Global and Local Civil-Military Disaster Relief Coordination in the United States and Japan

An IFPA Project Interim Report
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Global and Local Civil-Military Disaster Relief Coordination in the United States and Japan

An IFPA Project Interim Report

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A Project Interim Report and Summary of a Bilateral Workshop Organized by
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Report prepared by
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The succession of large-scale natural disasters and ambitious nation-building projects that have occurred or have been undertaken globally in the last several years has focused attention on the potential value of deploying national military assets in support of disaster relief and recovery efforts, as well as on the challenges that international disaster relief agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) face when working closely with dispatched military units. In the United States, this has led to a serious discussion in government circles about possible ways to adjust the military structure and training regimen in order to enhance its effectiveness in certain complex or catastrophic cases, including the development of a dedicated response capability and the enhancement of joint planning or training with nonmilitary groups.

The goal of this effort is relatively straightforward: to improve U.S. government and military readiness for domestic or overseas relief missions to which Washington will inevitably be called on to contribute. The motivation behind this goal, however, is more complex, especially when it comes to overseas operations, since it is recognized that such missions are increasingly connected to national security and diplomatic objectives. For similar reasons, Japan is examining ways that its civil society and military sectors can contribute more directly to disaster relief efforts and so-called international peace cooperation activities, making this an important time to foster dialogue and cross-fertilization of related ideas and initiatives between the two countries and beyond.

Both U.S. and Japanese policy makers understand that leveraging military resources in times of crisis is first and foremost an opportunity to do good, to save lives and property, and to help maintain stability and prosperity in affected communities and nations. This is particularly true in the wake of catastrophic disasters that quickly overwhelm the response capabilities of the affected nation and the international organizations it reaches out to for assistance. But Washington policy makers in particular recognize that responding effectively can further U.S. foreign policy goals by helping to eliminate sources of instability, building or restoring cooperative military ties with host and contributing nations that can prove useful in other mission areas, and establishing goodwill in countries where it has been latent at best. This was at least a small part of the U.S. government’s calculation when it responded ardently to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the 2006 Philippines mudslides. Moreover, failure to respond adequately can be devastating to the affected communities and will inevitably lead to...
charges of abandonment, indifference, and isolation on the part of America and its allies, which can undermine their interests and international cooperation more broadly.

For all of these reasons, U.S. policy makers are seeking to strengthen America’s contributions to international disaster relief efforts, and they cannot ignore the trend to enhance civil-military coordination (CMCoord) for these operations. It is quite clear that international military involvement in relief operations has saved countless lives in recent years, and it is not unreasonable to expect that strengthening CMCoord could further improve response to large-scale disasters. Recent experience also demonstrates, however, that many organizational, legal, and cultural obstacles can impede cooperation among the many actors who respond to a crisis and prevent the full realization of this CMCoord potential. The challenges are numerous and include command and control issues, information sharing, and field coordination. In addition, U.S. civilian and military officials have given mixed signals regarding their intentions and motivations, with some more focused on the “do good” opportunity in disaster relief missions, while others suggest a broader interest in Washington to strengthen CMCoord in support of diplomatic objectives (or even force protection), particularly when this involves so-called stability operations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. This has led to worry by some at the United Nations (UN) and among NGOs that the United States is politicizing CMCoord and potentially threatening their impartiality in volatile areas.

In Japan, the discussion regarding CMCoord has not developed as far as it has in the United States, but this situation is changing as Japanese NGOs and Japan’s self-defense forces (SDF) expand their involvement in disaster relief and international peace and reconstruction activities, as they did for the tsunami relief effort and the Pakistan earthquake, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq. New NGOs are being formed in Japan that are specifically designed to provide assistance to these kinds of operations.1 Japan’s National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) for FY 2005 and After paved the way for the country to become more proactive in overseas emergency assistance and peace cooperation activities, supported by new procurements, training programs, and a joint command structure formed in 2006. This culminated in early 2007, when Japan’s Defense Agency was upgraded to a full ministry, and overseas missions became primary duties, as opposed to secondary.2

To support these changes, several Japanese government agencies and universities have recently launched studies of CMCoord, and these organizations have been cooperating with the United States bilaterally and within multilateral frameworks through various workshops, seminars, and tabletop exercises. Although public support in Japan for the SDF’s participation in international disaster relief missions has increased in the last ten to fifteen years, disagreement remains within the government and among civil society about how extensive the SDF’s involvement should be. Japan is interested in joining the CMCoord debate to enhance its own understanding of the issues and to contribute to improving cooperation with the United States in ways that strengthen its own civilian and military institutions.

Of course, the debate about enhancing CMCoord is not limited to Washington and Tokyo, as this is truly a global phenomenon driven by the combination of persistent human vulnerability and a greater technical and financial capacity on the part of wealthy nations to respond. This response capacity, however, is not centralized, and so large-scale disaster relief missions are often conducted by loose, ad hoc coalitions of international organizations, NGOs, and national aid agencies and militaries, as opposed to being managed almost exclusively

1 These include Japan Mine Action Service in 2002 and Engineers without Borders in 2005.
2 These changes were accomplished by passage of the Law Concerning Partial Amendment of the Establishment of the Defense Agency on December 15, 2006.
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by the UN and its affiliated agencies and organizations. This arrangement places a premium on nation-to-nation communication and cooperation during a crisis, even though these networks are not fully developed.

We are therefore at a critical stage with regard to the future of CMCoord and related policies in the United States and Japan, as well as in the international community. Success in this effort can contribute not only to more effective relief and recovery operations, but also to greater interaction and mutual understanding among national militaries and the NGO community, as well as to stronger international and regional organizations that can tap into more synergistic civil-military coalitions. The United States and Japan are by no means the only two countries engaged in this effort, but they can play a unique role by virtue of their financial power (in terms of their contributions to the UN, to other international organizations, and via direct overseas development assistance) and their strong security relationship, which features frequent joint training opportunities and a high degree of interoperability.

Together with a handful of other key countries in Europe and East Asia, the United States and Japan can help form a valuable crisis core group that cooperates in support of large-scale, UN-led disaster relief operations. This kind of core group (of perhaps four to six nations) is generally more effective at making decisions and harmonizing policies and procedures than either a large collection of dozens of countries or uncoordinated efforts by individual countries, and it could play an invaluable support role to the UN or to host nations. An important part of making this core group idea work, however, is achieving greater mutual awareness and understanding about these issues among a wide variety of policy makers, military officials, and academics in the United States and Japan, which is a primary objective of the research and dialogue project introduced in this interim report.

The project focuses on improving the ability of the United States and Japan to effectively pool civilian and military resources and to respond together (bilaterally or as part of a broader coalition) in support of host nations and international relief agencies to alleviate suffering and to speed recovery in a time of crisis. Indeed, it is the pressure of time (an integral part of any crisis) that underscores the value of extensive dialogue and preparation in advance of a coordinated response to a natural or man-made disaster. Responding in a timely fashion requires a continuous regimen of effective planning and communication, which in turn relies on strong personal and institutional relationships between the two countries and with other partners. This project strives to strengthen and diversify these relationships so as to be better prepared, to respond more efficiently, and to improve over time as the individuals and organizations involved incorporate lessons from shared experiences.

The In Times of Crisis project is a two-year joint effort of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) and the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) at Osaka University, together with some individual scholars in Japan. Project team members are examining both domestic and international characteristics of the CMCoord debate from the two countries’ points of view, in order to explain how CMCoord is developing in each country, as well as how each country (or various institutions within the country) views international CMCoord developments and how they relate to their participation in future multilateral operations. The project team’s goal is to build linkages between the two countries across the spectrum of NGOs, government officials, scholars, and military officers. In addition to archival research and one-on-one interviews, the team organized a day-long bilateral workshop in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 2006, that brought together government and military officials from relevant agencies, along with UN officials and American and Japanese
NGOs, and policy specialists to discuss these issues (see appendix A for a description of the workshop agenda and a list of attendees).

The project generally draws a distinction between CMCoord for disaster relief operations and CMCoord for stabilization and reconstruction missions (such as in Afghanistan and Iraq). Part of the reason for this distinction is the fact that some real differences exist between the two, in terms of the types of activities carried out by the responding organizations, the speed with which the activities are carried out, and the overall environment in which they operate. It is also true that stability operations are much more political and controversial by nature, and there are a number of legal questions regarding how involved Japan's SDF can be in certain dangerous situations. That said, the personal networks, communications infrastructure, and many key capabilities and operating procedures apply to both types of CMCoord, and so it is not practical (or advisable) to ignore stabilization/reconstruction situations altogether. The IFPA-OSIPP project is focused primarily on CMCoord in disaster relief and consequence management situations, though some mention of stabilization/reconstruction CMCoord issues is unavoidable.

