include intellectual property (IP) crimes, which have become a global pandemic. In recent years, the international community has seen a significant increase in these crimes, ranging from sales of counterfeit designer goods to counterfeit vaccines and medicines that may pose major health and safety hazards. Following a "you make it, we fake it" motto, counterfeiters usually design their products to be similar enough to the "real thing" to confuse the consumer, but different enough to confuse (and thwart) the court system. Often these crimes involve illicit trafficking across national borders, taking advantage of legal loopholes and inadequate consumer protection wherever possible. That said, IGOs, it was confirmed, can and do play very useful roles in exposing and combating these IP-related crimes, raising public and global awareness and building legal and law enforcement capabilities to detect and successfully prosecute the perpetrators. INTERPOL, for example, has created both an IP action group and an IP crime unit, the former of which advises member states on strategies to combat IP crime and encourages resource donation to vulnerable countries, while the latter raises public awareness through media campaigns, training, and information-sharing via a member-accessible database.

For its part, WIPO, a specialized agency of the UN with eighty-five member states, is responsible for delivering a variety of IP protection services to its member states, using the confiscated proceeds of convicted violators to help finance improvements in national IP protection. More
specifically, WIPO actively promotes the adoption of IP legislation, standards, and procedures aimed at, among other objectives, enforcing IP rights and developing more effective IP systems worldwide, especially in the developing world. To help set in place IP networks able to identify and respond to IP-related criminal activities, WIPO works closely with INTERPOL, the WHO, the WCO, and other organizations concerned about counterfeiting and similar IP violations to create strategic alliances and to encourage cooperation between regions and among key national players, including judges, prosecutors, customs officials, and police. WIPO also holds policy discussions at the international level in order to raise global awareness of IP crimes and to formulate – and urge national adherence to – state-of-the-art enforcement strategies. WIPO, it was stressed, is committed to bringing on stream IP solutions that deal head-on with the major challenges of the day, including illicit trafficking, thereby maximizing the benefits of a common IP system for all stakeholders. In this sense, WIPO’s programs may be seen as a good example of how an issue-specific IGO can use multilateral agreements to support local capacity building for IP safeguards and to increase institutional coordination at the national, regional, and international levels so as to minimize the opportunities for criminal groups to work around these safeguards.

On a side note, the discussion of money laundering and IP violations highlighted in particular the growing importance and use of cyberspace as a medium for illicit trafficking, complementing the traditional air, sea, and land routes. Numerous workshop participants cited examples of financial criminals using cyberspace to steal identities or execute fraudulent sales of counterfeit goods. As a result, cyberspace is clearly emerging as an important fourth dimension in the campaign to combat illicit trafficking, as reflected in ongoing national and international-level strategic debates and reorganizations to address cyber-security needs. The Pentagon’s new cyber command and the anticipated incorporation of cyber concerns into NATO’s New Strategic Concept are but two prominent examples. Yet another, it was added by an INTERPOL representative, is that agency’s effort to counter the misuse of internet technology and improve online security by means of its GSI program mentioned earlier, which was designed specifically to tackle transnational crime networks that operate increasingly across geographical borders via cyberspace.

**Trafficking in Conventional Arms and SALW**

According to the EU Council, conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), can be linked to nearly five hundred thousand deaths every year, and, more often than not, they are the primary weapons used to undermine the security and stability of vulnerable national governments. But progress in stemming the illicit trade in conventional arms, SALW in particular, has been limited by the general dearth of reliable data on the trade, as well as by a lack of effective law enforcement at the national level and by poor interstate coordination at the regional and international levels. In many countries where safeguards do not approach the high standards of the more developed world, conventional weapons stockpiles remain especially vulnerable to exploitation and diversion by weapons traffickers. Stockpile management and security are especially important, it was said, precisely because aging stocks of arms, ammunition, and explosives no longer useful to or needed by the local military are exactly what terrorists, organized crime
Institutional Responses

groups, and proliferators want to acquire to launch attacks, seize power, build improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and use as currency to traffic other items such as drugs, humans, and CBRN materials. The global trade in ammunition and explosives is especially worrisome, as it is largely unregulated and because the unsafe storage and handling practices common to the trade often lead to unnecessary explosions that result in significant civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.

Efforts to combat illicit trafficking in conventional arms and SALW have been undermined in large part by the very uneven quality of national and regional data on the trade, data that is often incompatible for analytical purposes and/or contradictory. Without more transparency and greater accuracy on the part of national governments with respect to their arms exports and imports, especially in the area of small arms and ammunition flows, it will remain exceedingly difficult to pinpoint where regulatory gaps exist that must be closed by tighter controls on conventional arms sales. A more effective comprehensive approach to illicit trafficking in these weapons, moreover, must be informed by a fuller appreciation of the various supply and demand dynamics that fuel the SALW trade to and within particular countries and regions. Indeed, understanding both supplier and recipient motivations, and their variations from region to region, is perhaps the first essential step to setting in place mechanisms to control, if not eliminate, imprudent and illegal transactions. Without such an understanding, even the best-intentioned international efforts to control the SALW trade can have unintended and very unwelcome consequences. This was the case, for example, when a small arms “buy back” program in Africa run by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) actually stimulated an increase in SALW trafficking among traders seeking to sell a steady stream of weapons, many procured via illicit means, including theft from national stockpiles, for a profit to the UNDP.

Meanwhile, SALW trafficking remains a major contributing factor to armed violence – including inter-state conflict, civil wars, terrorism, organized crime, and gang warfare – in many unstable regions of the world, and efforts to rein in SALW trafficking run against multiple barriers. In Latin America, for example, small arms in the hands of
insurgents in Colombia and drug cartels in Mexico certainly have exacerbated local instabilities. Small arms are cheap, easy to use, and relatively easy to transport and conceal. For these reasons, steps by local law enforcement agencies to combat weapons trafficking across the U.S.-Mexican border, for example, must rely on timely intelligence and consistent bi-national information sharing, but such coordination faces significant hurdles because of political, socio-cultural, and language differences on both sides of the border. Similarly, contrasting approaches to local-federal cooperation in Mexico and the United States have complicated attempts to establish close working relationships between customs, law enforcement, and military units along even the most heavily trafficked portions of the border. It was noted as well that despite the urgent need for better cross-border regulation of illicit arms trafficking, the U.S. eTrace system for firearm registration and tracing is currently only available in English, although a standard format for Spanish names is apparently now being added. Similar border management challenges can also be found in other areas of the globe where there are long and porous frontiers, many more porous than the U.S.-Mexican border.

Recognizing the significance of the SALW trafficking problem, the UN passed in 2001 the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which establishes a legally binding set of standards for UN member states. To this same end, the UN has also implemented a Firearms Protocol, the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and the 2005 International Tracing Instrument (ITI) aimed at more accurately charting SALW flows. Of these, the ITI was especially important in setting minimum global standards for SALW markings (including serial numbers, year of production, and country of origin, along with other information), overall record keeping, and shipment tracing. Within the UN system, UNIDIR has also sought to standardize SALW data collection and analysis by means of its national status reports, which assess progress made in implementing the UN Programme of Action. In addition, UNIDIR publishes Disarmament Forum (the most recent 2009 issue of which focused on illicit trafficking), and it provides a clearinghouse function for SALW studies to help connect the needs of member states and national experts with technical resources and data organized in standard format that would not otherwise be available.

Examples of transfers of small arms and light weapons to East and Southern Africa, 2004–2008

- Djibouti received 14 machine guns and 141 rifles from the USA in 2005.
- Eritrea received 50 mortars from Bulgaria in 2008 and an unknown number of machine pistols from Romania in 2005.
- Ethiopia received 114 light weapons from Bulgaria in 2007.
- Kenya received 40,000 rifles and 405 grenade launchers from Ukraine in 2007.
- Rwanda received 5000 rifles and 76500 kilograms of small arms ammunition from Bulgaria in 2005, and 2010 assault rifles from Romania in 2007.
- The Somali Transitional Federal Government received 5000 firearms from Yemen in 2005.
- Uganda received 1000 automatic rifles from Ukraine in 2007.

The EU, it was pointed out, also has its own EU Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which identifies Africa in particular as the region most affected by unregulated SALW trafficking, while noting as well growing SALW challenges in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In an effort to channel its energies toward parts of the problem where it could have the most impact, the EU Council has endorsed an EU program that focuses on disrupting the illegal transport of SALW by air. Among other tasks, the program helps EU and non-EU states alike to draft national legislation that specifically targets illicit trafficking by air, and it seeks to set in place commonly agreed-upon definitions and standard operating procedures for the air transport of arms and related military equipment. These last two objectives are particularly important, it was argued, given that current procedures leave too much to the discretion of air carriers and are not uniformly applied. Of equal value, the EU Council program also provides training for customs agencies and other groups responsible for border control and the management of national weapons stockpiles. Council officials have acknowledged, however, that consistent and uniform enforcement still remains a challenge, given that different countries and regions abide by different cultures with respect to compliance and risk aversion.

That said, a number of national authorities, it was stressed, do contribute in very useful ways to combating specific aspects of SALW trafficking. Among U.S. agencies engaged in SALW matters, DTRA, for example, continues to assist numerous foreign governments with the security, safety, and proper administration of state-controlled SALW and ammunition stockpiles. Since 2000, DTRA has conducted missions in approximately fifty nations, providing education and training to foreign personnel on ways to render their overall weapons stockpiles more secure. In 2003, moreover, DTRA helped the OSCE to launch the Best Practices in Small Arms and Light Weapons Program, a program that describes best practices and procedures for securing SALW from the time of manufacture to their eventual destruction. DTRA has also participated in OSCE-led SALW assessments in Kaliningrad and Cyprus that led to the destruction of 324 SA-7 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS); supported multiple OSCE seminars in Moldova focused on stockpile security and management; assisted in no fewer than nine SALW destruction operations in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan; and sent experts to numerous OSCE-sponsored regional conferences and symposiums in Vienna on a variety of SALW control issues. At the same time, DTRA has worked closely with NATO to develop and teach SALW-related courses at the NATO School in Germany that were attended by approximately 150 students from NATO and NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. Finally, DTRA is actively assisting the U.S.
Department of State’s Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) activities in Southeast Europe, activities that seek to set in place (and build local capacity in support of) a coordinated regional program to secure and destroy excess and/or aging SALW stocks that in the wrong hands are still dangerous.

Still, despite these national and institutional efforts, many global standards regarding the control and regulated trade of conventional weapons and SALW have yet to be fully implemented. Indeed, only 52 percent of the UN’s member states have implemented the import marking standards required by the 2001 UN Protocol, and the fact that national reporting to UNIDIR on SALW sales and transfers is entirely voluntary means that critical information gaps persist. As described in greater detail in chapter 3, the Geneva Small Arms Process, a multifaceted, private-public study initiative launched by the Swiss government and dedicated to documenting global SALW flows, has made very good progress filling a number of these information gaps, but it also struggles with the voluntary – and hence inevitably limited – nature of national SALW reports. In the end, the failure to make greater progress on the SALW front can be traced largely to a lack of political will among nation-states to give real priority to SALW controls, as well as to an inability among the relevant IGOs to hold these states accountable to their obligations in the SALW realm. In an effort to overcome this problem, UNIDIR has begun to collaborate more closely with the EU, holding discussions about a potential conventional arms transfer treaty and exploring ways to promote closer collaboration among governments, industry, media, and civil society to achieve tighter regulation of SALW trafficking in regions, such as West Africa, where EU governments retain considerable influence.

**Trafficking Modalities**

In addition to developing strategies to combat and manage the impact of different types of illicit trafficking, the anti-trafficking community has focused on improving national and international controls over specific methods of transport exploited by traffickers. As suggested earlier, this includes a number of IGO initiatives aimed at combating illicit trafficking by air, sea, and overland routes. In the future, moreover, it will become increasingly important to monitor cyberspace, the fourth dimension of transport, given the critical role of electronic communications to a wide range of both illicit activities and anti-trafficking initiatives.

**Trafficking by Air**

Particularly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the airline industry has re-emphasized its commitment to ensuring the security of air transport and combating all types of illicit trafficking via air by implementing stricter safety procedures. At the same time, delivering on this commitment has been hampered by the poor capacity of many airlines to take on law enforcement tasks such as identifying false documents, as well as by ongoing challenges that the industry as a whole faces in balancing security concerns with continued commercial viability and competitiveness. For example, consumer demand has driven the use of more convenient, expedited check-in procedures (online check-in or “fast bag drop” programs, for example), all of which have the additional effect of compli-
cating security checks. Meanwhile, airlines must manage and accommodate the different security priorities and procedures set by different national governments, priorities and procedures that are often determined by each country’s individual vulnerability to, or prioritization of, a certain type of trafficking or security threat. There are also high costs and a great number of operational complexities involved, a senior industry representative from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) explained, in assisting governments with the identification of and collection of information on suspicious individuals or luggage. He also noted that in today’s zero-growth environment, which has forced many airlines into bankruptcy, there are often insufficient resources to commit to the security programs and priorities they have agreed to establish, and there are fewer airlines as a whole handling a larger volume of traffic. Given these constraints and pressures, it is important to ensure, he suggested, that any expansion in airline security regulations is “proportionate” to the likely range of threats, otherwise the airlines may be saddled with an additional burden that they can’t really handle effectively and that may not even be necessary. Ideally, the added value of new proposals for improved security would be confirmed by means of an iterative dialogue between the airline industry and national governments.

With these basic limitations in mind, it was acknowledged nonetheless that commercial airlines do possess unique skills and capabilities that could play a decisive role in combating illicit trafficking. Not only do airlines have substantial experience in data gathering and data management, but they also have a very useful operational presence worldwide that enables them to observe and detect suspicious behavior or activities. Additionally, they are part of a unique and well-established global network linked to both the airline industry and the various security and anti-crime organizations that monitor and support that industry. However, as noted earlier in this discussion, the airlines also often lack the capacity to fulfill the law enforcement-type roles they are often assigned or assumed to be performing. One need only consider the various oversights on the part of the airlines involved in the 2009 “Christmas bomber” affair for further evidence to that effect. There is also frequently a breakdown in communication between governmental authorities (including law enforcement IGOs) and the airline industry with regard to the analysis of the data that the airlines do in fact provide, leading to questions about how adroitly and intelligently that information is being handled by the national and international authorities who receive and process it.

As this last point suggests, however, IOs and IGOs certainly can and do play an important role in protecting air transportation systems from inappropriate use by traffickers. For example, a key element of the EU Council’s earlier-mentioned effort to control SALW is its focus on regulating and tracking the transfer of SALW transported by air. Moreover, apart from acting as intermediaries between industry and government agencies, IGOs often provide vital technical training and assistance to help member states to implement the best possible legal and border security frameworks. As one industry representative put it, standardizing and harmonizing competing national requirements for air travel security has proved to be a daunting task, but IGOs dealing with air transport matters – such as the IATA, as well as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) – have both the mandate and the resources to make serious headway toward that goal. Improving security measures with respect to small plane operations is another area where aviation-minded IGOs could play an especially useful role, given that smaller aircraft are rarely subject to the safety regulations and customs oversight with which large commercial aircraft must regularly deal. As was mentioned earlier, for example, MAOC-N monitors and reports suspected drug traffickers who operate in small planes or small boats and ships along the air and maritime approaches to Europe; this is a surveillance and intelligence sharing model that could
be usefully applied in other regions where illicit trafficking looms large.

**Trafficking by Sea**

In addition to shipments by air, illicit traffickers have become especially adept at smuggling their goods through and across waterways that are poorly patrolled and/or over which there is uncertain national jurisdiction. Indeed, as noted in the earlier MAOC-N discussion, trafficking by sea is often conducted by relying on yachts, fishing boats, and other small vessels (including, in some cases, crude mini-submarines) that can more easily slip through the cracks of traditional maritime surveillance networks. Moreover, even around quite heavily traveled sea lanes with dedicated naval patrols, it is exceedingly difficult, as Somali pirates operating in the waters off the Horn of Africa and in the western Indian Ocean have so ably demonstrated, to detect and interdict illicit activities at sea by small bands of dedicated criminals piloting quite rudimentary, but fast and GPS-aided, boats. Increasingly, therefore, the anti-trafficking community has turned its attention to developing better methods for closing these gaps in maritime security.

For example, in addition to the MAOC-N operation (which, again, focuses specifically on monitoring the operations of small boats and aircraft along the Atlantic approaches to Europe), a number of other EU-affiliated agencies have begun to pool resources and to consider the joint use of assets to improve maritime surveillance along the entire EU coastline. More specifically, FRONTEX, an EU agency charged with coordinating security measures for the external borders of EU member states, signed a cooperation agreement in December 2009 with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) aimed at maximizing the impact of all three agencies to their mutual benefit. This included agreements to exchange information on maritime matters of common interest, to explore potential synergies between their respective maritime surveillance and information systems, to coordinate in the areas of inspections, training, and R&D, and to explore future opportunities for collaborating on the security of external maritime borders. Based on recent immigration flows (including illicit trafficking in human beings), particular attention will be given to improving situational awareness and joint surveillance operations of maritime traffic originating from West and North Africa and passing through the Aegean Sea region. Moreover, a 2009 working arrangement between FRONTEX and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security should help to enhance overall surveillance of transatlantic sea routes covered in part by MAOC-N.

Multinational maritime forces, such as those deployed by NATO and its partners, can also help to provide a more comprehensive operational picture of the maritime environment so as to detect suspicious activity and, most importantly, to support the implementation of law enforcement and/or military activities via the provision of timely intelligence. The ocean-going, cross-regional reach of NATO naval forces, together with their proven capacity for data collection and analysis, intelligence

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**DEPARTURE LOCATION OF IDENTIFIED DRUG TRAFFICKING SHIPMENTS BY SEA FROM SOUTH AMERICA TO EUROPE**

Including shipments made via West Africa 2006 - 2008

![Graph showing departure location of identified drug trafficking shipments by sea from South America to Europe.](image-url)
Institutional Responses

fusion, and net-centric operations, make them especially useful tools for combating the maritime dimension of illicit trafficking. By way of illustration, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), a NATO official explained, which is tasked (as noted in chapter 1) with deterring, detecting, disrupting, and protecting against incidents of terrorism at sea, expanded its information coverage of the Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea areas from an initial 5 percent in the early months after 9/11 to 60 percent by 2009. Since it began in October 2001, moreover, OAE has hailed over one hundred thousand merchant ships in the Mediterranean, where about seven thousand such vessels are likely to be traveling at any one time. As an information-driven operation, OAE grants participating countries and the NATO alliance as a whole prompt access to the intelligence that it collects and to the analysis that it produces as part of its overall counter-terrorist mission. However, a by-product of this mission is a substantial amount of useful information gathered about suspicious maritime trafficking activities across the board. Future OAE efforts to package and transmit this data to appropriate European national authorities and law enforcement agencies, including INTERPOL and EUROPOL, via OAE’s Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) could provide an extremely useful supplement to the work of FRONTEX, EMSA, and CFCA described above.

Hence, while NATO forces currently have no specific tasking to combat illicit trafficking directly, there is a clear compatibility, at least in the OAE case, between their counter-terrorist activities and anti-trafficking efforts more broadly defined. Upon request, NATO could play an important supporting role for law enforcement agencies charged with combating trafficking, providing them with actionable intelligence and operational support that could include air as well as naval units. Moreover, insofar as naval assistance more specifically is concerned, NATO’s potential support to civil authorities is being formalized and integrated into the Alliance’s emerging concept of maritime security operations (MSOs). Indeed, in addition to more traditional naval combat missions that remain central to the defense of NATO territorial waters, the new MSO concept will likely embrace a range of less traditional missions of rising importance, including anti-trafficking missions. MSOs are likely as well to be mentioned explicitly in NATO’s New Strategic Concept now being developed to confirm and underscore NATO’s ongoing relevance as a twenty-first-century security organization. As a result, the utility and availability of NATO maritime forces as key enablers in the fight against illicit trafficking will also be reaffirmed, and maritime operations conducted in support of civil authorities – including law enforcement agencies – will be accorded a higher priority overall.

Achieving the degree of civil-military cooperation required to get the most from MSO-based support, however, will require special security and legal agreements with participating nations, and a greater willingness to share information and intelligence across the civil-military divide. It will take time and effort to ensure that such agreements
work in synergy, do not overlap in responsibility, and respect the sovereignty of each nation involved. For its part, NATO will need to address the facts that it does not yet have standard operating procedures for apprehending and then turning over traffickers for prosecution and that it has no judicial capacity of its own to prosecute and/or punish criminals. None of these shortcomings, however, is expected to divert the Alliance from acting on proposals contained in NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit Declaration to expand the OAE network, reaching out to additional law enforcement groups and even non-NATO nations. At the same time, there is likely to be increased emphasis on anti-trafficking “best practices” at sea in NATO training and exercise programs, as well as in coursework developed for the NATO School and the NATO Defense College.

On a cautionary note, a senior official from the IOM did raise concerns about the way in which uncertainties over maritime jurisdiction may discourage certain vessels – particularly commercial ships – from performing rescues at sea. He worried in particular that without greater efforts to clarify “rules of the road at sea” that now remain ambiguous and/or contentious, some ship captains will think twice before rescuing a vessel in distress and bringing it to shore, a reluctance that could prove disastrous should that ship be carrying illegal (but often quite helpless) immigrants or migrant laborers, including forced laborers. Indeed, a hesitation to intervene in such cases could give the traffickers involved ample time simply to throw the hapless people they are transporting overboard, thereby avoiding arrest and prosecution altogether. This, in turn, prompted a senior NATO official to argue that ship captains in general needed to be much better equipped to handle these and other issues related to trafficking at sea, including how best to identify victims of trafficking, how to provide them with adequate protection, and what procedures to follow in dealing with suspected traffickers. For once a presumed criminal is apprehended at sea, the legal situation can become quite complex, in part as it may be unclear as to which nation has jurisdiction for prosecutorial purposes and to what degree the country from which the interdicted or apprehended ship originally set sail (or in which it is registered) can be held responsible. In fact, fear of triggering the imposition of trafficking-related penalties appears to have contributed, it was said, to an overall decline in rescues at sea in recent years. After some discussion, participants generally agreed, therefore, that a greater effort needs to be made to establish common procedures for rescues at sea that both commercial and military ships can and need to follow, including, once again, reasonable measures for assuring the safety of all those rescued.

**Trafficking by Land**

Combating illicit trafficking over land presents yet another complex series of challenges, involving a dynamic mix of military, political, law enforcement, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural considerations. Some borders are more porous than others, but even quite tightly regulated borders (for example, the U.S.-Mexican border) continue to struggle to contain illicit trafficking, given the manpower and other resources required to monitor and enforce border security around the clock. In this context, a representative from MAOC-N noted that the EU faces an especially difficult situation, given the absence of internal borders and the increased responsibility that this places on perimeter states to regulate and restrict illicit flows for the EU as a whole. And in the less developed world where governance may be unstable and law enforcement resources limited, border control across land frontiers is likely to be rendered even more challenging by corruption, poor training, limited manpower, and inadequate equipment. Additionally, as a representative from IATA pointed out, all nations face the complicated balancing act of ensuring security while still enabling regular commercial trade, and this is no less true with respect to busy land borders than it is for major airports and seaports.

With these concerns in mind, IGOs with special expertise in border control – such as the OSCE and FRONTEX – certainly can and do play a vital role...
in securing external land borders in Europe and providing standardized training in border management. The OSCE, for example, has had considerable success in building up border management capabilities among the new democracies in Europe, particularly in areas such as the West Balkans and the expanse of Southeast Europe, where new land borders have been established and/or are in dispute. Since trafficking often promotes conflict, the OSCE, as a conflict prevention organization, considers the task of combating illicit trafficking in all its many forms to be one of its primary missions. Toward that end, this organization remains one of the few IGOs to deal with all three of what it considers to be the primary dimensions of illicit trafficking: the political-military (CBRN, WMD, and SALW smuggling), the eco-environmental (hazardous waste and resource plundering), and the human security (child soldier, forced labor, and sex trade) aspects. By its very structure, then, the OSCE, it was argued, embraces a comprehensive approach to combat trafficking across land frontiers.

Through its Permanent Council (which meets weekly in Vienna) and its Forum for Security Cooperation, the OSCE also provides high-profile platforms within which to highlight priorities for anti-trafficking action and cross-border cooperation, and, again, a major success in this context has been the OSCE’s contributions to improving security along Europe’s new land borders, especially in the Balkans and the Caucasus region. Central to this effort was learning that the border security challenges faced by the newly independent countries in and around Europe, including in Central Asia, are often quite different from those faced by West European countries. Climate, terrain, and a lack of infrastructure may demand innovative approaches to the management of land borders across which traffic of all kinds, legal and illegal, may have traditionally flowed with little oversight. On the other hand, given the operational experience that some of these countries have acquired in coping with various aspects of trafficking that may be relatively new to Western Europe, they can also be good teachers. Such was the case, workshop attendees noted, when Macedonia offered to help England develop more effective measures against human trafficking. No doubt, additional opportunities exist for developed nations and IGOs providing assistance to countries victimized by illicit trafficking to benefit from the experience of these same countries as they try to stem such trafficking and manage its consequences. In this way, information and analysis sharing between nations with relatively strong border control capacities and those with weaker capabilities can set in place a pattern of exchange that can eventually help both sides.

As for specific improvements to border controls along land frontiers, FRONTEX, once again, will play a central role in the greater EU region. A key task in this context will be to conduct risk analyses of vulnerable borders, helping EU countries and partner states to allocate available resources to likely risks in a way that provides sufficient protection without over- or under-protecting. FRONTEX will also assist in the training of national border guards in accordance with a common core curriculum keyed to the requirements of the EU’s new Integrated Border Security (IBS) system. In addition, FRONTEX will keep national border guard communities abreast of new technologies and products that may be especially helpful in securing their frontiers, and it has pledged to make an effort to solicit from the guard communities suggestions for border security research that address their specific...
concerns. R&D to support the continued development of the FRONTEX-sponsored European Surveillance System (or EUROSUR) will be given priority. At the same time, plans are in the works at FRONTEX to prepare what it calls “pre-positioned and pre-structured intervention packages” that could be rapidly deployed to EU borders where an increase in technical and operational assistance is urgently required.

Expanding and Adapting the Proliferation Security Initiative Model

The foregoing discussion has presented a range of approaches and best practices that could be used as models for other IGOs likely to become engaged in anti-trafficking efforts and that could be linked together more effectively over time to build a truly comprehensive international approach to illicit trafficking. It is clear, moreover, that having in hand a variety of formats for international cooperation is the best way to provide the kind of flexibility that IGOs and national authorities really need to have to be able to respond promptly to emergency situations. That said, it is also evident that speed, ingenuity, and, above all, a capacity for action have become increasingly important qualities for all anti-trafficking stakeholders, as traffickers themselves continue to devise innovative ways to circumvent, manipulate, or altogether avoid the constraints created by existing anti-trafficking regimes. In this respect, the early and rapid successes of the PSI in expanding its international membership and achieving concrete results in combating the proliferation of CBRN materials and WMD-related delivery systems have triggered a growing interest in exploring ways to strengthen and adapt the PSI approach to address other international security threats, particularly in the anti-trafficking realm where this new “initiative”-style format has already made great strides. Before discussing specific ar-
eas for cross-organizational collaboration, therefore, some additional discussion of the potential applications and future trajectory of the PSI model is in order.

**PSI Origins and Structure**

The PSI, and the new initiative-oriented format on which it is based, was launched in 2003 to address loopholes discovered in the anti-trafficking regime that allowed Spanish naval authorities to board the So San, a North Korean-flagged ship carrying illegal weapons (including Scud missiles) to Yemen, but not to seize the illicit cargo. This incident added to the international community's growing frustration with its inability to meaningfully enforce existing non-proliferation treaties and international regulations. As a result, the PSI was created to augment existing multilateral efforts to interdict such shipments, whether they are transported by sea, over land, or in the air. The PSI was also an attempt to strengthen the capacity of every member state's legal authorities to take decisive action to increase cooperation and promote intelligence sharing among all participating nations to enable them to intercept suspect arms transfers, especially those that may be WMD-related. In this way, the PSI, according to a former senior U.S. official involved in its creation, was a “call to action” that did not create any new legal obligations or authorities, but simply called on its members to endorse and be ready to enforce the Statement of Interdiction Principles, all of which were based on existing global non-proliferation mandates. In this context, UNSC resolution 1540 provided a particularly important legal foundation for PSI interdictions, because, even though it did not authorize enforcement actions inside another country’s territory, it can be seen as having established an important first step in that direction by creating an obligation among UN member states to halt illicit WMD trafficking wherever it occurs.

On this basis, then, PSI members commit to interdict proliferation-related shipments, to share information on suspected proliferation activities, and to prevent proliferation within their own territories. As a non-binding framework, all participation in meetings, exercises, and operations is strictly voluntary, and such flexibility allows members to pool resources quickly and join combined efforts as they choose to combat challenges as they arise. Capacity building is also a central goal of the initiative, including efforts to raise threat awareness and improve the readiness and capabilities of PSI partners to act on short notice. To date, PSI participants have held more than thirty-seven interdiction training exercises, most of them with a maritime focus. Initially, these exercises were coordinated by the PSI’s Operational Experts Group (OEG), made up of expert delegations from defense ministries, law enforcement offices, and other national agencies of twenty PSI-participating countries, as enumerated above. However, in an effort to increase active participation in meetings, the OEG plans in the future to hold expanded regional meetings rather than the smaller and perhaps less representative OEG sessions.

For security reasons, there is limited public information available on actual PSI interdictions. Perhaps the best-known PSI interdiction occurred

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**Members of the PSI’s Operational Experts Group**

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**PSI Founding Members**

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† member since 2003
only a few weeks after the Statement of Interdiction Principles was signed in October 2003. That particular interdiction, the work of the United States, the UK, Germany, and Italy, seized a shipment of centrifuge components headed to Libya, an operation that eventually exposed and led to the destruction of the infamous A.Q. Khan trafficking network. In addition to this and other less publicized successes, PSI members have developed over the years much stronger legal justifications for conducting interdictions. Most notably, the United States has signed ship-boarding agreements (modeled on earlier counter-narcotics agreements) with three of the largest “flag of convenience” states: Liberia, Panama, and the Marshall Islands.

Sustaining Success: Ways to Enhance PSI
Given the success and importance of past PSI efforts, the PSI, one participant argued, must continue refining existing tools and testing new ones in order to retain its adaptive and flexible role within the changing security environment. Moreover, he believed that taking steps to strengthen the initiative's framework should be a priority in order to eliminate budding symptoms of “routinization” or “initiative fatigue.” Already, for example, the pace of membership growth has begun to slow, and the scale of new member participation in joint exercises and operations has narrowed, even though overall PSI membership has risen to ninety-five states. Some analysts have attributed this ebb to a need to formalize the PSI structure, perhaps by incorporating it into the UN system. It is argued by many others, however, that such actions would actually over-formalize the PSI in a way that would undermine the speedy and flexible nature of its operations that make it valuable.

At the same time, there are, most knowledgeable observers agree, numerous ways in which PSI could still be improved without changing its fundamental character. First, as suggested above, the OEG could indeed organize more regionally focused meetings, while still meeting in a more traditional executive session format at least once a year. Second, a resumption of high-level policy meetings to build and solidify wider political support for the PSI would probably be helpful, especially as a way to sustain momentum. Third, nearly all PSI members, including the United States, need to establish dedicated, multi-year budgets for their PSI contributions. And fourth and finally, the legal foundation for PSI efforts could certainly be bolstered by, among other things, finalizing ship-boarding agreements with other “flag of convenience” states and improving national legislation for, and the enforcement of, national export controls.

In addition to structural changes, however, PSI membership could still be usefully expanded, particularly to include states that remain especially vulnerable to proliferation networks. Expansion along these lines, it was argued, could reinvigorate
PSI by giving it a broader global reach, since the geographic coverage afforded by its current membership is quite uneven. There is a particular need to recruit sub-Saharan African countries, Central and South American countries, and those Asian coastal states that remain outside the PSI framework if the initiative is to have the broadest impact in regions where it really matters. In this respect, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and South Africa loom as eight of the most important countries to incorporate, given their geopolitical influence, actual and potential access to CBRN material, and involvement to one degree or another in a variety of sensitive CBRN activities that could in theory be diverted for WMD-related purposes.

Beyond increasing the quantity and quality of PSI membership, it would be good as well to expand the participation of existing member states in key PSI activities. For example, workshop participants suggested that the OEG itself could be expanded to include as many as thirty members, ensuring better regional representation. Furthermore, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), only six non-OEG countries took part in the more than thirty-six exercises that the PSI held from September 2003 to September 2008, even though these exercises are being sponsored increasingly by newer members. U.S. agencies, among others, have sought to increase overall PSI cooperation and coordination by hosting and participating in PSI exercises, and more could be done along these lines. Broadening participation in PSI exercises, moreover, would help to widen support for treating PSI principles as “international common law” to be upheld by all. In a similar vein, several participants called for the PSI to increase its interdiction activities with regard to nuclear contraband transported by air and over land, recognizing that both modes of transport are even more difficult to disrupt than maritime trafficking, in part because they appear to allow fewer opportunities to interdict shipments in transit.

Unfortunately, the previously mentioned lack of transparency surrounding past interdictions has made it difficult to evaluate the success of many PSI initiatives and/or their usefulness as a model for more comprehensive anti-trafficking cooperation. Since transparency is viewed by many in the IGO community as a key precondition to facilitating successful cross-organizational collaboration, this is an issue that must be addressed more directly if the PSI program is to expand effectively and perhaps be applied to other trafficking challenges. The current scarcity in publicly available information about PSI activities makes it especially difficult to build broader public support, a weakness that could be addressed, it was suggested, by creating a dedicated public PSI website. Poor transparency also hampers communication and cooperation even among PSI members, a point made clear when U.S. officials confirmed in June 2008 that they did not know the true number of PSI interdictions conducted so far because operations were generally kept secret by other members. At present, information sharing is available through a members-only website managed by the German government, but this particular website lacks organizational structure and PSI members continue to question the accuracy of the intelligence it provides.

This last point is especially disconcerting, because anti-trafficking operations are often intelligence driven, and they require, as noted throughout the Geneva workshop, a strong intelligence support platform. A former U.S. official familiar with PSI operations argued that therefore “a more formal organizational structure and process for sharing and assessing the validity of intelligence claims” and lessons learned would give the PSI a more effective tool for interdiction cooperation. In effect, such a restructuring would make the PSI’s intelligence sharing structure similar to the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP) run by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, or GICNT, which provides a “secure but unclassified mechanism to exchange ideas and share information among the GICNT community.”
Adaptation and Application of the PSI Model: GICNT and Beyond

The success of the PSI in operationalizing existing international agreements in the field of non-proliferation has prompted efforts to adapt and apply the PSI model to other international security challenges, and this trend seems likely to continue as the international community becomes increasingly aware of the need for action to implement and advance existing anti-trafficking regimes. In this context, several defining features of the PSI were highlighted that need to be kept in mind in weighing the transferability of the PSI model to other initiatives aimed at combating illicit trafficking, including:

- A foundation of shared, explicit principles among members
- The need for high-level political endorsement and support
- Avoiding new legal obligations, unless voluntarily adopted by individual members
- An emphasis on the broadest possible membership, consistent with the purposes of the initiative in question
- Adherence to a limited central bureaucratic structure
- Periodic meetings of an operational working group or groups
- No requirement for consensus, except on some procedural matters and by founding members on basic principles
- Voluntary participation in the overall initiative and in individual activities
- Sharing of information, lessons learned, and best practices to enhance the capacity of all members to fulfill initiative goals
- Flexibility to adjust to evolving circumstances

Successful application of the PSI model need not include all of these features. In fact, it was stressed that rigid application of a PSI model would be contrary to the fundamental concept of the model. Of all the features listed above, the only one that should really be considered essential, it was further argued, was the first – the need for a foundation of shared, explicit principles that could be implemented by a group of states or organizations.