This report outlines the key findings from year 1 of the project, and it serves as a primer for CMCoord in the two countries and related policy reforms. The report also identifies the most promising areas for bilateral cooperation within international frameworks. Building on the first year’s results, the research team will further explore the possible avenues of cooperation mentioned above and propose specific ways that bilateral (or in some cases, minilateral) cooperation can more effectively support affected nations and multilateral relief operations. These ideas will be presented and discussed at another bilateral workshop in Tokyo toward the end of 2007, which will further inform a concluding monograph to be released in the spring of 2008.

The authors are grateful to key members of the project team for their contributions to this project to date: Dr. Hoshino Toshiya (OSIPP), Dr. Robert Eldridge (OSIPP), Dr. Atsumi Tomohide (Osaka University), Dr. Yoshizaki Tomonori (Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies), Dr. Nagamatsu Shingo (Disaster Reduction & Human Renovation Institution), Dr. Uesugi Yuji (Hiroshima University), and Dr. Charles M. Perry (IFPA). The authors also thank the officials and specialists who have given their time in interviews and through presentations or comments at the workshop, in particular those who serve as unofficial advisors to the project, including Ms. Nancy Lindborg (Mercy Corps), Ms. Linda Poteat (InterAction), Ms. Seki Kaoruko (UN-OCHA), and Ms. Yamamoto Rika (Peace Winds Japan). Valuable assistance at IFPA came from Charles Lister (research), Adelaide Ketchum (editing), and Christian Hoffman (graphic art and publication design). The entire project team is grateful to the Japan Foundation's Center for Global Partnership (CGP) for its financial support, advice, and encouragement. In this report, Japanese names appear with the family name first and the given name second, as is their custom.
Coordinating the civilian and military components of international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) activities is not necessarily a new effort, and it has always been a difficult challenge. The increased frequency and large scale of these combined operations, together with their potential positive impact are focusing renewed attention on ways to improve. Even when they are undertaking roughly the same mission, the NGO and military communities have very different cultures and priorities, they operate under different codes of conduct (or rules of engagement) and with different organizational philosophies, and they are subject to different types of international law. This is evident at the most basic level on the question of how even to refer to CMCoord. The United Nations prefers the term “CMCoord” (civil-military coordination), which has a slightly more detached connotation than cooperation (as in civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC, often used by NATO). “CMCoord” paints a far more neutral image than the oft used U.S. military acronym “CMO” (or civil-military operations), yet, the UN term is not detached enough for some NGOs that want to avoid any connotation of collaboration and coordination and who instead prefer the term civil-military relations. For these NGOs, the use of “relations” better describes a simple state of coexistence or of de-conflicting actions in the field.

The CMCoord debate is driven above all by circumstances, however, and regardless of what one names the function, the need to address these CMCoord issues is clear to most parties involved, given the potential benefits of good coordination and the dangers of poor coordination. A UN-led group of NGOs and international organizations, for example, noted that because of the “changing nature of modern complex emergencies,” the humanitarian community and non-UN militaries find themselves operating more closely together than ever before. “These developments, together with cases of military interventions claimed to be for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, have led to an erosion of the separation between the humanitarian and military space” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2004).

The concept of humanitarian space is important, and it does not refer to physical space for NGOs and UN agencies to operate. Instead, it refers to the complete freedom afforded to aid and relief workers to deliver assistance according to the three core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality (UN General Assembly 1991). Aid agencies and workers rely on this humanitarian space for their protection in areas of conflict, and they are sensitive to any potential damage to this metaphysical space caused by being too closely associated with a national military force.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, Europe, and a few other nations (including Japan) have been increasingly willing to use their militaries as a tool to help ameliorate conflict or alleviate suffering, compared to before, when the use of military assets by NATO or Warsaw Pact member countries involved a great deal more strategic and geopolitical baggage than is now usually the case. The relief operation Sea Angel (including many U.S. naval assets) in the aftermath of the 1991 cyclone/flood tragedy in Bangladesh was one of the first such examples, followed by operation Restore Hope in 1992, when a U.S.-led coalition of troops was sent to Somalia to protect relief workers and to help restore a major UN relief effort there. Similar operations have been (or are being) carried out in Haiti beginning in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1998, East Timor in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, along with other disaster relief activities that involved significant military deployments, such as after hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, and more recently the tsunami relief effort and the multilateral response following Pakistan’s earthquake.

This phenomenon has caused military planners to adjust some procurement and training strategies, and it has also confronted UN agency and NGO managers with new realities. As the scale and frequency of these combined operations increase, so too does the challenge to these managers in working alongside outside national militaries (usually referred to as “other deployed forces”), as opposed to affected-nation militaries or blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers. The NGO staffs are used to working in conflict areas and dangerous situations, but they could generally rely on their clear neutrality and impartiality (and UN mandate) for sufficient protection, and coordination was less complicated. Now they find themselves arguing with their national military counterparts as to how to assess need and priorities, the relative merits of a “demand pull” or “supply push” relief approach, whether or not the two groups can work together to distribute relief supplies or provide medical services, if the soldiers can wear civilian clothing, with side arms or not, and many other difficult questions. Coordination is particularly challenging as other deployed forces frequently work directly with the affected nation’s military outside of the UN’s normal coordination circle.

In large-scale disaster relief operations, NGOs recognize the contributions made by these forces, but, as one NGO executive put it, they would generally prefer that these militaries restrict their role to providing infrastructure or logistical support and otherwise “leave the relief work to the professionals” (interview 2005a). The soldiers, however, who are usually not specifically trained for these operations, tend to try to fill what they see as a leadership vacuum and seek to plug NGO resources and capabilities into their overall operation. Moreover, seemingly mundane issues of military contracting and cross-servicing, lines of command and communication, bureaucratic approvals, liability, and rules governing classified information and networks can frequently frustrate otherwise productive collaboration.

At the top of this scheme is the United Nations, which is supposed to coordinate all efforts (civilian and military) in support of the relief operation being led by the affected nation, yet this becomes extremely difficult when dozens of outside actors converge to assist relatively poor and unprepared nations that are overwhelmed by a large-scale disaster. Contributing governments and militaries all have different rules and procedures regarding how they interact with the UN and the affected nation, and they often seek distinct credit and acknowledgment for their efforts. One NGO field operator also noted, “Coordination is crucial…but you can literally spend all day [during a disaster] going from one coordination meeting to another and not get anything done. There are coordination meetings to coordinate the coordinators! So we’ve got to be smart about this” (workshop 2006). The UN itself is sensitive to this situation and recognizes that organizations usual-
ly do not like to “be coordinated” in the sense that they are taking orders from the UN. This is why it often stresses that the UN “facilitates” coordination and that “coordination is not a function, but a shared responsibility” (workshop 2006).

Despite the fact that officials and practitioners have been wrestling with a variety of CMCoord issues for several years, as well as benefiting from some well-documented experiences in the field, decision making in such a broad international forum is always difficult. Although some consensus has been reached on certain issues, even fundamental questions about what role military forces should be allowed or encouraged to play remain open. Just because the military can do something, for example, does not mean that it should. During one cleanup operation in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami disaster, a group of NGOs were assisting local villagers with a labor-intensive process of separating wreckage piece by piece, creating piles of different materials that could be reused, recycled, burned, and discarded. The operation involved a large and diverse segment of the village population, creating a communal sense of rebuilding, and each worker earned a small wage that contributed wealth to his or her family. Within a few days, however, a military detail came in with heavy equipment, dug deep holes and pushed all the debris into large pits. The job was done much faster, but it proved to be more expensive (factoring in the cost to mobilize the men and equipment) and possibly undermined the village’s rebuilding effort (interview 2006a).

In theory, military assistance is only to be sought as a last resort, when there is no other way to fill an identified need. But in practice, the assessment of needs and capabilities is often in the eye of the beholder. In the example above, was the need for speed more important to allow for a quicker reconstruction, or was a communal, wage-earning activity more helpful to the village? An argument could be made either way. Who makes the decision? Similar examples can be found in the aftermath of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, such as the delivery and construction of local school buildings by U.S. forces, or even during domestic operations in Japan when SDF personnel delivered, cooked, and served the food for victims of the Niigata-Chuetsu earthquake in 2004, among other duties. For every person who expresses praise or thanks for such military contributions, one can usually find a critic who thinks that it goes too far, especially when the military contribution involves the final stage of service delivery to the affected community (known as direct assistance) or continues for weeks or months after the initial disaster.