Participants noted that the GICNT is perhaps the best-known and most successful application of the PSI model to date and even improves on some aspects of the model. Much like the PSI, the GICNT has greatly expanded its membership and achieved concrete operational results in a very short period of time. However, in contrast to PSI, which primarily addresses the interdiction of WMD transfers among state actors, the GICNT targets potential proliferation pathways to terrorist actors. Toward that end, it focuses on securing nuclear weapons and related materials against diversion to and/or by non-state actors, on the early detection of any attempts at such diversions, and, in the event that defenses against diversion fail, on emergency response, consequence management, and eventual apprehension of the perpetrators. Moreover, unlike many other nuclear safety programs, such as the U.S. Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, the GICNT targets the security of civilian rather than military nuclear facilities and materials. Similar to the PSI, it does this via a non-binding framework for international cooperation open to all states endorsing its Statement of Principles, which focus on combating nuclear trafficking through the sharing of information and expertise, as well as by means of joint exercises.

As an adaptation of the PSI model, GICNT has no central structure, although in April 2008 an exercise planning group (EPG) was established to coordinate the joint exercise program. Much like the PSI, GICNT has also quickly gathered broad support, with seventy-six partners and four observer organizations, including the EU, the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the UNODC.

To date, GICNT members have sponsored more than thirty workshops, conferences, and exercises. However, it remains difficult for outside observers to assess the initiative’s full impact, because, just as in the PSI case, there is very little public information available about specific GICNT-related activities. One of its most important contributions, particularly in terms of enhancing the PSI model, is the Global Initiative Information Portal mentioned earlier in this chapter, which has become an
important internal information-sharing tool and a potential model for large-scale information sharing on the international level. As part of its strong support for the GICNT, DTRA, in coordination with the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, took the lead in developing the GICNT from its inception in August 2007, including primary responsibility for the GIIP. Secure but unclassified, the GIIP is a central communications hub for all GICNT-related events, facilitating planning of GICNT workshops, conferences, and exercises. In addition, the GIIP acts as a virtual repository for publications, presentations, and materials relevant to member planning and operational activities. Today, the GIIP has more than eight hundred active users, including seventy of the GICNT’s seventy-nine formal partners. In order to maintain this momentum and build on its success, it was suggested that GICNT members should explore ways to enhance the information portal to provide even better support to operational planning and execution, as well as to the compilation and sharing of key lessons learned.

The PSI model, it was noted, has also been applied with good effect to the problem of money laundering, but more could be done in this regard, especially with respect to proliferation financing. For example, the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF, discussed earlier in this chapter, was modeled in part on the PSI, promoting among its members a set of shared, explicit principles. Similar to the PSI, it acts far more quickly and decisively than many IGOs, despite the fact that, unlike the PSI, it adheres to a formal decision-making process and maintains a central, if small, secretariat at OECD headquarters. Where it could use some reinforcement, however, is in the area of tracking and disrupting proliferation financing, which FATF authorities have been slow to identify as a priority concern, despite the their release of the Proliferation Financing Report, which acknowledged such financing as a growing problem that needs to be addressed more directly. To help correct this oversight, the PSI, one attendee advocated, could create a financial sub-group within the OEG, while at the same time encouraging all PSI members to use their influence with the FATF staff to increase the priority it assigns to acting against proliferation financing.

A PSI-like approach could also be applied, another attendee suggested, in the field of global health security and cooperation. More specifically, the PSI could serve as the model for a “Global Initiative to Combat Biological Terrorism” aimed at coordinating national and multinational efforts to combat biological weapons and biological terrorism. Like the PSI, such an initiative would not displace the numerous existing international efforts and agreements already targeting bio-security challenges, but simply provide a flexible tool to implement them more uniformly and consistently. Additionally, while the PSI model has already been adapted to the problem of conventional arms and SALW trafficking, it could be applied more broadly in this arena, building perhaps on steps in this direction being taken by eight NATO and PSI partners, including the United States, to combat arms smuggling into and to the Gaza Strip. While this particular example is more geographically focused and less inclusive than other PSI-based efforts, it is founded on a set of shared, explicit principles to better implement existing mandates aimed at halting arms smuggling into and through Gaza. More importantly, this particular initiative serves as a good illustration of how the PSI approach can be effectively applied to a specific trafficking challenge that needs immediate attention.

Finally, the PSI model may be a source of inspiration for other forms of maritime cooperation, similar to the idea of a global maritime partnership (GMP) as proposed by the chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, in 2005 when he was serving as the U.S. chief of naval operations. The idea here was to create a “one-thousand-ship navy” made up of ad hoc groupings of naval and coast guard ships, commercial ships, and various law enforcement units drawn from nations from around the world to confront new and emerging maritime threats of growing importance, such as piracy, terrorism, and illicit trafficking of all
sorts. Subsequent ideas for similar maritime initiatives, such as NATO's concept of maritime security operations, or MSOs (also mentioned earlier), have the potential to reinvigorate this adaptation of the PSI model. In the interim, however, it might be possible, an attendee proposed, to blend a variant of the GMP idea with the PSI's shift toward regional meetings, thereby advancing both initiatives via regional maritime partnerships. Moreover, as trafficking by air receives greater attention following Thailand's December 2009 seizure of an arms-laden plane headed to Iran from North Korea, the idea of adding a "global aerospace partnership" component to a joint GMP-PSI initiative should also be seriously considered.

Conclusion

Clearly, much can be done to build upon and more effectively leverage the various institutional programs and mechanisms described in this chapter to combat illicit trafficking. In support of such efforts, it will be important to bear in mind both the diversity of existing trafficking streams and their interconnectedness, characteristics that will require, in turn, a mix of tailored responses for specific types of trafficking and more general, wider-ranging responses that could help to contain or disrupt more than one trafficking stream. To the extent possible, it will also be important to develop anti-trafficking strategies that can tackle trafficking challenges through their full cycle of operation, from points of origin to paths of transit and finally to points of ultimate impact. When one thinks about combating illicit trafficking in this way, it is also clear that successful initiatives by the anti-trafficking community will require more concerted efforts to protect vulnerable populations, to manage the potentially devastating consequences of various trafficking schemes, and, of equal importance, to assist those most affected to recover and build up defenses against future streams and adaptations of illicit trafficking, as well as a greater capacity to detect and interdict illegal activities.

Making progress on all these fronts, moreover, will depend as much on the breadth and depth of the cooperative relationships that key anti-trafficking IGOs and other stakeholders are able to establish, as on their individual technical skills and operational capabilities. The need to develop strategic partnerships that can help to close existing capability gaps and facilitate seamless operations across geographic and functional divides looms as an especially high priority. Identifying a number of opportunities for moving in this direction is the focus of chapter 3.
Based on the analysis presented in chapters 1 and 2, it seems clear that developing and implementing a successful comprehensive approach to combat illicit trafficking will depend in large part on the opportunities that exist (or can be created) to foster closer collaboration between and among the host of agencies, organizations, and other institutional stakeholders now charged with at least a degree of responsibility for preventing and impeding trafficking flows. Without the benefit of increased cross-organizational cooperation, anti-trafficking authorities are likely to falter in their efforts to redress troubling institutional weaknesses, to leverage existing IGO assets and infrastructure more effectively, and to close capability gaps in anti-trafficking operations. Workshop discussions turned next, therefore, to a review of various policy initiatives and institutional mechanisms that currently exist to promote anti-trafficking cooperation within and across specific functional and regional sectors in an effort to determine how best to boost (and expand on) their utility moving forward.

Counter-proliferation Planning as an Arena for Wider Collaboration

To evaluate in detail the specifics of such initiatives and measures, participants at the September 2009 Geneva workshop first took a closer look at the U.S. approach to the problem of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly in light of the Obama administration’s overarching goal of achieving a global zero in nuclear weapons sometime in the future. In pursuing that goal effectively, U.S. arms control and non-proliferation policy, according to a senior U.S. government official, would need to follow a clearly defined path that focuses on three key priorities. The first policy priority involves reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy and urging other governments to do the same. A second priority concentrates on strengthening the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-proliferation Treaty, or NPT), while preserving the basic bargain therein of disarmament and universal access to peaceful nuclear energy. The third key priority in the U.S. counter-proliferation approach centers on the importance of preventing terrorists and other potential sub-state adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons and other WMD capabilities. In support of this particular objective, Washington has emphasized the need for enhanced anti-terrorism measures and has encouraged all nations to increase their efforts to break up the black markets that facilitate the fabrication and trade in dangerous materials.

The discovery of the A. Q. Khan network and the consequent exposure of Libya’s nuclear weapons program, noted in the preceding chapter, unraveled a business model that has almost certainly been adopted by a wide variety of black marketers around the world. Data eventually uncovered about the Khan network and its transactions clearly illustrated the enormous profits that individuals and entities involved in facilitating WMD proliferation stand to gain, providing a compelling incentive to exploit opportunities and weaknesses in the international commercial and financial systems to achieve their ends. Many of the goods involved in these trafficking schemes are also dual-use in nature, making it even harder to prevent their diversion to countries of concern, such as North Korea...
and Iran, for use in WMD-related programs. Frequently adding to the problem is the reluctance of some nations to implement strong export controls due to fears that doing so would be “bad for business.”

Moreover, as noted earlier in this report, individuals and entities involved in proliferation networks have proven to be quite agile and quick to adapt their procedures in reaction to non-proliferation measures taken to shut them down. This might include employing tactics such as the falsification of shipping paperwork, the use of front companies, changes in the names and locations of these front companies, the use of multiple intermediaries between shipment points, and frequent changes in methods of transport. These and related tactics have made the tracking and discovery of illicit WMD—a particularly difficult challenge. It is a challenge, moreover, for which broader access to high-quality actionable intelligence will be critical to the wider success of anti-trafficking activities, especially if such access is paired with closer intelligence collaboration, capacity building, and information sharing overall, a broader understanding of legal mechanisms and networks that may be involved, and greater efforts to go beyond narrow national capacities to tap the resources of the international community. The figure above illustrates a few examples of generic trafficking pathways that a proliferator might take, while demonstrating the complexity of counter-proliferation operations.

The U.S. approach to the problem of WMD trafficking, it was argued, relies as well on several sets of international instruments that have been designed to address the risks posed by proliferation-related trades. Among those initiatives are key non-proliferation treaties, which seek to obligate their member states to work to prevent illicit trafficking of the items that are prohibited by the treaty in question. However, while they can be effective, treaty obligations are also somewhat limited in scope, as they apply only to their states parties. Another important instrument for multinational collaboration comprises the various non-proliferation regimes that are not treaty-based—including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement—but nonetheless endorse control lists that can be used to help bolster national export regulations so as to discourage destabilizing and/or illicit transfers of sensitive items. A third, voluntary and more informal, set of arrangements encompasses initiatives such as the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which hold a significant advantage over other control mechanisms because they are flexible and voluntary, and they facilitate prompt action, particularly in the case of the Global Partnership and the PSI.

In addition to these international agreements, ship-boarding agreements, negotiated as part of
the PSI, are becoming increasingly important in the anti-trafficking toolkits of the United States and other PSI members. Negotiated bilaterally with a number of the world’s major flag-of-convenience states, and pursued in accordance with relevant national and international laws and regimes noted above, these boarding agreements open the door to a rapid international reaction (and access) to sea-going vessels suspected of carrying WMD or related materials. Such agreements have proven to be especially useful on several occasions since 2004, contributing substantially to successful efforts to actively prevent proliferation shipments from reaching their intended destinations.

An additional multinational tool for achieving greater awareness of maritime activity, including maritime traffic that may be proliferation-related, is the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) mentioned in chapter 2, which was developed by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center to support NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour and has become a model for international maritime information sharing. An easily scalable and accessible web platform, the MSSIS system consolidates information broadcasts by the Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders carried onboard many commercial ships with data available from shore-side receivers. Since AIS transponders are required for all ocean-going vessels of a certain size, MSSIS users can access and share a host of maritime data on such vessels (cargo type, destination, ship type, course and speed, and so on) in a non-classified framework, together with built-in analysis tools that facilitate the pinpointing of data anomalies that could in turn indicate suspicious activity. The resulting near real-time awareness of the maritime environment provided by MSSIS has served to improve the overall effectiveness of OAE naval forces, and at times it has offered them an alternative to the use of more intrusive and costly ship-boarding inspections and fly-over surveillance missions as a way to check on ships that appear somewhat suspect. Moreover, with the number of participating nations at fifty-six and growing, MSSIS has enabled maritime cooperation not only among NATO members and partner states, but, as displayed in the figure above, among a much larger network of countries around the globe with a stake and a willingness to assist in halting illicit trafficking by sea, including WMD-related trafficking.

Quite apart from these OAE – and PSI-related initiatives, however, counter-proliferation capacity building that also supports broader anti-trafficking goals has been a central feature of American efforts to raise global threat awareness with respect to WMD proliferation and to improve the readiness and capabilities of U.S. partners around the world to act on short notice to stem such proliferation. The United States, for instance, has offered capacity-building opportunities, focusing on maritime, ground, air, and portside interdiction skills, via a wide variety of programs that include cooperative threat reduction, export control, and related border security programs managed by the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the megaports, second line of defense, and various other programs managed by the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security. These initiatives can be, and have been, instrumental in building and enhancing global capacities for preventing illicit transfers in the WMD realm. A particularly productive
example, it was noted, was DTRA’s initiative, discussed in chapter 2, to build up anti-trafficking capacities in the Black Sea region by establishing a network of cooperative regional law enforcement agencies to target and defeat transnational organizations believed to be engaged in smuggling nuclear materials as well as drugs, weapons, and human beings, along the Great Silk Road. In this way, a program that began largely as a counter-WMD exercise evolved quite naturally into a more widely cast anti-trafficking scheme.

A relatively new and ongoing challenge to global anti-trafficking efforts, and to the international financial system as a whole, is the problem of proliferation financing. U.S. initiatives to stop proliferation financing have included, for example, collaboration with the EU, which has also taken vigorous action in this regard. The United States has also worked closely with the previously mentioned Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental policy-making body housed at the OECD that has taken up the issue of proliferation financing and issued best practices for preventing proliferation-related transactions via money laundering and related schemes. In addition to these steps, the United States has designated over 150 suspect entities and individuals worldwide for asset freezes should their assets ever come under U.S. jurisdiction. Workshop participants agreed that following the money flow has paid significant dividends in inhibiting illicit trafficking and further agreed that effective proliferation financing countermeasures are an important priority in developing a comprehensive anti-trafficking approach.

However, workshop attendees acknowledged that, despite this interlocking network of international obligations, political arrangements and initiatives, and capacity-building opportunities, the implementation of counter-proliferation strategies still faces major challenges. To begin with, while international support for export controls, the regulation of financial flows, and the imposition of stiff penalties on those engaged in illicit trafficking may send a strong message to potential proliferators, enforcement of these measures is entirely dependent on the political will (and courage) of individual sovereign states and on their readiness to take concrete action when required. Unfortunately, demonstrations of political will in this arena are far less frequent than expressions of rhetorical support. In addition, the international community as a whole is generally quite reluctant to endorse penalties and enforcement actions without clear authorization to do so via a UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR), passage of which requires the support of the Security Council’s five permanent members (known as the P-5), a rather rare occurrence on proliferation matters. Indeed, even though UNSCRs based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (such as UNSCR 1540), along with other resolutions that target proliferation-related problems, have provided a firm international legal basis for direct action to stop illicit shipments, such resolutions are exceedingly difficult to obtain and, more often than not, represent the lowest common denominator of international agreement. Hence, while welcome developments, they are not yet seen as a sufficient mandate for decisive action in the absence of P-5 unanimity. Looking ahead, therefore, another difficult challenge, participants agreed, will be the task of closing the loopholes and the existing gaps in today’s anti-trafficking architecture, as well as developing a capacity to look over the horizon to the next generation.
of proliferation threats, rather than react to them after the fact.

Cooperation and Collaboration in Law Enforcement

Workshop discussion next focused on assessing a range of opportunities for enhanced coordination in the area of international law enforcement. Illicit criminal activity and the presence of organized criminal groups – defined as groups of more than two individuals collaborating in suspected criminal offenses in pursuit of a profit – have been on the rise in recent years, largely thanks to a worldwide increase in immigration flows combined with a disregard for (or, in some cases, the absence of) clearly defined territorial borders. The removal and relaxation of internal border controls within the EU, for instance, have made it possible for a growing number of smaller and mid-level criminal groups to replicate the ability of larger, more sophisticated criminal organizations to operate across borders, from more than one country. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 2, even in the EU framework, national authorities, along with regional and international law enforcement organizations, tasked with combating illicit trafficking struggle in their efforts to cooperate with one another, constrained as they are by different rules, cultures, languages, police services, borders conditions, and bureaucratic protocols. On the other hand, the criminal actors involved in proliferation and other trafficking activities have not let international boundaries block their communications, and they have often been better able to coordinate their activities across borders than have the various law enforcement agencies charged with stopping them.

The ad-hoc and limited exchange of cross-border law enforcement information, therefore, emerged in discussions as a major roadblock to anti-trafficking cooperation. Law enforcement capabilities and police collaboration at the global level, it was pointed out, must be strengthened by improved information sharing, IT networking, and legal mechanisms that are reinforced by training and, when necessary, by appropriate assistance in carrying out successful operations. Information sharing can and must be better leveraged in support of cooperative operational capabilities to combat the destabilizing influences of transnational illicit activity. Perfect illustrations of how this could be done, it was said, could be found in the International Money Laundering Information Network’s (IMoLIN) internet-based anti-money-laundering information system maintained by the UNODC, as well as in the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP) on nuclear terrorism managed by DTRA, both of which were discussed in chapter 2.

With regard more specifically to enhanced cross-border police cooperation, one particularly promising development, it was stressed, was the greater use of direct, secure lines connecting law enforcement officers around the world to ensure the safe and rapid exchange of information among them, such as INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global police communication system. The I-24/7 network enables states and authorized users to search and share crucial police data with one another, and to have twenty-four-hour-a-day access to INTERPOL’s services and central databases on criminals, fingerprints, DNA files, and other useful information. It can be and has been useful to a number of other IGOs as well as to national law enforcement entities stationed at strategic trafficking locations, such as border crossings, airports, and customs and immigration posts. A database on stolen and lost travel documents, linked to I-24/7 and commonly referred to as the MIND/FIND technical solution, has enabled front-line officers to instantly cross-check whether a travel document such as a passport, identity card, or visa is lost or stolen, and it is becoming increasingly important in dismantling organized crime groups engaged in international people smuggling. Additional tools available to I-24/7 subscribers include the Human Smuggling and Trafficking (HST) message, which provides a standardized format for reporting cases of such trafficking between member countries and to INTERPOL’s central database, and the International Contact Directory for People Smuggling Issues, which maintains contact details for key officials in INTERPOL’s national central bureaus.
(NCBs) around the world who are responsible for human trafficking issues.

According to an INTERPOL representative at the meeting, a relatively new and successful information-sharing tool that fosters police cooperation to address one of the most distressing aspects of human trafficking is a project named CHILDHOOD, designed to combat the commercial exploitation of children, including for sex tourism, a growing problem with which many countries lack sufficient capabilities and expertise to cope. To help strengthen local capacities, CHILDHOOD focuses on the operational training of local police in countries requiring assistance (for example, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia), as well as on methods to develop partnerships with law enforcement authorities and other stakeholders to promote the prosecution of abusers and the rescue of victims. It also serves as a complementary mechanism to the Child Sexual Exploitation Image Database (ICSE) and the recently established Virtual Global Taskforce, an international alliance of law enforcement agencies working together to prevent and deter online child abuse. Especially important in this context is what INTERPOL refers to as the Green Notice, an electronic alert through which countries can warn other member states if a known child-sex offender is travelling to their territory or region.

The inherent problem with such databases, however, according to another IGO representative attending the workshop, is that most of them are only in-house tools and their administrators usually do not provide the crucial data they collect to the front line, especially in the case of developing countries which frequently lack sufficient information system resources and technology to instantly connect to INTERPOL’s global databases. The ideal mechanism for the future, it was suggested, would instead be to offer every law enforcement investigator instant electronic access to a massive, comprehensive database that would provide a platform for support across the myriad of trafficking activities. Not unlike the overarching “system of systems” comprehensive-approach architecture called for by a senior Swiss diplomat and described in chapter 1, such a multifaceted database network would be rather unwieldy to build and maintain, but interest in such a system points to a rising desire for global connectivity among anti-trafficking IGOs and other institutional stakeholders. Meanwhile, in moving toward that larger goal, it will remain important, to paraphrase Voltaire, not to “let a desire for the perfect be the enemy of the good.”
management center for law enforcement users that would offer its members a range of technical support, forensic databases, training, and even translation services not available at the national level alone. To augment their counter-trafficking efforts beyond bilateral police contacts, for example, European countries are working through EUROPOL, the EU’s criminal intelligence agency, to establish various types of agreements for cooperation with other countries and international organizations outside the EU, ranging from operational cooperation, including the exchange of personal information, to technical and strategic agreements. Many of EUROPOL’s cooperative initiatives have helped to build up high-level expertise among participating agencies in such cutting-edge areas as cyber and high-tech financial crimes, and they have also led to the documentation of previously unknown linkages between cocaine – and other drug-smuggling operations, thereby uncovering drug networks that up to that time had been hidden. EUROPOL-wide information sharing has also helped to track more comprehensively what has long been a poorly regulated trade in explosive ordnance, much of which feeds into the production of IEDs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries experiencing insurgencies.

In spite of the progress made so far to promote these and similar data exchanges, workshop participants acknowledged as well a number of challenges to making law enforcement collaboration an operational reality. One speaker pointed out, for example, that ongoing communication problems can often be traced to the discomfort one or another national agency may feel, even solely within the EU community, with the different working cultures employed by their partner agencies in other countries. In the resulting absence of effective regional cooperation, the police are sometimes left trying to dismantle illegal distribution chains one link at a time, a phenomenon, it was noted, that has bedeviled current efforts by DTRA, the UNODC, the OSCE, and others to build a seamless anti-smuggling network in the Black Sea region. Moreover, participants agreed, a lack of coordination can be a major problem even among the law enforcement agencies of a single country. In that respect, one IGO official noted the unsuccessful efforts of a Latin American country to manage and enhance border security at its biggest airport until it was discovered that the chief of the border police and the chief of the investigation police had worked for years in close physical proximity without ever having met one another, let alone knowing what their respective units did and how their efforts might better reinforce each other. Many developing countries are also poorly equipped, financially and technically, to store, handle, and properly maintain the donations of valuable police equipment they receive from more developed countries, leading to the problem of mismanaged and often ruined high-tech supplies.

To guard against any decrease in effectiveness as traffickers become more agile, interconnected, and empowered by technology, INTERPOL, as discussed briefly in chapter 2, launched its Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2008, the main goal of which is to develop new and innovative law enforcement tools to counter the increasingly transnational nature of twenty-first-century organized crime. To this end, the GSI model, as illustrated above, focuses on incorporating capacity-building measures and new ideas, initiatives, and techniques into the international law enforcement system, together with establishing strategic global partnerships with various entities engaged in combating illicit trafficking. Major emphasis, in this context, is placed on partnering with the private sector, especially information technology companies such as Microsoft, whose important role in creating IT solutions to high-tech crime and to the task of building greater connectivity among law enforcement agencies around the globe and the IGOs with whom they most often collaborate had been largely unacknowledged.

As a key part of the GSI framework, for instance, INTERPOL initiated its OASIS project in Africa to provide essential capacity-building, intelligence sharing, operational assistance, and infrastructure support to policing projects throughout the region. This was an essential step to take, it was said, given
the steady rise in transnational crime in Africa in recent years, a development that had to be addressed more directly if, in particular, a more comprehensive approach to illicit trafficking was going to have any chance of success. Focusing on Africa at this point was important, one attendee emphasized, because the continent was joining the global fiber optic network just as many traditional crimes – money laundering, child pornography, IP violations – have increasingly migrated to cyberspace. With the help of Microsoft and other global industry leaders in the IT sector, INTERPOL, moreover, has been able to establish an advanced information management system, using the GSI framework, that allows it to synthesize and fuse data from a large variety of sources in real time. As part of its long-term collaboration with Microsoft, INTERPOL has also acquired the Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE) tool to aid global law enforcement units in combating cyber-crime. Other opportunities for useful private-public sector collaboration in law enforcement are outlined in the table below left, including potential partnerships to cope with the wider exploitation of social networks such as Facebook and e-commerce tools such as eBay by organized crime groups.

Countering Covert Nuclear Trade
Nuclear proliferation networks present one of the biggest challenges to both national and international safeguards and WMD-related verification regimes. For that reason, participants paid particular attention to role the IAEA could play, as the world’s principal nuclear watchdog, in investigating potential covert nuclear trade activities. As a number of attendees argued, however, its capacity to do this is hindered by the fact that traditional nuclear verification tools developed in the late 1960s are geared toward a facility-oriented system focused entirely on declared nuclear materials located at declared sites. And while this system was improved and strengthened in the 1990s to address indications of undeclared activities, it has not been sufficiently adapted to the proliferation challenges of today. Furthermore, the unraveling of Libya’s widespread international nuclear procurement network revealed the rise of larger nuclear proliferation risks that were no longer solely state-specific, but also transnational in nature and that can encompass an ever wider group of non-state actors, terrorists and, thanks to technology, even individuals, engaged in the covert trade of proliferation-sensitive nuclear-related goods, software, and technologies. Perhaps the greatest problem of all is the current lack of specific IAEA verification tools and measures to address the challenges posed by these new transnational trafficking networks. Moving forward, it was agreed, the IAEA must therefore develop new tools and procedures to detect and measure the ex-
tent of illicit procurement networks, tools and procedures that use mechanisms to encourage better information sharing from member states with regard to nuclear-related exports, procurement inquiries, and other safeguards-related issues.

In workshop discussions of past experiences with verification and monitoring activities (particularly those in Iraq), participants concluded that a comprehensive verification system must focus not only on facility monitoring, but on the entire nuclear program. Moreover, in their efforts to acquire nuclear-related goods, services, or technology for covert nuclear weapons programs, traffickers and their clients can leave behind a number of discernible traces. This highlights the need for improved access by the UN and other agencies to sites where traces may likely be found, such as companies serving the nuclear industry and select businesses involved in nuclear-related industrial processes, especially since "industry often knows first" about proliferation activities.

The increased use of corporate-level export control compliance programs is another important regulatory measure to ensure that company sales are not used for advancing the proliferation of WMD. As additional motivation for companies to improve their awareness and avoid export control violations, one participant mentioned the risk of becoming black-listed, being charged penalties of up to $100 million, or losing export privileges in the future. Stated more positively, the communique of the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. called on the nuclear industry to embrace a corporate culture that gave priority to the security of nuclear materials. The importance of securing information on, and eventual access to, additional suspect sites through bilateral voluntary arrangements for information sharing between the IAEA and private companies, as well as state-level agencies, engaged in nuclear commerce was highlighted as well.

Workshop participants recognized the ongoing need for additional information in developing a better understanding of covert nuclear trade, particularly for the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities. To address some of the safeguards challenges in that area, the IAEA's Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (TTA) has been established as a central hub for the analysis of all information on procurement networks currently available to the IAEA. In cooperation with other organizational units, the TTA investigates the activities of known nuclear procurement networks, attempts to uncover as yet unknown ones, and maintains the IAEA's institutional memory on covert nuclear activities overall. One participant pointed out that close cooperation with other information analysts and/or inspectors working with other IGOs that have an NBCR focus – such as UNICRI, the UN’s 1540 Committee, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – is also improving IAEA efforts to pick up on and better understand what he referred to as certain "weak proliferation indicators" related to transnational trade activities that may well suggest a larger (if still somewhat hidden) incentive on the part of the recipient country to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

An additional IAEA outreach program of note, launched in 2006, serves to provide the agency with complementary information from diverse primary sources that it would not otherwise have access to. The program has equipped IAEA officials with unique, reliable, and high-quality information on international attempts to covertly acquire nuclear goods or services that is helping them to gauge nuclear proliferation risks more accurately. The program, which relies on the voluntary participation of states and companies, focuses on export denials and procurement inquiries, and targets intermediate traders and non-state actors, though it is not an export control mechanism. By improving IAEA access to original inquiry documents, such as faxes, e-mails, other contact data, or the discarded inquiries between potential purchasers and companies, the program in fact recycles information that others may have thrown away, with the goal of learning more about the process, identifying middlemen or end-users, and providing early detection of undeclared activities. The premise for this tool is
the notion that developers of an undeclared nuclear program may purchase sensitive items from the open market and in the process leave traces that, once analyzed, could reveal important early indicators of proliferation. The program has so far been introduced to several dozen states and companies and receives hundreds of inquiries annually, which are entered into the TTA database for analysis to verify the completeness and correctness of state and corporate declarations.

As this example reconfirms, creating more effective information sharing mechanisms among diverse groups is a key component of any comprehensive approach to the problem of illicit trafficking. As discussed briefly in chapter 2, another new data tool that could prove to be quite useful in this regard is the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP). The GIIP is an information sharing portal developed by DTRA in 2007 that, according to one participant, has led to an increase in multinational collaborative efforts to prevent such threats as nuclear terrorism. With more than eight hundred active users, the GIIP has attracted an average of forty-five new users a month, two hundred log-ins per week, and over four hundred visitors per month. Since its inception, moreover, the GIIP has facilitated the planning of more than ten multinational workshops, conferences, and exercises in support of the GICNT, and, in the wake of its contributions to a nuclear security exercise held under the auspices of the GICNT in the Netherlands in November 2009, plans are afoot to improve the utility of the GIIP as a key resource for planning and conducting nuclear-related exercises in the future. Secure but unclassified, providing access to well over five hundred publications, presentations, photos, and other materials of immediate relevance to GICNT partner countries, the GIIP serves as an immense knowledge center and a virtual collaboration tool that, it was indicated, could be a useful portal model for the IAEA in its own efforts to use information technology to combat nuclear proliferation.

Bio-hazards: Improving Prevention and Protection Measures

Some of the threats and problems in the illicit trafficking realm may manifest first as health-related challenges, particularly in the case of bioterrorism, where biological agents, such as viruses, bacteria, or other germs, may be deliberately spread among targeted populations so as to cause public panic, social disruption, and a potentially major public health and economic impact. Terrorist elements, for instance, may use such organisms because they can be extremely difficult to detect, can be modified to become resistant to current medicines, and in many cases do not cause illness for several hours to several days, catching first responders by surprise. Workshop participants explored the function and control measures of the WHO’s Bio-risk Reduction Program, which is charged with responsibility for detecting bio-related incidents, developing surveillance systems for different diseases, and ensuring that the current scientific expertise on high-consequence pathogens is maintained in order to apply the most appropriate guidance for treatment, control, and safety, regardless of the source of the disease event. In addition, bio-risk officials look for tools, mainly through laboratory tests, that would enable them to assess a risk, determine its origin, and, when deemed necessary, implement infection control practices for prevention, including therapeutics, vaccinations, and the like.

The work of the Bio-risk Reduction Program, it was argued, often overlaps with that of other agencies and organizations in the field, particularly in cases where the food chain is affected, when counterfeit medicine is causing people to get sick, or in connection with migration issues, whether

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<th>10 MOST ACTIVE PARTNER NATION USERS OF THE GIIP after the US</th>
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Priorities and Opportunities for Enhanced Coordination

Legal or illegal, and human organ trafficking, all of which may have a serious impact on the health of communities where such events occur. As one bio-security official noted, “We rarely operate in isolation,” and for bio-risk responders support for cross-organizational collaboration and a comprehensive, integrated approach is a high, if often elusive, priority. As illustrated on this page, for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the WHO have made a good deal of headway in developing a disease-related global early warning and response system, but much more remains to be done. Even with such a system in place, numerous problems can arise in managing a complex bio-related event, including communication difficulties among responders, the likelihood of an overly complex command and control structure, and a lack of understanding and general knowledge of public health issues among the public at large. As one example, a workshop attendee noted the confusion that prevailed in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the Indonesian government was overwhelmed by 222 different international organizations arriving on the spot, most with little or no experience in public health interventions and all struggling to operate in a multi-agency environment without a clearly defined operational command structure. To overcome similar problems, participants stressed the importance of building in flexibility and sustainability when developing intervention efforts and solutions.

Another important, though often underappreciated, dimension related to global health security and biological pathogens is the risk associated with zoonotic diseases, or illnesses caused by infectious agents that can be transmitted between, or shared by, animals and humans. In global market terms, the illicit trafficking of wild animals is a multi-billion dollar business, by some estimates worth as much as $20 billion each year. In addition, it was pointed out by one IGO representative, 60 percent of the animal diseases that now exist can adversely affect human populations, and 75 percent of emerging animal diseases appear to have the ability to infect people. Both the legal and illicit trade in animals and animal or biological products can result in the transfer and spread of disease, whether through accidental trafficking, such as during tourist travel, intentional trafficking, or as part of a bioterrorism event involving a deliberate biological weapons attack using an animal-based agent. The economic and financial impact resulting from an animal disease outbreak can be substantial as well, as exemplified by the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Britain, with direct and indirect costs estimated at close to £8 billion before it was successfully halted; such high losses are by now commonly associated

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**BIO-SECURITY GLOBAL EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE SYSTEM**

**GLEWS**

- **OIE, FAO, WHO**
  - Disease tracking system
- **Additional data**
  - Other FAO and UN data
  - Refugees
  - Climatic data
  - Production data
  - Economic data

**GLEWS Platform**

- **Early warning**
  - Disease alerts
  - Trends and analysis
  - Climate change
- **Emergency response**
  - Urgent intervention
  - Coordinated response
  - Rehabilitation

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Priorities and Opportunities for Enhanced Coordination

With global epidemics involving livestock. In addition to the financial impact, outbreaks of infectious zoonotic diseases can seriously affect animal health and production more broadly, impacting food safety and security and the general public health in the form of illnesses such as mad cow disease, rabies, anthrax, and avian influenza, among others.

To improve animal health in general and to guard against the spread of animal infectious disease, one official explained, the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE, based in Paris, strives to develop adequate health standards, international trade safeguards, and cross-border regulations to ensure the healthy trade in terrestrial and aquatic animals and their products worldwide, to provide a better guarantee of the sanitary safety of food of animal origin, and to encourage regional and transnational cooperation in the control of animal-related diseases. Toward that end, the OIE has established legal standards, recognized by the World Trade Organization, with regard to animal health and zoonoses, together with national interagency and broader cross-organizational recommendations and guidelines for cooperation on animal health issues. The OIE also promotes certification procedures to be used by importing and exporting countries in devising appropriate health regulations to avoid or minimize the transfer of pathogenic agents that can harm animals and humans.