But few, if any, would deny that national militaries can provide critical support when responding to a large-scale natural disaster, whether it is the ability to organize quickly on the scene or to provide unrivaled logistical capabilities. During the Pakistan earthquake relief effort, for example, U.S. military helicopters carried more than twenty thousand passengers, conducted over thirty-seven hundred medical evacuations, and delivered nearly fifteen thousand tons of cargo to distressed villages, which was more than any other country or organization handled, including the UN. Military units delivered fuel, serviced equipment, erected total Tonnage of Relief Supplies Delivered in Response to the Pakistan Earthquake

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Tonnage of Relief Supplies Delivered</th>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>14,741.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>688.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>576.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3006.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>14,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>630.6</td>
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Supplies delivered via helicopter in tons October 12, 2005 - March 31, 2006
buildings, set up mobile hospitals, and provided medical care to more than forty thousand patients (workshop 2006). Japan’s SDF helicopters delivered over fifty-four tons of cargo during the Pakistan operation, part of a non-U.S., non-UN group of countries whose military hardware helped to carry more than five thousand tons of relief supplies.

As one participant at the December 2006 workshop aptly put it, “The CMCoord debate often tries to bridge the most dramatic differences in our [NGO and military] approaches and priorities. The truth is, if you list up the ten most important objectives of the civilian and military sectors, we agree on six or seven of them. We’re better off discussing those points of agreement, rather than focus on where we disagree” (workshop 2006). In the end, it is clear that the question is not whether or not to involve the military in certain circumstances, but rather what is the right balance and how to manage that interaction. This is being considered in earnest in the United States and Japan.

In the United States in the 1990s, mobilizing the military to assist with disaster relief or stability operations overseas was generally seen as an anomaly. This attitude has gradually changed, however, for a variety of reasons. As noted earlier, it became politically and technologically easier to dispatch forces abroad for such missions after the Cold War, and so the number and frequency of such operations increased. Later, the post-September 11 security environment forced U.S. military planners to expand their definition of an event with strategic implications. Moreover, while the Asia-Pacific region does play an increasingly important role in world trading, finance, and energy markets, its high degree of population density and the severity of the disasters that hit the region can have disproportionately negative impacts on local populations and global markets. In addition, hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the United States (in 2005) awakened U.S. officials to the inadequacies of their plans and preparations for responding to catastrophic domestic events, the list of which has grown since the government started factoring in potential terrorist attacks utilizing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). As a result, U.S. policy makers no longer see such scenarios and the capabilities needed to respond to them as unique or outside of their area of operations, and they are looking for ways to develop the necessary response skills.

The State Department, which takes the U.S. lead for assisting with disasters overseas, has worked to stay current with CMCoord developments. When the military started to get more involved in the 1990s, for example, the State Department’s Agency for International Development (USAID) published a field operations guide for its assessment teams and disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) that included a chapter on working with U.S. military forces during relief activities. The field guide was updated in 2005 (USAID 2005), and it outlines the military’s structure and roles during operations, and how, when, and where assessment teams and DARTs can coordinate the work of USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) with that of the military. As stability operations became more frequent, the U.S. government created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004, a new office within the State Department charged with improving the working relationship between civilian agencies, the NGO community, and the military, and helping to prepare for and deal with post-conflict situations in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. More studies, reports, and recommendations soon followed.

The U.S. military also began to address these issues in earnest in the 1990s, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, producing its first manual on interagency coordination for joint operations in 1996. The purpose of that document was to

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3 It should be noted that this is not limited to natural disasters, as the SARS outbreak in Asia showed the potential human and financial cost of disease pandemics in the region, and more recently Japan’s SDF and China’s military (among others) have been called on to help cull infected birds to help avoid an outbreak of pandemic influenza.
establish doctrine and guidance for commanders who increasingly found themselves involved in “military operations other than war” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996). By the time the document was updated in 2006, it expanded beyond interagency coordination to include coordination with intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006). At about the same time, the Department of Defense approved a new directive in December 2005 that elevates stability operations to a core military mission that “should be given priority comparable to combat operations (Department of Defense 2005). The directive instructs the Pentagon to “be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations, U.S. and foreign NGOs, and private-sector individuals and for-profit companies.” Many of these capabilities and procedures will be applicable in support of large-scale disaster relief operations, not only overseas, but also domestically.

On this domestic front, the Pentagon is apparently considering creating an active-duty force for responding to major natural disasters, in light of the lessons learned from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, though this has caused some consternation among state governors and NGOs such as the Red Cross (Tyson 2005). The assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense, Paul McHale, stressed that the response of active-duty troops would be limited to rare and massive catastrophic events, and that poor communication between the military and local authorities should be corrected by lessons from past disaster missions. Still, some state governors, such as Texas’ Rick Perry, cautioned the federal government to “leave decision-making in the hands of local and state leaders and leave for our military the most important job of fighting wars and keeping the peace” (National Journal’s Congress Daily AM 2005). Whether disaster relief is being carried out at home or overseas, however, the reality is that it does not call for an either-or type of approach (such as local versus central government or civilian versus military assets). All of these actors work together in different ways and to varying degrees of intensity depending on the circumstance. No two emergencies will ever be exactly the same, which underscores the value of a high awareness among all the potential responders about each other’s cultures and capabilities (and of developing common procedures for coordination).

In Japan, although the SDF has experience assisting local governments and populations in times of crisis, its relationships with civilian institutions are changing. Civil society in Japan, led by a small number of NGOs, is developing greater capabilities to assist government entities with various services, including disaster relief and consequence management, prompted by a growing need for such a role due to decentralization efforts, as well as legislative changes aimed at growing the NGOs’ resource base. In recent years, NGO networks in Japan have been formed to improve their ability to work together and to respond to a domestic disaster, though their interaction with the SDF and other countries’ NGOs has been quite limited to date. In contrast to its counterparts in the United States, therefore, the SDF has relatively extensive disaster relief training practices and capabilities, but its NGO partners are less well developed and it is still only in the early stages of learning how to integrate a response with NGOs. This situation (almost the opposite of that of the United States) highlights the opportunity for the two countries in terms of learning from each other their various approaches to integrating civilian and military responses to domestic disasters or collaborating overseas.

Japanese NGOs also have little experience working closely with the SDF or other national militaries in international disaster relief situations, but this too is slowly changing as Japanese NGOs strengthen...
their capabilities and participate more frequently in multilateral operations. Japan has had a legal framework for providing overseas emergency aid since 1987, when the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (JDR Law) was enacted. In 1992, the JDR Law was revised to enable SDF participation in order to facilitate the dispatch of larger relief teams, to enable teams to conduct operations in disaster areas in a more self-sufficient way, and to upgrade the means of transportation. After experiencing difficulties responding to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, Japanese government officials believed that insufficiently funded Japanese NGOs could not effectively and independently conduct their activities in such an international setting, so they created an institution called Japan Platform, which works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Japan Platform is an organization that pre-registers certain Japanese NGOs to receive grants for overseas emergency relief activities and facilitates joint planning, preparation, and logistical support for such missions.

Japanese NGOs generally are not yet sure how to respond when difficult CMCoord questions are raised, though the issue is less controversial for disaster relief operations than it is for humanitarian assistance in conflict areas. Several Japanese NGOs are active in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, where they have refused to accept even small grants from the U.S. military to carry out certain projects, for fear of being too closely identified with the U.S.-led coalition there. In addition, although then-Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko said that Japan should contribute to Iraqi development on an “all Japan” basis, utilizing the government, SDF, NGOs, and private corporations, many Japanese NGOs opposed the dispatch of the SDF on the grounds that involvement of the military in development and humanitarian assistance would jeopardize the neutrality of the NGOs’ activities (Asia Press Network 2004).

The final report of a security and defense committee appointed by the prime minister in 2004 emphasized the need for “the contribution of personnel and various types of human resources acting in close collaboration with each other, including the SDF, the police, government administrators, Official Development Assistance related organizations, private enterprises, NGOs, and others.” The report also urged the Japanese government to “establish guidelines that clearly delineate what is expected of the SDF and what is expected of civilian agents” (Council on Security and Defense Capabilities 2004, 70).