Other efforts of note include a worldwide network of interconnected scientific centers, reference labs, and scientific experts available to OIE members, collaboration with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WHO to manage and improve the global early warning system that analyzes zoonotic disease information from around the world, and efforts to enhance transparency and communication regarding the world disease situation overall. In that respect, it was mentioned that the OIE World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID), as shown below, enables the international exchange of reports and epidemiological information on new zoonotic outbreaks, exceptional disease events, laboratory and vaccine production facilities, and the health status of animal populations; WAHID is already improving access to such resources among national veterinary services and other stakeholders.

In addition, as highlighted by one workshop speaker, the OIE now advocates a number of alternative strategies to reduce the spread and impact of animal diseases, including a stronger international emphasis on prevention measures rather than the culling of animals, especially in light of the enormous costs associated with the UK’s 2001 control strategy of exterminating millions of sheep.
and cattle to contain the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. Since then, the OIE has also promoted the alternative use of vaccination where appropriate, confirmed the importance of surveillance mechanisms and rapid response capabilities, and introduced the principle of dividing a country into different zones and compartments in order to minimize the spread of disease from one part of the country to others. This same speaker stressed that the OIE’s approach to reducing the risk of a zoonotic outbreak is instructive and transferrable to other organizations, with the caveat that tackling the challenges of the global animal trade would require practical and creative solutions that sometimes extend beyond established rules.

**Human Trafficking: Prevention and Protection**

Providing adequate protection of victims and potential victims of human trafficking presents yet another set of challenges that can complicate, but nonetheless point to the need for, efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to combating illicit trafficking. Various statistics can be quoted regarding the extent of the human trafficking problem, but the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates, for example, that 2.5 million men, women, and children are victims of trafficking (or VOTs) at any point in time, and, according to the U.S. Department of State, approximately 800,000 people are trafficked across national borders every year. Factors that could increase the chances that certain groups could become VOTs include, according to a UN representative, the burden of forced displacement, the disintegration of family unity, the loss of socio-economic support systems, the limited availability of human assistance, discrimination, an uncertain resident status, and the temptation to pursue irregular onward movement to improve living conditions.

Refugees, in particular, have been identified as being especially vulnerable to human traffickers, as they often have few resources to provide for their needs, and their situation of forced displacement away from their traditional family and community support networks puts them at increased risk of being manipulated by criminal groups. Similarly, stateless persons, it was argued, constitute another segment of the population that is highly susceptible to trafficking threats. Their stateless status, moreover, could be caused by the confiscation and/or deliberate destruction of their documents by traffickers as a means of control, or it may be due to the refusal of their home country to acknowledge citizenship and issue the documents required for their return home. Not surprisingly, as increasing numbers of VOTs slip into a refugee/stateless-person status, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has become increasingly engaged in the VOT issue. Indeed, as one UNHCR official put it, the fact that human traffickers are motivated primarily by profit does not mean that a VOT can not establish a strong claim for refugee status, and getting this message out to and understood by the wider anti-trafficking community has become a priority for the UNHCR.

That said, the gray area that currently exists between the legal definition of a refugee and a VOT can lead, it was acknowledged, to a number of gaps in the protection mechanisms for trafficked people, particularly trafficked children. While the 2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also known as the Trafficking Protocol), a legally binding international treaty, does include some provisions on the protection of VOTs, it is primarily a law enforcement document that does not specifically focus on protection issues. Rather, it concentrates on the prosecution of traffickers and, to a lesser extent, on the prevention of trafficking in the first place, as key priorities in the fight against human trafficking. Moreover, even though the protocol clarified and established for the first time an agreed international definition of the term “trafficking,” complex legal issues regarding the application of the refugee definition to trafficked people persist, as noted briefly in chapter 2. Among other questions, it remains unclear, for example, whether any, all, or none
of the trafficked people who are moved across an international border become by definition refugees, or to what extent the exploitation of a VOT would constitute a state of persecution for the purposes of refugee protection. To qualify for refugee status, it was noted, a trafficked person must meet the definition of a refugee as set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention, including demonstrating a founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group. In reality, VOTs, it was pointed out by one UNHCR official, often are targeted precisely because they do fit into one or another of these categories, but proving that after the fact can be a difficult task.

Another major organizational obstacle that impedes the adequate protection of VOTs, it was said, is the lack of effective national legal frameworks that not only promote the identification and protection of trafficked people, but provide as well a consistent linkage between the national systems for ensuring protection for VOTs on the one hand and for managing asylum cases on the other, systems that, again, remain quite separate and unconnected in many countries. Moreover, coordination problems between existing protection systems, to the extent they exist at all, combined with various procedural hurdles that arise when first dealing with VOTs, can complicate still further the task of establishing the eligibility of a VOT for refugee status or complementary protection. Hence, a partial remedy, it was argued, might be found by introducing better VOT safeguards procedures at the points of reception and initial screening in countries that must most often contend with human trafficking flows. This could include providing medical care and psychological counseling, providing legal assistance, identifying possible fears of being returned home, being more sensitive to sexual and/or gender-based persecution of VOTs, and informing VOTs of their right to contact the UNHCR or other IGOs that deal with human-trafficking matters.

Even if these improvements are made, there are other problems, a UNHCR speaker noted, that could still stand in the way of effective VOT protection. There are often insufficient resources and limited political incentives at the national level to investigate plausible sites where VOTs may be trapped and held against their will. As suggested already, very little information and data are shared between various national officials making trafficking protection and asylum decisions, and very few opportunities exist for the joint training of staff working in these two separate but related systems. Workshop participants agreed, therefore, that durable solutions must include an explicit link between the need to combat human trafficking and the need to provide at the same time for the protection of VOTs by adding mandates to that effect in domestic legislation. Reforms should also include explicit clarifications through guidelines that the definition for a refugee may very well apply to the circumstances of a VOT. Additional measures should seek a higher level of inter-departmental integration on VOT matters, common training, monitoring and evaluation among those who deal with VOT issues, and the routine referral of all cases involving trafficked children to the asylum authorities.

A final initiative to improve interagency cooperation, as highlighted by a UNHCR representative, is the recently created joint framework
between the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR that focuses on the development of standard operating procedures to facilitate the protection and assistance of trafficked persons. Spurred by the sheer number of trafficked-person cases that were falling through the cracks under the auspices of existing protection mechanisms, this initiative seeks to pool the talents and resources of the IOM, the UNHCR, and other anti-trafficking agencies to provide, among other benefits, "protective relocation" of VOTs who do not meet the refugee definition. Given the arbitrariness of many past VOT-related decisions as described above, this joint project aims in particular to encourage the development of standard operating procedures between IOM and UNHCR officials at the regional and country-mission levels as a major step forward in the protection component of a comprehensive approach to combat illicit trafficking.

Policy Coordination and Cooperative Operations

Workshop discussion also delved into other important features of enhanced IGO collaboration, including infrastructure and capacity-building measures to support policy coordination and cooperative operations at both the regional and global levels. Among some of the obstacles to achieving better coordination, according to a UN official with responsibility for arms control, is the so-called knowledge barrier that often separates stakeholders with an apparent common interest from one another. While less pronounced today in the area of trafficking because of a better understanding of the many links between and among trafficking streams, ignorance of what others could bring to the table neverthe-
less remains a problem. A further barrier involves the persistent, Cold War-like fault lines that often run through the core of the UN system, exposing wide differences between the North and the South and complicating the task of creating a common political will. On this point, however, a promising development of note, this official argued, was the growing number of coalitions, spanning North and South, in the areas of arms control, disarmament, and counter-proliferation.

However, in addition to the relatively large issue of creating common political will, there is the somewhat smaller but more practical concern, it was argued, of how best to foster a collaborative approach that sheds the “silo mentality” – the lack of adequate communication, information exchange, knowledge sharing, and common goal development among potential partners. This remains a challenge, the UN official stressed, not only within the UN system, but in a broader, inter-institutional context as well, particularly with respect to the UN’s collaboration efforts with other IGOs and regional organizations. If the anti-trafficking community is ever to evolve toward a system of systems or network of networks, as some have advocated, the silo mentality of the past must be substantially reduced if not eliminated altogether.

As for some of the ways to foster more effective coordination, the key is to promote transparency, this same UN official explained, while the “knowledge is power” and “turf mentality” approaches of the 1970s need to be discarded. Moreover, top department managers must encourage horizontal cooperation and coordination at the working level, and dedicated focal points should have sufficient funding, with the caveat that coordinators should not identify with any specific major stakeholders, as this also engenders turf battles and prestige fighting. More simply put, “The hat of coordination,” he added, “should belong to the coordinating mechanism and that alone.” To make coordination more effective, moreover, the UN and other stakeholders must strive to cultivate partnerships with both civil society and the private sector to efficiently leverage the fairly limited resources that international organizations usually have at their disposal.

Based on the above criteria, one example of a successful coordination initiative from the UN system, it was suggested, is the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), established in 1998 as an interagency tool to formulate and implement a multidisciplinary and coherent approach to the problem of illicit SALW proliferation. Since its inception, CASA has provided a forum for harmonizing policy proposals and building synergies among all participating bodies. In addition, it has offered a coordinated response to the challenges facing the UN system, planning and carrying out collaborative initiatives, such as fact-finding missions, field projects, workshops, and seminars to assist member states with the implementation of the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (or, the UN Programme of Action on SALW). One important project currently being implemented by CASA involves developing international small arms control standards, similar to previous UN international standards in the areas of mine action and in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process for peacekeeping operations. To help develop such standards in the area of SALW, CASA has established a broad interagency consultative process that involves both member states and civil society representatives.

Another example of note, as highlighted by another attendee, is the Geneva Process on Small Arms, established shortly after the adoption of the UN Programme of Action on SALW. The initiative draws together member states, international organizations, NGOs, and civil society based in Geneva for regular informal consultations. The group boasts a particularly influential role in the follow-up processes mandated by the UN Programme of Action on SALW, developing in the process a more accurate and comprehensive database on the production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of SALW around the world, information that is vital, as outlined in chapter 2, to SALW anti-trafficking
initiatives. A particularly valuable element of the Geneva Process, it was added, is the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project established in 1999 with support from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and housed at the Geneva Institute of International Studies. The survey, which has garnered additional financial support from a number of the other governments, the UNDP, UNIDIR, and various NGOs, has played an instrumental role in documenting the global flow of SALW, assessing the various causes and consequences of their proliferation, and ranking the relative utility of efforts to control that proliferation on a region-by-region basis.

As for ideas for the future, workshop participants agreed that it is difficult to get one’s arms around the full scope of the illicit trafficking challenge in a sector-by-sector approach, and that it might indeed be more sensible and productive, if nonetheless unwieldy, to try to establish a new super-agency IGO-wide framework for managing all aspects of illicit trafficking. A second consideration would include developing a UN global strategy for combating illicit trafficking as a whole rather than on a piecemeal basis, perhaps along the lines of the United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in September 2006. Third, one might also examine the relevance of addressing illegal trafficking in terms of development assistance. In that respect, some international financial institutions and national and regional development agencies, including the UNDP, are already considering establishing mechanisms for financing capacity-building projects as they relate to combating illegal trafficking. Finally, as stressed above and in chapters 1 and 2, additional collaboration with civil society and the private sector is called for, especially with the academic and policy research communities, to explore innovative approaches to promoting cooperation between and among stakeholders working within the different trafficking arenas.

With respect to policy coordination and cooperation in the area of chemical weapons (CW) elimination, discussion centered on the work and programs of the OPCW, located in The Hague, which is charged with implementing the seminal Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), including the complete elimination of chemical weapons and the destruction of declared CW stockpiles worldwide within stipulated deadlines. Working closely
with the global chemical industry and other private sector actors, the OPCW seeks to ensure that chemicals and their precursors are used for strictly peaceful purposes, and, in this role, it organizes inspection procedures to verify compliance with the CWC and provides technical support to countries that have inherited a legacy of chemical weapons stockpiles from previous governments. To date, according to one senior OPCW official, half of the global CW stockpiles have already been destroyed, and the rest remain secure against the possibility of being used and/or illegally diverted.

Despite the entry into force in 1997 of the CWC, a multilateral treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons, a number of states maintain clandestine CW programs and continue to import intermediate chemicals, known as precursors, from foreign manufacturers through covert procurement networks.

Some of the states suspected of possessing chemical weapons remain outside the treaty, while other countries that are already part of the 184-member CWC have been known to violate their treaty obligations. Since chemicals themselves are not considered weapons, their trade, an OPCW representative explained, can not be prohibited, but must rather be carefully monitored. This can be problematic, however, especially since states seeking to produce chemical weapons typically rely on the importation of precursors that have legitimate industrial applications, but can also be converted into military-grade CW agents, such as mustard gas or sarin. Moreover, recent globalization trends within the chemical industry have greatly expanded the volume of legitimate chemical trade, further complicating the task of tracking and interdicting illicit transfers of dual-use precursor chemicals.

Given the abiding interest of certain state and terrorist actors in acquiring chemical weapons, participants agreed, improving multilateral cooperation among like-minded states, foreign customs services, and other national and international stakeholders must be a priority in any successful strategy to limit the availability of dual-use components and equipment related to CW production. In this context, it was pointed out, the OPCW has been working closely with the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, or UNICRI, the World Customs Organization (WCO), EUROPOL, NATO agencies, and other institutions to strengthen national capabilities and multilateral cooperation in deterring CW-related trafficking. A key development in this regard is the OPCW’s new Knowledge Management System, launched in 2008, which allows states to share information and expertise, disseminate best practices, and identify areas of common interest to deter illicit CW-related activity, particularly in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus.

The challenge is, however, that some countries either do not share international concerns about the need to prevent the diversion of dual-use chemicals and equipment for possible use in
WMD programs, or they simply lack the resources to effectively prevent such diversions. Furthermore, illicit trafficking networks for CW precursors often try to circumvent national export control strategies by providing false information on shipping manifests about the cargo, its prospective end use, and the final destination. A possible solution in this regard is the UNSCR 1540 mentioned earlier, which requires all UN member states to adopt national legislation preventing criminals and terrorists from acquiring WMDs, their delivery systems, and the materials needed to produce them, and which may offer a useful mechanism for stronger export-control measures. Among other issues also noted by participants were the need for states to understand more fully the connections between control measures that are related but not yet fully coordinated (for instance, the CWC and BWC regimes) and the need to promote better capacity building and to encourage shared goals and priorities to counter CW proliferation, especially within developing countries.

Cooperation at the Local and Community Levels

Workshop discussion next centered on yet another important, if sometimes overlooked, element of a comprehensive anti-trafficking strategy: the instrumental role that local communities and their concerted development can play in an integrated approach to illicit trafficking. As noted by a UNDP representative, sound and sustainable development at the local level must be viewed as a core component of any larger strategy to combat illicit trafficking. Clearly, underdevelopment and the instabilities it feeds render many population groups vulnerable to human trafficking, drug trafficking, resource exploitation, and other criminal activities and abuses at the hands of illicit traffickers. Conversely, international efforts to address local development needs hold the potential to render once-vulnerable communities far less vulnerable. An anti-trafficking comprehensive approach without a vibrant development dimension, therefore, would be an inadequate response to the global trafficking challenge.

Local communities, moreover, can and should take an active part in developing solutions, and not just act as passive recipients of aid. If local communities are properly involved and mobilized from the outset in the search for solutions to trafficking streams that pose direct threats to their societies, then they will be all the more likely, one senior IGO suggested, to help sustain the elusive political will to act that is often missing in anti-trafficking programs, as discussed earlier both in this chapter and in chapter 2. Toward that end, for example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) collaborates with organizations such as the UNHCR, IOM, UNDP, UNODC, and other stakeholders who work on the developmental side of anti-trafficking, with the goal of bringing together at the local level and in a much more effective way the multitude of actors from the different organizations that approach the illicit trafficking problem from this angle. Looking solely at the IFRC, there are, it was pointed out, more than a hundred million volunteers in 186 member-state national societies, twenty million of whom are actively trained and could be mobilized to help establish better defenses against the effects and attraction of illicit trafficking. This same official warned, however, that the term “capacity building” has now largely become a hackneyed expression,

### Declared and Inspected Chemical (CW) Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties that have Declared Facilities</th>
<th>Declared Sites or Facilities</th>
<th>Inspections Conducted</th>
<th>Sites Inspected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons Production Facilities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned Chemical Weapons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Chemical Weapons</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>2,226</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: From the entry into force of the CWC in April 1997 until February 28, 2010, the OPCW has conducted 4,051 inspections on the territory of 81 States Parties, including 2,226 inspections of chemical weapons-related sites. Additionally, 195 CW-related sites have been inspected out of a total of 227 declared.

and he stressed, in that respect, the need to develop new and innovative ways of mobilizing people and strengthening communities that do more than pay lip service to the capacity-building slogan.

As for the incompatibility that may exist among different IGOs with contrasting mandates, differences that can often lead to confusion and misconceptions as to what it is that each can do best, a representative from the IFRC noted the example of current struggles by INTERPOL and the IFRC to forge a common cooperative agreement. While these two organizations may seem like unlikely collaborators at first glance, with INTERPOL focused on security and the IFRC on humanitarian assistance, in reality both the local police force and the local IFRC chapter can be seen as community-based development tools that help to ensure the safety and stability that local communities need in order to grow and prosper. Viewed in this way, the mutually reinforcing roles of INTERPOL and the IFRC in the civil support realm come to the fore, and common ground can then be found. The same approach, it was said, could be applied to spotlight the potential for collaboration between the military community and the humanitarian community more broadly. Indeed, this is precisely what is taking place in the disaster relief arena, where close civil-military coordination is the key to success, and the military is increasingly seen as a vital enabler as opposed to an interloper by the non-military IGOs and NGOs that specialize in disaster relief and recovery.

**Conclusion**

Picking up on this last point, it was generally agreed among workshop attendees that the successful implementation of a broadly conceived comprehensive approach to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, the 2008 cyclone in Myanmar, and now the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, among countless other smaller-scale civil emergencies, provides more than enough evidence that the multidimensional, public-private, civil-military, cross-organizational coalition being called for in the anti-trafficking realm is politically feasible and can be cost-effective. The main question is not whether such a coalition should and can be organized, but how best to do so. Building greater familiarity among major anti-trafficking stakeholders with regard to what each is able to do (in part through more regular multi-agency workshops and information exchanges), and encouraging closer working relationships among them wherever possible at the national and international levels, must be seen as critical first steps in that direction. The opportunities and priorities for institutional collaboration identified in Geneva and summarized in this chapter provide ample material for at least an initial agenda around which to forge such cooperative ties and mutual understanding.
on earlier discussions of IGO capabilities and the general areas where enhanced institutional collaboration could be especially fruitful, the final session of the workshop concentrated on identifying more precisely a number of realistic steps that could be taken to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive approach that would help to coordinate IGO and other stakeholder efforts in support of common anti-trafficking requirements and objectives. In addition to exploring further ways to establish strategic partnerships, pulling together common themes, and pinpointing action items that participating organizations could pursue to good effect together, discussants addressed as well the longer-term objective of developing a multi-layered, cross-organizational, and coordinated response-based network to help combat trafficking activity, including programs and capabilities to prevent, disrupt, interdict, and, if necessary, manage the consequences of illicit trafficking.

Learning from the World Customs Organization’s Approach

To begin with, workshop participants examined in greater detail the efforts and approach of the Brussels-based World Customs Organization (WCO), the primary customs-oriented IGO. With a truly global reach and with responsibilities for helping to detect and interdict a broad range of illicit cross-border trafficking, in addition to its revenue collection and legitimate trade facilitation duties, the WCO was seen as a useful model for how best to go about building a comprehensive-approach strategy. Internationally recognized as the world’s top center of customs expertise, the WCO, for example, stands out from many other IGOs in large part due to the active participation of private sector groups and various observer organizations in WCO discussions and debates over customs regulations and trade security priorities. As one senior IGO official stressed, strategic partnerships, in concert with improved coordination between and among international, regional, and national border control activities, are a high priority for the WCO, as customs authorities work at all three levels to secure the global supply chain. Collaboration efforts, in this regard, could include governmental agencies with border control responsibilities, IOs and IGOs that represent and/or work closely with those agencies, or private sector partners, such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the World Shipping Council (WSC), and the Global Express Association (GEA), all three of which deal with global supply chain concerns. Public-private coordination along these lines, it was suggested, would be appear to be absolutely central to finding viable solutions to the so-called trade facilitation versus trade security dilemma. They appear, moreover, to be key as well to the type of compre-
hensive approach workshop attendees were advocating for combating illicit trafficking overall.

Customs administrations worldwide increasingly face this trade facilitation/trade security dilemma, as they struggle to manage a continuing growth (at least until recently) in legitimate international trade, while guarding against the illicit cross-border movement of WMD (or their components), drugs, counterfeit merchandise, dual-use chemicals, SALW, nuclear material, undeclared merchandise, currency, cultural property, endangered species, pornography, trafficked human beings, hazardous waste, unsafe foodstuffs, and dangerous consumer products. That said, customs officials understand as well that it is important not to view trade security, which has been a major goal of the WCO since 2001, and trade facilitation as mutually exclusive propositions, but rather as “opposite sides of the same coin.” Toward that end, they have tried to introduce, with the WCO’s help, an adequately layered risk-management approach to supply chain security that can facilitate global trade by focusing the limited resources that customs agents generally control on cargo that is moving in supply chains that have not been properly secured and/or where the potential risks of illicit activity are deemed to be greatest.

In light of the illegal trafficking concerns discussed throughout this report, most nations look to their customs administrations for assurances of a high degree of security, while international traders primarily seek uniformity, predictability, transparency, and efficiency in their dealings with customs officials. Against this backdrop, the WCO has increasingly focused its energies on globalizing and, to the extent possible, standardizing customs control measures that are able to improve both the security and the smoothest possible operation of the global supply chain. Its most visible efforts in this regard include passage of the Revised Kyoto Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, whose conditions govern 85 percent of international trade today, and the SAFE Framework of Standards (FoS), a global supply chain initiative developed with WCO support between 2002 and 2005 by the international trade community and WCO member states. The tools subsequently formulated under SAFE, such as the use of advanced electronic information, the application of common risk assessment procedures, customs-to-customs cooperation, customs-to-business partnerships, coordination and collaboration among all border control agencies (via the Coordinated Border Management concept), and the use of modern, non-intrusive search technology, were all developed to provide enhanced security and to facilitate legitimate trade simultaneously. Because trade facilitation and trade security are inextricably intertwined, the theory underlying SAFE, as one speaker pointed out, is that appropriate, risk-managed, focused, and layered trade security measures should actually facilitate the movement of legitimate trade across national borders and thereby protect the global economy. In many ways, therefore, the SAFE FoS represents an informal agreement along the lines of the PSI model, and its principles can be found both in recent U.S. security legislation and in the new EU Customs Code.

In addressing the global supply chain facilitation dilemma, the WCO, it was argued, has also engaged a number of other regional and international organizations, such as the UN, the WTO, the ILO, the IMO, the UNODC, the EU, and the African Union (AU), among others, to ensure that the

### Core Elements of the WCO’s SAFE Framework of Standards (FoS) to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The use of advanced electronic cargo information to identify high-risk supply lines for more careful scrutiny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The adoption of a common cargo risk-management approach among WCO members to avoid conflicting national procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The inspection of high-risk cargo as early on in the global supply chain as possible, ideally at the port of origin using non-intrusive detection equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The facilitation of trade in low-risk cargos via Customs-to-Customs agreements on pre-approved exporters that embrace SAFE FoS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promotion of Customs-to-Business partnerships to build up a cadre of secure traders and to increase public-private cooperation on SAFE FoS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for capacity building among WCO members with insufficient financial and human resources to implement the SAFE FoS on their own</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The benefits of adopting SAFE FoS are noted both in recent U.S. trade security legislation and EU Customs legislation.
SAFE FoS is compatible with other facilitation and security guidelines being developed by these organizations. Furthermore, the WCO coordinates with the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee, the G8, the G20, the UN Counterterrorism Committee, the IAEA, the UNODC, WHO, INTERPOL, the OSCE, NATO, the World Bank, the Regional Development Bank, the IFRC, the OPCW, and other international agencies and partners on security matters that can have a very specific impact on particular sectors and product streams of the global supply chain. One type of collaboration, for example, involves arrangements with WHO and the Red Cross on customs procedures for managing and expediting the movement of medicines in response to major national disasters (be they natural, terrorism-related, or otherwise man-made) and pandemics, with a special focus on crafting common tools that would work for both the organizations involved and for the societies and people they intend to protect.

Another joint program of note is the WCO-UNODC Container Control Programme (CCP), which aims to enhance port surveillance capabilities in developing countries. It does this primarily by assisting local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to identify high-risk maritime containers that are or could be exploited and utilized by criminal groups and individuals for illicit drug trafficking and other forms of fraudulent activity. In addition, given intense economic pressures today to expedite ship transits and cargo trans-shipments at many of the world major ports, pressures that tend to complicate the application of the highest possible customs standards, the WCO has been able to work with influential industry groups to encourage the adoption of a standard set of “best practices” for customs inspections. In cooperation with the IATA, for example, the WCO has had considerable success in recent years soliciting support among agents at the world’s busiest airports for the most up-to-date export control procedures for handling shipments by air. This, in turn, has led to a greater ability to spot the favorite techniques of illicit traffickers, including in particular those who may be engaged in CBRN-related trafficking.

### Key Features of the WCO’s Customs Enforcement Network (CEN)

Given the importance of timely intelligence to effective Customs enforcement, the WCO developed the CEN as an internet-based tool for gathering and sharing information on Customs violations in a secure and reliable manner 24 hours a day. Over 150 of the 168 national Customs administrations that belong to the WCO subscribe to the CEN, which has been operational since July 2000. Subscribers receive password-protected access to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A global database (CEN Db) on Customs seizures and offenses that includes data required for accurately tracking trends in illicit trafficking. The CEN Db contains comprehensive files on thirteen products and/or activities that are subject to Customs enforcement, including drugs, weapons and explosives, nuclear materials, money laundering, and counterfeiting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CEN Web Site (CWS), which serves as a repository for up-to-date information and reference material on Customs procedures and regulations, including enforcement alerts, situation reports, and links to collaborating organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Concealment Picture Database (CPDb) that illustrates with pictures exceptional concealment methods utilized by illicit traffickers. X-ray images can also be uploaded to the CPDb for training purposes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A members-only email and communications system (CEN COMM) to facilitate dialog and coordination among CEN users and between CEN users and various Customs support services. Closed user groups (CUGs) can be created for Customs operations, and encryption technology is used to protect communications and data transfers.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the context of assuring efficient information flows, already identified in earlier chapters as crucial to any effort aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of anti-trafficking operations, the WCO has also begun collecting tactical and operational data for intelligence purposes via its Customs Enforcement Network (CEN). Since 2000, for example, the CEN has served as a global enforcement system to combat transnational organized crime, providing customs services with an up-to-date database on customs seizures and offenses to use in analyzing illicit trade trends. CEN also maintains a picture database on classic concealment methods used by traffickers, an X-ray picture exchange to illustrate exceptional concealment methods, and a number of internet-based communication applications to improve coordination between various customs services at the international level. In addition, the newly launched Project AIRCOP, funded by the European Commission and carried out by the WCO and INTERPOL, aims to promote information sharing among airport-based customs services, as well as an intelligence-led approach to the problem of detecting and interdicting illicit drug trafficking. To that end, the project will establish Joint Airport
Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) at selected international airports in Africa and Latin America, connecting them to law enforcement databases and communication networks to enable the transmission of operational information between participating agencies and airports in real and near-real time. Such prompt notification is expected to boost substantially the interception of illicit shipments headed to other international airports.

As for the important corporate dimension of the WCO’s approach, it was further noted that the WCO’s close partnerships with the private sector on security standards, training, and sustainable capacity building have proven to be of enormous value. A WCO Databank on Advanced Technology, for instance, assembles detailed information on technical equipment and company products available in the market place that can assist customs administrations in securing the international trade supply chain and in managing the cross-border movement of people and goods. Indeed, close public-private ties, a WCO representative concluded, were essential in developing both the Revised Kyoto Convention and the SAFE FoS mentioned earlier. This was true, it was noted, particularly in view of the fact that, while customs units mostly interact with the global supply chain at points of importation, in a free zone, or possibly at points of exportation, the private sector controls and manages the global supply chain from end to end. Moreover, the private sector, it was added, also acts as the custodian of large amounts of commercial and transportation information that is critical to effective customs operations and to accurate trade-related risk analysis and the targeting of suspect supply lines.

Priorities for a Comprehensive Approach

In synthesizing common themes discussed throughout the workshop or highly desirable for the future, a senior International Organization for Migration (IOM) representative with responsibilities for counter-trafficking raised three main points that need to be considered in support of a comprehensive approach to the problem of illicit trafficking. First, as noted as well by earlier speakers, it is important to be clear at the outset about the scale of the trafficking challenge, which currently accounts for no less than 7 to 10 percent of the world’s economy. Beyond matters of size, however, there is also the way in which the damage produced by one traffick-
ing stream feeds that of others, producing aggregate costs that not widely understood. In an effort to drive this particular point home to the UN Security Council, the head of the UNODC recently stated “one line of cocaine snorted in Europe kills one square meter of Andean rain forest and buys 100 rounds of AK-47 ammunition West Africa.” If you multiplied this by the 850 tons of cocaine produced each year, you would begin to get a sense, he went on to emphasize, of the enormity of the costs imposed by illicit traffickers.

Looking at the problem from a slightly different angle, the IOM official described the unexpectedly devastating consequences that could also result from the trade in counterfeit drugs alone. More specifically, he recalled a detailed study of anti-malaria tablets in Asia by the WHO which revealed that 34 out of the 108 medicine brands examined were found to have no active anti-malaria ingredient in them at all. Based on that percentage of fake drugs, one could make the argument, he said, that as many as 200,000 of every one million deaths caused by malaria in Asia could have been avoided if the drugs taken were real and not counterfeit. In terms of casualties produced, this was equivalent to the deaths one could expect from the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction. Hence, while some trafficking-related crimes, such as the production and sale of fake medicines, may not seem overly consequential at first glance, their overall impact can actually be quite devastating.

The second major issue to consider, according to the IOM official, involves the often-mentioned need for anti-trafficking agencies to work together, and the importance of knowing what the goals and characteristics of each organization are if their collective efforts are to be successful. It is especially important to understand, in this context, whether an agency’s focus is on law enforcement, security, humanitarian assistance, or development work, and to be clear about what value different organizations can add to the work of others so as to reinforce each other. One example of note in this regard, illustrating the value that a humanitarian agency can add to law enforcement efforts, involved a recent case in which the IOM acted as a conduit between an East European ministry of the interior and a ministry of labor in a Middle Eastern country to get the labor ministry to inspect a factory in which trafficked nationals from the East European country were thought to be held. Yet another instance of cooperation in a human trafficking scenario could include the provision by an IGO of non-confidential but vital personal information to defense and security forces, including the police, on individuals of interest whom the IGO may have crossed paths with or learned about during its own field work. Although differences in operational cultures can still complicate efforts to coordinate, the substantial cultural divide between military and civilian organizations is, as noted in chapter 3, no longer as great as it was perhaps a decade ago, and various humanitarian agencies, such as the IOM, have increasingly been working hand in hand with INTERPOL, Europol, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and even with U.S. forward-deployed military forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Indeed, given that civil-military cooperation has become a necessity, none of these more security-minded groups, it was argued, are really viewed today as pariahs, as they once were just a few years ago, by the humanitarian community.

Finally, a third important issue highlighted by the IOM representative is that much of the illicit traffic discussed throughout the Geneva workshop comes from or through fragile states, failed states, states with weak rule of law, and/or states where the government itself may be the organized criminal group. Through their hundreds of regional offices worldwide, humanitarian agencies, workshop attendees were reminded, can provide indispensable on-site help to various anti-trafficking organizations and other relevant stakeholders (including those in the private sector), assisting their efforts to establish local contacts or build up trust in countries where they otherwise might not be well received. When it comes to the trafficking and smuggling of human beings, a frequent complaint by many law enforcement authorities from
developing or transitioning countries, it was noted as well, is that when they contact North American or EU police or judicial offices, the response rate has commonly been 30 percent or less. In situations like this, IGOs that don’t have a formal security or law enforcement portfolio, but are familiar with the lay of the land in countries requesting assistance, can be of particular help in fostering essential links, relationships, and cooperation between different agencies, whether on a global scale or within the countries themselves. One example cited was a successful IOM initiative in Pakistan which connected the Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency with a group of anti-trafficking NGOs, a step that turned out to be critical in facilitating continued work and progress on a number of important trafficking-related issues.

In the interest of fostering closer coordination and cooperation among all types of anti-trafficking organizations, including the UN, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, and their various constituent offices and agencies, a senior official responsible for WMD policy planning at NATO went on to suggest that the Alliance in particular could play an even larger role than it already has in forging a more comprehensive approach to combating illicit trafficking. Specifically, NATO, he explained, can offer its partners access to important training facilities, including those already highlighted in chapters 1 and 2, such as NATO’s centers of excellence on cyber security, CBRN defense, and counter-terrorism; its maritime interdiction and operational training center on Crete; and both the NATO School in Germany and the NATO Defence College in Rome. Nor should this be seen as a one-way street relationship, as humanitarian organizations and other IGOs can bring, it was stressed, vital expertise to these NATO educational programs, helping to build a NATO course structure to ensure that allied troops are adequately trained with regard to many of the civil-military anti-trafficking issues discussed earlier. The Alliance, he added, is very
interested in further collaborating with international organizations, especially since the lack of sufficient resources and personnel that all groups must now contend with have made working together a greater and more appealing priority. For these reasons alone, participants agreed on the importance of meeting again and taking additional steps to boost cooperation in the very near future.

**Conclusion**

In terms of leveraging the individual successes of the many IOs, IGOs, and other institutional stakeholders discussed in this report, a senior U.S. military official closed the final session of the Geneva workshop by concluding that each one of the participating organizations held “pieces of the puzzle” to a comprehensive approach, even if a full picture of what the end result would look like remained for the moment elusive. In addition, a number of the “puzzle pieces” may be missing, nonexistent, or simply unknown at present to other organizations throughout the world that might be working toward the same anti-trafficking goals. The ultimate challenge, he argued, is acquiring that common operating picture and a more detailed view of what the final puzzle ought to look like. Hence, as a top priority action item to be undertaken soon after the workshop, this same U.S. military official called for conducting an integrated assessment and inventory of all the various IOs and IGOs that participated in the workshop, but including as well a number of key groups that could not make the Geneva meeting.

At a minimum, such an assessment and inventory should summarize each group’s primary anti-trafficking roles and missions, the authorities and mandates under which they operate, and their key skills and capabilities. The end product, he emphasized, would certainly find favor with the various departments and agencies of the U.S. government discussed in this report, all of whom have a strong interest in achieving a greater synergy of effort and developing a more commonly-shared operational picture with their allied and partner country counterparts, as well as with the primary IOs, IGOs, and other multilateral organizations now engaged in efforts to combat illicit trafficking. The institutional survey attached as Appendix A to this report is intended, therefore, as a first step in this direction, one that can hopefully be expanded and refined over the course of future multilateral workshops.
INVENTORY OF KEY ANTI-TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS

APPENDIX A
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association Romande des Intermédiaires Financiers (ARIF)</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Air Transport Association (IATA)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Maritime Organization (IMO)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Criminal Police Organization—INTERPOL</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre—Narcotics (MAOC-N)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allied Maritime Component Command (AMCC)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States (OAS)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Organized Crime Section, Secretariat for Multidimensional Security</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UN 1540 Committee ........................................................................................................... 49
UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) ................................................................. 51
UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) ............................................................................................... 53
UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) ....................................................................................................... 55
Geneva Branch
UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) ....................................................................................................... 56
Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC ISU)
UN Institute Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) ............................................................................................... 58
UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) ............................................................................... 61
World Customs Organization (WCO) ................................................................................................................... 62
World Health Organization (WHO) ..................................................................................................................... 65
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ............................................................................................... 67
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) ......................................................................................................... 69
Association Romande des Intermédiaires Financiers (ARIF)

*Mandate/Objectives*
ARIF is a private self-regulatory organization (SRO) recognised by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) for the prevention of and the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The task of ARIF is to draw up the regulations governing implementation of the obligations under the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) and to ensure that the institutions affiliated with it comply with their obligations.

*General Activities and Capabilities*
- To constantly ensure the respect of legal obligations from its members
- To have an efficient control system and apply sanctions to assure that the financial intermediaries respect their legal due diligence
- To provide its members with appropriate training
- To establish an open and efficient communication with its members, the Federal Authority and the other SROs
- To promote and enforce rules of good conduct in asset management (Code of Deontology)

ARIF has about five hundred members from across Switzerland who serve as non-banking financial intermediaries in the following specific areas of activity: asset management, foreign exchange, money transfer, company administration, trusts, payment services, credit/leasing/factoring, and insurance brokerage.

*Specific Activities*
In addition, independent asset managers who are members of ARIF, if they wish or are obliged to do so by virtue of the law, may adopt the rules of conduct enacted by ARIF in its Code of Deontology.

*Favorite/Essential Tool(s)*
Supervision on compliance is done by means of periodic checks carried out, for example, by an external AMLA auditor commissioned by ARIF, or by the ARIF member's duty to submit an audit report prepared by an external AMLA auditor. ARIF is free to choose what penalties to apply in the case of a breach of its regulations (for example, reprimand, pecuniary penalty, or expulsion from membership which means no authorization to practice).

*Website and Research Materials*
www.arif.ch

* Trafficking Point of Contact*
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Council of Europe

Mandate/Objectives
The primary aim of the Council of Europe is to create a common democratic and legal area throughout the whole of Europe, ensuring respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The organization works to pass laws to combat human rights and democracy abuses and to help member states implement these laws. In 2010, the Council of Europe has a budget of €218 million.

General Activities and Capabilities
There are four bodies of the Council of Europe related to cross-sector trafficking issues. Specifically, they include: the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the European Court of Human Rights, the Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Conference of INGOs:

- **The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities** is a forum where representatives can discuss common problems, pool their experiences, and develop policies. It works to strengthen democracy and improve services at the local and regional level.

- **The European Court on Human Rights** is the permanent judicial body, which guarantees the rights of the European Convention on Human Rights.

- **The Commissioner for Human Rights** is an independent body responsible for promoting human rights-related education and awareness. The Commissioner plays a preventative role in seeking to halt human rights violations.

- **The Conference of INGOs** includes more than four hundred international non-governmental organizations, and it provides vital links between politicians and the public. More importantly, it connects the expertise of the INGOs to European citizens in need.

Specific Activities
The Council of Europe addresses anti-trafficking issues with respect to the sexual exploitation of children, counterfeit medicine, migration, and Internet governance.

- **Child abuse**— The Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, an instrument that establishes various forms of sexual abuse as criminal offenses. The 2001 Convention on Cybercrime also establishes laws against online child pornography.

- **Counterfeit medicine**— The Council of Europe is involved in the standardization of medicines and the organization of a convention to combat counterfeit and illegal medicines.

- **Migration**— The Council of Europe works to build minimum standards and to strengthen cooperation between receiving, transit, and origin countries in order to prevent abuse and violence.

- **Internet crime**— The Council of Europe builds conventions and creates innovative tools to combat cybercrime and cyberterrorism, including with regard to the cybercrime convention.

Website and Research Materials
http://www.coe.int/DefaultEN.asp
**Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)**

**Mandate/Objectives**

The mission of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is to safeguard the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.

The director of DTRA also serves as the director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). Co-located with DTRA and fully integrated within the daily activities of the agency, the SCC-WMD assists the commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) with (1) the synchronization of countering-WMD (C-WMD) planning and coordination of related DoD activities across the combatant commands and with its interagency partners; (2) identification of C-WMD capability needs; and (3) advocacy for C-WMD capabilities.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

DTRA is the only DoD agency focused fulltime on countering WMD threats. The agency is the DoD Combat Support Agency for the C-WMD mission; executes national missions in arms control monitoring and verification and in threat reduction; builds and leverages DoD, U.S. government, and international partnerships; performs related science and technology development including the science and technology portion of the DoD Chemical-Biological Defense Program; develops and provides capabilities that make strategic differences in C-WMD; and provides unique support to the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

DTRA provides C-WMD expertise and support at strategic (global and national), operational (regional and theater), and tactical (battlefield) levels. The agency initiates, stimulates, and participates in interagency, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships, often providing the essential expertise and leadership to get programs established and projects moving. However, the primary role of DTRA in the global C-WMD effort is that of an executing agency. DTRA's programs support the full range of the U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD: nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and consequence management. In partnership with others across the U.S. government, the private sector, and overseas allies and friends, DTRA integrates a wide range of C-WMD technical, operational, and intelligence subject matter expertise to provide integrated, readily applicable solutions to C-WMD challenges.

In the area of nonproliferation, DTRA (1) eliminates WMD delivery platforms and weapons; (2) secures nuclear weapons and fissile material; (3) promotes bio-engagement, security, and early warning; (4) monitors and verifies arms control treaties; (5) provides nations improved means to detect and intercept smuggled WMD; and (6) trains partners' border security, customs, and law enforcement officials to counter WMD trafficking.

In the area of counter-proliferation, DTRA (1) develops tools to locate, track, and interdict WMD on the move; (2) develops capabilities to defeat WMD (production, storage, and means of delivery), while minimizing collateral effects; (3) develops non-nuclear means for neutralizing hardened and deeply buried targets; (4) models weapons effects and hazard prediction and provides technical reach-back;
(5) provides operational and technical support to the strategic deterrent (nuclear weapons stockpile); (6) assesses vulnerabilities and develops means to protect people, military systems, and infrastructure against WMD; and (7) provides support to the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

In the area of consequence management, DTRA (1) provides post-WMD attack support; (2) provides emergency response support, including training exercises, CBRNE advisory teams, and operational planning assistance, for matters involving CBRNE events; (3) provides weapons effects predictions; (4) assists the U.S. National Guard’s WMD civil support teams; (4) executes/manages the DoD Foreign Consequence Management program (training/exercises); (5) maintains global situational awareness of man-made and natural bio-threats and provides indications and warning; and (6) provides operational and technical expertise to post-nuclear detonation forensics and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics program.

The agency’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) program is designed to meet the most pressing WMD challenges and to reduce the time needed to close WMD capability gaps. RDT&E priorities include the nexus of WMD and terrorism; countering engineered pathogens; non-traditional agents; denying safe refuge; comprehensive assessments of WMD consequences; post-attack forensics; nuclear and biological detection; engagement with the intelligence community; and bolstering basic science and university engagements.

**Specific Activities**

DTRA prevents WMD proliferation and builds capacity to combat illicit trafficking through the following specific programs:

- **DoD Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program** — DTRA implements the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program according to policies established by the under secretary of defense for policy and consistent with applicable CTR implementing agreements and international arms control agreements. The strategic goal for the program remains to prevent state and non-state actors from proliferating WMD-related technologies, materials, and expertise with the priority on securing WMD at the source. CTR activities contribute to stability, cooperation, and expanding U.S. influence in partner states and regions. The CTR program (1) dismantles strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure; (2) enhances security and safety of WMD and fissile material during transportation and storage; (3) consolidates and secures dangerous pathogens at risk of theft, diversion, accidental release, or use by terrorists; (4) enhances partner states' capacity to detect, diagnose, and report bio-terror attacks and potential pandemics in compliance with international health reporting requirements; (6) facilitates biological research partnerships; (7) helps prevent proliferation of WMD and related materials through establishment of land and maritime surveillance systems; and (8) facilitates defense and military contacts related to non-proliferation. The CTR program is currently executing programs in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, and pursuing new bio-engagement initiatives with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, and Uganda.

- **Arms control programs** — As the U.S. government focal point for U.S. treaty implementation, DTRA executes current arms control treaties and agreements, and prepares for new initiatives. Because of its arms control experience, DTRA is increasingly involved in shaping the international security environment through on-site activities in post-conflict stabilization operations. The DTRA inspectors provide the secretary of defense with first-hand evidence that international commitments are fulfilled through the verifiable reduction of the world’s stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,
and conventional weapons. The three primary objectives of the DTRA arms control program are to (1) conduct U.S. government inspections of foreign facilities, territories or events; (2) coordinate and conduct the escort of inspection teams for inspections or continuous monitoring activities in the U.S. and at U.S. facilities overseas; and (3) acquire and field technology capabilities required to implement, comply with, and allow full exercise of U.S. rights and prerogatives under existing and projected arms control treaties and agreements. DTRA conducts inspection, escort, and monitoring provisions for Strategic Arms Reduction treaties, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies (OS), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA). DTRA executes other missions requiring its unique skills, organization, or experience, including support for the Dayton Peace Accords, Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) and other confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

- **DoD International Counterproliferation Program** — DTRA partners with the U.S. Departments of Justice (FBI) and Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection) to implement the DoD International Counterproliferation (ICP) Program. This program seeks to counter the threat of WMD proliferation and related materials across the borders and through the territories of participating nations. The ICP Program is the primary tool for the Combatant Commands to apply in their theater security cooperation strategies to combat trafficking of WMD and related material. The ICP Program has delivered WMD training in approximately 30 nations, traditionally focused on the Baltic states, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

- **Small Arms and Light Weapons program** — The DTRA Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) program assesses host nation arms, ammunition, and explosive (AA&E) stockpiles, conducts seminars to orient participants to international best practices for, and recommends ways to improve the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of, AA&E. This program has provided PSSM orientation to over one thousand foreign government officials in over fifty countries worldwide. The SALW program also provides recommendations on the destruction of unsafe, unsecured, and excess weapons and ammunition. DTRA provides its assessment reports to the U.S. Department of State, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, which, when asked by a foreign government, uses these reports to provide physical security upgrades and destruction assistance. Through this effort, DTRA has contributed to the destruction of over one million SALW, ninety million rounds of ammunition, and over thirty-two thousand man-portable air defense systems.

- **DTRA Counter Smuggling Network Initiative in the Black Sea region** — In July 2008, DTRA began an assessment into whether a collaborative law enforcement environment was possible in the Black Sea Region. The objective of this initiative is to establish a network of cooperative law enforcement agencies that includes countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to target and defeat transnational criminal organizations that engage in human trafficking and drug, weapons, and nuclear materials smuggling along the Great Silk Road.

- **Technical reach-back support** — DTRA provides near-real-time C-WMD reach-back support for the national and DoD leadership, combatant commanders, U.S. government interagency partners such as the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, and first responders. Technical reach-back is based on a core group of specialized CBRNE-trained subject matter experts that provide a decision-response and support capability for deliberate and crisis action planning and operations. Most of these requests require modeling a variety of operational and exercise scenarios related to WMD. In just a few years, the number of reach-back requests that the agency has answered has grown from several hundred annually to over one thousand in 2009.
• **Global WMD situational awareness** — DTRA operates a 24/7 operations center that provides command, control, communications, information, and technical support for DTRA's daily operations and WMD exercises. DTRA's efforts focus on enhancing global WMD situational awareness and the development and maintenance of a world-wide WMD common operating picture. DTRA provides access and connectivity to countering WMD expertise that is critical for strategic and contingency planning, facilitates the integration of DTRA-unique capabilities, and provides situational awareness for integrating and synchronizing efforts across the DoD to support national C-WMD objectives.

• **Support to Proliferation Security Initiative** — The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international cooperative effort to stop trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. It is designed to support efforts to defeat WMD proliferation through international cooperation, information sharing, and capacity building in cooperating states. With ninety-six participating nations, the PSI has proven itself an effective international forum supporting common counter-proliferation goals. In support of the president's goal to turn the PSI into a durable international institution, the SCC-WMD supports the Joint Staff, OSD, the combatant commanders, and interagency and international partners with PSI training. The SCC-WMD is also embedding PSI-related activities into existing combatant commander exercises, thereby enhancing combatant commanders' security cooperation efforts and improving partners' interdiction capabilities.

• **Support to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism** — The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), as announced by Presidents Bush and Putin on July 15, 2006, includes a statement of principles endorsed by partner nations to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism. The principles address the full spectrum of nuclear security issues from material protection and control to managing the consequences of a release. There are currently seventy-seven partner nations and four observer organizations (the European Union, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Criminal Police Organization, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) that have committed to upholding the GICNT's statement of principles. To date, partners have conducted thirty-nine workshops, conferences, and exercises. The initiative, led by the Department of State, has been actively supported by DTRA since its inception. In support of the GICNT, DTRA (1) developed and now hosts/maintains the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP), a secure but unclassified mechanism to exchange ideas and share information amongst the GICNT community; (2) sponsors/conducts events (on behalf of the USG) in support of the GICNT; and (3) participates in GICNT working groups.

**Website and Research Materials**
http://www.dtra.mil/

**Trafficking Point of Contact**

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EURATOM

Mandate/Objectives
EURATOM coordinates EU member-state research programs for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It helps to organize knowledge of, and infrastructure and funding for, nuclear energy, and it ensures the safety and security of the supply of nuclear energy through a centralized monitoring system.

General Activities and Capabilities
Under the EURATOM Treaty, EURATOM's tasks include:
- Promoting research and ensuring the dissemination of technical information
- Establishing and applying uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and the general public
- Facilitating investment and ensuring the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the EU
- Ensuring that all users receive regular and equitable supplies of ores and nuclear fuels via the EURATOM Supply Agency
- Ensuring that civil nuclear materials are not diverted to other purposes through a comprehensive system of safeguards.

EURATOM's other activities include:
- Inspecting nuclear facilities in the EU in close coordination with the IAEA
- Cooperating closely with the IAEA on all safeguards activities
- Controlling and accounting for nuclear material for all EU states
- Harmonizing regulatory requirements and assessment procedures in licensing and inspection processes
- Implementing security measures for the transport of radioactive materials
- Requiring each member state to establish a system of notification, licensing, inspection, and enforcement against illicit trafficking
- Implementing emergency response actions to ensure adequate levels of radiation protection
- Denying shipment by some carriers and via certain seaports and airports

Specific Activities
- **EU Council Directive 2006/17/Euratom** of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel — Concerns member states' application of a system of control and prior authorization for shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel. It provides for a compulsory and common system of notification and a standard control document. The Directive covers shipments of radioactive waste or spent fuel, which have a point of departure, transit, or destination in an EU member state if the quantities or concentration are over certain limits.
- **Nuclear Partnership Agreement with Russia** (12 December 2009) — A mandate authorizing the Commission to negotiate a partnership agreement for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between EURATOM and the Russian Federation. Russia is one of the main global suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment. It is also a key supplier of nuclear fuel and related nuclear fuel cycle services to nuclear power plant operators in the EU.
• **Joint Research Center** — Conducts in-depth research focusing on nuclear fission and innovative technology.

• **EURATOM Supply Agency** — Intervenes in research and the development of security standards to ensure that states receive a regular and equitable supply of materials required for peaceful nuclear energy.

• **Over three hundred inspectors** — Employed to ensure that civil nuclear materials in member states are not diverted for other purposes.

**Website and Research Materials**

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/euratom/euratom_en.htm

**Trafficking Point of Contact**

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**European Commission**

**Mandate/Objectives**

The European Commission (EC) is responsible for developing policies, proposing legislation, and upholding EU treaties, and it manages a broad range of instruments designed to address the security challenges highlighted in the 2003 European Security Strategy. The EC is a major provider of assistance in the field of security capacity building, and is active on multiple anti-trafficking fronts, especially in countering the illicit trafficking in CBRN materials, drugs, human beings, and small arms and light weapons (SALW), and in fighting organized crime, piracy, and terrorist activities that might facilitate such trafficking. This assistance targets squarely the critical nexus between development and security.

The EC has been supporting a number of research projects related to chemical, biological, and radiological threats, the strengthening of preventive measures, and the ability to respond to possible attacks. New preventive measures, such as creating mobile laboratories that may be deployed in times of crisis, are being explored as well.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

- The EC Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX) contributes to policy formulation on trans-regional issues and manages relations with non-EU members as well as with international organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. RELEX also manages some of the main components of the Instrument for Stability.

- The Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom, and Security (JFS) works on specific tasks involving internal security, justice, immigration and asylum seeking, migration and borders, human rights and others, especially as they relate to organized crime and CBRN trafficking issues.
• The Joint Research Centre (JRC) is a research-based policy support organization that is an integral part of the EC. Independent of private and national interests, the JRC, through its seven scientific institutes in Europe, provides customer-driven scientific advice and technical know-how to support a wide range of EU policies, including efforts to combat illicit trafficking of CBRN materials. In particular, the JRC conducts research on nuclear safety and contributes to nuclear security in the area of safeguards, nonproliferation, and the fight against illegal activities involving nuclear and radiological material. The JRC also supports EC services through the development and application of information technologies that combat fraud, organized crime, including money laundering and illicit trafficking in general.

• The Commission’s Instrument for Stability (IFS) is a global instrument designed to address a broad range of regional and trans-regional threats in a coherent way, taking account of horizontal and geographical objectives of the EU. The IFS, which took force in January 2007, has the combined goals of (1) providing rapid, flexible, adequately funded crisis response assistance to third countries; (2) developing longer-term EU programs to counter trans-regional threats, including weapons proliferation and related trafficking; and (3) promoting capacity building among IOs, IGOs, and other institutional actors with a crisis prevention or crisis response mandate. The IFS comprises a short-term component as well as long-term projects, including, in the latter category, the nonproliferation of WMD (considered priority 1) and trans-regional threats to security (deemed priority 2).

• Operationally, the priority areas are regulated by the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (IP) for the long-term component of the IFS. The current IP for the period 2009-2011 includes the first global counter-terrorism measures developed by the EC and EU members, with a key focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Sahel region in Africa.

• The Expert Support Facility (ESF), successfully implemented in 2008, is a mechanism for mobilizing high-profile experts from EU members to conduct fact-finding, support, and training missions and to provide input on WMD proliferation and trans-regional security threats. ESF projects also seek to address the links between illicit CBRN trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.

Specific Activities
• The primary focus of priority 1 initiatives under the IFS has been on risk mitigation and preparedness related to CBRN materials or agents and their means of delivery. Projects under IP 2009-2011 include:
  » Creation of regional centers of excellence on CBRN trafficking primarily in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, in cooperation with UNICRI and regional organizations
  » Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Mediterranean, fighting deceptive financial practices, and border management assistance in the ASEAN region
  » Assistance and cooperation on establishing more systematic and effective export controls on sensitive dual-use goods
  » Strengthening bio-safety and bio-security in Russia, Central Asian countries, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and in parts of Africa
  » Support for the retraining and alternative employment of scientists and engineers formerly employed in weapons-related areas
  » Support for the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank under the control of the IAEA and other forms of multilateral nuclear assurances
Priority 2 project areas funded by the IfS under IP 2009-2011 include:

- Fighting organized crime on the new cocaine route (mainly from Latin America and the Caribbean to Western Africa and onward to the EU)
- Fighting organized crime and trafficking on the heroin route (especially in the Black Sea basin and the Western Balkans)
- Support of measures to prevent and combat terrorism
- Protection of critical maritime routes from the threat of piracy (especially in the Gulf of Aden), with new regional training centers to be established in Yemen and Djibouti under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization
- Support of measures to prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW

A new EC program to combat trafficking from Afghanistan along the heroin route recently became operational. With its coordination center located in Tehran, it represents a rare example of capacity building that involves all the main countries in the region surrounding Afghanistan. Similarly, a recent IfS initiative targeting piracy centers on improving the capacity and capabilities of regional coastal states to ensure security along critical maritime trading routes. In addition, an important focus of the EC’s efforts against the proliferation of SALW relates to building and strengthening the capacities of national and regional institutions and civil society organizations responsible for arms control, together with developing systems for information exchange and improving border and customs controls.

With respect to human security and conventional disarmament, the EC continues to sponsor projects that deal with anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, and provides assistance to victims of such weapons.

The JRC is a key contributor to EC efforts in the field of nuclear forensic science. It has developed analytical methodologies for detailed investigation of seized materials as well as conceptual approaches for developing response plans to incidents involving nuclear material. Experts at the JRC also maintain an extensive database of commercial nuclear materials, together with information on seized illicit materials. In addition, the JRC supports nuclear safety agencies such as EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the development, implementation, and inspection of new security and monitoring systems.

Since 2008, experts from the ESF have conducted a number of country visits and strategic workshops on nuclear smuggling, export control, and the redirection of weapons scientists, among other issues. ESF experts continue to consult potential beneficiary countries in regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

The EC, in concert with the European Council, has taken additional steps to strengthen EU mechanisms for dealing with illicit trafficking. In 2003, a European strategy to counter WMD proliferation was endorsed to strengthen global nonproliferation norms and to assure strict compliance with CBRN-related trade regulations. Further, in December 2008, the Council adopted “New Lines of Action” to improve the WMD strategy and make it more operational.

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)

- ConTraffic is a new technology, developed by the JRC, to screen data on global maritime container movements to detect potentially suspicious consignments. The system automatically gathers container movement data from online sources and facilities to target suspicious containers based...
on analysis of their itineraries. It is designed to complement other risk analysis performed by EU customs authorities.

- The JRC's TAME (Tank Measurement) Laboratory has developed a new technology in the field of nuclear safety that helps achieve “very efficient real-time inspection of nuclear material” through highly accurate readings and miniaturized density measurements. This feature is particularly important when inspecting materials in strategically sensitive areas.

- Another nuclear-related technology introduced by the JRC is 3D monitoring and construction inspection. As visual methods (e.g., video-filming) are often inadequate for detecting and observing critical changes in nuclear high-security systems, the new 3D technology has proven a reliable alternative for monitoring and inspection.

Website and Research Materials


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EUROPOL

Mandate/Objectives
The objective of Europol shall be, within the framework of police cooperation between the member states pursuant to the Treaty on European Union, to improve the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the member states in preventing and combating serious international crime where there are factual indications or reasonable grounds for believing that an organized criminal structure is involved and that two or more member states are affected in such a way as to require a common approach by the member states owing to the scale, significance, and consequences of the offenses concerned.

For the purpose of this Convention, the following forms of crime shall be considered as serious international crime: crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against life, limb, personal freedom or property; unlawful drug trafficking; illegal money-laundering activities;
trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances; illegal immigrant smuggling; trade in human beings; motor vehicle crime; and the forms of crime listed below:


- “Illegal immigrant smuggling” means activities intended deliberately to facilitate, for financial gain, the entry into, or residence or employment in, the territory of the member states of the European Union, contrary to the rules and conditions applicable in the member states.

- “Traffic in human beings” means subjection of a person to the real and illegal sway of other persons by using violence or menaces or by abuse of authority or intrigue, especially with a view to the exploitation of prostitution, forms of sexual exploitation and assault of minors, or trade in abandoned children. These forms of exploitation also include the production, sale or distribution of child-pornography material.

- “Motor vehicle crime” means the theft or misappropriation of motor vehicles, lorries, semi-trailers, the loads of lorries or semi-trailers, buses, motorcycles, caravans and agricultural vehicles, works vehicles, and the spare parts for such vehicles, and the receiving and concealing of such objects.

- “Illegal money-laundering activities” means the criminal offences listed in Article 6(1) to (3) of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, signed at Strasbourg on 8 November 1990.

- “Unlawful drug trafficking” means the criminal offences listed in Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention of 20 December 1988 against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and in the provisions amending or replacing that Convention.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

Europol covers the following areas related to trafficking:

- **Drugs Unit (SC2)** — Projects are carried out against the production and/or trafficking of heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs and precursors.

- **Crimes against Persons Unit (SC3)** — Its main roles and responsibilities are focused on the fight against facilitated illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, child sexual exploitation, murder, grievous bodily injury, and the illicit trade in human organs and tissue. It has a homicide working group that focuses on cross-border homicide issues.

- **Crimes against property and financial crimes (SC4)** — This unit deals with the full range of crimes against property and financial crimes, including customs matters.

- **Terrorism Unit (SC5)** — With regard to counter-proliferation (CP), SC5 covers the following aspects of the mandated areas:
  - Criminal use of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) substances and weapons
  - Illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive substances
  - Illicit trafficking of arms, ammunitions and explosives

- ** Forgery of money (SC6)** — This unit deals with forgery, fighting against euro currency counterfeiting, and other means of payment fraud.
Specific Activities

Every unit comprises different analytical work files (AWF), dealing with specific issues within the scope of the unit. In some cases, the AWFs have a vertical approach (focused on a specific area of crime) and in other cases a horizontal approach (focused on criminal groups rather than on a single type of crime). Europol has developed the horizontal approach because most criminal groups operate in a variety of criminal areas.

The specific tools run by the different units that Europol uses to fight against the trafficking include:

- **Organized Crime Unit** — This Unit currently manages the following projects:
  - AWF Copper — Focuses on crimes committed by ethnic Albanian Organised Crime Groups (EAOCGs). It has a horizontal approach, covering a broad range of crime areas involving EAOCGs.
  - AWF EEOC — Covers crimes committed by OCG from Eurasia and Baltic States (FSU). It also has a horizontal approach covering a broad range of crime areas that involve EEOCGs.
  - AWF MONITOR — Covers all crimes committed by Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs.
  - AWF SMOKE — Covers tobacco smuggling.
  - AWF CYBORG — The focus of the work file is on ICT and internet-related organised crime aiming at financial gain. More specifically, the AWF will deal with the crimes defined in articles 2–8 of the Convention on Cybercrime, ranging from computer intrusion (“hacking”) to computer-related fraud. Included are botnet and malware driven cyber crime, ID-theft, e-banking attacks, e-commerce frauds, and e-laundering.
  - High Tech Crime Centre (HTCC) at Europol — The High-Tech Crime Centre can serve the direct and indirect needs of the EU states in this important emerging area of criminality by maintaining a high level of expertise through coordination, operational support, and training.

- **Drugs Unit**:
  - AWF MUSTARD assists member states in combating Turkish and associated criminal groups operating towards and within the European Union and engaged in the trafficking of drugs, primarily heroin, and related crime.
  - AWF COLA aims at the identification and targeting of Latin American and associated criminal groups operating towards and within the European Union and engaged in the trafficking of drugs, primarily cocaine, and other related crime. It also enhances the strategic intelligence picture by providing insight into Latin American, notably Colombian, criminal groups in the trafficking of drugs, and by providing expertise in and knowledge of this area.
  - The Europol Cocaine Logo System (ECLS) collates modus operandi, photographic, and other information on cocaine seizures and on the logos and markings on the drugs and their packaging, enabling the identification of matches between seizures with a view to promoting international law enforcement cooperation and exchange of information.
  - AWF SYNERGY gathers and exploits relevant information available within and outside of EU member states in order to identify new criminal targets; initiate, support, and coordinate law enforcement investigations; and identify links between different investigations in the area of synthetic drugs and precursors.
  - Project SYNERGY also includes the Europol Illicit Laboratory Comparison System (EILCS) and the Europol Ecstasy Logo System (EELS).
  - Project SYNERGY supports the activities of the European Joint Unit on Precursors (EJUP).

- **Crimes against Persons Unit**:
» AWF TWINS is focused on combating child pornography on the Internet.
» AWF PHOENIX deals with trafficking in human beings.
» AWF CHECKPOINTS deals with illegal immigration.

- **Crimes against Property and Financial Crimes Unit:**
  - **Crimes against property:**
    » AWF FURTUM combats organized robberies, burglaries, and theft.
    » AWF COPY combats intellectual property theft.
    » EuVID and RAKK combat vehicle crime, including vehicle identification databases.
    » It maintains a database of personal identification documents (DOCIS).
  - **Financial crimes:**
    » AWF SUSTURANS combats money laundering.
    » AWF MTIC deals with missing trader intra-community fraud (i.e., VAT fraud).
    » ECAB (Europol Criminal Assets Bureau) is responsible for asset tracing, the Financial Crime Information Centre website, and the CARIN Secretariat (Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network).
    » The European Suspicious Transaction Reporting network (€STR) is part of the money laundering project.

- **Terrorism Unit**— With regard to counter-proliferation SC5 covers the following aspects of the mandated areas:
  » Criminal use of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) substances and weapons
  » Illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive substances
  » Illicit trafficking of arms, ammunitions and explosives

The objective of SC5’s CP activities is twofold: on the one hand, it aims at bridging the gap between the law enforcement and the scientific community, and, on the other hand, at creating awareness of the threat posed by the areas it deals with. In addition, SC5 has established partnerships with leading international agencies.

The EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, approved by the Council of the European Union on 18 April 2008, defines the following priorities with regard to Europol:
- Establishing an early warning system concerning explosives
- Creating a European Bomb Data System
- Establishing a European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EOD Network)
- Considering developing specialized threat assessments on explosives

In line with these priorities, SC5 has created the European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN). The EEODN is a new tool available to EU member states in the fight against terrorism to help improve the security of explosives. It aims to enhance the sharing of information on explosives between the competent authorities of member states in part by holding regular meetings at Europol.

- **Euro counterfeiting:**
  » AWF SOYA deals solely with Euro counterfeiting.
  » AWF TERMINAL manages other means of payment fraud.
SC6 Laboratory: The Forgery of Money Unit has forensic capabilities and supports the law enforcement authorities of EU states with knowledge and technical tools in order to contribute to the fight against counterfeiting, in particular of the Euro, and payment card fraud. The SC6 Forensic Lab is equipped with new and advanced forensic tools to facilitate the analysis and identification of materials used in making forged documents, including ink, paper, toner, etc.

In-house forensic support is provided by analyzing the payment cards, banknotes, and/or the tools used to forge cards or currency, or, when requested by an EU member state, SC6 experts can provide support directly on the spot with mobile equipment. In addition, the SC6 forensic lab is equipped with training materials, including increasingly accurate methods for simulating the production (i.e., printing, embossing, and tipping) of counterfeit money and payment cards.

One of the latest pieces of equipment acquired is the Forum 685 – 2 Raman Spectroscopy and the mobile automated MagTek card reader. The Forum 685 – 2 can be used for a non-destructive direct analysis of banknote and card samples based on an analysis and identification of the ink pigments present. The MagTek card reader is an automated card reader capable of processing high volumes of payment cards (with magnetic stripe and/or chip) and providing the investigators with an ad hoc read out report.

Favorite/Essential Tools
- **Europol Information Systems Database** (EISD) — A general database that countries and Europol staff can access to contribute to research.
- **AWF IBASE** — Every AWF has its own database to provide analytical capabilities.

Website and Research Material
www.europol.europa.eu

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European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

**Mandate/Objectives**
To promote and ensure “a safe, efficient, and sustainable European air transport system by harmonizing civil aviation practices among its member states” and by coordinating policies with other countries and organizations.¹

Mandate on security: ECAC, in collaboration with the European Union, pursues the development and implementation of a single, comprehensive aviation security policy for the wider Europe, with a particular focus on security measures against new threats.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

- Coordinates and integrates member state views on aviation security to build a consensus
- Ensures that all members are fulfilling their minimal security commitments
- Facilitates the implementation of required security measures for member states by providing technical expertise and assistance
- Manages working relationships with other regional and international organizations to further integrate security measures and to ensure consistency
- Assesses and audits state compliance with ECAC requirements
- Develops assistance tools and procedures

**Specific Activities**

- Produces a Civil Aviation Security Handbook for member states that consolidates the recommendations and consensus on security measures noted above
- Technical Task Force develops technical specifications for security equipment used by member states civil aviation programs, such as explosive detection systems
- Performs initial and targeted follow-up audits to ensure state compliance.
- Conducts training courses and certification sessions for officials
- Analyzes trends and patterns of compliance and non-compliance across member states
- Leads multilateral workshops on increasing security and conducts high-level talks with the United States and other partners in aviation security

**Website and Research Materials**

http://www.ecac-ceac.org/index.php

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**European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)**

**Mandate/Objectives**

Stationed in Lisbon, Portugal, EMSA is a regulatory structure of the European Union that works with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. Its role is to implement and monitor maritime policy within the European Union. In particular, its objective is to enhance maritime safety and security, to protect the marine environment, to ensure harmonized and
controlled implementation of IMO rules in Europe, and to contribute to updating and improving IMO mechanisms and the development of a global maritime regulatory regime.

EMSA’s main objective is to provide technical and scientific assistance to the European Commission and EU member states on the proper development and implementation of EU legislation on maritime safety, pollution by ships, and security on board ships. To do this, one of EMSA’s most important supporting tasks is to improve cooperation with, and between, member states in all key areas. In addition, the Agency has operational tasks in oil pollution preparedness, detection, and response. As a body of the EU, the Agency sits at the heart of the EU maritime safety network and collaborates with many industry stakeholders and public bodies, in close cooperation with the European Commission.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

- **Implementation Activities:**
  - Inspections — EMSA monitors and inspects EU states’ application of EC Regulation 725 (2004), which aims to enhance security measures and protect against terrorism. EMSA also has technical responsibility for monitoring of port state control at the EU level. EMSA ensures that there is effective inspection of ships in EU ports and that ships sailing in EU waters have been appropriately constructed and maintained.
  - Ship safety standards — Ship safety standards are developed by the IMO and subsequently implemented and enforced by national maritime authorities. EMSA ensures that the European Community’s legislation on ship safety issues is effectively and consistently applied by all member states. EMSA also monitors that EU ships are up to performance and testing standards.
  - Environmental protection — EMSA conducts training activities in fields such as port state control, maritime security, traffic monitoring, port reception facilities, marine equipment, and pollution response.

- **Operational Activities**
  - Pollution preparedness and response — EMSA is tasked with providing member states and the Commission with technical and scientific assistance in the field of ship-sourced pollution. EMSA also supports on request with additional means the pollution response mechanisms of member states and maintains a stand-by vessel oil recovery service for European sea areas, which can be mobilized upon request.
  - Vessel traffic and monitoring services — Because of the increase in oil tanker and hazardous goods traffic in the region, EMSA’s goal is to monitor ship movements to reduce the danger from accidents and prevent the development of dangerous situations. EMSA monitors ships and their cargos in EU waters and creates a more consistent approach to this task across all EU sea areas.

**Specific Activities**

- **SafeSeaNet Project** — EU Directive 2002/59 set in place an order to establish an EU vessel traffic monitoring and information system. EMSA supports the European Commission in developing the SafeSeaNet project, a pan-European electronic information system that deals which ship movements and cargos. The ultimate goal is a system to ensure that ships in EU waters and their cargos are monitored more effectively and consistently across all EU sea areas.
SafeSeaNet also aims to improve the response of authorities to incidents, accidents, or potentially dangerous situations at sea, including search and rescue operations, and contributing to a better prevention and detection of pollution by ships.