The Japan Association of Corporate Executives study group on Iraqi issues also finished a report on Japan’s future development assistance framework, pointing out the need to clarify roles for the SDF and the private sector in international aid activities. The report concluded that Japan should establish a Japanese equivalent of CMCoord and that as a start Japan should promote communication among the SDF, police, coast guard, and civil organizations including international NGOs, because their interface is too limited at the moment (Japan Association of Corporate Executives 2004, 4-7). Serious discussion of the issue of CMCoord is just beginning in Japan, therefore, but the topic will be increasingly important in domestic and multilateral forums. Moreover, close U.S.-Japan communication during the development of CMCoord will help ensure that “Japanese style” CMCoord does not develop in ways that make it difficult to integrate with other nations.

All of this confirms many of the findings of recently completed IFPA projects on U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation to manage complex contingencies and on crisis management reforms in the United States and Japan (see Schoff 2004 and 2005). That is, in Japan and the United States (and among its allies) broad-based interest and support exist for building and strengthening networks and capabilities among the wide range of actors that respond to domestic and international disasters, but communication and mutual understanding regarding their respective approaches, capabilities, and priorities remain insuf-
icient to allow for more than incremental progress. This is where the current In Times of Crisis project aims to make useful contributions.

Beyond the United States and Japan, the United Nations has, of course, conducted a series of studies and issued guidelines regarding CMCoord in humanitarian crises over the last fifteen or so years. In fact, it was during the 1990s that the current UN system for overseeing and supporting disaster relief missions began to take shape. In December 1991, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182, designed to strengthen the UN’s response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters in part by creating a high level position of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to centralize control, as well as by establishing the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). Soon thereafter and over the course of two years, the UN drafted its Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (also known as the Oslo Guidelines), which established a basic framework for the use of foreign military assets and expertise by relevant international organizations during the disaster relief operations (UN 1994).

As part of the secretary-general’s program of reform in 1998, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and its mandate was expanded to include the coordination of humanitarian response and policy development. OCHA was quickly put to the test by hurricane Mitch, and it has been particularly challenged by large-scale disasters in the last few years in South and Central Asia. According to OCHA, “The unprecedented deployment in 2005 of military forces and assets in support of humanitarian response to natural disasters...confirmed the need to update the 1994 Oslo Guidelines,” and the new version was released in November 2006 (UN 2006). NGOs have also contributed to the CMCoord dialogue throughout this time, either as members of panels developing some of the documents mentioned above, or on their own through training manuals and videos. Several regional organizations and initiatives in Asia have contributed as well, with a particular focus on applying lessons learned from recent disasters and building up regional capacity for prevention and response.

Given the lessons learned from the tsunami relief efforts and many other case studies, it is clear that joint consultation, planning, and exercises between militaries and civilian agents in domestic, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks can greatly enhance the capacity for domestic and international crisis/disaster response. The challenge, however, is how to make this work in a practical manner. It is relatively easy to prescribe additional joint planning, training, workshops, and exercises as a way to improve cooperation in crisis response or disaster relief situations. But the reality is that all the national militaries, government and UN agencies, and NGOs are working with limited staffs and budgets, and they do not always share the same training priorities or political freedom of action. Putting together multilateral exercises is a time-consuming and complicated task, which only gets more difficult as more participants are added to the roster.

The mere fact that improving crisis response coordination is difficult, however, should not dissuade organizations and leaders from pursuing this goal. All the hard work, interaction, and compromise that go into putting together a bilateral or multilateral exercise (that is, what makes it difficult to achieve) are precisely what makes the effort valuable. The overall success of the joint civil-military response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was a direct result of the work that was done before at Cobra Gold (a multilateral civil-military exercise) and many other official and unofficial initiatives. The ability to cooperate effectively does not just materialize. It is planned for and practiced. For multilateral responses, the ideal situation is to work together as a group on a regular basis, but this
is often logistically impossible. Strengthening key bilateral relationships, however, is more practical and can go a long way to improving the way that these partners cooperate as members of impromptu coalitions. The U.S.-Japan relationship is particularly important in this regard.

Governments obviously have an important role to play when it comes to developing and strengthening these networks, but CMCoord is a particularly difficult issue for governments to address, since by definition it involves many actors largely beyond their control or influence. Some government initiatives are being undertaken, but much more can be done to enhance these networks and to help identify priorities for common study. IFPA’s previous work on crisis management cooperation issues has inspired us to design this project in a way that brings together NGO, UN agency, and national and local government leaders across disciplines (for example, specialists in disaster relief, assessment, logistics, contracting, communications, and medicine) to help develop a consensus with regard to cooperation priorities and to stimulate new initiatives and relationships that can enhance the process of cooperation.
Domestic Roots for CMCoord

There are a number of reasons to look simultaneously at both the domestic and international perspectives of CMCoord, though they also have distinct qualities. First, there is a significant overlap on the military side of the equation, since any adjustments to unit organization and training will likely be applicable to both domestic and international catastrophes (indeed, if dedicated disaster response capabilities are created within the military, they should be deployable both at home and abroad). Second, for truly large-scale disasters, even the internationally active NGOs often mobilize to contribute domestically, as Mercy Corps did in response to hurricane Katrina or as Japanese NGOs did during a significant earthquake in Niigata in 2004. Finally, there is also an indirect overlap between domestic and international events in terms of incorporating the contributions from other countries, since even wealthy nations can benefit from well-targeted assistance.5

Many characteristics of domestic and international operations are clearly dissimilar, however, and these must be considered. The NGOs and UN agencies that work in the international sphere are often different from those that will respond to domestic emergencies (at least when it comes to wealthy countries like Japan and the United States). The legal and political circumstances surrounding domestic and international events are also usually quite different, and the number of organizations participating in international operations in a substantive way can often be greater than in a domestic situation, not to mention the challenge of operating with multiple languages and cultures. Although U.S.-Japan disaster relief cooperation is likely to be most substantive in the international context, it is still important to understand the domestic roots for CMCoord in both countries, as well as how attitudes and policies are changing.

The United States

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States prompted a major overhaul of federal crisis response plans and policy for responding to catastrophic domestic events, whether resulting from natural occurrences like hurricanes and earthquakes or from terrorist attacks, possibly including the use of WMDs. The U.S. government established a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the start of 2003, which quickly began to draft a new national plan for responding to large-scale disasters, working in collaboration with a wide variety of stakeholders and partners around the country. The government’s National Response Plan (NRP) was released at the end of 2004, and it continues to be updated.6 One important goal of the plan is to improve interagency and civil-military coordination during a relief operation by establishing, together with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), “a single, comprehensive framework for management of domestic

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5 Such assistance for disasters in the United States or Japan would likely be limited and called upon only in extreme cases, but examples could include mobile hospitals, temporary housing, water purification systems, or power generators, and they could perhaps be drawn from a ready reserve pre-designated by a handful of wealthy nations.

6 The National Response Plan was last updated in May 2006 and it is currently under interagency review. The review is scheduled to be completed by June 2007.
incidents” (Department of Homeland Security 2004).

The government’s NRP was put to its first big test during hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005, which was the first time the president designated a catastrophe an “incident of national significance” under the new plan. Although significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to respond, the lack of coordination and timely damage assessments, communication problems, and logistical shortfalls overwhelmed response efforts across all government and non-government levels. The inadequate disaster response to hurricane Katrina demonstrated the limitations of the nation’s readiness and ability to react to a major domestic incident, and it renewed discussion about possible ways to enhance such plans and preparations including the possibility of a stronger federal, and perhaps even military, lead role in certain circumstances. The following few pages outline how America responds to large-scale disasters, with a particular focus on lessons learned from Katrina.

Local and state response to disaster relief
As in most countries, emergency response in the United States is managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level – typically the local government – with the state government becoming involved when local resources (police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel) have been, or are expected to be, overwhelmed. A key partner for state and local governments is the American Red Cross, which responds to thousands of disasters, large and small, every year. Although the Red Cross is not a government agency, it was chartered by the U.S. Congress in 1905 to “carry on a system of national and international relief… [in response to] fire, floods, and other great national calamities.” In addition to its support of local authorities for even the smallest of tragedies, such as a house fire, it is also an integral part of the NRP. Today, the Red Cross has an annual budget of over $3 billion, and in the year just prior to hurricane Katrina, it spent more than $400 million on domestic disaster services (American Red Cross 2005).