SafeSeaNet requires the collection and distribution of various kinds of data. It concerns vessel traffic monitoring, dangerous cargo details, results of ship inspections, and information related to ship waste and cargo residue. This program has improved data exchange, standardization, and profusion of transfer mechanisms from paper, phone, or fax to electronic messages. EMSA keeps track of data through an online Central Index available to members at all times.

- **Long-Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT)** — Provides ship identity and current location in formation for a contracting government to evaluate the security risk posed by a ship off its coast and to respond, if necessary, to reduce the risk.
- **CleanSeaNet** — This program fulfills EMSA’s task to enhance the overall maritime safety system within the EU by reducing the risk of marine pollution. This program uses satellite monitoring to detect and track marine oil spills. It also provides a range of rapid detailed information including imagery and alerts to member states.
- **Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Action Plan** — Provides states with a concise overview of existing available information in the field of preparedness and response to HNS marine pollution, including information on: seaborne transportation of HNS, past HNS incidents, challenges and impacts of HNS marine pollution, existing HNS pollution preparedness and response mechanism, and options for and the limitations of response methods to such incidents.

**Website and Research Materials**

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**Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

**Mandate/Objectives**
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF makes policies to generate the necessary political will to create and implement
legislative and regulatory reform in those areas. So far, the FATF has published what it calls its 40 + 9 Recommendations to meet this objective.

The FATF also monitors members’ progress in implementing necessary measures, reviews money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures, and promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally. In performing these activities, the FATF collaborates with other international bodies involved in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

The FATF does not have a tightly defined constitution or an unlimited life span. The Task Force reviewed its mission every five years. The FATF has been in existence since 1989. In 2004, Ministry representatives from the 35 FATF members (thirty-three states and the European Commission and Gulf Cooperation Council) agreed to extend the mandate of the Task Force until 2012.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

- Studying money laundering and terrorist financing trends
- Monitoring and examining the national and international efforts and their effectiveness in combating money laundering and terrorist financing
- Devising new measures and plans to deal more effectively with money laundering and terrorist financing

**Specific Activities**

- Laundering trends and techniques are studied through the annual FATF typologies exercise, which “brings together experts from the law enforcement and regulatory authorities of FATF member countries to exchange information on significant money laundering cases and operations.”
- The FATF also studies precedents to determine current trends, lessons learned, and areas that require improvement.
- Examines national and international efforts through the Mutual Evaluations Program, a program by which FATF assesses the effectiveness of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing systems in member states.
- Determines whether states implement all necessary measures and laws through on-site inspections and comprehensive meetings with officials.
- Publishes handbooks to guide state practices.
- Devises new measures and revises and renews FATF’s “40 + 9 Recommendations.”

**Website and Research Materials**

- http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
- FATF Recommendations: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417, en_32250379_32236920_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
- FATF Standards: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/findDocument/0,3354, en_32250379_32236920_1_34956090_1_1_1,00.html
- FATF Papers on Best Practices: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/findDocument/0,3354, en_32250379_32236920_1_43383774_1_1_1,00.html

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2 FATF-GAFI, “Money Laundering Methods and Trends,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/23/0,3343, en_32250379_32237202_34037591_1_1_1_1,00.html.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Mandate/Objectives
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) leads international efforts to defeat hunger. Serving both developed and developing countries, the FAO acts as a neutral forum where all nations meet as equals to negotiate agreements and debate policy. FAO is also a source of knowledge and information. It helps developing countries and countries in transition modernize and improve agriculture, forestry, and fisheries practices, and it ensures good nutrition for all.

General Activities and Capabilities
The FAO deals with cross-border issues most when responding to a food emergency. It works on both sudden and slow-onset disasters as well as protracted crises, such as trans-boundary pests and animal diseases, chemical hazards, and radiological releases. To reduce exposure to risk, increase the resilience and capacity of countries, and help transition from relief to recovery of food and agricultural systems, the FAO:

• Strengthens capacity for disaster preparedness and ability to mitigate the impact of emergencies affecting food security and the productivity of rural populations.
• Forecasts and provides early warning of adverse conditions in the food and agricultural sectors, and of impending food security emergencies
• Assesses needs and devises programs to help transition from relief to reconstruction and development, and to build on national and household resilience rather than external inputs
• Improves analysis of the underlying causes of a crisis, emphasizing collection and use of information to design evidence-based food security policies
• Strengthens local capacities to cope with risks through agricultural practices, technologies, and support services

Specific Activities
• The FAO Crisis Management Center for the Food Chain serves to address the cross-border challenges of animal diseases, plant pests, and food safety emergencies in a more effective and coordinated way. Within that center, the FAO established in 1994 an Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) for trans-boundary animal and plant pests and diseases.
• The functions of EMPRES include early warning and detection, rapid response, research on new survey and control mechanisms, and close collaboration with affected countries, research centers, and international institutions in response to a contamination of food or water supplies.
The complexity of cross-border animal diseases requires a coordinated approach, and the FAO has developed joint initiatives with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), which has proven useful in dealing with avian influenza, Rift Valley fever, African swine fever, foot and mouth disease, *peste des petits ruminants*, and other animal disease outbreaks.

In its response to emergencies, the FAO works closely with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which mobilizes and coordinates the UN system's response to emergencies. In addition, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the FAO have conducted joint field missions as part of needs assessment strategies to appraise immediate food requirements.

The FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) acts to highlight potential emergencies, while disaster prevention and contingency planning programs help countries reduce the impact of emergencies on the food security of affected populations.

**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**

- AQUASTAT is the FAO's global information system of water and agriculture, developed by its Land and Water Development Division. AQUASTAT provides users with comprehensive statistics on the state of agricultural water management across the world, with an emphasis on developing countries and countries in transition.

- The FAO Statistical Database (FAOSTAT) is an online multilingual database with "over one million time-series records from over 210 countries and territories" covering statistics on agriculture, nutrition, fisheries, forestry, food aid, land use, and population.

- The Global Livestock Production and Health Atlas (GLIPHA) is a highly interactive electronic atlas, using the Key Indicator Display System (KIDS) developed by the FAO. The atlas supplies a scalable overview of spatial and temporal variation of quantitative information related to animal production and health through a combination of maps, tables, and charts.

**Website and Research Materials**


**Trafficking Point of Contact**

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**FRONTEX**

**Mandate/Objectives**

"Frontex is an EU agency in Warsaw that was created as a specialized and independent body responsible for coordinating the operational cooperation between member states in the field of border security."
The activities of Frontex are intelligence driven. Frontex complements and provides particular added value to the national border management systems of the member states.\footnote{FRONTEX, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/}  

**General Activities and Capabilities**

Frontex coordinates operational cooperation between member states in the field of the management of external borders; assists member states in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; carries out risk analyses with regard to border security; follows up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; assists member states in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; and provides member states with the necessary support in organizing joint return operations.

Frontex interacts closely with other Community and EU partners responsible for the security of the external borders, such as EUROPOL, CEPOL, OLAF, and those involved in the customs cooperation and coordination on phyto-sanitary and veterinary controls, in order to promote overall coherence. In addition, Frontex:

- Promotes a pan-European model of integrated border security that consists of border controls and other important elements
- Helps states exchange information and cooperate on immigration and repatriation
- Helps border customs and control with surveillance, border checks, and risk analysis
- Helps border guards, customs, and police authorities in neighboring countries
- Helps member states cooperate with other countries on common border activities
- Carries out risk analysis by looking at vulnerabilities and weighing consequences
- Strengthens border security overall

**Specific Activities**

Selected operations for 2009 included efforts to: identity migrants arriving at main European airports from third country air hubs; target illegal migration via the main railway and highway routes of the Eastern and Western Balkans; enhance border control expertise along the Greek-Albanian, Greek-Turkish, and Bulgarian-Turkish borders; and strengthen control of the southern maritime borders of the EU focusing on illicit trafficking from Africa to Spain.

**Website and Research Materials**

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/specific_documents/

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International Air Transport Association (IATA)

*Mandate/Objectives*

The air cargo industry is experiencing increasing security costs and inconsistency with regard to terms, definitions, and national requirements, fueled in part by diverse opinions regarding appropriate and necessary security controls. IATA is committed to addressing these challenges by developing an integrated global supply chain approach, Secure Freight.

Cargo Mission of IATA: To simplify cargo security by developing an integrated solution, which involves all key supply chain stakeholder functions, is proportionate to the threat, effective, harmonized, and sustainable.

*General Activities and Capabilities*

- **Security** — IATA's main objective in security is to ensure that international security requirements are mutually accepted between states. IATA strives for the implementation of effective and cost-efficient measures based on threat assessments and specific operational environments. Security measures aim to prevent acts of unlawful interference, thereby minimizing negative impacts on passenger and cargo flows.

- **Facilitation** — IATA focuses on reducing unnecessary regulation and on improving customs and immigration procedures to expedite the movement of people and goods across international borders. Acceptance of internationally recognized facilitation standards and recommended practices is a great contributor in stimulating the global economy as it facilitates international trade.

- **Harmonization** — IATA harmonizes technology standards in the fields of passenger data requirements, cargo security, simplification of passenger travel.

*Specific Activities*

- **Secure Freight** — supply global supply chain security solution fulfilling regulatory requirements while minimizing related costs. Freight is security up-stream in the supply chain, then protected by each subsequent supply chain operator.

- **IATA e-freight** — Takes the paper out of air cargo in order to lower costs, expedite service, increase reliability and accuracy of tracking, and improve visibility.

- **Security Management Systems (SEMS)** — Provides a standardized approach to implementing the security standards outlined in IATA's air carrier security program.

- **Cargo 2000** — An industry initiative to improve the efficiency of the management system for the worldwide air cargo industry.

*Website and Research Materials*

http://www.iata.org/about/mission.htm

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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

**Mandate/Objectives**
The IAEA is the world’s center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world’s “Atoms for Peace” organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The agency works with its member states and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The work of two departments within the IAEA is relevant to combating illicit trafficking.

**Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, Office of Nuclear Security, Illicit Trafficking Database**

**General Activities and Capabilities**
Established in 1995, the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), within the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, is the IAEA’s information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and radioactive materials. The ITDB is a unique asset helping participating states and selected international organizations in combating illicit nuclear trafficking and strengthening nuclear security. It is also an essential component of the information platform supporting the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan.

With 110 states participating, the ITDB is the most authoritative source of information in its field. In some cases, non-participating member states also provide information to the ITDB.

**Specific Activities**
- The IAEA carries out analysis of the data stored within the ITDB. Quarterly reports are issued to member states listing those incidents confirmed during that time frame. Annual reports are also issued that provide further detail and analysis on the most significant cases and where possible identifies trends on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activity involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.
- The IAEA is to establish a secure portal and network for communication with member states and other organizations. This will provide the facility that will allow them to electronically access key data currently held by the ITDB.

**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**
The IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database and its customized analytical software package.

**Website and Research Materials**

**Trafficking Point of Contact**
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General Activities and Capabilities
Established in 2004, the Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (TTA), within the Department of Safeguards, is the IAEA's formal contact for receiving complementary trade related data from member states and analysing it together with other sources of information.

For the purpose of international Safeguards, the IAEA has been seeking member states' support through the voluntary provisions of information on nuclear related trade. This information can include activities on proliferation networks and their procurement activities on nuclear technology markets.

Specific Activities
The information currently provided to the IAEA by member states via the mandatory mechanism of Safeguards Agreements is vital but not enough.

There may be extensive covert network(s) related to the procurement and supply of sensitive nuclear technology. The IAEA strives to strengthen its capabilities for analyzing such networks and seeks to obtain, through appropriate mechanisms and channels, pertinent information on international nuclear activities and trade relevant to safeguards implementation.

Following resolutions from its General Conference, the IAEA outreach program is seeking the voluntary cooperation of member states to provide extra safeguards information on nuclear-related trade. This information includes export license denials and informal procurement enquiries (which may or may not lead to a transfer or export denial).

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)
All information provided under the Safeguards outreach program regarding procurement and supply is treated by the IAEA as confidential or, if so requested by the provider, as highly confidential, and is therefore handled according to the IAEA's strict security procedures.

Website and Research Materials
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/index.html

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International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Mandate/Objectives
The Federation carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters, and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national societies. The Federation's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

General Activities and Capabilities
The four general activities include: promoting humanitarian principles and values; disaster response; disaster preparedness; and health and care in the community.
Disaster preparedness and capacity building activities include:
- Building the capacities of volunteers and training leaders to strengthen national Red Cross societies
- Assisting national societies with long-term fundraising efforts
- Providing technical assistance, training materials, and performance indicators to national societies
- Helping states prepare for pandemics and other natural disasters
- Disaster management represents the largest portion of work. Each year, the Federation assists around 30 million people affected by refugee crises and natural disasters.

Specific Activities
- Better Programming Initiative (BPI) — an impact assessment tool to help communities affected by violence implement well-planned humanitarian aid to support local capacities for recovery and reconciliation. The BPI methodology applies five steps:
  » Context analysis
  » Impact identification
  » Options
  » Repeat analysis
- Regional Disaster Response Units (RDRU) — Management units that provide operational support and services in disaster response and disaster response preparedness to National Societies in different regions.
- Emergency Response Units (ERUs) — Trained teams of specialist volunteers and pre-packed sets of standardized equipment ready for immediate use in emergencies. ERUs are created to respond rapidly to emergencies in a high-quality, standardized way. ERUs can be the first response to provide essential services while the Federation adjusts further assistance according to the standards in the recipient country.
  » There are nine types of ERUs, which can provide health and water, sanitation services, support with logistics, IT and telecommunications, and relief.
  » All nine are able to stay for one to four months in a country.

Website and Research Materials
http://www.ifrc.org/
**Trafficking Point of Contact**

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**International Labour Organization (ILO)**

**Mandate/Objectives**
The Special Action Program to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) organizes the ILO’s work on forced labor. Its mission is to work with states and other partner organizations to eliminate all forced labor by 2015.

**General Activities and Capabilities**
- Raises global awareness and understanding of modern forced labor by publishing research and data
- Assists state governments to develop and implement new laws, policies, and action plans to combat forced labor within their state
- Develops and shares guidance and training materials on key aspects of forced labor and human trafficking
- Implements innovative programs involving policy development, capacity building of law enforcement and labor market institutions, and field-based targeted projects to prevent forced labor and to identify and rehabilitate victims

**Specific Activities**
- Global four-year action plan to eliminate forced labor
- ILO leads an international effort to eradicate forced labor through capacity building, assistance to governments, action-oriented research, data collection, capacity building for labor inspectors, and increasing awareness through media and communications

**Website and Research Materials**
International Maritime Organization (IMO)

Mandate/Objectives
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is primarily responsible for developing and maintaining a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping, and its mandate today includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical cooperation, maritime security, and the efficiency of shipping. Based in the United Kingdom, the IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with 169 member states and three associate members, with around three hundred international staff.

General Activities and Capabilities
- The IMO works to update existing legislation and to develop and adopt new conventions, protocols, and codes relating to safety, pollution prevention, security measures, search and rescue, liability and compensation issues, and facilitation of international maritime traffic, among others.
- In 2004, the IMO adopted regulations requiring the mandatory installation of Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage or higher engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage or greater not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships irrespective of size. AIS units are designed to monitor and track vessels and to provide information about the ship to other ships and aircraft and to coastal authorities automatically.
- In 2005, the IMO incorporated amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which among other things, introduced the right of a State Party to board a ship flying the flag of another State Party when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship, or a person on board the ship, has been or is about to be involved in the commission of an offense under the Convention.
- The Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system is a designated IMO system designed to collect and disseminate vessel position information received from IMO member state ships. The IMO recently adopted new mandatory requirements, establishing a multilateral agreement for the sharing of LRIT information for security, safety, and search and rescue purposes. Unlike AIS, which is a broadcast system, data derived through LRIT will be available only to the recipients who are entitled to receive such information, with added built-in confidentiality safeguards concerning LRIT data.

Specific Activities
- Maritime security is an integral part of IMO’s responsibilities. A comprehensive security regime for international shipping entered into force in July 2004, with numerous amendments to the...
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The most far-reaching of the mandatory security measures is the new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which provides a standardized, consistent framework for managing risk and permitting the meaningful exchange of information among contracting governments, companies, port facilities, and ships. The ISPS Code consists of a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to perceived threats to the maritime transport sector in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

- Additional IMO maritime security instruments include, among others, guidelines for administrations and industry on combating acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships; passenger ferry and port security recommendations; guidelines on the resolution of cases of stowaways, as well as illegal migrants and asylum seekers rescued at sea; and guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic.

- The IMO is implementing a long-term anti-piracy project, begun in 1998, aimed at fostering regional agreements on the implementation of counter-piracy measures. The 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (RECAAP), which includes the RECAAP Information Sharing Center for improved sharing of piracy-related information, represents a good example of successful regional cooperation that IMO seeks to replicate elsewhere.

- The IMO and the WCO further strengthened their cooperation in 2002 by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on how to jointly deal with matters concerning “container examination and integrity in multi-modal transport,” as well as the ship/port interface.

- In 2002, the IMO unveiled a global technical cooperation program on maritime and port security, which has included workshops at regional and national levels, training of personnel in developing countries, and specific security-related operational measures, among other activities.

**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**

- The IMO initiated a global search and rescue system in the 1970s, with the establishment of the International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO), which has greatly improved the provision of radio and other messages to ships.

- The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), fully operational since February 1999, allows a ship that is in distress anywhere in the world to be virtually guaranteed assistance, even if the ship's crew do not have time to radio for help, as a distress message will be transmitted automatically.

**Website and Research Materials**

- [http://www.imo.org](http://www.imo.org)


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**International Organization for Migration (IOM)**

**Mandate/Objectives**

“To assist States in the development and delivery of programs, studies and technical expertise on combating migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, in particular women and children, in a manner consistent with international law.”

The IOM takes a comprehensive approach to combating trafficking in persons, addressing the issue within the wider context of managing migration. The approach is based on three principles to govern all counter-trafficking activities:

1. Respect for human rights
2. Respect for the physical, mental, and social well-being of the individual and community
3. Sustainability through institutional capacity building of governments and civil society

**General Activities and Capabilities**

“Building on our individual commitment and global presence, we strengthen capabilities of our partners in government and civil society and set the operational standards to achieve sustainable results.”

The three principal activities include:

1. Providing protection and empowering trafficked women, men, and children
2. Raising awareness and understanding of the issue
3. Bringing justice for trafficked persons

Since 1994, the IOM has conducted over five hundred projects in eighty-five countries, providing assistance to over fifteen thousand trafficked persons. In order to achieve results, IOM engages in activities such as:

- Maintaining the Counter Trafficking Module Database
- Quantitative and qualitative research projects on trafficking-related issues, such as trafficking routes and trends, the causes and consequences of human trafficking for the victim and for the society, and the structures, motivations, and modus operandi of organized criminal groups
- Information campaigns (mass media and small/local media campaigns) in source and destination countries to help prevent trafficking
- Technical cooperation activities:

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Capacity building programs, including training officials from state and non-governmental organization

» Training police

» Providing counter-trafficking technical support

» Providing technical advice and assistance on implementing counter-trafficking legislation, policies, procedures, and institutional upgrades

» Direct aid to trafficking victims through safe housing, medical and psychosocial support, skills development, and vocational training

Specific Activities
IOM conducts activities in all areas of counter trafficking work. The priorities are strengthening the capacity of governments in the areas of protection and prosecution, and of civil society organizations in the field of providing direct assistance. IOM also carries out prevention campaigns and provides protection and direct assistance to trafficked individuals (over twenty thousand to date) throughout the world.

IOM’s database is widely renowned as the only global data collection and analysis tool to have primary data on trafficked individuals throughout the world.

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)

Website and Research Materials
- http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp

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The International Criminal Police Organization—INTERPOL

Mandate/Objectives
INTERPOL is the world's largest international police organization, with 188 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime.
Its aims are:
- To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes

INTERPOL has identified four core functions on which to concentrate its efforts and resources:
1. Secure global police communications services
2. Operational data services and databases for police
3. Operational police support services
4. Police training and development

General Activities and Capabilities
The Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) sub-directorate focuses on criminal acts involving the exploitation of people through illegal smuggling, trafficking or sexual abuse. The sub-directorate was created in 2001 and works closely with many governmental and non-governmental organizations to achieve its core functions. Global population expansion expected to be from 6.8 to 9.0 billion by 2050, greater disparities in wealth, water shortages, climate change, and globalization all provide key drivers to the exponential increase in the illicit movement of people. Whether this is by illegal immigration (smuggling) or trafficking in persons resulting in exploitation, THB seeks to position INTERPOL to provide value-added services to member countries to combat this increasingly nefarious practice.
INTERPOL engages in combating three basic types of activities:
- **Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and organ trafficking**—INTERPOL established a specialist group to address the issue of trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in 2001. Approximately fifty countries participate and the current focus is on practical operational investigations, sharing of new techniques, best practice, and the use of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Message via INTERPOL's I-24/7 communications tool. The work focus conducted in trafficking now expands beyond trafficking in women for sexual exploitation and looks at other forms of trafficking such as trafficking in forced labor and organs. A key focus is on trafficking from African and Asian regions, which are significant jurisdictions where INTERPOL can provide operational support across the range of trafficking challenges.
- **People smuggling**—The key project within people smuggling in THB is Dismantling Smuggling Networks (DSN). DSN is an operational project that uniquely combines all four INTERPOL core functions. It provides operational data support by connecting INTERPOL databases (especially the stolen and lost travel documents or SLTD database) and the implementation of FIND or MIND in the targeted country. It provides enhanced outputs by providing border security agencies with the tools to target, identify, and disrupt smuggling activity. The project provides police training and development of operational police officers by increasing knowledge in smuggling activity,
INTERPOL tools and databases, and analytical/tactical understanding of international police antismuggling operations. DSN is being strategically disseminated to all parts of the globe to immediately provide a more robust platform for member countries to combat people smuggling. It also provides a useful way to promote and market INTERPOL’s programs.

- **Crimes against children** — The aim here is to prevent the sexual abuse of children through the identification of victims and abusers, the sharing of information on individuals who are believed to be a threat to children, and the promotion of best practices for countering such abuse. THB also manages the international image database ICSE (International Child Sexual Exploitation Image Database), which stores, indexes, and compares images. This database was a major factor in identifying the location of crime scenes during Operations Vico and Ident leading to the successful global appeals for the offenders in these cases. As of 31 July 2009, ICSE had successfully identified and rescued 943 victims from thirty-seven countries. The database is only accessible to expert units working on child abuse and victim identification in member countries through I-24/7. Operationally, INTERPOL supports member states in carrying out large operations investigating the commercial exploitation of children and pedophile networks. Furthermore, INTERPOL is a partner and board member since inception of the Virtual Global Taskforce, which is a global alliance of law enforcement agencies working together to fight online child abuse.

**Specific Activities**

- **Dismantling Smuggling Networks (DSN) project** — A key project in the Trafficking in Human Beings Directorate is the Dismantling Smuggling Networks (DSN) effort. It is an operational project that uniquely combines all four INTERPOL core functions. It provides operational data support by connecting INTERPOL databases (especially the SLTD database) with the implementation of FIND or MIND in the targeted country. It also provides border security agencies with the tools to target, identify, and disrupt smuggling activity. In addition, the project supports police training and the development of operational police officers by increasing overall knowledge of smuggling activity, INTERPOL tools and databases, and analytical/tactical understanding of international police smuggling operations. As noted earlier, DSN is being disseminated to all parts of the globe to immediately provide a more robust platform for member countries to combat people smuggling.

- **Project Childhood** — This project addresses the issue of sex tourism, aiming to develop partnerships with police authorities and other stakeholders in order to promote the prosecution of abusers and the rescue of victims.

- **G6 trafficking initiatives** — The European G6 initiative was supported by INTERPOL, Europol, and Eurojust, and it involved the following countries: the UK, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Ireland. The G6 initiative ran from October 2007 to October 2008. It had four strands of activity: intelligence; enforcement in relation to labor trafficking and trafficking for sexual exploitation; awareness raising; and a protection of victims strand.

Apart from this INTERPOL has conducted many successful operations such as Operation IDENT, which involved the identification and arrest of an unknown child sex abuser in only forty-eight hours. This effort highlighted the power of international cooperation between police, the public, and the media. Operation IDENT is our second global public appeal for help in identifying a pedophile. Earlier, Operation Vico led to the arrest in Thailand of Christopher Paul Neil in October 2007, now serving a prison sentence.
**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**

- INTERPOL organizes **regional and international meetings**, offers technical assistance and training, facilitates the exchange of intelligence, and provides other services for investigating and prosecuting criminals involved in illicit activity.

- INTERPOL's **Expert Working Group on Trafficking in Human Beings** meets annually to raise awareness of emerging issues, promote prevention programs, and initiate specialized training.

- INTERPOL's **manual of best practices for law enforcement investigators** includes information on how to investigate trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labor, domestic servitude, and organ removal.

- INTERPOL also operates the **Notices and Diffusions System**, which facilitates global cooperation between member countries in tracking criminals and suspects, as well as in locating missing persons or collecting information. Especially relevant for the fight against child sexual exploitation is the **Green Notice**, by means of which countries can warn other member states if a known child-sex offender is travelling to their territory or region.

- By means of the SLTD database noted above, INTERPOL also maintains a record of passports, identity cards, and visas that have been reported as stolen or lost by countries around the world. The SLTD database was created and implemented in June 2002. It enables front-line officers to check instantly whether a travel document is stolen or lost, and it has emerged as an important tool to dismantle organized crime behind people smuggling. SLTD is recognized and endorsed by the UN, EU, OSCE, ICAO, and APEC as the global repository for lost and/or stolen travel documents.

**Website and Research Material**

- [http://www.interpol.int/](http://www.interpol.int/)
- “Trafficking in Human Beings,” factsheet, [http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/THB02.pdf](http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/THB02.pdf)

**Trafficking Point of Contact**

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Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre—Narcotics (MAOC-N)

Mandate/Objectives
The EU Drugs Strategy (2005 – 2012) advocates that a global, balanced approach, based on the simultaneous reduction of supply and demand should be met by improving coordination and cooperation at the national, European, and international levels, in particular with regard to certain regions in the world.

MAOC-N is a European Law Enforcement unit with military support that will coordinate maritime and aviation intelligence, resources, and trained personnel to respond to the threat posed by transatlantic cocaine traffic. Participating countries who signed the agreement on which this regional initiative is based are France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and The United Kingdom. There are several observers to the centre, such as the U.S. Joint Inter Agency Task Force – South (JIATF-S), the European Commission, and Europol.
The goals of MAOC-N are:
- Preventing drugs from reaching the European markets
- Denying traffickers their revenue from the delivery of drugs
- Providing a long term deterrent against maritime and aviation drug trafficking

General Activities and Capabilities
- Supporting, planning for, and coordinating operations that interdict illegal drugs being moved by un-canalised air and maritime conveyances within or through the Joint Operating Area (JOA)
- Fusing intelligence obtained from partner country activities
- Responding to actionable intelligence and multinational law enforcement direction
- Debriefing operations within the legal framework of the partner countries

Apart from these activities concerning operations, the management provides statistics and an annual activity report for the executive board.

Information is gathered by the national agencies of partner countries that are involved in counter drug trafficking. Information, if applicable, will be sent to MAOC-N.

At MAOC-N, it is shared between the liaison officers (LOs) of the seven main participating countries. The LOs check the information with their own agencies and a continuous update of the intelligence occurs.

Since its start in September 2007, MAOC-N has coordinated thirty-nine Sea Operations (SEAOPS). From these thirty-nine SEAOPS, there were twenty-nine successful interdictions resulting in the seizure or jettisoning of 44,755.5 tons of cocaine and 24,347 tons of hashish/cannabis.

Following these operations, there have been prosecutions in eight different countries. MAOC-N is only successful because of the partner countries’ willingness to make assets and Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) available. In total, eleven countries provided assets, and personnel were provided by two countries,

Specific Activities
MAOC-N supports partner countries in developing operational maritime responses and best practice. This includes initiatives both within the partner countries and elements of capacity building with African partners.
Website and Research Materials


 Trafficking Point of Contact

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Mandate/Objectives

NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949. NATO headquarters are in Brussels, Belgium, and the organization constitutes a system of collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external force.

NATO began the most recent transformation of its capabilities by launching the NATO Response Force (NRF) at the 2002 Prague Summit and in June 2003, by a major restructuring of the NATO military commands as the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, were abolished and a new command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), was established in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) became the headquarters of the Allied Command Operations (ACO). ACT is responsible for current operations. NATO has also created a chain of so-called centers of excellence (COEs) that support NATO’s transformation processes and brings added value in many different areas of expertise.

General Activities and Capabilities

- Identifying tools, capabilities, and activities relevant to NATO involvement specifically with illicit trafficking is challenging. A number of NATO bodies oversee different aspects of Alliance activities in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Overall, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s highest political decision-making body, provides political guidance. More detailed oversight of activities and policy in specific areas is provided by a number of bodies, including the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on Conventional Arms Control, the Nuclear Planning Group and High Level Group (NPG/HLG), the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP).

- Within NATO’s cooperative frameworks, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) — in particular, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action — and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) — especially the Arms Control Experts Group, the NRC Ad Hoc Working Group on Proliferation Issues, and the NRC Group of Nuclear Experts — can all be seen to play roles in NATO’s fight against many forms of illicit trafficking.
• In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO naval forces began Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), which is focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. The launch of this maritime surveillance operation in October 2001 added a new dimension by NATO to the global fight against terrorism. With this operation, NATO is also supporting the non-proliferation of WMD and combating illicit trafficking.

• At the 2002 Prague Summit, improved intelligence sharing was identified as a key aspect of cooperation among Allies. The Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was created to improve intelligence sharing and analysis on terrorism. This unit draws on civilian and military intelligence resources from both NATO and partner countries, in order to provide assessments to the NAC and NATO staff. The TTIU analyzes general terrorist threats and threats that are more specifically aimed at NATO.

• At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, a decision was taken to review intelligence structures at NATO headquarters. A new intelligence liaison cell for NATO Allies and partners to exchange relevant intelligence has been created at Headquarters, Allied Command Operations, SHAPE.

Specific Activities
- NATO’s ongoing operations to challenge illicit trafficking include participating actively in international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. NATO itself does not belong to any treaty as an entity, but continues to encourage its members, partners, and other countries to implement their international obligations fully.
- NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships in the Mediterranean since April 2003. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in accordance with international law. The increased NATO presence in these waters has benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits by improving perceptions of security. More generally, the operation has proved to be an effective tool both in safeguarding a strategic maritime region, countering terrorism, and impacting illicit trafficking on and from the high seas.
- NATO has extended the mandate for Operation Active Endeavour a number of times, and nations have continuously adapted operationally to the ongoing threats it encounters. Additionally, the incorporation of partner forces has greatly assisted in building a consensus for action. NATO forces have hailed more than 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded some 148 suspect ships.
- NATO has begun preparations for identifying dedicated personnel for maritime interdiction operations in connection with combating of illicit trafficking of WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials. The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Training Centre in Souda Bay, Crete supports this activity by annually organizing relevant courses and seminars (the first of which took place in October 2009).
- Specific capabilities in support of nonproliferation and combating illicit trafficking are also being provided by NATO centers of excellence, such as the Joint CBRN Defense COE in the Czech Republic and the Defense Against Terrorism COE in Turkey. These centers are repositories for expertise and the sharing of lessons learned as well as best practices.

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)
Website and Research Materials

- http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50082.htm
  Partnership for Peace
  WMDC
- http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48895.htm
  Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation
  Science and Peace Homepage
- http://nc3a.info/nctdp/
  NATO Counter-terrorism Technology Development Programme
  NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism

Trafficking Point of Contact

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NATO Allied Maritime Component Command (AMCC)

Mandate/Objects

NATO's Allied Maritime Component Command (AMCC) has bases at Northwood, UK, and Naples, Italy. It provides specialist maritime expertise to the joint force commander in Brunssum, the Netherlands. Its vision is to be NATO's most professional and effective maritime component command, prepared to support joint and combined missions and operations.

Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFCNP) does not have any direct anti-trafficking mandates. However, the Article 5-mandated Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) does have measures specifically aimed at combating terrorism.

Analysis has shown that OAE's active patrolling has, and continues to make, a difference in deterring terrorism and related activities in the Mediterranean, including illicit trafficking. In the course of our anti-terrorist activities, we have detected and reported suspicious activity to appropriate law enforcement agencies. Examples of these reports include drug trafficking, explosive movements, large numbers of illegal immigrants, and suspiciously behaving ships (some of which were subsequently impounded).

JFCNP also has specialists in organized crime and border controls monitoring the way in which the headquarters can cooperate with organizations that are specifically mandated to fight trafficking.

General Activities and Capabilities

MCC Northwood provides and employs a military operational capability to:

- Preserve peace in the North Atlantic and Northern Europe
• Maintain and support current operations, including the provision of manpower to ISAF and to support the implementation of the NATO Rapid Forces (NRF) concept, including the provision of maritime advice

• Continue the integration of the Polish navy into NATO and supporting NATO enlargement by leading the Accession Integration of the Baltic States’ Navies

CC MAR HQ Northwood is responsible for:

• The production of the Recognized Maritime Picture, a strategic picture of the position of all naval ships and task forces in the Atlantic

• The administration and programming of two of NATO’s four standing naval forces, Standing NATO Response Force Maritime Group 1 and Standing NATO Response Force Mine Countermeasures Group I. These are immediate reaction forces (IRFs) that are on constant standby for real world operations

CC MAR Naples is responsible for:

• Crisis management and deterrence by establishing and maintaining effective operational readiness as Maritime Component Commander

• Ensuring proper assessment of capability and capacity through implementation of automated information exchange systems

• Conducting accession and integration activities

Specific Activities

• Operation of Maritime Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities — PfP has been a major NATO initiative since 1994. The aim is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe by focusing on defense-related cooperation, by forging partnerships between each Partner country and NATO, and by expanding and intensifying political and military cooperation. There are currently twenty-six participants.

• Operation Active Endeavour — This NATO operation is a response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States and one of NATO’s 8 specific measures to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. It involves patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean and dispatching the Standing NATO Response Force Maritime Group 2 to conduct maritime presence operations to combat terrorism. Operation Active Endeavour currently covers about 60 percent of all traffic in the Mediterranean. Additionally, in April 2009, the NATO Atlantic Council approved a new concept of operations. The combined joint statement of requirement changed the permanent deployed forces to standby forces in combination with six surge operations per year by the Standing NATO maritime groups.

• Operation Ocean Shield — Operation Ocean Shield is NATO’s effort to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. It began on 17 August 2009 and builds on NATO’s previous counter-piracy mission by adopting a more comprehensive approach. It is designed to complement the efforts of existing international organizations and forces in the region.

• Operation Allied Provider — This NATO operation began in October 2008 and fulfills the UN secretary general’s request for assistance in escorting World Food Programme chartered vessels while delivering humanitarian aid.
**Favorite/Essential Tool**

The main tool is the Maritime Safety Security Information System (MSSIS), a civilian database showing the movement and details of shipping, currently based on input from sixty-two contributing nations. MSSIS software abilities continue to improve and are now able to update the status of many tracks each day, identifying unusual behavior by ships that could indicate terrorist activity. However, the main feed is via the AIS (Auto Indent System) imposed by IMO for ships over three hundred gross tons, meaning that the majority of vessels below that tonnage are not in the picture.