When state resources are exhausted, state governors may request assistance from neighboring states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) or directly from the federal government under a presidential disaster or emergency declaration. State governors may also call up members of the National Guard under their control to respond to domestic emergencies, including natural disasters, civil unrest, terrorist incidents, and other complex contingencies.

National Guard troops can be activated by state governors or by the president. The nature of the emergency determines which of these governing authorities calls up the troops and the corresponding duty status under which they serve:

- In a domestic emergency, the state governor can call up the National Guard, and the troops serve under state-active duty status. The operation is commanded by state-level authorities and it is funded by the state. Since the National Guard remains under state control at this duty level, it is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, which restricts the use of federal resources.

The Red Cross is the only NGO assigned primary agency responsibility for a so-called emergency support function (ESF) under the NRP. It serves as a primary agency, along with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to lead and coordinate federal efforts for ESF 6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services.

EMAC is a congressionally approved national disaster-relief compact that enables a disaster-affected state to request assistance from other member states. It serves as a legally binding contractual agreement, under which the receiving state is responsible for reimbursing the states that provide assistance.
military forces within the U.S. homeland, particularly for law enforcement activities.

- In a domestic emergency with homeland security implications, the state governor can, with the approval of the secretary of defense, mobilize the National Guard, and the Guard serves under Title 32 full-time National Guard duty status. The troops remain under state control but the operation receives federal funding to conduct homeland defense activities. Since the state retains control, the forces are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.

- In a war or national emergency, the president has the authority, with the consent of the state governors, to call up the National Guard. Troops thus federalized serve under Title 10 active-duty status, and they are considered to be part of the full-time federal military forces and under the command of the president. Under Title 10 status, National Guard troops are directed on the ground by the Department of Defense (DoD) and operate under the appropriate combatant command. Under Title 10, National Guard troops are subject to Posse Comitatus restrictions.

Confusion surrounding National Guard troop status disrupted the Katrina response effort. Initially, National Guard troops, including those from other states, were called on to assist under state-active duty status. In order to access federal funds in support of Katrina-related disaster relief operations, National Guard personnel were transferred from state-active duty to Title 32 duty. Although the federal government considered transferring National Guard personnel to Title 10 status, officials dismissed this option in order to avoid the political and legal implications of federalizing the National Guard forces, particularly if state governors resisted surrendering control of the National Guard troops under their command or if Title 10 forces were confronted with law-and-order challenges, for which they would face Posse Comitatus Act restrictions. Instead, separate active-duty forces were deployed in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other civil authorities. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commanded the federal military response to hurricane Katrina, while the state governors directed the National Guard forces in their respective states.

The failure to fully integrate active-duty and National Guard forces, however, led to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort. For example, the search and rescue operations of the National Guard, federal military responders, and the Coast Guard were never fully coordinated, resulting in multiple organizations assigning search and rescue tasks without knowing which missions had been completed and which missions still needed to be performed (GAO 2006a, 8). The bottom line is that the National Guard and the active duty forces plan and train for these missions independently, and they do not have an integrated communications or command structure. This problem was highlighted by a recent report on the future of the National Guard and reserves, which noted the significant lack of communication between reserve officials and other military leaders, DHS, and NORTHCOM (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 2007).

Bridging this gap will not be easy, as any simple solution requires one side to compromise its authority. As noted earlier, some in Washington think that DoD should take the lead role during a large-scale disaster, but the respected Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves recommended the opposite, that governors be given more command authority over active-duty troops responding to local emergencies (2007). This dilemma of how to integrate active duty and National Guard forces is mirrored on the international stage, since it is similar to how different national militaries might interact on the scene of a large disaster overseas. They too plan and train separately, and though they are willing to work together, they are reluctant (often prohibited) from
putting themselves under another’s control. It will be interesting to see how U.S. defense officials bridge this coordination gap, as it might provide some useful cues for international players.

As one would expect, the Red Cross played a substantial role in the immediate response to hurricane Katrina. This charitable organization distributed financial assistance to over 1.2 million families, provided 3.42 million overnight stays in 1,100 shelters across the country, and served over 52 million meals (U.S. House of Representatives 2006, 343-44). Despite this massive response, the magnitude and severity of the disaster was much larger than the Red Cross was equipped to handle. The Red Cross lacked the logistics capacity to reach affected areas and was dependent on FEMA and DoD for assistance. Although the Red Cross had embedded staff at most relevant state and federal emergency operating centers, the relief agency experienced significant communication and coordination breakdowns with FEMA. Some of the Red Cross’ requests for fuel and mobile refrigeration equipment were never processed, and FEMA often failed to coordinate the transportation of evacuees, making it difficult for the Red Cross to track and shelter hurricane victims.

Relevant to this project, several after-action reports regarding Red Cross activity during the Katrina response provide little mention of actual, or even attempted, collaboration with the National Guard or federal forces. This is surprising given that the Red Cross is the official disaster relief entity of the United States, and it assists with a number of so-called emergency support functions (ESFs) that are designated within the NRP. For example, the Red Cross is a primary agency for ESF 6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, and it serves as a supporting agency for ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, which is led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Moreover, the Red Cross plays a role in several other ESFs that involve agriculture and natural resources, and long-term community recovery and mitigation. Lastly, amid the criticisms that have been leveled against the Red Cross for its apparent inability to reach disaster sites quickly, there is clearly a need to facilitate greater cooperation between the Red Cross and the American military, at least in the area of logistical support.  

The federal response to disaster relief
Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster whose scope and destruction severely tested all levels of government. The disaster left more than fifteen hundred dead, affected over ninety thousand square miles, caused at least $80 billion in damage, and displaced an estimated six hundred thousand households from across five states along the Gulf Coast (GAO 2006b, 10). Even before Katrina struck, it was obvious that federal help would be necessary, and so President George W. Bush instructed DHS and DoD in advance to be ready to respond. Despite the mass pooling of local, state, federal, private, and NGO resources, however, the overall response “fell far short of the seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned” under the new disaster response architecture adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 (White House 2006, 3).

The National Response Plan unveiled in December 2004 described the federal approach to domestic disaster response for “incidents of national significance,” incorporating best practices from a variety of crisis management disciplines, including fire, emergency management, law enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services. The NRP identifies the roles and responsibilities of all local, state, and federal agencies involved in domestic incident management, as well as non-governmental actors such as nonprofit and volunteer organizations, the private sector, and ordinary citizens. Nothing in the NRP violates the existing

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In addition, the NRP identifies fifteen emergency support functions for coordinating national support to local and state entities during incidents of national significance. The ESFs range from transportation and communication capabilities to urban search and rescue and emergency management to disaster housing and nutrition assistance, requiring assistance from government agencies as diverse as the departments of Homeland Security, State, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, Agriculture, and Housing and Urban Development. The ESFs can be activated independently of each other, depending on the type of disaster. A large-scale event could trigger activation of all ESFs, while a localized incident such as a tornado might only require the activation of a few ESFs.

As the core operational plan of incident management, the NRP establishes national-level coordinating structures and processes that will be employed in conjunction with local and state entities to manage catastrophic events. Overall coordination for federal incident management activities is executed by the secretary of homeland security through multi-agency emergency operating centers at the headquarters, regional, and field levels. Within this coordinating framework, FEMA is no longer the primary agency managing the federal response to domestic disasters. Instead, all federal departments and agencies involved in disaster response and recovery activities report directly to the secretary of homeland security (for Katrina, this was the FEMA director, Michael Brown). In theory, the job of the JFO is to facilitate federal support to an established incident command system (ICS), and the ICS is typically handled at the lowest possible jurisdictional level. This can get quite complicated and confusing.

### Joint Field Office (JFO) Organization

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Federal Official</th>
<th>State Coordinating Officer</th>
<th>Senior Federal Officials</th>
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<td>Operations Section</td>
<td>Planning Section</td>
<td>Logistics Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance/Admin Section (Comptroller)</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
<td>Defense Coordinating Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFO Coordination Staff</td>
<td>JFO Coordination Group</td>
<td>JFO Coordination Group</td>
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The State Coordinating Officer represents the State, and in some instances, the JFO Coordination Group may include local and/or tribal representatives as well as NGO and private sector representatives, as appropriate.

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11 The fifteen ESFs are 1) transportation; 2) communications; 3) public works and engineering; 4) firefighting; 5) emergency management; 6) mass care, housing, and human services; 7) resource support; 8) public health and medical services; 9) urban search and rescue; 10) oil and hazardous materials response; 11) agriculture and natural resources; 12) energy; 13) public safety and security; 14) long-term community recovery and mitigation; and 15) external affairs.
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during large-scale disasters, however, when there is no single and clearly recognized “incident commander.” Again, in theory, all of the Defense Department’s support is supposed to be coordinated through one person at the JFO, known as the defense coordinating officer (DCO). But as seen after Katrina, the JFO did not function properly in this regard. Two days after the storm hit, the U.S. general leading the military component of the relief effort could not even get in touch with the PFO, and FEMA aides were not sure where to find their director (Hsu 2005).

The DoD’s contributions to disaster relief efforts are described as defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and according to the NRP, requests for DCSA should originate from the JFO. U.S. Northern Command is responsible for DSCA and homeland defense duties. In the case of Katrina, NORTHCOM began its alert and coordination procedures in advance of Katrina’s landfall on August 29, 2005; however, many military assets did not reach the affected area until after the presidential declaration of a federal emergency and the declaration of an incident of national significance were made on August 30 and August 31, respectively. After the declarations were made, NORTHCOM sent DCOs to all the potentially affected states, established a joint task force (JTF-Katrina) in support of FEMA relief efforts, and deployed medical personnel, helicopters, ships, and construction battalion engineers. In Louisiana, four MH-53 Sea Stallion and two HH-60 Seahawk helicopters from USS Bataan were flying medical-evacuation and search and rescue missions within days of Katrina’s landfall (Miles 2005).

Additional aircraft from the army and air force, including aircraft capable of nighttime search and rescue missions, were transporting FEMA teams to the affected states to assess the damage and gain situational awareness. A wide range of other military members and assets were also called to the area, including the Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group, loaded with disaster response equipment, the USNS Comfort, a hospital ship equipped with medical personnel and supplies, and USS Grapple, a Navy rescue and salvage vessel prepared to support maritime and underwater survey and salvage operations (Miles 2005). However, most of these assets, as well as additional active-duty forces, did not arrive until September 5, seven days after hurricane Katrina hit.

Several factors influenced DoD’s incremental response to the situation. First, although the Pentagon began deploying personnel and resources before the storm made landfall, it could not fully respond until the presidential declaration of a federal emergency and declaration of an incident of national significance were issued, and in response to DHS and FEMA formal requests for military support. That did not happen until four days after Katrina struck. Second, both the NRP and the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (released in June 2005) promote the National Guard as the primary military response in support of civil authorities. Although both documents recognize that active-duty forces can also play a critical role depending on the nature of the event, the guiding principle is that DoD is a supporting agency and a resource of last resort, particularly in response to natural disasters. During the Katrina response, DoD initially relied on the National Guard to respond, but growing concerns about the severity of the disaster prompted DoD to supplement National Guard troops with active-duty personnel. However, neither document either specified how DoD should be used to support federal agencies or what resources it should provide in the event of a domestic disaster.

Third, the DoD plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities (Department of Defense 1993), which was undergoing revision at the time of the Katrina crisis, also neglected to address key questions of integration, command and control, timeframes for response, and the division of tasks between National Guard resources under state control and federal resources under NORTHCOM (GAO 2006a, 10). As a result, critical military assets were not utilized, such as communications equipment.
and reconnaissance and surveillance assets, all of which would have provided additional situational awareness and improved communication between responders. Finally, the failure to fully integrate and coordinate the National Guard, active-duty units, and other state and federal responders led to several inefficiencies, including a lack of clarity in search and rescue missions and poor visibility of logistics requirements. Finally, the DoD often made its own damage assessments and began deploying its resources without knowing the full extent of the damage or the required assistance (GAO 2006a, 7).

Despite these challenges, the military mounted an impressive response, which in the end included over twenty-two thousand active duty personnel and fifty thousand National Guard troops, more than 80 airplanes, 50 ships, and 360 helicopters (U.S. Northern Command 2005a and 2005b). Interestingly, after the White House reported in its assessment of the federal response to hurricane Katrina that the military, National Guard, and Coast Guard were the only entities that proved truly effective during the response to that event, revisions to the NRP have been undertaken to redefine the military role in domestic disaster management. Plans to designate DoD as the lead federal agency for certain large-scale disasters have also been discussed.12 State governors are resisting such efforts, however, fearing it would enable the president to federalize the National Guard during a domestic incident without the consent of the state governors. Nevertheless, DoD has announced plans to embed defense officials into FEMA regional offices, fold support from federal reconnaissance agencies into the military’s civil support processes, and conduct exercises to improve interagency planning and coordination.

Interagency coordination is a particularly tough challenge for the government and the military, and U.S. efforts to address this issue may contain useful lessons for Japan, which has begun to make significant structural changes in the last few years to the SDF, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), MOFA, and the Cabinet Secretariat that severely test the government’s and the military’s ability to coordinate effectively during stressful events. In the United States, NORTHCOM, as well as every combatant command, has a joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) already in place to facilitate interagency relationships, with representatives from the federal government, the National Guard, the Coast Guard, other combatant commands, academia, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and law enforcement, as well as partners from Canada and Mexico. The emergency preparedness and planning division of the interagency coordination directorate focuses on DSCA operations and on those agencies and operations associated with natural and man-made incidents. JIACG has working groups on issues of special interest, such as natural disaster, pandemic influenza, private-sector engagement, and scripted mission assignments.

Despite these efforts, however, several Katrina after-action assessments characterized the coordination between the Defense Department and DHS, and FEMA in particular, as ineffective. One report recommended that NORTHCOM better integrate with FEMA and the National Guard because a lack of effective information-sharing mechanisms impeded more efficient civil-military coordination during the Katrina response (U.S. House of Representatives 2006, 201). To prevent such failures in the future, NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau have purchased deployable communications systems and interoperable communications equipment (Fein 2006).

Overall, improving civil-military coordination also depends on forward-looking assessments of what resources are needed and when those resources will be needed, as well as an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in the disaster response. To this end, JIACG is developing scripted requests for assistance (RFAs) based

12 For a discussion of the role of the military in disaster relief, see Business Roundtable 2006.
on certain scenarios that anticipate requests for federal and military support, as well as identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each agency involved in a relief effort. If scripted RFAs can strike the right balance between specificity and flexibility, they could be a great asset to disaster managers at all levels. Some involved in these efforts are hopeful that such planning and preparation activities can even go beyond generic RFAs and begin to address the implications of certain policies in the context of specific scenarios. As an example, one workshop participant noted, “During the Katrina response, road blocks were set up to prevent sightseers from wandering into dangerous areas, but those same road blocks turned away transport trucks loaded with relief supplies.” Disaster management planners cannot anticipate every problem, but efforts should be made to plan for as many as possible.

**Private-sector response to disaster relief**

An interesting feature of recent disaster planning and response efforts has been the increased role for, and contributions from, private corporations. This has become evident not only in terms of financial donations, but also in the companies’ willingness and ability to provide operational support across several functional areas, including strategy development, logistics, and communications.\(^{13}\) For all of the benefits that this vast pool of capabilities and resources brings, however, the private sector presents another coordination challenge to local and federal responders, despite corporations’ apparent enthusiasm to contribute during times of crisis.

During hurricane Katrina, for example, Anheuser Busch donated 9.4 million cans of safe drinking water to victims, and was able to leverage its packaging operations, logistics personnel, and government affairs office to distribute the supplies. Ford Motor Company sent 275 vans, pickup trucks, and sport-utility vehicles to law enforcement personnel in the disaster region and dispatched a mobile command center to serve as a temporary headquarters for a local sheriff’s office in Louisiana that had been destroyed. Wal-Mart’s efforts began even before the storm made landfall, as its emergency operations center pre-positioned relief supplies and response teams around the Gulf Coast. Interestingly, the company’s relief inventory was developed through trend analyses that revealed what communities usually need to purchase before, during, and after a disaster. The Home Depot also began mobilizing four days before hurricane Katrina blasted the Gulf Coast, stocking stores with electrical generators and rebuilding supplies. In fact, the company’s rapid response was a result of planning efforts, which included reorganizing its regional inventories to match the disasters they confront: earthquakes and wildfires in the West, blizzards in the North, and hurricanes in the South (Fox 2005).

In some cases, private corporations can offer to civilian emergency responders certain capabilities similar to those provided by the military, such as satellite communication links and air and ground transportation. Moreover, businesses are relatively unburdened by chain-of-command and other bureaucratic and legal hurdles that often constrain military engagement. This prompts questions that will need to be addressed going forward, such as, In what circumstances can and should the private sector assist civilian disaster-response efforts in lieu of the military? How can private corporations and the military work together to provide logistical support? Should there be a private-sector- and/or NGO-coordinating component embedded within the JFO structure?