**Website and Research Materials**

- http://www.manw.nato.int/default.aspx
- http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/index.htm

**Trafficking Points of Contact**

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United Kingdom

**Organization of American States (OAS)**

Transnational Organized Crime Section, Secretariat for Multidimensional Security

**Anti-Trafficking in Persons**

**Mandate/Objectives**

The Organization of American States aspires to develop and implement anti-TIP efforts with a regional perspective by providing technical assistance to governments of the hemisphere in the form of capacity building and legal assistance. The Organization also develops training materials, monitors activities in the field (including trafficking routes), and catalogues existing reports, documents, and laws.

**General Activities and Capabilities**

- Broadening awareness and understanding of the trafficking in persons problem
- Sharing information with governments and civil society
- Identifying policies that will reduce TIP
- Working with officials on implementing concrete anti-trafficking measures
- Identifying new partners and financial resources for fighting TIP in the hemisphere

**Specific Activities**

For the period 2010 – 2011, the Organization is implementing two programs throughout the region:

- **Strengthening Capacity of Law Enforcement Officials, Judges, and Prosecutors to Identify and Combat Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children** — This project aims
to train police and immigration officials, as well as prosecutors and judges, from the participant countries, in order to increase awareness and support the efforts of law enforcement agencies in combating human trafficking. Among the program's objectives are 1) to increase awareness of the crime of trafficking among law enforcement; 2) to strengthen the role of police, prosecutors, and courts in their capacity to implement laws to combat trafficking; and 3) increase the exchange of information between agencies involved in combating human trafficking in the region. Courses will be delivered throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, as well as to all Central American countries.

- **Specialized OAS Capacity-building Project on Border Controls, Phase I**—This project will strengthen the capacity of customs and migration personnel responsible for detecting and preventing criminal activity utilizing the airports and land border points of entry in the Dominican Republic (Dirección General de Aduanas and Dirección General de Migración, respectively). Specifically, the project will aim to provide the participating customs and migration officers with the knowledge and skills to: more effectively combat drug, human, and other forms of illicit trafficking; to improve their controls over the movement of people and goods through the country’s airports and land border crossings; and to more effectively coordinate with each other, other law enforcement entities, and prosecutors. Toward this end, the proposed course will utilize as instructors numerous experts working in a range of aspects of migration and customs controls, including: passenger and behavioral screening, luggage and cargo screening, human trafficking, and the detection of fraud involving travel, identity and other documents. In addition, by bringing together customs and migration officers the course will seek to strengthen the inter-institutional and professional relations among these two key stakeholder authorities, and to promote increased and more effective cooperation and information-sharing going forward.

In addition, when funding is available, the Organization offers another capacity-building activity, the **Anti Trafficking in Persons’ Train-The-Trainers Program for Peacekeeping Personnel from the Americas**. This program is designed to strengthen the capacity of Latin American and Caribbean peacekeeping forces to recognize the crime of trafficking in persons and contribute to its prevention. Specifically, the project trains the personnel of peacekeeping missions to identify and prevent potential trafficking in persons abuses prior to their deployment on UN missions. It also encourages peacekeeping training centers in Latin America to include the OAS-developed toolkit in their training curricula. To date, training has been conducted in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay – all countries that are currently contributing to UN Peacekeeping missions around the world.

*Favorite/Essential Tool(s)*
The Organization develops its own toolkits for delivery of its training courses.

*Website and Research Materials*
http://www.oas.org/dsp/espanol/cpo_trata.asp

*Trafficking Point of Contact*
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Illicit Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives

Mandate/Objectives
Within the framework of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other related materials (CIFTA), the Organization provides member states with technical assistance to combat the proliferation and illicit trafficking of firearms; ensures that firearms and ammunition are properly stored and destroyed (if necessary); and develops model legislation and regulations to ensure that national legislative regimes are in compliance with the various provisions of the CIFTA.

General Activities and Capabilities
• Contributing to the prevention and elimination of illicit firearms trafficking
• Developing related model legislation and regulations
• Strengthening national capacities on the issue
• Promoting horizontal cooperation among member states

Specific Activities
During the period 2010-2011, the Organization is implementing two programs:
• Stockpile Management and Destruction in Central America – This program was developed under the Mérida Initiative to strengthen national capacities to prevent and eliminate illicit firearms trafficking and to ensure the safety and security of legally-held stocks. Specifically, the program will provide training to national authorities through a sub-regional seminar in best practices and proper stockpile management techniques, and a specialized seminar to enhance technical capabilities on munitions' destruction; the modernization of one to two selected arsenals in one of the beneficiary countries; and the destruction of approximately nine hundred tons of excess, obsolete and expired munitions from Guatemalan Army stockpiles, and two thousand tons of obsolete munitions stored in Nicaraguan military installations. It will also provide legal assistance to each of the Central American countries to ensure that national laws and legislation are in compliance with the provisions of CIFTA and other international agreements on firearms trafficking.
• Promoting Firearms Marking in Latin America and the Caribbean Project – This program seeks to strengthen national capacities to mark firearms at point of manufacture or import, as well as those confiscated from crime scenes, in order to meet their obligations under the CIFTA. This project will provide at least one marking machine and related training to thirty beneficiary countries throughout the hemisphere. The Organization will also undertake a comprehensive study to identify the needs of the states with regards to marking and will organize a regional workshop on marking practices and stockpile management.

Website and Research Materials
http://www.oas.org/dsp/espanol/cpo_armas.asp

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Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

*Mandate/Objectives*

The OPCW exists to implement the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to achieve the vision of a world free of chemical weapons and of the threat of their use. The OPCW also encourages cooperation in chemistry for peaceful purposes. Its ultimate aim is to contribute to international security and stability, to general and complete disarmament, and to global economic development.

*General Activities and Capabilities*

- Ensures a credible and transparent regime for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons and preventing their reemergence
- Provides protection and assistance against chemical weapons to member states
- Encourages international cooperation in peaceful uses of chemistry
- Encourages new states to join and participate in the OPCW by facilitating cooperation and national capacity building

*Specific Activities*

- Eliminates chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production sites.
- The OPCW Technical Secretariat verifies the destruction of weapons and production sites and non-proliferation. CWC provides the verification measures.

*Website and Research Materials*

http://www.opcw.org/

* Trafficking Point of Contact*

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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

*Mandate/Objectives*
- The OSCE is a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe and its environs. It is the largest regional security organization in the world, and has eighteen missions or field operations in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
- The Organization deals with three dimensions of security—politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. It addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism, and economic and environmental activities.

*General Activities and Capabilities*
- The OSCE’s eighteen missions foster the administrative capacity of the host countries through concrete measures, such as initiatives to support community policing, minority rights, legislative reform, press freedom, the rule of law, and border management. Increasingly, the OSCE is building networks of professionals to work more efficiently against terrorism threats, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, and the trafficking in human beings.
- The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) provides direct support to all OSCE field operations. In order to stimulate regional cooperation, the CPC organizes and conducts a number of programs and activities both in field operations areas and at headquarters, in close coordination with other international and regional organizations. Areas of interaction include border security and management, regional seminars on small arms and light weapons, and the return of refugees, as well as war crime issues in Southeastern Europe, among others.
- In 2009, the OSCE’s Strategic Police Matters Unit and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime (SECI) presented a manual for law enforcement officials and the judiciary, particularly those in Southeastern Europe, designed to improve cross-border cooperation in the fight against the trafficking of illicit narcotics, psychotropic substances, and other illicit goods.
- The Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR) assists OSCE states in their anti-trafficking efforts by providing multi-dimensional support at four main levels: policy-making, field work, technical expertise, and coordination of international actors. The OSR also closely coordinates with relevant OSCE institutions, structures, and field operations in their anti-trafficking activities. A major goal of the OSR is to avoid duplication, to ensure complementarity and coherence, and, when appropriate, to seek to develop an integrated approach to preventing and combating the trafficking in human beings in the OSCE region.

*Specific Activities*
- In recent years, the fight against trafficking, be it in human beings, small arms and light weapons, or drugs, has become a top priority for the OSCE. Human trafficking to or from member states looms as one of the most pressing and complex issues in the OSCE region. Actions the Organization takes in this regard include legislative reforms, training of law enforcement authorities, and improving the security of travel documents, to name a few. The economic impact of trafficking in all its many forms is also closely monitored.
• In 2008, the OSCE supported an information campaign to promote Kosovo’s anti-trafficking helpline, aimed at increasing the information flow between the public and the authorities to combat human trafficking. In addition, the OSCE has assisted the government of Moldova since 2001 in its development of a comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategy.

• In April 2008, the OSCE mission to Macedonia supported the adoption of new guidelines on the proper treatment of trafficked persons, which would help the government address the problems of identifying and assisting victims of trafficking.

• The OSCE Border Security and Management Concept (BSMC), adopted in 2005, provided participating states with a political framework for their cooperation on border-related issues. In seeking to enhance border security, while at the same time facilitating legitimate travel and commerce and promoting human contacts, the OSCE launched in 2009 the Border Management Staff College to train border officers from all OSCE countries and partner states, including Afghanistan, and to promote cross-border cooperation in the Central Asian region.

• Due to its legal status, the OSCE does not deal with arms control issues directly. However, the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), the main OSCE body dealing with the politico-military aspects of security, develops documents regulating the transfers of conventional arms and establishes principles governing non-proliferation, including the destruction of shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADS), conventional ammunition, and others. From 2001 to 2006, OSCE states destroyed over 6 million small arms, of which roughly 1 million were seized from illegal possession and trafficking. The OSCE has been working with Tajikistan, Georgia, and others in the disposal of surplus small arms and ammunition.

Established in 2002, the OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) serves as the focal point for facilitating OSCE initiatives to combat terrorism. To address existing gaps in the anti-terrorism capabilities of participating states, the Unit has developed an inventory of multilateral and bilateral anti-terrorism capacity-building measures taken in the OSCE region since UN Security Council Resolution 1373 was passed in 2001. The ATU also serves as an anti-terrorism information resource for OSCE states and other international, regional, and sub-regional as well as non-governmental organizations.

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)

• The OSCE’s Situation/Communications Room (Sitroom) provides a 24/7 operational response capacity to the Organization. A team of duty officers monitors events in the OSCE area around the clock and provides real-time reporting to senior management, thereby serving as an early warning tool and maintaining a vital link in the security chain between the secretariat and the field operations.

• The OSCE Communications Network, managed by the CPC, is a system that allows the foreign and defense ministers of the fifty-six OSCE states to securely share and exchange military information among each other. The network is accessible and operational through a secure environment around the clock, seven days a week.

Website and Research Materials

• http://www.osce.org/

• http://www.osce.org/cthb/item_11_41953.html (“An Agenda for Change: Implementing the Platform for Action Against Human Trafficking”)

• http://www.osce.org/cthb/13413.html (“Combating Trafficking in Children”)

• http://www.osce.org/resources/
Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI)  
Regional Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime

*Mandate/Objectives:*  
The SECI Center is an operational regional organization bringing together police and customs authorities from 13 member countries in Southeast Europe. The Center delivers valuable support to the national customs and law enforcement agencies by offering a trustworthy environment for information sharing, knowledge development, joint planning, and common action in the field of trans-border crime.

*General Activities and Capabilities:*  
- Facilitates the rapid exchange of information between law enforcement and border agencies from different countries  
- Establishes a mechanism based on enhanced law enforcement cooperation at the national level to be used by member states to assist each other in preventing, detecting, investigating, prosecuting, and repressing trans-border crime  
- Supports the field activities of law enforcement officers  
- Supports national efforts in order to harmonize their law enforcement legislation in respect to the EU requirements

*Specific Activities:*  
Supports specialized task forces on issues such as:  
- **Human trafficking and migrant smuggling** – Regional Action Plans were developed in 2002, 2003, and 2004 to implement Operation Mirage. During these operations, which were intended to be the largest operations ever executed in the region, the police forces were organized to act as a single body, implementing raids and controls in public places (night bars, hotels, discos) in all the participating countries.  
- **Anti-drugs trafficking** – The SECI Center has also acted as an operations center and a communications platform for Southeast Europe, encouraging cooperative approaches to strategic analysis, regional operations, joint investigations, and controlled deliveries and trainings via its Anti-Drug Task Force  
- **Anti-fraud and anti-smuggling**— The Anti-Smuggling and Anti-Fraud Task Force has ensured effectiveness in assisting member countries to combat smuggling and customs fraud. The positive influence was mainly achieved by exchanging case information, coordinating regional
anti-smuggling operations, and supporting joint investigations on cigarette smuggling among the member countries.

- **Financial and computer crime** — The Task Force on Financial and Computer Crime is active today in the framework of the SECI Center, targeting five specialized crime areas: counterfeit currency, plastic card fraud, cyber-crime, intellectual property theft, and money laundering.

- **Stolen Vehicles** — A new approach against smuggling stolen vehicles in Southeast Europe was proposed by the SECI Center by shifting from time-limited operations to a larger strategy that will allow for structural and legislative changes within the national systems. This new strategy has already started to be implemented in 2006, by supporting joint investigations between member countries on stolen vehicles, and by supporting the idea of a standard vehicle registration project.

- **Anti-terrorism** — The Anti-Terrorism Task Force aims to help identify operational, legislative, and structural obstacles to cooperation against terrorism and associated crime in the region, and to create links and trust among regional investigators. Regular meetings are held, and important professional knowledge is exchanged by means of case studies and shared situational awareness.

- **Container security** — The Container Security Task Force represents a multi-dimension effort, combining customs enforcement expertise with a concrete regional strategy (policy or action plan) for setting up safety and security standards with regard to incoming, transiting, and departing containerized shipments within Southeast European territory. These standards are regularly updated and upgraded, and offer a solid modern platform for the Center’s customs and border control agencies in encountering and intercepting high-risk container cargos. To achieve its goals, the task force organizes two standard types of large, regional-scale operations, while conducting as well limited-scale joint customs operations on an occasional basis. Moreover, this project focuses on providing permanent training and seminars. As a result, container security experts from all the SECI Center member states have, on regular base, the opportunity to upgrade their professional skills and capabilities. Another tool for closing gaps, due to regional vulnerability, is the two-year assessment process in container security.

- **Environmental crimes** — Another task force coordinates regional efforts to combat such illicit activities as the illegal trade of endangered species, the damaging of nature by illegal hunting, polluting water resources, and the unlawful disposal of waste.

**Website and Research Materials**
http://www.secicenter.org/

**Trafficking Points of Contact**

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UN 1540 Committee

*Mandate/Objectives*

On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, obliging states to refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems. Resolution 1540 also imposes binding obligations on all states to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.

The Committee also encourages international cooperation on such efforts, in accord with and by promoting universal adherence to existing international non-proliferation treaties.

The 1540 objectives were reaffirmed in resolution 1810 (2008), which also urged the Committee to continue strengthening its role in facilitating technical assistance, including by engaging actively in matching offers and requests for assistance.

The 1540 Committee consists of all members of the Security Council and is supported by a group of eight experts. It reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.

*General Activities and Capabilities*

Guided by programs of work, the 1540 Committee decided on its Eighth Program (1 February 2009 – 31 January 2010) to focus attention on these five main tasks:

1. Organizing a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and report to the Security Council on its outcome
2. Increasing its knowledge by examination of the information on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through encouraging more member states to report and share additional information
3. Fostering outreach, dialogue, assistance, and cooperation to promote all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004)
4. Enhancing ongoing cooperation between the Committee and other international organizations, including other Security Council-related committees established by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001)
5. Taking full advantage of voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)

With the adoption of the Eighth Program of Work, the 1540 Committee also established on a trial basis four working groups to focus on:

- Monitoring national implementation (coordinator: Mexico)
- Assistance (coordinator: France)
- Cooperation with international organizations, including the 1267 and 1373 Security Council Committees (coordinator: Austria)
Specific Activities
The chairman of the 1540 Committee delivers briefings on the main activities of the Committee to the Security Council on a regular basis. In the briefing covering the six months prior to May 2009, such activities included:

- Compiling a report to address specific state compliance with resolution 1540, focused especially on accountability, physical protection, border controls and law enforcement efforts, and national export and trans-shipment controls, including controls on providing funds and services
- Encouraging states to submit their reports and extra data to the Committee through correspondence, informal meetings with regional groups and states, and other outreach activities
- Researching state actions regarding resolution 1540
- Holding dialogues with states on implementing all elements of the resolutions
- Providing technical assistance to states if required or requested
- Facilitating technical assistance by engaging in matching offers and addressing state requests for assistance
- Enhancing and encouraging international and regional cooperation and intelligence sharing on WMD related issues

Favorite/Essential Tools
The 1540 Committee and its group of experts are supported by the UN Secretariat, namely the UN Department for Political Affairs (UNDPA), and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). As such, the 1540 Committee and its group of experts have access to available UN resources, and have developed specific tools, such as an assistance template and a legislative database, that are available on the official Committee website. Specific databases are being developed to manage data related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including assistance requests and offers.

Website and Research Materials

Trafficking Points of contact
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UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

Mandate/Objectives

Within the framework of the UN, UNICRI was founded to “strengthen the UN action in the prevention and control of both juvenile delinquency and adult criminality.” Its aim is “to assist intergovernmental, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations in their efforts to formulate and implement improved policies in the field of crime prevention and justice administration.”

UNICRI works to:

- Advance understanding of crime-related problems
- Support governments and the international community in tackling the threats of crime to social peace, development, and political stability
- Foster just and efficient criminal justice systems
- Facilitate international law enforcement cooperation and judicial assistance;
- Improve cooperation at the international and regional levels to prevent the illicit trafficking and use of biotechnology advances, CBRN materials, and precious metals
- Improve policies to reduce trafficking in human beings for commercial and sexual exploitation
- Maintain “the UNICRI Laboratory [as] an information-gathering center…pursuing a strong regional approach, the Lab tests ideas to find proactive solutions to the many global security issues”
- Promote national self-reliance through assisting in the development of institutional capabilities

General Activities and Capabilities

“Knowledge management, creativity in finding solutions, and the power of partnerships are the major UNICRI instruments of work. The UNICRI Applied Research Program is organized in four main work areas: Emerging Crimes and Anti-Human Trafficking; Security Governance and Counter Terrorism Laboratory; Justice Reform; and Post-Graduate Training.”

UNICRI achieves its goals via the organization of projects, meetings and conferences, and training courses.

- **Projects** — Conducts projects in the areas of counter-terrorism, working to implement policies and improve the cooperation among state governments and regional/international organizations to prevent the illicit trafficking of CBRN material, precious metals, and biotechnology advances. Conducts projects to formulate effective policies for human trafficking prevention.

- **Meetings and conferences** — Organizes meetings and conferences that focus on security and the illicit trafficking of human beings, CBRN material, arms, and drugs. The purpose is to shed light and bring attention to these crucial issues.

- **Training Courses** — The Training and Advanced Education (TAE) Unit organizes courses in partnership with high-level universities. It also develops projects in cooperation with other academic institutions, international organizations, research centers, and individual experts. It plays a “central role in meeting UNICRI’s specific targets: integrated knowledge management through research and dissemination of relevant information on crime prevention and criminal justice.”

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Specific Activities

- **Knowledge Management System (KMS) on the prevention of illicit trafficking of CBRN Material** — The objective is “to assist states in establishing clear channels of communication, improving information sharing on CBRN incidents, and accessing information that helps strengthen capabilities in terms of effective border control, law enforcement operations, national export controls, and trans-shipment controls.”

- **Illicit trafficking of precious metals** — This project aims “to strengthen existing mechanisms for the prevention of illicit trafficking of precious metals and to combat laundering of illegal income.”

- **Preventing and combating trafficking of minors and young women from Nigeria to Italy** — The target is to create the social, economic, and political conditions that “reduce the vulnerability of women and children to trafficking from Nigeria to Italy.”

- **Collecting data and exchanging information** on policy options, strategies, and practices:
  - Maintains an international documentation center
  - Creates comparative databases
  - Helps establish criminal justice databases in developing countries
  - Holds meetings and seminars with states to collaborate on data

- **Promoting and coordinating international and regional research:**
  - Analyses and assesses policy formulation and implementation
  - Establishes networks between policy-makers, administrators, and researchers
  - Studies national and local crime-related problems that impact or are associated with development activities

- **Providing training and educational activities to develop professional skills:**
  - Conducts training courses
  - Develops training curricula, methods, and materials, and instructs trainers to use and disseminate them

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)

- The Security Governance/Counter Terrorism Unit employs the following tools:
  - The Portal
  - The Need Assessment Tool — Seeks to assist states to develop a comprehensive CBRN policy as well as to identify gaps and needs, the mitigation of which should enhance capabilities to comprehensively prevent and combat the illicit trafficking and criminal use of CBRN material. In part, the Need Assessment Tool is a response to the observation that past international assistance has not always addressed the most pressing needs of states in the CBRN area.

- The Emerging Crimes and Anti-Human Trafficking Unit employs the following tools:
  - The Bibliography on Trafficking in Human Beings, a database containing material related to trafficking and sexual exploitation of human beings.
  - International Repository of Institutions against Sexual Exploitation of Minors (IRISEM), a database containing the most relevant institutions and organizations committed to combat, reduce, and prevent trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors around the world.


The International Legal Repository (ILR), a database containing a list of relevant international, regional, and sub-regional legal instruments.

**Website and Research Materials**
- http://lab.unicri.it/about_the_lab.html
- Publications: http://www.unicri.it/wwk/publications/books/series.php
- Electronic resources: http://www.unicri.it/wwk/resources/resources.php
- Security Governance/Counter Terrorism Laboratory: http://lab.unicri.it/

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**UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)**

**Mandate/Objectives**

“The UNIDIR—a n autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security with the aim of assisting the international community in its disarmament thinking, decisions and efforts.”

UNIDIR:
- Assists diplomatic negotiations and disarmament efforts
- Engages the arms control and disarmament community on a variety of disarmament-related topics, including: nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missiles, small arms, landmines, peacekeeping, and education
- Leads discussions in emerging security debates
- Focuses many activities on trafficking issues related to disarmament

**General Activities and Capabilities**

UNIDIR engages in four basic types of activities: research projects, meetings and conferences, a fellowship program, and the Geneva Forum. These four types of activities are focused in three areas of research: global security and disarmament, regional security and disarmament, and human security and...
disarmament. UNIDIR activities aim to provide the international community with more complete data on problems relating to disarmament in order to assist ongoing negotiations, create solutions, and promote security. UNIDIR is primarily funded from voluntary contributions from states and from public and private organizations. The UN General Assembly and other contributing organizations request that UNIDIR conduct specific activities.

UNIDIR is based in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the primary center for security and disarmament negotiations, home of the Conference on Disarmament, and global focal point for humanitarian concerns such as human rights, refugees, migration, health, and labor issues.

- **Research projects** — UNIDIR conducts long-term and short-term forward-looking, in-depth projects in all focus areas (global security, regional security, and human security). The research projects are designed to examine issues in innovative and creative ways, to provide decision-makers with specific policy recommendations, and to stimulate new international initiatives.

- **Meetings and conferences** — UNIDIR organizes seminars and meetings that focus on disarmament, security, and non-proliferation topics in order to bring new ideas to the attention of different arms control experts and organizations. The meetings and conferences also build relationships and partnerships with various UN bureaus, state governments, research organizations, and NGOs in the disarmament field.

- **Fellowship program** — UNIDIR hosts visiting fellows that interact with the UN Secretariat, government delegations, international organizations, and NGOs to broaden the research program and scope.

- **Geneva Forum** — UNIDIR organizes the Geneva Forum, an ongoing discussion series, together with the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and the Quaker United Nations Office. The Forum is an intellectual space for experts from the UN, NGOs, media, and academia to discuss broad disarmament issues.

**Specific Activities**

Recent UNIDIR projects include:

- **Addressing Illicit Brokering Activities: Issues and Control** — Ongoing global security research project "to describe, disseminate information, and raise awareness of the international community on the threat posed by illicit brokering activities in all types of weapons, including WMD, and initiate discussions on control measures."[12]

- **Promoting Discussion on an Arms Trade Treaty** — Ongoing regional security research project “to promote the participation of all stakeholders in the discussions around an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), integrate national and regional contributions to the international process under way, and to identify the scope and implications of a treaty on the regional organizations and civil society by encouraging discussions around different aspects of a possible international treaty on the arms trade.”[13] In 2008 and 2009, UNIDIR was involved in promoting UN Resolution 1540, through a publication and having a consultant attending the regional seminars organized by ODA.

- **International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons** — Ongoing human security research project “to research the global and regional dynamics of international assistance for implementing the UN


Programme of Action with a view to establishing a global mechanism to identify requests for assistance and communicate these requests to donors.\(^{14}\)

**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**
UNIDIR uses many different databases and security networks. The other essential tools include workshop series, working groups, meetings within the Geneva process, and the CASA mechanism on SALW.

**Website and Research Materials**

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**UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)**
**Geneva Branch**

**Mandate/Objectives**
“The Office promotes the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.”\(^{15}\)

Three main areas of focus are WMD, conventional arms, and regional disarmament.

**General Activities and Capabilities**
- Provides substantive and organizational support for disarmament norm-setting
- Encourages preventative disarmament measures such as dialogue, transparency, and confidence building on military matters and supports regional disarmament efforts
- Provides information on the UN disarmament efforts
- Supports the development and implementation of practical post-conflict disarmament measures, such as disarming and demobilizing former combatants and helping them to reintegrate in civil society
- Offers substantive support to the 1540 Committee through fundraising and organizing regional seminars and workshops

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Specific Activities

- **Conference on Disarmament (CD) Secretariat and Conference Support Branch** — Provides organizational and substantive servicing to the Conference on Disarmament (the international negotiating forum)

- **WMD Branch** — Provides substantive support in the area of WMD disarmament; supports multilateral efforts to strengthen non-proliferation efforts and connects with IGOs and specialized UN agencies, such as the IAEA, OPCW, and the CTBTO

- **Conventional Arms Branch** — Provides conference support on the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, the Arms Treaty process, and the UN transparency registers

- **Regional Disarmament Branch** — Advises and supports member states and regional organizations on disarmament and related security issues

- **Information and Outreach Branch** — Organizes special events and programs on disarmament, produces UNODA publications, and maintains a database on treaties and resolutions

**Website and Research Materials**

**Trafficking Point of Contact**

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**UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC ISU)**

**Mandate/Objectives**

The BWC ISU was created by the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC in 2006 to “help States Parties help themselves” in improving the implementation of the Convention. The ISU is funded by the States Parties to the Convention and is housed within the Geneva Branch of UNODA. It consists of three professional staff. The ISU is mandated to provide:

- Administrative support and assistance for the BWC and its meetings
- National implementation support and assistance for States Parties
- Support and assistance for the BWC confidence-building measures
- Support and assistance for obtaining universality for the BWC

The ISU is a small outfit geared to facilitating and coordinating the activities of the others: it does not carry out implementation activities (training, drafting of legislation, etc) itself. The ISU’s mandate will expire at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011.
General Activities and Capabilities

- The ISU’s activities relevant to trafficking fall under its support for national implementation of Article III of the BWC, which prohibits transferring, or assisting anyone to acquire, biological or toxin weapons. This obligation is generally interpreted as requiring national export controls on biological agents, toxins, and equipment that may be subject to misuse.

- The ISU maintains a database of national implementation measures that includes various export control regimes, and provides research and support for the discussion of export controls when this topic is considered in the BWC’s intersessional work program. The ISU helps States Parties find resources and assistance to implement appropriate national controls, either through bilateral channels or from relevant international organizations.

Specific Activities

The BWC ISU does not have any specific anti-trafficking activities: requests for assistance are handled on an ad hoc basis, and activities are generally conducted by bilateral or regional donors, specialist international organizations, or NGOs and academic consultants.

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)

The ISU maintains a national implementation database (NID) containing details of national measures that might be relevant to the BWC in as many states for which it has been possible to gather data. Where possible, it also provides a summary of the measures and a link to the full text of the instrument. The NID currently includes a total of over two thousand individual national measures from 121 States Parties. The NID is publicly available on the ISU website (http://www.unog.ch/bwc/NID).

Website and Research Materials

- http://www.unog.ch/bwc
- http://www.unog.ch/bwc/NID

Trafficking Point of Contact

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UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

*Mandate/Objectives*

The mandate of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is “Assisting Member States in the ratification and implementation of the international drug and transnational organized crime conventions.” This includes:

- Monitoring the implementation of the Conventions
- Developing and promoting best practice in countering illicit trafficking and organized crime across the globe
- Improving the exchange of information; judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance between law enforcement officials
- Determining the most effective method for collecting information on illicit trafficking and organized crime from a regional and global perspective and ensuring that such information is available to policymaking and technical assistance projects

*General Activities and Capabilities*

- Strengthening national expertise and institutional capacity of law enforcement or other criminal justice agencies on trafficking in persons, drugs and firearms, smuggling of migrants, money laundering and precursor control
- Legal advice and assistance to review and draft national legislation and regulations, including through the provision of model laws, to facilitate ratification and implementation of international legal instruments pertaining to drugs, crime, and terrorism
- Strengthening of institutional structures responsible for international cooperation mechanisms in criminal matters, including on extradition, mutual legal assistance, and cooperation for purposes of confiscation
- Advice and guidance in the implementation and management of witness and victim protection measures and programs
- Promotion and technical support to the implementation of inter-agency and international cooperation in law enforcement
- Assistance to countries of origin, transit and destination to develop joint strategies and plans of action to combat trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, drugs trafficking and firearms trafficking
- Collection, analysis, and dissemination of data on trends in organized crime and human and illicit drug trafficking
- Promotion and support of national and regional information/data exchange mechanisms on firearms dealers, importers, exporters and methods and means of trafficking
- Enhancing international security through enhancing sea container control.
- Development, implementation, and support of IT resources and computer-based training for improved law enforcement to counter illicit trafficking
- Support to integrated information and case file management within the law enforcement and judicial authorities
- Assistance in prevention and awareness raising on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants
• Provision of capacity building services (which may include use of mentors, advisory services and e-learning programs) in the following areas:
  » Specialized drug law enforcement investigation techniques
  » Training of criminal justice officials on new legislation, international cooperation and the rule of law in terrorism-related matters
  » Capacity building of criminal justice practitioners in combating trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, including training of first responders and specialists
  » Border management and controls, risk assessment, targeting and profiling;
  » Managing and oversight over the legal trade and transit of firearms, ammunition and explosives to prevent their diversion to illicit trafficking
  » Dissemination of best practices
  » Data collection and management

Specific Activities

• **Legal Advisory Programme** — Delivers legal assistance to help states ratify and effectively implement the international drug conventions and common provisions of the transnational organized crime, corruption, and counter-terrorism instruments.

• **Container Control Programme** — Assists states strengthen their border management through identifying containers used for the carriage of illegal goods in international trade.

• **The Paris Pact Initiative** — Provides technical assistance to facilitate consultations, strategic thinking and coordinated operational responses by countries affected by drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan.

• **Global Programme Against Money Laundering** — Assists states in implementing the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures in compliance with UN related standards.

• **Global Programme against Human Trafficking** — Assists states to implement the anti-trafficking in persons provisions and other related provisions of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, which supplements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

• **Global Programme against the Smuggling of Migrants** — Assists states to implement the anti-smuggling of migrants provisions and other related provisions of the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, which supplements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

• **United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking** (UN.GIFT) — A project of UNODC managed in cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). UN.GIFT's core areas of work include global and collective advocacy efforts to help raise awareness of human trafficking, promoting evidence-based knowledge on TIP, developing greater coordination and cooperation among international organizations and innovative public-private partnerships and supporting system-wide institutional and individual capacity-building of stakeholders.

• **Computer-based training programs** — Support a uniform approach to law enforcement and communication to address border management, drug law enforcement, trafficking in persons
and the investigation of organized crime through the application of internationally benchmarked training syllabuses.

**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**

- Legislative Guide for the Implementation of UNTOC
- Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the Protocols
- Model laws on:
  - Witness protection
  - The classification of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors and on the regulation of the licit trade of drugs; drug trafficking and related offences; abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
  - Trafficking in persons
  - Smuggling of migrants
  - Money-laundering and financing of terrorism
- Model Regulation for Civil Law Countries on establishing an Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Coordination of Drug Control
- International Framework for Action to Implement the Trafficking in Persons Protocol
- Implementation Guide to the Firearms Protocol
- Guidelines on Special Investigative Techniques
- Good Practices in the Protection of Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Involving Organized Crime
- Toolkit for investigating and prosecuting complex organised crime and corruption cases
- Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons
- Anti-Human Trafficking Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners
- First Aid Kit for use by Law Enforcement Responders in addressing Human Trafficking
- Online tools:
  - Directory of Competent National Authorities under the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance
  - UNODC Legal Library
  - goAML
- Computer software to improve police investigation and forensic capacities
- UNODC Checklist — Justice System Processing of Drug-Related Casework
- Biannual seizure reports
- Database on Trafficking Trends
- Global Report on Trafficking in Persons
- Tailor-made training manuals against trafficking in persons for several countries/regions
- Country reports/handbooks on action against trafficking in persons
Website and Research Materials
- UNODC: http://www.unodc.org/
- UN.GIFT: www.ungift.org

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UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT)

Mandate/Objectives
UN.GIFT was launched in March 2007 by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with a grant made on behalf of the United Arab Emirates. It is managed in cooperation with the ILO, the IOM, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the OSCE. UN.GIFT works with all stakeholders—governments, business, academia, civil society, and the media—to support each other's work, create new partnerships, and develop effective tools to fight human trafficking.

Over 115 countries have signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, which supplements the Palermo Convention against Trans-National Organized Crime.

Capabilities
- Conducts research on human trafficking issues
- Disseminates information and spreads knowledge to increase awareness of the issue
- Promotes effective rights-based responses to human trafficking
- Conducts capacity-building measures for state and non-state actors
- Fosters partnerships for joint action against human trafficking

Specific Activities
- Initiated the Women's Leadership Council, a community of women leaders from around the world that work against human trafficking, which disproportionately affects women; they network and use their positions to help UN.GIFT and fight for the cause
- Prepared a draft handbook for parliamentarians to legislate against human trafficking within their states
- Prepares the yearly “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons”
- Organizes Expert Group Initiatives on a wide range of topics that work to create practical tools to help governments, civil society, business communities, the international community and other relevant actors in preventing trafficking, protecting victims and bringing criminals to justice
Website and Research Materials

- http://www.ungift.org/

Point of Contact

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World Customs Organization (WCO)

Mandate/Objectives
The World Customs Organization (WCO), established in 1952 as the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), is an independent international intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of member Customs administrations, thereby assisting them to contribute successfully to national development goals, particularly in the areas of trade facilitation, revenue collection, community protection, and national security.

Today, the WCO represents 176 customs administrations across the globe that collectively process approximately 98 percent of world trade. As the global center of customs expertise, the WCO is the only international organization with competence in customs matters, WCO can rightly call itself the voice of the international customs community.

The World Customs Organization is internationally acknowledged as the global center of customs expertise and plays a leading role in the discussion, development, promotion, and implementation of modern and secure customs systems and procedures. It is responsive to the needs of its members and its strategic environment, and its instruments and best-practice approaches are recognized as the basis for sound customs administration throughout the world.