Efforts toward integrating all of these entities are currently underway, such as with the Strong Angel III exercise held in California in August 2006, which simulated an integrated response to a rapidly spreading, highly-contagious virus. Public-private disaster response cooperation regarding communications and information sharing were the key dynamics being highlighted in this event, and

\(^{13}\) For more detail on these and other private-sector contributions to the hurricane Katrina response effort, see Business Civic Leadership Center 2005.
sponsors included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Naval Postgraduate School, Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Sprint Nextel, and Google. The rising importance of the private sector in this realm has also been reflected in the efforts of many organizations to raise awareness of the issue and to help improve the ability of private corporations to contribute in a disaster. These include, among others, the Partnership for Disaster Response of the Business Roundtable, the Disaster Resource Network, and the Business Civic Leadership Council at the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Beyond private-sector companies and the Red Cross, the efforts of countless charitable organizations and private donors in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina constituted the largest relief effort in U.S. history, totaling over $3.13 billion in cash and in-kind gifts (U.S. House of Representatives 2006, 343). Disaster relief agencies responding to Katrina assisted with evacuations and the delivery of critical commodities such as food, water, and shelter; provided medical and social services; conducted animal search and rescue missions; and removed debris. Moreover, charities worked together to coordinate the delivery of supplies and shared information through daily conference calls and electronic databases. The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), a consortium of over thirty recognized national disaster relief organizations, released a relief and recovery assistance guide one month after hurricane Katrina hit, identifying the resources and contact information of federal and relief agencies assisting hurricane victims. The guide included information on a variety of topics, including debris removal, housing, employment and training, funeral arrangements, health and safety, legal assistance, family and pet reunification, and financial assistance.

Everyone involved in disaster management in the United States recognizes that improvements are needed across the spectrum of local, state, federal, and non-governmental entities involved in responding to catastrophic events, particularly in the areas of joint planning, communications, and coordination. It would seem reasonable, for example, to pursue greater planning and training interaction between the National Guard/DoD and the Red Cross and other humanitarian NGOs. After all, one of the core missions of the Red Cross, according to its congressional charter, is to be a “medium of communication between the people of the United States of America and their armies.” Yet, official Red Cross representation in the JFO organization noted above is strikingly absent.

Over the next few years, the United States should be better prepared to provide relatively quick and effective relief to victims of large-scale disasters, and a major reason for this will be the focused efforts to improve integration of capabilities that reside in different departments, agencies, and organizations at the national and local levels. Many have likened this effort to the process of integrating the U.S. military service branches (army, navy, etc.) to improve their ability to conduct joint operations. The ultimate objective of this effort, known as jointness, is something that the U.S. military has made great strides toward achieving, though it is truly a never ending process of communication, interaction, and practice. There is always room to improve, because the different cultures of these organizations, their different vocabulary and procedures, and their institutional pride will often complicate joint planning and operations. This will certainly be the case in the area of disaster relief.

14 For a complete list of participating organizations of the Strong Angel III exercise, see http://www.strongangel3.net.

15 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act) reworked the command structure of the U.S. military, integrating the branch services (army, air force, navy, and marine corps) under the operational authority of functional (transportation, space, special operations, etc.) and regional (Europe, Pacific, etc.) combatant commanders. The act also designated the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as opposed to the service chiefs, as the principal military advisor to the president of the United States, National Security Council, and secretary of defense.
In most ways, the United States and Japan are a study in contrasts rather than similarities when it comes to their geography and national composition, and many of these differences affect the way that each country responds to large-scale domestic disasters. In contrast to the United States, for example, Japan is geographically small and densely populated. Japan’s population, roughly half the size of America’s, squeezes into an area about the size of California, and the country’s mountainous terrain makes for an even higher degree of population density. Demographically Japan is an older nation, with one-fifth of its population over sixty-five years of age, compared to the slightly more than one-tenth of the U.S. population that falls into that age group. Emergency services are also highly centralized in Japan, meaning that there is a national administrative and policy-making umbrella for local police and fire department personnel (the National Police Agency, or NPA, and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, or FDMA). Although Japan’s forty-seven prefecture governments do not have their own national guard units to call upon in times of crisis, they can request support from the nation’s self-defense forces. Japan’s SDF have averaged well over eight hundred domestic disaster relief operations annually over the last five years, demonstrating how often it assists local responders with emergency patient transportation, search and rescue operations, and firefighting activities (Japan Defense Agency 2006).

The SDF’s relatively high tempo of relief operations also underscores how often Japan endures natural disasters, particularly earthquakes and typhoons. Japan experiences a large percentage of the world’s earthquakes with a magnitude over 6.5 on the Richter scale (or M6.5), totaling fourteen in 2004 and thirteen in 2005 (or about 15 percent of the world’s total). In October 2004, the Niigata Chuetsu earthquake of about M6.8 killed forty-six people and destroyed 2,827 homes. Of course, the most devastating earthquake since the 1920s occurred in the Kobe-Awaji region in January 1995, killing over sixty-four hundred and destroying more than 100,000 homes. Volcanic eruptions in populated areas also occur from time to time, as do extremely heavy snowfalls in some regions. In December 2005 and January 2006, for example, three to four meters of snow fell in Nagano and Niigata prefectures, claiming at least eighty lives, injuring nearly two thousand, isolating numerous villages, and cutting power to over a million households. Japan’s high population density also raises the human and economic stakes for industrial accidents, chemical fires, or accidents at nuclear power facilities.

Despite Japan’s familiarity with natural disasters, its centralized governing structure, and its wealthy economy, the government demonstrated several crisis management shortcomings in the 1990s that led to some substantial reforms. The irony was that, although political, administrative, and budgetary power was concentrated in Tokyo, each ministry and agency controlled its own piece of the crisis management puzzle, and the prime minister had little statutory authority to compel a unified approach to planning, procurement, training, and communication. The most significant reforms, therefore, were designed to enhance the capability of the prime minister to lead and coordinate the various ministries and independent agencies in the Japanese government during a crisis. Other legal changes allow for quicker mobilization and dispatch of the SDF during a disaster, even allowing for direct requests by a town mayor to the SDF or an MOD representative under certain circumstances.

Overshadowing these recent and ongoing reforms is the expectation that a major earthquake will someday strike the Tokyo region, as happened...
in 1923 when over 140,000 people died. The Japanese Cabinet Office has estimated that as many as 13,000 could be killed in a major modern-day earthquake around Tokyo, while other estimates run as high as 30,000 to 60,000 (Eldridge 2006). Research indicates that the probability of an M8 earthquake in areas near and west of Tokyo within the next thirty years ranges from 50 percent to 87 percent depending on the exact location. This reality sharpens the focus of Japan’s disaster relief and prevention specialists.

Japan’s basic approach to disaster management coordination
As in the United States, Japan delegates responsibility for disaster relief management to the lowest possible jurisdictional level. Given the national affiliation of local fire and police personnel, however, coupled with the de facto national guard role that Japan’s SDF plays, the central government is quite frequently involved in local disaster relief and recovery efforts. The foundation for Japan’s disaster management system is the Central Disaster Management Council, placed under the aegis of the Cabinet Office in 2001. The council is chaired by the prime minister and it includes all cabinet ministers (notably the minister of state for disaster management), along with the heads of four designated public corporations (Bank of Japan, Japanese Red Cross Society, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) and four academic or technical experts. The council prepares the nation’s Basic Disaster Management Plan (Basic Plan), upon which the responsible agencies, organizations, and local governments develop their operational plans. The Basic Plan was almost entirely revised after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, and various components of it have been further revised based on lessons learned in the past decade.

Key players at the national level besides the prime minister include the minister of state for disaster management, the deputy chief cabinet secretary for crisis management, the director general for disaster management in the Cabinet Office, and the NPA commissioner, all of whom report within the immediate cabinet structure (that is, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet Office). Other critical agencies outside of the Cabinet Secretariat/Cabinet Office framework are the FDMA (officially a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), the Maritime Safety Agency (the Japan Coast Guard, which is part of the
severity of the disaster. There are also cases when the government will establish an on-site disaster management headquarters by dispatching a governmental investigation team to the stricken area, not unlike the JFO in the United States.