Customs enforcement is concerned with the protection of society and fighting trans-national organized crime based on the principles of risk management. In discharging this mandate, customs enforcement services are involved in a wide range of activities relating to information and intelligence exchange, combating commercial fraud, counterfeiting, the smuggling of highly-taxed goods (especially cigarettes and alcohol), drug trafficking, stolen motor vehicles, money laundering, electronic crime, and the smuggling of arms, nuclear materials, toxic waste and weapons of mass destruction. Enforcement activities also aim to protect intellectual and cultural property and endangered species of plants and animals.
General Activities and Capabilities

The WCO's work areas cover the development of global standards, the simplification and harmonization of Customs procedures, trade supply chain security, the facilitation of international trade, the enhancement of customs enforcement and compliance activities, anti-counterfeiting and piracy initiatives, public-private partnerships, integrity promotion, and sustainable global Customs capacity building programs. The WCO also maintains the international Harmonized System goods nomenclature, and administers the technical aspects of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements on Customs Valuation and Rules of Origin.

- **International cooperation and information sharing**—Provides a forum for international cooperation to promote greater connectivity and more harmonious interaction, including the exchange of information and experience and the identification of best practices, between member administrations, international organizations, and other relevant stakeholders.

- **Harmonization and simplification of customs systems and procedures**—Develops, maintains and promotes a series of internationally agreed conventions, other instruments, and best-practice approaches to achieve harmonization and simplification of customs systems and procedures.

- **Compliance and enforcement**—Supports members through activities in the areas of commercial fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, IPR, and other related offences, through the development of compliance and enforcement tools and intelligence sharing via the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) for the protection of society in the areas of public health and safety, environmental crimes, and containment of possible pandemics.

- **Trade facilitation**—Promotes the Revised Kyoto Convention to assist members on trade facilitation matters. The WCO will continue to work with other international organizations, including the WTO to support its Trade Facilitation Negotiating Group with advice and consultations to foster better understanding of WCO trade facilitation instruments and tools.

- **Supply chain security and facilitation**—Enhances customs-to-customs networks and customs-to-business partnerships in a meaningful and mutually beneficial way, through continued dialogue with its members and its business partners to secure and facilitate the international trade supply chain, including coordinated border management in cooperation with other border agencies.

- **Capacity building**—Provides a range of capacity building, training and technical assistance and integrity program to increase the capacity of member customs administrations to contribute effectively to national development goals, in partnership with international organizations and the private sector.

- **Research and analysis**—Conducts research and analysis into new visions, issues and trends of strategic importance to the WCO and member administrations, in cooperation with research institutions.

The Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) is the foundation for effective, modern, 21st Century Customs procedures and is a reference tool within the framework of WTO negotiations on trade facilitation, as well as a basis for the SAFE Framework of Standards. There are currently 59 Contracting Parties to the RKC.

The Coordinated Border Management (CBM) initiates an outreach program to other border control agencies and promotes the use of the WCO Data Model and other instruments as ideal tools to achieve coordinated border management.

Under the 2003 WCO Customs Capacity Building Strategy, the WCO is focused on helping WCO members develop or acquire the skills, competencies, tools, processes, and resources needed to improve the capacity of the administration to carry out its allotted functions and achieve its objectives. Capacity building is not only limited to assistance for developing countries; every member needs to further...
develop its own capacity in implementing WCO instruments and tools. The WCO’s focus has recently added more emphasis towards the aspect of management (organizational structure) and human resources, which are of interest for both developed and developing countries.

**Specific Activities**

- **Columbus Program** — Since 1 January 2006 the WCO has initiated a number of capacity building programs and activities. The Columbus Program is the largest and most comprehensive customs capacity building initiative. The aim of the Columbus Program is full implementation of the SAFE Framework of Standards. The Columbus Program consists of three phases:
  - Phase 1, needs assessment, is a comprehensive diagnostic needs assessment of the current situation in the Customs administration.
  - Phase 2, implementation, is support for action planning, donor matchmaking, planning of pilot activities, and implementation.
  - Phase 3, monitoring, involves monitoring of progress.

- **National Customs Enforcement Network (nCEN)** — In order to serve members which do not have their own centralized database for risk management and operational analysis, the Secretariat has started the development of the nCEN application.

- **Project AIRCOP** — The overall objective is to build drug-interdiction capacities in ten selected international airports in West Africa, Morocco, and Brazil. In so doing, the project will establish Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITF) and connect them to international law enforcement databases and communication networks to enable the transmission in real time to other international airports of operational information aimed at intercepting illicit shipments. The project will also promote intelligence and information sharing between services at the national and international level, as well as an intelligence-led approach to countering drug trafficking.

- **WCO/UNODC Container Control Program:** The WCO and the UNODC initiated the Container Control Program (CCP) for the purpose of enhancing port surveillance in developing countries to minimize the risk of maritime containers being exploited and used for illicit drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and other forms of fraudulent activity.

- The Secretariat acts as the co-executive agency for the WCO-UNODC CCP, which focuses on assisting law enforcement agencies in developing countries to work jointly in efforts to identify high-risk shipments loaded in sea containers, which also carry other cargo.

**Favorite/Essential Tools**

- Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_epoverviewboxes_tools_and_instruments_epcengien.htm
- Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILO), http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_epoverviewboxes_tools_and_instruments_eprilo.htm
Website and Research Materials
- http://www.wcoomd.org/
- WCO-Enforcement topics: http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_epoverviewboxes.htm

 Trafficking Point of Contact

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World Health Organization (WHO)

Mandate/Objectives:
The World Health Organization (WHO) has taken on very specific responsibilities for addressing potential health risks caused by biological sources (such as viruses). In this respect, WHO seeks to protect humans and agriculture by setting standards and obligations for its member states to restrict the transport of potentially dangerous biological specimens and to control the cross-border spread of disease. In addition to providing technical assistance to help states meet these obligations, WHO also collects data and keeps its member states informed about potential biological risks that may affect them. During actual outbreaks or other health-related emergencies, WHO also provides crisis management support and advice.

The International Health Regulations (IHR) are an international agreement that is legally binding on all WHO member states, with the goal of helping the international community prevent and respond to acute global public health risks that have the potential to cross borders. The IHR, which entered into force in 2007, reflect a modernization of the international community's approach to public health and an acknowledgement of the importance of establishing an effective international strategy to manage emergencies that threaten global health security.

General Activities and Capabilities
- The Global Alert and Response (GAR) framework is an integrated system designed to address systematically the threat of natural and intentional epidemics through integrated strategies for combating known risks, for responding to the unexpected, and for improving both global and national preparedness. In the event of a deliberate release of a biological agent, WHO's GAR activities and operational framework, together with the technical resources of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), would be vital for effective international containment efforts.
- To strengthen bio-safety, bio-security, and readiness for outbreaks of dangerous or emerging pathogens, WHO advocates a “dual-use investment” in national, regional, and global public health operations and infrastructure, and it works to provide members with state-of-the-art technical guidance, real-time information, and assistance with building national preparedness for epidemics of either natural or intentional origin.
The IHR introduced several new operational concepts, including, among others, specific procedures for notification and reporting of public health events, the creation of permanent 24/7 communication channels between countries and WHO, and an Emergency Committee to provide its views to the WHO Director General on events of international public health concern.

**Specific Activities**

- Since illicit trafficking in biological agents may manifest first as a health-related event, the WHO Bio-risk Reduction Program has developed specialized surveillance systems for specific diseases and maintains rapid-response packages for high-consequence pathogens. In addition, bio-risk officials look for tools to enable them to assess a risk, determine its origin, and, when necessary, implement infection control practices for prevention.
- Given that the activities of the Bio-risk Reduction Program often overlap with those of other IGOs operating in the field in cases where the food chain may be affected, counterfeit medicine may be involved, or human trafficking is part of the mix, WHO remains particularly supportive of a cross-organizational, comprehensive approach.
- GOARN is a WHO-led early warning and health security system that links together a variety of medical, emergency response, and UN-affiliated groups. Created in April 2000, GOARN ensures that countries have rapid access to technical support, experts, and resources for outbreak response, and it provides an operational framework to focus the delivery of support to countries.

**Favorite/Essential Tool(s)**

- The Global Health Observatory (GHO) is WHO’s portal providing access to data, tools, and analysis for monitoring the global health situation. It supplies critical information on key health themes, as well as direct access to the full database, including data from all WHO programs.
- The WHO Communicable Disease Global Atlas is an electronic platform that brings together for analysis and comparison standardized data and statistics for infectious diseases at country, regional, and global levels. In addition to epidemiological information, the system also aims to provide data on essential support services, such as the network of communicable disease collaborating centers and the activities of GOARN, among others.

**Website and Research Materials**

- [http://www.who.int/en/](http://www.who.int/en/)

**Trafficking Points of Contact**

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World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

Mandate/Objectives

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations. WIPO is dedicated to developing a balanced and accessible international intellectual property (IP) system, which rewards creativity, stimulates innovation, and contributes to economic development while safeguarding the public interest. A key element thereof, constituting one of the Strategic Goals of WIPO, is building respect for IP.

It should be understood that WIPO, as the intergovernmental organization responsible for the promotion and protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among states and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organization, is not mandated to enforce private intellectual property rights. However, the Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE), established at the 2002 Session of the WIPO General Assemblies, has the following mandate:

- Coordinating with certain organizations and the private sector to combat counterfeiting and piracy activities
- Public education
- Assistance to member states
- Coordination to undertake national and regional training programs for all relevant stakeholders
- Exchange of information on enforcement issues

This mandate, inter alia, opened the door for WIPO to partner with INTERPOL, the WCO, and the private sector (ICC/BIAC, INTE, and ISMA) in the framework of the Global Congress on Counterfeiting — see http://www.ccaponline.net/. It also allowed cooperation with other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned by the escalation of IP crimes, including the socio-economic and health and safety consequences thereof.

In addition, in line with the wording of Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, as incorporated in recommendation 45 of the WIPO Development Agenda (see http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html#f), the deliberations in the ACE paved the way to WIPO adopting a new strategic goal aimed at building respect for IP (see WIPO strategic goal 6, program 17, at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-wipo/en/budget/pdf/budget_2010_2011.pdf), pursuing the following objectives:

- Holding informed and empirically well-founded policy discussions at the international level to support the creation of an enabling environment that promotes respect for IP in a sustainable manner
• Strengthening the capacity of the member states for the effective enforcement of IP rights in the interests of social and economic development and consumer protection

General Activities and Capabilities
From the above, it should be noted that WIPO is not an “operational enforcement” organization and has, therefore, no specific trafficking tool. Rather, it has a supportive role in combating IP crime in the framework of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. Guided by strategic goal 6, the Building Respect for IP division of WIPO, in cooperation with other WIPO divisions, performs the following activities:

• Secretariat responsible for the organization of the sessions of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement
• Legal and technical assistance in the field of enforcement of IP rights to the member states upon their request
• Strategic assistance for the formulation of national/regional strategies (including capacity-building) to enhance effective enforcement actions provided to the member states upon their request
• Consultations and studies on specific issues pertaining to the enforcement of IP rights
• International cooperation with other international organizations and the private sector, as mentioned above, to combat counterfeiting and piracy
• Training provided to law enforcement agencies, including the judiciary, and private sector stakeholders in the field of enforcement of the IP rights
• Awareness campaigns against counterfeiting and piracy (in cooperation with public/private stakeholders)
• Exchange of information between the member states in the field of enforcement of IP rights


Specific Activities
An overview of the activities performed by WIPO within the aforementioned framework may be seen at: http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/activities/.

Favorite/Essential Tool(s)
As previously indicated, WIPO is not an “operational enforcement” organization in the field of combating trafficking and, as such, there is no specific trafficking tool being used by WIPO. Yet, WIPO’s role is subsidiary in addressing the trade in illicit goods by assisting member states in, inter alia, formulating and adopting appropriate legislation to combat IP crimes; capacity building; and awareness raising. Similarly, the ACE is a forum for intense policy dialogue and in the most recent session in November 2009, for example, specific attention was drawn to the involvement of organized crime in the domain of IP crimes (involving also concerns pertaining to illegal labor practices in the manufacturing and distribution of counterfeit and pirated goods).

Website and Research Materials
• The Building Respect for IP division’s website, http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/
• All contributions and documents discussed within the framework of the various sessions of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement, http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/topic.jsp?group_id=142

In this regard, on the fight against IP crime, see for example:
Enforcement Point of Contact

The term “trafficking point of contact” is not appropriate, since WIPO is not an “operational enforcement” organization in the fight against illegal trafficking. The term “enforcement point of contact” is therefore more appropriate.

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World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)

Mandate/Objectives

The OIE is the intergovernmental organization responsible for improving animal health worldwide, and it responds to the need to fight animal diseases at the global level.

It is recognized as a reference organization by the WTO and as of 2010 had a total of 175 member countries and territories. The OIE maintains permanent relations with 36 other international and regional organizations, and has regional and sub-regional offices on every continent.

General Activities and Capabilities

The OIE as an organization does not have direct tools to prevent trafficking. However, its activities include the operation of border controls aimed at detecting illegal movements of animals and animal products, and theses controls have an obvious bearing on trafficking activities. The OIE conducts the following activities related to trafficking:

• Safeguards world trade by publishing health standards for international trade in animals and animal products
  » Develops normative documents relating to rules that member countries can use to protect themselves from diseases and pathogens
  » Specialized commissions and working groups, bringing together internationally renowned scientists and experts, contribute to creating the standards and safeguards
• Sets standards on animal health. Some key normative works produced by the OIE are the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, the Aquatic Animal Health Code and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals
• Improves the legal framework and resources of national veterinary services.

• Advocates for greater transparency when a country detects animal diseases on its territory and disseminates the information to other countries, which can take the necessary preventive action

• Collects, analyzes, and disseminates scientific information on animal disease control

• Provides technical support to member countries requesting assistance with animal disease control and eradication operations, including diseases transmittable to humans

• Offers expertise to the poorest countries to help them control animal diseases that cause livestock losses, present a risk to public health, and threaten other member countries

• Develops and publishes health standards for international trade in animals and animal products

• Maintains permanent contact to international, regional, and national financial organizations in order to convince them to invest more and better in the control of animal diseases

Specific Activities

• **OFFLU** — A joint OIE-FAO worldwide scientific network for the control of animal influenza. The objectives of the network are:

  » To exchange scientific data and biological materials (including virus strains) within the network to analyze such data, and to share such information with the wider scientific community

  » To offer technical advice and veterinary expertise to member countries to assist in the prevention, diagnosis, surveillance, and control of animal influenza

  » To collaborate with the WHO influenza network on issues relating to the animal-human interface, including early preparation of human vaccine

  » To highlight influenza research needs, promote their development, and ensure co-ordination

• **Disease emergency preparedness** — Hosts simulation exercises worldwide to teach member states how to respond to animal disease emergencies and helps countries develop national disease contingency plans

Favorite/Essential Tool

The OIE tool for the evaluation of performance of veterinary services (OIE PVS Tool) using OIE international standards of quality and evaluation.

In this era of globalization, the development and growth of many countries, as well as the prevention and control of major biological disasters, depend on the performance of their agricultural and food policies and economies, and this, in turn, directly relates to the quality of their veterinary services (VS). Important roles for VS include veterinary public health — including food-borne diseases — and regional and international market access for animals and animal products. To meet current and future opportunities and challenges, VS should be independent and objective in their activities and decisions should be based on sound science and immune from political pressure.

Strengthening of VS to help them comply with OIE international standards for quality and evaluation requires active participation and investment by both the public and the private sector. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has refined an Evaluation Tool developed initially in collaboration with the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) to produce, in 2009, a revised edition of the **OIE Tool for the Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services (OIE PVS Tool)**. The **OIE PVS Tool** is designed to assist VS to establish their current level of performance, to identify gaps and weaknesses in their ability to comply with OIE international standards, to form a shared vision with stakeholders (including the private sector), and to establish priorities and carry out strategic initiatives.
In the international trade of animals and animal products, the OIE promotes animal health and public health (as it relates to the prevention and control of zoonoses, including food-borne diseases of animal origin) by issuing harmonized sanitary standards for international trade and disease control, by working to improve the resources and legal framework of VS/AAHS, and by helping members comply with the OIE standards, guidelines and recommendations consistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the WTO.

The traditional mission of VS was to protect domestic agriculture and most resources were directed towards the control of diseases that threatened primary production. The services began at the national borders and were focused domestically. The prevention and control of major aquatic animal diseases is similarly the basis of AAHS in many countries. The credibility of these services, as viewed by domestic stakeholders and other countries, largely depended on the effectiveness of these domestic programs, and the response of VS and AAHS to animal disease emergencies.

In light of the growing technical requirements, consumer expectations, and opportunities for international trade, the VS/AAHS should adopt an appropriate mandate and vision, and provide services that respond to the needs and expectations of stakeholders. This will entail stronger alliances and closer cooperation with stakeholders, trading partners and other countries, national governmental counterparts, and relevant intergovernmental organizations (in particular the OIE, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and the WTO SPS Committee).

Under the WTO SPS Agreement, each WTO member has the right to impose SPS measures to protect plant, animal, and human life or health, but measures should be based on science and risk analysis and implemented transparently. For animal health and zoonoses, the OIE is recognized as the reference organization for measures relating to international trade in animals and animal products. The implementation of the OIE standards, including on quality and evaluation of VS/AAHS, is the best way to facilitate safe and fair international trade.

Effective VS/AAHS have four fundamental components:

- Human, physical and financial resources to attract resources and retain professionals with technical and leadership skills
- Technical authority and capability to address current and new issues, including prevention and control of biological disasters based on scientific principles
- Sustained interaction with stakeholders in order to stay on course and carry out relevant joint programs and services
- The ability to access markets through compliance with existing standards and the implementation of new disciplines, such as the harmonization of standards, equivalence, and zoning

Website and Research Materials
http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm

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A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

WORKSHOP AGENDA, PARTICIPANTS, AND SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

HIGH-LEVEL WORKSHOP ORGANIZED BY
GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP)
INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (IFPA)

WITH THE SUPPORT OF
THE SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FDFA)
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
U.S. DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
SEPTEMBER, 2009
Workshop Agenda and Concept
28–29 September 2009

Monday, 28 September 2009

16.00 – 16.15
Welcome and Introduction
Ambassador Dr. Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Dr. Charles Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)

16.15 – 17.45
Session I:
Combating Illicit Trafficking: Why Do We Need a Comprehensive Approach and How Can It Help?
This session was designed as a “big picture” session, framing the overall problem of illicit trafficking in its many guises and highlighting the primary reasons why a comprehensive approach-strategy ought to be adopted that would coordinate more effectively the various contributions of individual intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other stakeholders trying to combat illicit trafficking. It was opened by a senior UN official with a broad anti-trafficking perspective and mandate, who was then followed by discussants from the three key European regional organizations—the OSCE, the EU, and NATO—which serve in part as umbrella organizations for other groups more directly involved in anti-trafficking work.

Chairs: Ms. Katharina Vögeli, Deputy Director, GCSP; Dr. Charles Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies, IFPA

Opening remarks: Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, UN Under-Secretary General, Director-General of the UN Office in Vienna, and Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Initial responses: Mr. Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy and Director, Nuclear Policy Planning Directorate, NATO; Mr. Pierre Cléostrate, Principal Administrator, Security Policy Unit, Directorate-General for External Relations, European Commission; and Mr. Henry Bolton, Senior Border Advisor, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

General Discussion

18.00 – 20.00
Reception and Dinner at Restaurant L’Attique

Keynote speaker: Ambassador Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO and Ambassador of Switzerland to the Kingdom of Belgium
Tuesday, 29 September 2009

09.00 – 10.30

Session II (Part I):
Institutional Responses to Trafficking Challenges: Strategies, Capabilities, and Networks

In this session, several individual IGO representatives gave brief, focused presentations (no more than five to ten minutes) on their strategies and capabilities for combating specific types of illicit trafficking. The idea here was to develop a better sense of the individual parts of the larger trafficking problem — and a clearer understanding of what specific IGOs and other stakeholders can bring to the table — before talking about how (and to what degree) these separate organizations and their assets might be “reassembled” and more closely coordinated in support of a more comprehensive approach. Presentations were organized according to specific types of illicit trafficking and specific methods/modes of transport utilized by traffickers. An effort was be made to identify common problems and experiences, as well as unique difficulties, faced by these organizations as they conduct anti-trafficking operations in particular sectors.

Chair: Dr. Khalid Koser, Director, New Issues in Security Course, GCSP

Anti-trafficking examined by type of trafficking challenge, including:

- **Trafficking in CBRN materials (and WMD proliferation):** Dr. Francesco Marelli, Deputy Head, Security Governance/Counter-Terrorism Laboratory, UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI); Mr. Nicolas Kasprzyk, Group of Experts, UN 1540 Committee; Dr. Anita Birgitta Nilsson, Director of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

- **Drug trafficking:** Mr. Tim Manhire, Executive Director, Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N); Dr. Doris Buddenberg, Senior Manager, Anti-Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit, UNODC

- **Human trafficking:** Dr. Doris Buddenberg, UNODC; Mr. Roger Plant, Head, Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, International Labour Organization (ILO)

- **Money laundering/counterfeiting:** Mr. Norberto Birchler, Director, Association Romande des Intermédiaires Financiers (ARIF); Ms. Louise van Greunen, Deputy Director for Enforcement and Special Projects, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

- **Trafficking in conventional arms/SALW:** Dr. Christiane Agboton Johnson, Deputy Director, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

10.30 – 10.45
Coffee Break

10.45 – 12.00

Session II (Part II):
Institutional Responses to Trafficking Challenges: Strategies, Capabilities, and Networks

Chair: Professor Steven Haines, Head, Security and Law Programme, GCSP

Anti-trafficking examined by trafficking method/modality:
Workshop Agenda, Participants, and Speaker Biographies

- **Air:** Mr. John Edwards, Head of Cargo Security, International Air Transport Association (IATA)
- **Maritime:** RADM Jacques de Solms, FRN, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Allied Joint Forces Command (JFC)-Naples
- **Overland:** Mr. Henry Bolton, Senior Border Advisor, OSCE

12.00 – 14.00
Lunch at Restaurant L’Attique

**Keynote speaker:** Ambassador Dr. Robert G. Joseph, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy

14.00 – 15.30

**Session III:**

**Priorities and Opportunities for Enhanced Coordination**

Based in part on the morning’s presentations, this session zeroed in on specific functional and operational sectors where there is both an opportunity to pursue greater cross-organizational collaboration and a real utility in doing so. IGO representatives and other stakeholders with a special expertise/interest in the functional and operational sectors outlined below offered some opening comments (five to ten minutes) to trigger broader discussion. Key questions discussed included the following: How can existing IGO assets and infrastructure be leveraged more effectively across a broad range of trafficking challenges? Where are the most troubling weaknesses and/or capability gaps in anti-trafficking operations? What policy initiatives and mechanisms for cooperation would help most? Where can technology improvements have the greatest impact?

**Chair:** Dr. Jacquelyn Davis, Executive Vice President, IFPA

**Opening remarks:** Mr. Tony Foley, U.S. Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Counter-proliferation

Issue areas and operational sectors reviewed included:

- **Strengthening information sharing, IT networking, legal mechanisms, and law enforcement capabilities:** Mr. Ralph Markert, Assistant Director, Global Security Initiative, INTERPOL; Mr. Roberto Codesal, Senior Project Manager, Organized Crime Unit, EUROPOL
- **Information Sharing as a Response to Covert Nuclear Trade:** Mr. Matti Tarvainen, Unit Head, Nuclear Trade and Technology, Department of Safeguards, IAEA
- **Improving prevention, protection and prophylactic measures:** Dr. Daniel Lavanchy, Coordinator, Programme for Bio-Risk Reduction, WHO; Dr. Wim Pelgrim, Chargé de Mission, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE); Ms. Anja Klug, Senior Legal Officer, Division of International Protection Services, UNHCR
- **Infrastructure and capacity-building to support policy coordination and cooperative operations (e.g., at both the regional and global levels):** Mr. Jarmo Sareva, Director, UN Disarmament Office in Geneva; Mr. Malik Ellahi, Head, Government Relations and Political Affairs, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- **Plans and capabilities for managing the consequences when prevention fails (i.e., consequence management and recovery):** Mr. Christopher Lamb, Special Advisor, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

15.30 – 15.45
Coffee Break
15.45 – 16.45

Session IV:

Setting the Agenda for a Comprehensive Approach

Building on session III’s discussion of basic areas/opportunities for enhanced collaboration, this session sought to identify more precisely a number of realistic steps that could be taken to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive approach that would help to coordinate IGO and other stakeholder efforts in support of common anti-trafficking requirements and objectives. The intention here was to encourage a more open summary discussion focused on pulling together common themes and identifying action items that participating organizations could pursue to good effect in concert.

Chair: Mr. Guy Roberts, NATO

Roundtable discussion opened with comments by: Mr. Guy Roberts, NATO; Mr. Michael Schmitz, Director, Compliance and Facilitation, World Customs Organization (WCO); and Mr. Richard Danziger, Head, Counter Trafficking, International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Topics discussed included:

• Building a list/roster of key POCs and capabilities (what level, where it should reside, how accessible, etc.)
• Cross-referencing/integrating data banks
• Establishing additional strategic partnerships
• Thinking about joint training and exercises (e.g., civil-military, interagency, cross-organizational, etc.)
• Future opportunities for R&D collaboration
• Moving toward a multi-layered and coordinated response network (for prevention, detection, disruption/interdiction, and consequence management)

16.45 – 17.00

Concluding Remarks
Ambassador Dr. Fred Tanner, Director, GCSP
Dr. Charles Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies, IFPA
Participant List

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Speaker Biographies

Dr. Said Abousahl is coordinator of nuclear security activities for the Work Programme Unit at the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in Brussels. Dr. Abousahl has held this post since 2006. Previously, he served as sector head of Nuclear Analytical Services and Nondestructive Assays at the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe, Germany. Prior to that, he worked as Scientific Officer on the development of nondestructive methods for uranium and plutonium assays at the European Commission Joint Research Center's Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) in Geel, Belgium. He has also worked at the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) in Saclay, France. Dr. Abousahl holds a Ph.D. in sciences from the University of Pierre & Marie Curie in Paris, France. He has also published a number of papers in the field of nuclear safeguards and security.

Dr. Christiane Agboton Johnson is deputy director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Since 1998, she has committed herself to a wide array of church and civil society activities, including peace building, development, and education, particularly with respect to women and children. She was founding president of MALAO (Movement against Small Arms in West Africa), an organization that works through advocacy, lobbying, and education to encourage peace and security in Senegal and throughout West Africa. Dr. Agboton Johnson has served for three years on the Secretary General Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and is currently a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Advisory Board on Small Arms Control. She was an active member of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and a founding member of IANSA Women's Network and the West African Action Network on Small Arms. In addition to studying women's gender roles and the link between security and development, Dr. Agboton Johnson has initiated a variety of research activities for promoting peace education, focusing in particular on the role of youths in conflict management on the ground, specifically in Senegal. Dr. Agboton Johnson holds a Ph.D. in odontological studies and has worked as a dental surgeon in both the public and private sectors.

Mr. Oldrich Andrýsek is chief of the Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section, Division of International Protection Services, at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Mr. Andrýsek is a lawyer and joined the United Nations in 1990 and UNHCR in 1991. In his previous UN assignments, he participated in inspection missions for the General's Office and he served as the chief of section responsible for country-of-origin information and as special advisor to the AHC for Protection, and he was assigned to the Regional Office Kiev where he was responsible for an EU-funded project. He also held positions as representative in Moldova, deputy regional representative (protection) in Austria, and as head of desk for Central and Eastern Europe. Mr. Andrýsek has also worked at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (policy and legal advice on human rights and refugees), in the then UN Centre for Human Rights (individual complaints to treaty-based human rights bodies), and with several Dutch NGOs. He was awarded a fellowship of the Council of Europe Directorate of Human Rights and has lectured widely abroad on refugee, humanitarian, and human rights law, minority rights, individual complaints procedures, and religious intolerance. Mr. Andrýsek speaks several languages and has authored a number of publications.

Dr. Roberta Arnold works in the Arms Control and Disarmament Policy section of the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports. Her key focus is on nuclear weapons
and small arms and light weapons (SALW). Previously, Dr. Arnold worked as a commissioner in the Special Federal Commission for the Admission of Objectors of Conscience to the Civil Service. Between 2002 and 2005, she was a legal adviser on the staff of the chief of the Armed Forces at the Swiss Department of Defense (Laws of Armed Conflict Section). During her time at the Swiss Department of Defense, she trained international military observers, Swiss peacekeepers (Swisscoy, EUFOR), and cadet professional officers at the Swiss Military Academy in international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights and human trafficking. She has also taught courses on IHL and international criminal law both in Switzerland and abroad. She is an investigating magistrate holding the rank of specialist officer (captain) within the Swiss Military Justice and, after taking the bar exams in Canton Ticino, qualified as an attorney in June 2009. Dr. Arnold is also the Swiss correspondent of the Review of the International Society for Military Law and the Laws of War. She attended the Universities of Bern, Sheffield, and Tel Aviv and holds an L.L.M. in international criminal justice and armed conflict law from the University of Nottingham and a Ph.D. from the University of Bern.

Mr. Norberto Birchler is managing director of the Association Romande des Intermédiaires Financiers (ARIF), a private Swiss association founded in 1999 to help support public efforts to prevent and combat the illicit laundering of assets, including money laundering and various activities related to terrorist financing. A specialist in financial and security issues, he is also a high-ranking officer of the Swiss Army. As militia officer, he serves as deputy G5 on the staff of territorial region 1. At the moment, and until 11 October 2009, he is candidate for election to the Parliament of the Republic and Canton of Geneva.

Mr. Henry Bolton is senior border advisor for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He has held this post since 2006, and is responsible for leading the OSCE Borders Team and its border security and management activities throughout the OSCE’s fifty-six state areas. In 2003, Mr. Bolton became the United Kingdom’s bilateral advisor to the Macedonian Ministry of Interior on behalf of both the UK National Criminal Intelligence Service and the UK National Crime Squad. He is also the author of the Macedonian government’s National Integrated Border Management Strategy. After serving eleven years in the British Army, he joined the UK police in 1990 and was responsible for a number of international investigations, developing criminal intelligence systems and major incident and crisis management procedures. Mr. Bolton has been with OSCE since 1997.

Dr. Doris Buddenberg is senior manager of the Anti-Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In 2000, Dr. Buddenberg headed the UNODC’s country program in Vietnam, which focused on law enforcement, alternative development, trafficking in human beings, and demand reduction. In 2004, she managed UNODC’s drug control program in Afghanistan, working on demand reduction, support to law enforcement (including border control), government institution and capacity building at the national and provincial levels, national opium poppy cultivation surveys, and economic research on Afghanistan’s drug industry. She has also served as officer-in-charge of the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in Turin, and since 2007 has managed the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), which aims to mobilize state and non-state actors to eradicate human trafficking by reducing both the vulnerability of potential victims and the demand for exploitation in all its forms, ensuring adequate protection and support to those who do fall victim, and supporting the efficient prosecution of the criminals involved. Prior to
joining UNODC, Dr. Buddenberg worked in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Laos, and Indonesia, serving as a consultant on the design and evaluation of drug control programs, alternative livelihood strategies, and the development of national drug control strategies. Dr. Buddenberg focused on Slavonic studies, economics, and ethnology, and graduated with an MSc and a Ph.D. from Heidelberg University.

**Mr. Pierre Cléostrate** is principal administrator and policy analyst in the Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX) at the European Commission in Brussels. In his current role, he focuses on the long-term part and projects of the European Commission's Instrument for Stability (IFS), such as trans-regional and global threats, organized crime, maritime security, and terrorism. Mr. Cléostrate was a representative of the European Commission in the Civ-Mil cell of the EU Military Staff at the General Secretariat of the Council until 2008. Prior to that, he was responsible for investigation, prosecution, and management at the French customs service for twenty-five years and was director of customs services until 2007. He also worked as manager of security assistance programs for the Western Balkans and CIS countries at the EuropeAid Directorate-General until 2005. Mr. Cléostrate was expert national détaché in the fight against drugs for three years and has been principal administrator of the European Communities since 2003. He holds a master's degree in public law, a D.E.A. in history of law, and a doctoral degree in public law from the Faculté de Droit d'Aix-en-Provence in France, as well as a diploma from the Criminal Science Institute.

**Mr. Roberto Codesal** is senior project manager, Analysis Work File Eastern European Organized Crime, OC Unit at EUROPOL. Mr. Codesal assumed his current position in April 2009. Previously, he was team leader of the national EUROPOL Unit in Spain. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Spanish police contingent commander and chief of the Election Security and Planning Unit at the UN Mission in East Timor (UNMIT), and between 2004 and 2006, he served as contingent commander and chief of the Regional Intelligence Unit in Mitrovica at the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Mr. Codesal began his police career at the National Police Corps in Spain in 1997, where his key responsibilities as police inspector and deputy chief of the Antiterrorist Unit included the fight against terrorism in the Basque region, as well as investigations of organized crime (OC) groups and human trafficking and illegal immigration networks in Algeciras and the Costa del Sol region of Spain. He holds a master's degree in business administration from CEU Luis Vives University in Madrid and a master's degree in police sciences from the University of Salamanca.

**Mr. Antonio Maria Costa** is UN under secretary general, director general of the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV), and executive director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Previously, Mr. Costa served as director general for economics and finance at the European Commission. He was also secretary general at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London, where he oversaw political issues, institutional affairs, corporate governance, and questions relating to shareholders. Prior to those appointments, Mr. Costa worked as senior economist in the UN Department of International Economics and Social Affairs in New York. He was subsequently appointed under secretary general at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, where he served until 1987. He was a member of the OECD working group for financial transactions (later called FATF), a member of the IMF/World Bank Interim Committee and of the G-10 group for the coordination of economic policy. Mr. Costa holds a degree in political science from the University of Turin (1963), a degree in mathematical
economics from the Moscow State University (1967), and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley (1971).

Brigadier General Dieter Dammjacob, GEAF is assistant chief of staff, J3, at the SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium. He assumed his duties in August 2008. BG Dammjacob joined the German Air Force in 1968 and graduated from pilot training in 1971. As a fighter pilot, he flew F-104G Starfighters, F-4F Phantoms and, Alpha Jets and was an instructor pilot with the USAF flying F-16 A/B Fighting Falcons. He commanded 2nd Squadron Fighter Bomber Wing 36 and the Flying Group of Fighter Bomber Wing 41. Promoted to colonel in 1997, he served as chief of concepts at the Reaction Force Air Staff until 1999, when he became military advisor to the German Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). From 2003 to 2005, he served on the Planning and Advisory Staff to the minister of defense in Berlin. Between October 2005 and July 2008, Brigadier General Dammjacob held the post of deputy commander and chief of staff of the German Air Force Operations Command (promoted to brigadier general on October 1, 2006), including a six-month tour as commander in the Regional Command North in Afghanistan.

Mr. Richard Danziger is head of counter-trafficking at the International Organization for Migration (IOM) based in Geneva. His work entails developing IOM's overall policy on combating trafficking in persons, and advising the Organization's member states on their own anti-trafficking strategies. Prior to his current position, Mr. Danziger served as IOM's regional representative for West and Central Asia, and as chief of mission in Indonesia and Afghanistan. His involvement in humanitarian work began in 1994 in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and has led him to such far-flung places as the Philippines, Rwanda, Tajikistan, and the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza.

Ambassador Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel is head of the Swiss Mission to NATO and ambassador of Switzerland to the Kingdom of Belgium. Prior to April 2007, he directed the Political Affairs Division of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in charge of bilateral relations with European and Central Asian countries, as well as with the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In that capacity, he also served as the national coordinator for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Prior to 2004, Ambassador de Dardel was head of the Centre for International Security Policy of the DFA, responsible for international security policy and for arms control and disarmament matters. Prior to 2001, he served as ambassador and personal representative of the president of the Swiss Confederation to the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie in Paris and held earlier diplomatic postings in France, Australia, the United States, and Austria. He was also regional officer for Eastern Europe and head of the Service of Francophone Affairs in Bern. Prior to joining the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in 1981, Ambassador de Dardel was secretary-jurist of the International Committee of the Red Cross and at the Diplomatic Conference on the Development of International Humanitarian Law in Geneva. He holds a Ph.D. in political science and a diploma in international relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, as well as a master's degree in economics from the University of Geneva.

Mr. Adam Davis serves as deputy counselor of UN affairs in the United States Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE). The UN Affairs Section serves as the U.S. government's interlocutor with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the Office of Outer Space Affairs (OOSA). Mr. Davis previously served in Beijing at the U.S. Embassy. He graduated from the University of Minnesota Law School in 2004. Mr. Davis speaks English, Chinese, and Polish.

**Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis** is executive vice president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). Dr. Davis is an authority on defense planning, arms control, and military technology issues, especially as they relate to U.S.-allied security relations in NATO-Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the Asia-Pacific region. She has lectured widely and has authored numerous publications, including recent assessments of the challenges that an Iran with nuclear weapons would present and the future of deterrence planning. Dr. Davis was the chair of the Defense Advisory Committee for Women in the Services for an unprecedented three terms. She was a member of SOCOM’s Futures Advisory Group, and currently is a member of the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) Executive Panel (CEP), the Council on Foreign Relations, and U.S. European Command’s Senior Advisory Group (SAG), and she is working with NATO’s SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) on its future evolution. Dr. Davis also works with a wide variety of U.S. interagency and allied officials on non- and counter-proliferation planning. She holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania.

**Mr. Robert P. Dickey** is a senior strategic planner in the Operations Enterprise at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). He is a retired United States Air Force colonel, having served thirty years active duty. During his service in the U.S. Air Force, he served in a variety of positions, including deputy director of U.S. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and commander of an air operations squadron in Germany. He served tours in both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, and he was a strategic airlift navigator in the C-5A. Additionally, he earned a master’s degree in nuclear engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology.

**Mr. John Edwards** is head of cargo security at the International Air Transport Association (IATA) based in Geneva. He has held that post for over three years. His key responsibilities include aviation and customs security strategy and policy, and he is project director for Secure Freight—a new air cargo supply chain security solution being developed by IATA to deter, detect, and disrupt potential acts of terrorism and crime. Prior to joining IATA, Mr. Edwards worked for British Airways Corporate Security, where one of his responsibilities included supporting the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort that aims to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

**Mr. Malik Ellahi** is the head of government relations and political affairs at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). By profession, Mr. Ellahi is a career diplomat from Pakistan specializing in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation policy and negotiations relating to weapons of mass destruction. Before joining the OPCW in May 2006, he served as deputy permanent representative of Pakistan to the OPCW in The Hague. Previous diplomatic assignments include work in the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN in New York (1986–91) and the Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva (1994–2001). Prior to working in The Hague, he served as director in the Office of the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. In 1993, Mr. Ellahi established the Disarmament Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad, which served as the focal point for all matters relating to arms control and security policy. His WMD-related negotiating and implementation experience includes the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and Facilities) (CPPNM).

**Mr. Philip “Tony” Foley** is U.S. acting deputy assistant secretary of state for counter-proliferation in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Mr. Foley oversees regional affairs, counter-proliferation initiatives, and chemical and biological weapons threat reduction, and strategic planning and outreach. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the Director of the Office of counter-proliferation initiatives. Prior to that, he served as the deputy director of the Office of Strategic and Missile Affairs in the Bureau of Verification and Compliance, and as special advisor for verification to the U.S. representative to the INF Treaty Special Verification Commission and START Treaty Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. In addition, he has served as the Libya Missile Team leader and Missile Subcommittee co-chair for the U.S.-UK-Libya Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee. He has been employed at the U.S. State Department since 1999. Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Foley served thirty years in the U.S. Air Force, achieving the rank of colonel. He has flown C-123 transports and B-52 heavy bombers, and he has served assignments at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command and at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force at the Pentagon as deputy chief of the Strategic Forces Division. Following his Pentagon assignment, he became a special assistant to Ambassador Edward Rowny, a senior arms control advisor to Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush. He completed two assignments at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, during which he was acting director of the Office of Strategic Affairs, member of the START delegation, and military advisor and executive secretary of the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission.

**Dr. Amanda Gatto** is technical officer in the Global Alert and Response program at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. She is responsible for developing WHO guidance and tools to assist event organizers and authorities with the planning, implementation, and evaluation of mass gatherings of international relevance. Previously, Dr. Gatto worked as policy scientist at the Department of Health in London, focusing on policy development in the management of emerging infections and zoonoses and on associated contingency planning. From 1998 to 2006, she worked at the HPA Centre for Infections in London, serving first as clinical scientist in the Respiratory Diseases Department, and subsequently as clinical scientist and coordinator for the Salm-gene Project and as senior scientist (Epidemiology) in the Environmental and Enteric Diseases Department of the Center. Dr. Gatto holds a M.Sc. in control of infectious diseases from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and a B.Sc. in microbiology from the Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine in London.

**Ms. Louise van Greunen** is deputy director, Enforcement and Special Projects Division at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. She has held that post since 2002. Ms. Van Greunen joined WIPO in 1996 as a senior legal counselor, assisting English-speaking developing countries with the adoption of TRIPS compliant legislation. Prior to her appointment at WIPO, Ms. Van Greunen was a public prosecutor in the criminal courts, a lecturer on law, and the registrar of patents, trademarks, copyright and designs in South Africa. In addition to administering the office, she was also a hearing officer at the Tribunal of the Registrar of Trademarks, where she had the judicial competence of a single judge. She has also been admitted as advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa.
**Professor Steven Haines** is the head of the Security and Law Program at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Before joining GCSP he was professor of strategy and the law of military operations at Royal Holloway College, University of London. From 1971 to 2003, he was an officer in the UK's Royal Navy, with his recent operational experience consisting of attachments to NATO's KFOR in Kosovo and to the UK's Joint Task Force HQ in Freetown, during the civil war in Sierra Leone. His previous operational service included the first ever UN maritime embargo operation off the coast of Mozambique in the early 1970s and four years with the Security Forces in Northern Ireland (he was head of the Naval Operations Department there from 1979 to 1981). From 1995 he was principally a Ministry of Defence staff officer working on strategic doctrine, operational analysis, and latterly on issues to do with legal aspects of operations. In 2001 he was the Hudson Senior Visiting Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and was invited to participate in the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, being a named contributor on its report, *Responsibility to Protect*, presented to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2001.

**Ambassador Dr. Robert G. Joseph** holds the position of senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) in Washington, D.C. Prior to that, Ambassador Joseph served as U.S. under secretary of state for arms control and international security until March 2007. In this capacity, he reported directly to the secretary of state as the principal State Department officer for non- and counter-proliferation matters, arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations, and security assistance. His management responsibilities included oversight of three major bureaus headed by assistant secretaries of state for international security and nonproliferation; political and military affairs; and verification, compliance and implementation. Previously, from January 2001 through November 2004, Ambassador Joseph served on the National Security Council as special assistant to the president and senior director for proliferation strategy, counter-proliferation, and homeland defense. In this capacity, he was responsible, under the supervision of the national security advisor, for developing and coordinating U.S. policies and strategies for preventing, deterring and defending against threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction. From 1992 until 2001, Ambassador Joseph was professor of national security studies and director/founder of the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University. Earlier, he was U.S. commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission and ambassador to the U.S.-Russian Commission on Nuclear Testing, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear forces and arms control policy, nuclear policy/planning officer at U.S. Mission to NATO, and assistant professor of international relations stratégiques) in the French Ministry of Defense. From 1999 until 2002, Mr. Kaspryzk worked as a researcher for a French think tank dealing with international security and arms control issues, and was seconded during that time to the Strategic Analysis Department of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company — Launch Vehicles.
Mr. Kasprzyk is also a lecturer on the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery at l’Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris, France.

**Dr. Takashi Kawakami** is professor at the Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University, and a lecturer at Cyuou University School of Law in Tokyo, Japan. Previously, Dr. Kawakami was professor at Hokuriku University, professor and senior research fellow at the Japan Defense Agency, and research fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies, the Applied Research Institute, and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Dr. Kawakami has also served as policy secretary for the president of Japan’s New Progress Party and as research director at the National Institute for Policy Studies in Japan. Dr. Kawakami has authored a number of publications on U.S. foreign policy, U.S. forward deployment and East Asian security, ballistic missile defense, and global governance. Dr. Kawakami holds a master of law degree from Kyoto Sangyo University, a degree from Georgetown University, and a Ph.D. from the Osaka School of International Public Policy at Osaka University.

**Mr. Jack Kelly** is a senior staff member and business development specialist at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). His areas of expertise include new business development, U.S. national security planning and policy, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Capitol Hill defense budget process, DoD research and development and procurement programs, the homeland security/defense market, missile defense, industry-government relations, and international defense industrial cooperation. Mr. Kelly is the co-author of several IFPA conference reports and studies, including *The Strategic Plan for Safeguarding the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against Terrorist and Related Threats*, which was completed under contract from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In addition, he has been responsible for the planning and organization of several high-level Institute conferences and workshops. He received a B.A. with honors from Villanova University and an M.A. with honors from the University of Massachusetts, and he completed Ph.D. courses and examinations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

**Ms. Anja Klug** is senior legal officer in the Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section (PPLA) of the Division of International Protection Services at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), where she is responsible for the protection of refugees in the context of mixed migration, protection of refugees at sea, and anti-trafficking. Previously, Ms. Klug served as a legal officer at the UNHCR Representation in Bonn and Berlin, Germany. Ms. Klug has also held legal internships in Hamburg, New York, and Geneva, and she has worked as an assistant at the Institute for Private International and Comparative Law at the University of Bonn. She is a member of and, since 2004, Chair of the Board of Trustees of the German Institute for Human Rights in Berlin. Ms Klug studied law and German philology in Bonn and Lausanne and passed the Second Juridical State Exam in 1996. She has authored a number of publications on the asylum and refugee system in the European Union.

**Captain Martin Klüver, GEN**, is director for plans and policies at NATO’s Maritime Component Command HQ in Naples. Prior to this posting, he served from 2005 to 2007 as division head for plans and policy at CINCGERFLEET HQ, and as commander of the German Navy’s 6th Frigate Squadron from 2003 to 2005. This last assignment included deployments as chief of staff TF 150 in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Horn of Africa as well as CTG during the Tsunami relief measures off the coast of Sumatra/Indonesia. Earlier, Captain Klüver reported to the German
military representative in the NATO Military Committee as desk officer, plans and policy, following a two-year assignment in the Armed Forces Staff, Federal Ministry of Defense, where he participated in the reform and further development of the Bundeswehr in his position as desk officer, Bundeswehr Concept. From 1995 to 1998, he commanded frigate FGS *Mecklenburg-Vorpommern*, after having served as executive officer on board destroyer FGS *Lütjens*, as military assistant to the chief of staff of the Navy at the Federal Ministry of Defense, as operations and principal warfare officer on board destroyer FGS *Rommel*, and as communications officer on board destroyer FGS *Mölders*. Captain Klüver has attended the Admiral Staff Officer Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg, the Operations School of the Royal Dutch Navy, and the Bundeswehr Universität in Hamburg, from which he graduated with a master’s degree in mechanical engineering.

**Dr. Khalid Koser** is course director of the New Issues in Security Course (NISC) at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He is also a non-resident fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. and a research associate at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. His previous appointment was as a fellow in humanitarian affairs and deputy director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement at the Brookings Institution (2006–08). Prior to that he was senior policy analyst for the Global Commission on International Migration (2004–06), where he was seconded from his position as lecturer in human geography at University College London (1998–2006). From 2006–08 he held an adjunct position in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Dr. Koser is chair of the UK’s Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. He is co-editor of the *Journal of Refugee Studies* and on the editorial board for *Ethnic and Racial Studies* and *Forced Migration Review*. He has published widely on international migration, asylum, refugees, and internal displacement. He has field experience in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, and Western Europe.

**Mr. Christopher Lamb** is the special advisor in international relations at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Geneva. In this function he supports the president and the secretary general in their task of representing the International Federation and its 185-member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the international field. Before joining the International Federation in 2000, he served for over thirty years as an Australian diplomat. He also has wide experience in multilateral diplomacy. Mr. Lamb’s work has given him a very wide range of multilateral contacts in many different sectors, but especially in those that concern human rights and humanitarian affairs. He has also worked on treaty and other issues with small-island states in the Pacific and elsewhere.

**Dr. Daniel Lavanchy** is coordinator and project leader of the Program for Bio-risk Reduction for Dangerous Pathogens at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Dr. Lavanchy assumed his current position in 2001. He was previously chief, viral diseases at WHO and is the former head of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Program. Dr. Lavanchy has more than twenty years of experience in clinical wards of different hospitals in Switzerland, in internal medicine, emergency medicine, surgery, intensive care unit medicine, rheumatology, immunology and allergy, and medicine of the elderly. He has been involved in the development of several national and international public health guidelines (e.g., hepatitis B immunization, hepatitis B & C treatment, influenza vaccine use, biosafety standards), and has worked to increase the awareness among governments and health care personnel in the field of global surveillance for the
management of communicable diseases. He has more than two years of experience in the pharmaceutical industry, and has participated in the revision of the UN model regulations for the transport of infectious substances (UNCETDG), including diagnostic specimens. Dr. Lavanchy was also in charge of the establishment of the first WHO recommendations for the use of the annual influenza vaccine. He is a scientific reviewer for international journals, and a reviewer of projects and facilities in the field of viral hepatitis and influenza for the WHO, foreign governments, and scientific institutions. He has authored more than one hundred scientific articles and chapters in reference books. Dr. Lavanchy holds a doctorate in medicine (1977) from the University of Basel, a master's degree in health economics and management (2005) from l’Université de Lausanne in Switzerland, and is a specialist FMH in internal medicine, allergy and clinical immunology.

Mr. Richard Lennane is head of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Implementation Support Unit, which was established by the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC in 2006.Previously, he was a member of the BWC meetings secretariat in the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, where he was responsible for organizing BWC meetings and tending to the administrative needs of the Convention and its States Parties. He has been secretary of a number of BWC meetings, including the Fifth Review Conference in 2001 and the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. Before joining the United Nations in 2001, he was a diplomat in the Australian Foreign Service, and from 1998 to 2001 was a member of the Australian delegation to the Ad Hoc Group negotiations on a verification protocol for the BWC.

Mr. Tim Manhire is executive director of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center — Narcotics (MAOC-N)) based in Lisbon, Portugal, an intergovernmental organization blending law enforcement and military, in which intelligence is shared and naval and aerial assets coordinated for drug interdiction by multiple European states. Previously, Mr. Manhire served as a senior manager for the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in the UK, where he was given the role of head of the Military and Maritime Intervention Cell. Prior to that, he was the coordinator for all maritime operations carried out by Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMC&E), managing the day-to-day operational activity of the HMC&E Customs Cutter Fleet. In 1998, Mr. Manhire worked as the head of a new operational team specializing in operations against West African organized crime groups. This included the lead in all counter-drug operational activities in the UK, as well as cooperating overseas with countries such as Pakistan and Brazil. Mr. Manhire has also held positions as drugs liaison officer at the British High Commission in Kingston, Jamaica, and as drugs liaison officer based at the British Consulate General in New York, where he interacted closely with U.S. federal agencies, including the FBI, DEA, U.S. Customs, ATF, and the Secret Service. He has also carried out training courses in South Africa and presented in Beijing on behalf of INTERPOL.

Major General Randy E. Manner, USA, is the deputy director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Before joining DTRA in July 2008, Major General Manner served as the deputy director, G33, Current Operations, at Headquarters, Department of Army, in the Pentagon. He has served on the staff of the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the commander of the Mobilization Augmentation Command (MAC) in Washington, D.C., with duty at the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon and the Army National Guard Emergency Operations Center in Arlington, Virginia. His first Operations Research/Systems Analysis (OR/SA) utilization tour was in the Combat Developments and Experimentation Command at Fort
Ord, California. Follow-on tours as an OR/SA included service in the G-4 and G-6 offices of Headquarters, Department of Army, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. In 1997, Major General Manner was selected as the first commander of the MAC in the District of Columbia National Guard. He was commissioned an Army officer in 1976 as a distinguished military graduate and computer science major from Pennsylvania State University. He has also earned a master of business administration with honors in decision sciences (operations research) from the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Francesco Marelli is deputy head of the Security Governance and Counter-Terrorism Laboratory at the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in Turin, Italy. Dr. Marelli served in the Italian Army as a second lieutenant in an infantry regiment and obtained a Ph.D. degree from the School of History at the University of Leeds (UK) with a thesis on the history of Italian anti-mafia policy. He joined UNICRI in 2003 and coordinated research and analysis activities on illicit trafficking and terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material. Dr. Marelli is also the director of the book series entitled *Terrorism, Intelligence and Security* published by Franco Angeli Publisher, and he frequently lectures at different universities on new challenges to global security.

Mr. Ralph Markert is assistant director of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at INTERPOL. He previously worked at INTERPOL’s General Secretariat as police trainer for Central and South America in the fight against child abuse images over the internet and as crime intelligence officer responsible for worldwide people smuggling and human trafficking. Prior to that, he was liaison officer in the Federal Criminal Investigations Department of the German Federal Investigation Police (BKA) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, with concurrent jurisdiction over Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile. While in South America, Mr. Markert taught at the police academy of Buenos Province on topics such as modern forms of crime and ways to combat them, German and European police structure, as well as police ethics. He has also served as federal senior criminal investigations commissioner and as liaison officer in the Federal Criminal Investigations Department of the BKA, working on state security-related offences, general and organized crime, as well as on policy and operational measures in criminal investigations at the Frankfurt am Main airport and abroad. Mr. Markert has training in business administration and as criminal investigations officer of the executive service class from the Federal Higher Technical College.

Mr. Michael Moodie is an independent consultant on international security affairs, specializing in issues at the intersection of security, science, technology, and politics. Among his current responsibilities, he serves as editor-in-chief of the online publication *WMD Insights* and as director of the Proliferation Community of Interest of the Global Futures Forum, an outreach program of the U.S. intelligence community. After serving on the staffs of a number of policy research organizations, for twelve years Mr. Moodie held the position of president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. He has also served in government as assistant director for multilateral affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and as special assistant to the ambassador at the U.S. Mission to NATO. Mr. Moodie holds a masters of law and diplomacy degree from the Fletcher School, Tufts University.

Ms. Oksana Myshlovska is knowledge manager in the Global Agenda Councils Department at the World Economic Forum (WEF). She previously held positions with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Renaissance Foundation, Kyodo News (UN office), and
the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, as well as in the Parliament of the Ukraine, the Institute of International Relations in Kiev, and the House of Commons in Canada. Ms. Myshlovska holds an M.A. in international studies from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, where she is also a Ph.D. candidate, and a B.A. in international relations from L’viv National University. She is also a WEF Global Leadership Fellow and speaks Ukrainian, English, French, Russian, Italian, Polish, Japanese, and German.

Dr. Anita Birgitta Nilsson is head of the Office of Nuclear Security at the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a position she has held since January 2003. Dr. Nilsson's main responsibility is the coordination of all IAEA programs on the security of nuclear material. She also provides reports to the IAEA Board of Governors and the IAEA General Conference, and she coordinates bilateral nuclear security support programs. Before taking up her present position, Dr. Nilsson worked for the Department of Safeguards at the IAEA in the position of senior coordinator. In 2002, she became the coordinator of the Agency's nuclear security-related activities, which cut across several IAEA departments. A medical doctor with a master of science in mathematics and physics, Dr. Nilsson worked in various managerial and leadership positions at the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate before joining the IAEA, dealing with nonproliferation, international and national safeguards, and bilateral nuclear supply and cooperation. Among other responsibilities, she was in charge of the Swedish nuclear security support to the Newly Independent States and the Baltic States.

Colonel Parker W. Northrup, USAF, is the deputy associate director for operations at the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Colonel Northrup graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1988 and was assigned to Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, where he worked as instructor pilot in the B-52H before being assigned to 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. During his time at Barksdale, he commanded Duke 02, one of two B-52s used in Operation Desert Strike, which saw the first use of H-model B-52s in combat and, at that time, set the record for the longest distance flown on a combat sortie. In 1998, he was assigned to the Air Force Command and Control Training and Innovation Group at Hurlburt Field, Florida, where he served as the chief of the commander's action group and director of plans and programs. Colonel Northrup attended Air Command and Staff College before being assigned to Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea at Headquarters Seventh Air Force, where he worked on the staff of the director of operations and in the Korean Air Operations Center. He was the director of academics and then commander of the 11th Bomb Squadron at Barksdale AFB, LA. In his subsequent role as commander of the 5th Operations Group at Minot AFB, ND, he led three hundred combat-ready professionals to provide global B-52 conventional and nuclear strike capability. Colonel Northrup assumed responsibilities as vice commander, 5th Bomb Wing prior to his current assignment at DTRA. He also holds master's degrees from Louisiana Technical University (1998), Maxwell AFB, AL (2001, 2003), and the National War College, Ft. McNair, Washington D.C. (2007).

Dr. Willem Pelgrim is chargé de mission in the International Trade Department of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) based in Paris. Dr. Pelgrim graduated in 1992 with a doctor of veterinary medicine degree from the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands after having earned a prior degree in agricultural engineering. He worked for a short period as a practitioner in the Netherlands. Between 1996 and 2009, he held positions in the Dutch government as veterinary inspector at a border post, as policy advisor on international trade, and as policy advisor on the prevention and control of animal diseases of ruminants. From 2007 until 2009, he
was closely involved in the development of the control programs of bluetongue and Q-fever. Dr. Pelgrim has also worked for several years in Ecuador, providing agricultural and veterinary advice in a rural development project in the Province of Cañar.

**Dr. Charles M. Perry** is vice president and director of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). He has written extensively on a variety of national and international security issues, especially with respect to NATO affairs and European security, strategic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region, global arms trade and proliferation trends, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and resource security issues. His principal areas of current research and analysis encompass future defense priorities for NATO, security developments in the Arctic region, civil-military cooperation in support of disaster relief and homeland defense, and the prospects for stability on the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Perry also directs and/or contributes to a number of Institute studies that focus on specific aspects of U.S. defense reform and military transformation to meet post-9/11 security challenges. These include assessing ways to promote and improve a “whole of government” approach to national security that leverages both military and non-military capabilities. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

**Mr. Roger Plant** is head of the Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour at the International Labour Organization (ILO). He has been Head of the ILO’s Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour since its inception in 2002, spearheading the ILO’s work against forced labor and trafficking. He was the principal author of the 2005 report *A Global Alliance Against Forced Labor*, and is currently leading efforts to consolidate this new alliance which seeks to rid the world of all forms of forced labor over the next decade. With degrees from Oxford University, and visiting academic positions at universities including Columbia and Notre Dame, he has written several books and other publications. His book *Sugar and Modern Slavery*, published in the mid 1980s, was one of the first to draw attention to new forms of forced labor and trafficking in today’s global economy. Prior to working with the ILO, Mr. Plant worked and consulted for the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, Shell International, the Danish International Development Agency, and several international human rights NGOs. He has travelled extensively throughout the world, and has broadcasted regularly for the BBC, CNN, and other major media outlets. He speaks English, French, Spanish, and Russian.

**Mr. Guy Roberts** is the deputy assistant secretary general for weapons of mass destruction policy and director, Nuclear Policy Planning Directorate at NATO. In that capacity, he is responsible for developing policy on issues related to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and overseeing NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. Previously, Mr. Roberts was principal director for negotiations policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for advising senior Defense Department officials on the entire range of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policies. From 2000 to 2003, Mr. Roberts served as the legal counsel for arms control and nonproliferation in the U.S. Department of the Navy. He was responsible for reviewing all naval programs and developing policy on all arms control and nonproliferation agreements or initiatives which could impact departmental equities. Mr. Roberts had a distinguished career in the U.S. Marine Corps before retiring, holding a wide range of assignments in policy formulation, operations support, negotiations, management, litigation, and policy/legal advisory roles both in
the United States and during overseas assignments. Positions and responsibilities included legal counsel to a four-star combatant commander, and military representative for disarmament and arms control issues to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. Roberts received his law degree from the University of Denver, and he holds master’s degrees in international and comparative law from Georgetown University, in international relations from the University of Southern California, and in strategic studies from the Naval War College. He is admitted to practice in Colorado, California, and Arizona and before the Military Court of Criminal Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. Roberts has written extensively on non-proliferation, arms control, terrorism, and law-of-war issues.

Mr. Jarmo Sareva is deputy secretary general of the Conference on Disarmament, and Director of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Sareva served as chief of the Disarmament and Peace Affairs Branch at the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management at the UN Secretariat in New York. Before that, Mr. Sareva was elected as chairman of the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) on 6 June 2003, and he served as special assistant to the executive chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 2001. Earlier, in 2000, he was chef de cabinet (chief of staff) in the Office of the President of the fifty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. He also served as a minister counselor at the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations in 1998. In 1996, Mr. Sareva held the post of deputy chief of mission at the Finnish Embassy in Moscow. Prior to that, in 1995, he was director of arms control and non-proliferation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki. He also worked as First Secretary at the Finnish Embassy in Washington, D.C., in 1990, specialising in trade and economic issues.

Mr. Soenke Schmidt is first counselor of the Permanent Delegation of the European Commission to the International Organizations in Geneva. Mr. Schmidt has been a European Commission (EC) official since 1993. Previously, he was a consultant in the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security at the EC. From 2001 until 2005, Mr. Schmidt served as head of the sections on organized crime and on economic, financial, and computer crime at the European Commission.

Mr. Michael Schmitz is director of compliance and facilitation at the World Customs Organization (WCO). Mr. Schmitz began a five-year term as the WCO director of compliance and facilitation in January 2006. He was previously assistant commissioner in the Office of Regulations and Rulings at U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), where he provided policy and technical support to the Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. government agencies, and international organizations concerning the application of customs and other laws, regulations, and procedures administered and enforced by the U.S. CBP. Mr. Schmitz has also served in the international arena, holding the position of acting assistant commissioner in CBP’s Office of International Affairs, where he was responsible for cooperation with foreign governments on initiatives and programs in areas as diverse as border security, antiterrorism, export controls, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mr. Schmitz worked as chef de cabinet (chief of staff) to the secretary general of the WCO for five years in the late 1990s, and was a principal in the negotiation and completion of the Revised Kyoto Convention that laid the groundwork for the modernization of customs administrations.

Ms. Sara M. Sekkenes is the senior program adviser and team leader, conflict prevention and recovery team at the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) under the United Nations
Ms. Astrid Sekkenes is a senior adviser at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In her current position, she is responsible for UNDP policy development, practice management, and program design with respect to armed violence, mine action, and small arms control. Prior to that, Ms Sekkenes worked for a number of years with Norwegian People’s Aid, a non-governmental organization with programs in Africa (Mozambique, Angola) and in the Balkans. She also served as global landmine policy adviser in the organization’s headquarters in Norway. During this period, she covered mine action program management, landmine surveys, the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of humanitarian mine action policies, and the development, training and implementation of standard operational procedures for setting mine clearance priority. She also managed the development of training programs and workshops for quality management, organizational development, and project management. A native of Norway, Ms Sekkenes holds a master of science degree in the field of human and physical geography, and additional university degrees in development studies and political geography.

**Rear Admiral Jacques de Solms, FRN** is the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations at Joint Force Command, Naples. Prior to this assignment, Admiral de Solms served as defence and naval attaché to the French Embassy in Spain and as head of the Foreign Relations and Cooperation Office at the Naval Staff Headquarters in Paris. Previously, he was deputy chief of the Foreign Relations and Cooperation Bureau, as well as head of the Export Support department. In this position, he was in charge of the transfer of aircraft carrier *Foch* to the Brazilian Navy. Admiral de Solms was the air expert to the Naval Action Force commander's tactical staff during deployments in 1995 and 1996 in the Adriatic, in the course of which he assumed, in close coordination with the allies, the programming of carrier aviation missions above Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1997, he was appointed as Commanding Officer of FS *Marne*, with which he took part in an officers' training deployment in the Indian Ocean. A fighter pilot and a helicopter pilot, Admiral de Solms has held successively the positions of head of detachment, executive officer, and squadron commanding officer, operating on aircraft carriers and destroyers, and in missions off Lebanon and in the Indian Ocean. He graduated from the French Naval Academy in 1975, the Madrid Naval War College in 1992, and attended NATO Defence College's 99th session in 2001 – 2002.

**Mr. David Spence** is political counselor with special responsibility for human security and disarmament at the European Commission's delegation to the United Nations in Geneva. He was on loan in 2006 from the Commission to the United Nations as senior political advisor to the special representative of the UN for the elections in the Ivory Coast. Mr. Spence’s career at the European Commission has included service as secretary of the task force for German unification and as head of training for the Commission’s External Service, and he also has been responsible for European security and defense policy and relations with NATO. Until 2003, he was the Commission representative in the G8 and EU Terrorism Working Groups. Before joining the Commission, Mr. Spence was head of European Training at the UK Civil Service College and academic advisor to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's conference center, Wilton Park. He has lectured at the Sorbonne, the Ecole normale supérieure, and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, and is a graduate of Sussex, Oxford, and Nice Universities. He also holds a business affairs diploma from the Bremen Chamber of Commerce in Germany. Mr. Spence has published widely on European affairs, including various articles and book chapters on the Commission and the EU, on CFSP, and on effective multilateralism. His most recent publication is “EU Governance and Global Governance” in *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart* published by Palgrave in 2008. He is an advisor to the Centre International de Formation Européenne (CIFE), the Institut
Ambassador Dr. Fred Tanner is the director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). On 16 May 2007, the Swiss Federal Council awarded Fred Tanner the title of ambassador. Prior to this appointment, Fred Tanner was deputy director of the GCSP, in charge of academic affairs and training. At the same time he was a visiting professor for Swiss security and foreign policy at the Graduate Institute for International Studies (GIIS/HEI) of the University of Geneva and was responsible for the University's program for diplomatic studies. Dr. Tanner is a member of the International Council of the Center for Sustainable Development and International Peace at the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies and a member of the Board of Trustees of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. From 1994 until 1997, seconded from the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), he was director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) in Malta. In the course of his distinguished academic career, Dr. Tanner has held teaching and research positions at universities such as Harvard (CFIA), Johns Hopkins (SAIS), and Princeton (CIS). Mandated by the OSCE chairmanship, he was the honorary chairman of the Committee for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a position he held from 1999 to 2001. Dr. Tanner is the author of numerous publications, including “The Iraq Crisis and World Order” (2006, co-author); a “Chaillot Paper” (with H. Haenggi) Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU’s Neighbourhood, July 2005; From Versailles to Baghdad (1993); The EU as a Security Actor in the Mediterranean (2001); Refugee Manipulation (co-editor, with S. Stedman, 2002). He holds a PhD and a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a bachelor's degree from the University of Geneva.

Mr. Matti Tarvainen is unit head of the Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (TTA) in the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His current responsibilities include analysis of covert nuclear trade in order to combat international proliferation networks. Mr. Tarvainen has over twenty-seven years of experience in safeguards both on the national (SSAC) and the international level. Before joining the IAEA in 2002, he held the position of principal advisor at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in Finland where his main responsibilities included safeguards R&D and IAEA Safeguards Support Program coordination. Before the establishment of the TTA Unit in 2004, his main responsibilities at the IAEA included safeguards state evaluation. He has a degree in applied nuclear physics and radiochemistry from the University of Jyväskylä, Finland.

Mr. Antony Taubman is director of the Intellectual Property Division at the World Trade Organization (WTO). He oversees programs on intellectual property and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore, the life sciences, and related global issues. After a diplomatic career, he left the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in 2001 to join the newly formed Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture at the Australian National University, teaching and researching on international IP law. From 1998 to 2001, he was director of the International Intellectual Property Section of DFAT, responsible for multilateral and bilateral negotiations on intellectual property issues, domestic policy development, regional cooperation, and dispute settlement under the international Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) administered by the WTO. He has authored a training handbook on intellectual property and biotechnology, a comprehensive study on the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, and a range of academic and general publications on
international intellectual property law and policy. His service at DFAT included work on disarmament policy, participation in the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, a posting in the Australian Embassy in Tehran as deputy head of mission, a posting to The Hague as alternate representative to the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and chair of the Expert Group on Confidentiality. He previously worked for WIPO from 1995 to 1998 on development cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. A registered patent attorney, he worked in private practice in the law of patents, trademarks, and designs in Melbourne in the 1980s. His tertiary education has included computer science, mathematics, engineering, classical languages, philosophy, international relations, and law, and he has taught ancient Greek philosophy at Melbourne University.

Colonel Philip R. Thieler, USA is defense and army attaché at the Embassy of the United States in Bern, Switzerland. Prior to this assignment, Colonel Thieler served as chief, Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria. As a foreign area officer, Colonel Thieler served thirty-six months as a staff officer for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. He served as the political-military affairs officer in the J-5, responsible for developing policy for Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Colonel Thieler also served as the deputy commanders’ special advisor for US-German relations and then as branch chief for Southeast Europe. Among his field assignments, he has served as acting commander for Task Force Lion, deploying part of his battalion in support of multinational peacekeeping operations in the Kosovo theater of operations. He also commanded A Company (Apaches), 4th Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment in Southwest Asia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Colonel Thieler holds a B.A. in history from the University of New Orleans (1985) and an M.A. in European area studies from Indiana University (1995).

Mr. Charles Vincent is director of the UN World Food Programme (WFP) Office in Geneva, a position he first assumed in September 2008. From 2004 to 2008, Mr. Vincent was successively WFP representative and country director in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where he led two of the most complex operations for WFP. He has also served as WFP representative and country director in Haiti in the late 1990s and as head of office and emergency coordinator during the 1992–95 war in the former Yugoslavia. He has also worked on programs and logistics in India, Madagascar, and at WFP’s headquarters in Rome. He was the deputy director of WFP at the United Nations in New York and the assistant to the senior deputy executive director of WFP in Rome. He began his UN career as a UN volunteer for WFP in Karamoja, Uganda, in 1983. Mr. Vincent holds an M.S. in international rural development with specialization in agricultural economics from the University of California at Davis and a B.A. in political science (international relations) with a minor in international economics from Haverford College in Haverford, Pennsylvania.

Ms. Katharina R. Vögeli is the deputy director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Prior to her appointment in 2007, she was the executive director of the Swiss Foundation for World Affairs, based at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. She has held positions in government and NGOs, as well as in international organizations, reflecting a commitment to the issues that frame the mission of the GCSP — peace and security policy, human rights and humanitarian law, development, and migration. Her main focus, both in her professional and academic work, has primarily been on the resolution of conflicts and peace building, with a regional focus on Africa. Throughout her career, she has been
committed to fostering a respectful and non-partisan dialogue on issues of critical political interest. She has lived and worked in Europe, Africa, and the United States.