The other important components in all this, of course, are the prefectural and local governments and their emergency management teams, since they constitute the first wave of response to a disaster. At the prefecture and municipal levels, there are disaster prevention councils made up from local government agencies, police departments, fire departments, and designated public institutions. These councils are responsible for implementing disaster-reduction programs and overseeing the development of local operational plans. When a significant disaster strikes, the municipal government will create a headquarters for disaster countermeasures (HDC) to manage the local response. An HDC can also be established at the prefecture level if the situation requires a more robust relief effort. Requests for central government assistance generally come from the governor of the prefecture on behalf of town leaders, but under particularly urgent circumstances the mayors can directly request national assistance including from the SDF.

Communication and coordination among all of these key players has improved drastically over the last decade, though the system is still far from perfect. A key challenge continues to be the integration of command and control functions when multiple towns and prefectures are involved. Although prefectures in Japan are analogous to American states in terms of financial clout and political stature, in terms of physical size they can often be more comparable to counties within states. This means that a large enough earthquake or typhoon can quickly affect many prefectures and lead to the establishment of multiple HDCs at the prefecture level. Japan does not have a standardized ICS or a unified command approach for dealing with multiple jurisdictions. Instead, the government tends to rely on parallel disaster management structures that are severely tested during large-scale or rapidly unfolding crises.

Other shortcomings and subsequent lessons learned from past events include insufficient knowledge of the plans and capabilities of other agencies and levels of government, a lack of adequately staffed organizations with responsibility to handle disasters, and a lack of drills or exercises that simulate decision making and test systems to the breaking point. Japanese authorities have been working to address all of these issues, in part by increasing the frequency and substance of national-local collaboration for disaster planning and management, investing in compatible emergency communications systems and a new satellite-based tsunami alert system, and creating more realistic training exercises that do not reveal beforehand the scenarios to which participants will be responding.18 There have also been efforts to train and deploy more emergency medical technicians (EMTs) among the first responders, who were relatively few in number in the 1990s.

As with many other aspects of disaster management in Japan, the relationship between the central and local governments has been steadily changing in recent years. Local governments have always been assigned a wide range of substantive responsibilities, collectively spending much more than the central government does on administrative and social services, including disaster prevention and management activities. This is despite the fact that the local governments’ tax revenues are less than half those of the central government’s general account, which results in large financial transfers from the central government in the form of local allocation tax grants and other treasury disbursements (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 2006). Traditionally, this gave cen-

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18 The new satellite alert system is called J-ALERT and was launched on February 9, 2007. J-ALERT will instantly send warnings of tsunamis and updates on volcanic activity to help speed evacuations. The FDMA will manage the system, which is being tested first with ten prefectures and four cities.
tral government bureaucracies a lot of regulatory control over local authorities, and local officials were often quite satisfied to accept the money and follow the rules regarding how it should be spent. Since the Kobe earthquake and for other reasons, however, critics have begun to question just how much local capacity this deferential approach was actually building within the communities. Some feared that towns simply became more adept at political and bureaucratic maneuvering to obtain the funds than they were at integrated disaster management with neighboring villages.

Against this backdrop, the central government has been trying to strengthen the administrative foundation of municipalities as part of a decentralization campaign in the past few years, and toward this end it created a number of legal and financial incentives to promote the merger of municipalities. Recent results have been quite dramatic, once the groundwork was laid in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As of April 2006, within Japan's forty-seven prefectures there were 1,820 municipalities plus the twenty-three wards of Tokyo. That compares to about 3,100 municipalities in 2004, or a drop of roughly 40 percent in just two years, and it represents a remarkable consolidation of disaster prevention, public safety, and disaster management resources (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 2006). The motivations behind this decentralization and consolidation policy are by no means solely tied to improving local disaster response capabilities, but this is certainly one result of a broader trend of divesting more responsibility and accountability to local governments.

Other components of this strategy include more frequent joint emergency training exercises involving the central government and (at times) multiple prefectural governments, and MOD has also made efforts to place former SDF officers in local government positions to bolster the localities’ crisis management capabilities. By 2002 there were roughly twenty-five such SDF officers working in local governments, and by the end of 2005 there were ninety-three retired SDF officials serving as staff responsible for disaster prevention in forty-three municipalities (Japan Defense Agency 2006, 182).

Apart from the expectation in Japan of a massive earthquake, the trend toward closer central-local government coordination for contingency planning and preparedness is also being driven by regional security concerns and potential threats associated with Japan's support of the United States in the so-called Long War against global terrorist networks. The overall coincidence of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States (and follow-on attacks in places like Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005) with North Korea's resumption of its missile and nuclear weapons programs in 2002 and 2003 prompted the Japanese government to consider more seriously the possibility that it could one day be the target of a terrorist or missile attack. This also created a political climate in which policy makers could pass national emergency legislation that began to clarify two key issues long in need of attention: 1) the role of central authorities vis-à-vis local officials in such an emergency and 2) the role of the military in a crisis and consequence management situation. As a result, three new laws were adopted in 2003 that prescribed the basic principles for response to an armed attack (or “anticipated attack”), the respective responsibilities of the national and local governments, and some of the extra-ordinary rights afforded to the SDF during such an emergency in order to respond more effectively.

These new laws only created the basic framework for this kind of emergency response, however, so further deliberation and details were required. Over the next year, bureaucrats and politicians hammered out a set of seven additional bills that clarified a variety of related issues such as the gov-

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19 Revenue transfers from the central government to the local governments are also a form of income redistribution, where some local governments with a solid tax base receive no grants at all, while others receive a large proportion of their local revenue from such transfers.
ernment’s and SDF’s ability to commandeer land and houses, remove vehicles to clear roads, and draft private organizations to assist with transportation or public communication efforts. Even though these laws were primarily designed to deal with attack scenarios, amendments were made to allow the government to take such measures in “similar emergency cases,” meaning that Japan was essentially creating a new legal framework to respond to any kind of large-scale domestic disaster (natural or man made) (Chikara and Yuichi 2004). The laws also clarified how U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) can cooperate with the SDF in these situations, including the mutual provision of supplies and services during disaster relief operations. Basing its work on the new emergency legislation passed in 2003 and 2004, the central government took another nine months to finalize the implementing guidelines for the new laws, which were finally approved by the cabinet in March 2005.

This activity has helped create a closer working relationship between the central and local governments in general, and between the prefectures and the SDF in particular. The laws mentioned above, for example, required local governments to develop civil protection plans to explain how they will manage and assist with evacuations, temporary housing, food, and medical care in the event of an attack. The prefectures and towns had already considered all of these issues to some degree, but they had never done so in such a military context or in such close coordination with the SDF. Some prefectures moved aggressively to establish their civil protection procedures, notably Tottori prefecture by the Sea of Japan and Fukui prefecture, which is home to fifteen nuclear reactors. Follow-up joint exercises were then conducted throughout 2005 and 2006 involving anywhere from five hundred to two thousand central and local government officials (including the SDF) and up to four prefectures in one exercise (Japan Defense Agency 2006, 203, and Chikara and Yuichi 2006).

The SDF has also made adjustments to improve its coordination with local governments, in part by establishing the joint Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division in Tokyo and creating the new post of civil protection and disaster relief coordinator in each of the local provincial cooperation headquarters. Whereas for many decades the central and local governments sought to downplay the SDF’s involvement, it is perhaps a sign of the SDF’s improved reputation when the provincial cooperation headquarters name was officially changed to the SDF Prefectural Cooperation Headquarters, starting in FY 2006. The SDF and prefecture governments utilize these offices and personnel to identify potential staging areas and communications centers for the SDF in case of a disaster, implementing a numbering system on the roofs of buildings to facilitate identification from the air, and harmonizing response manuals.

A growing role for the SDF and civil society
The SDF’s role in domestic and international crisis management contingencies is growing and still evolving. Even though the SDF has long contributed to consequence management operations in Japan, more often than not the nature of its contribution has been a secondary support role, usually geared toward recovery activities such as debris removal and the longer-term care and feeding of the affected population. After all, the SDF personnel are not meant to be first responders, and their base of operations is almost always farther from the disaster site than the local fire and police personnel. It was only in 1996 that disaster relief support activities were first designated as one of three primary roles for the SDF’s capabilities (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995).

As a largely self-sufficient organization, the SDF often takes a day or two to mobilize, and it does not have the kind of daily contact with the local population that local responders do. In addition, the police department keeps detailed and updated records about the local population (who lives
where, their ages, even information about physical disabilities or special medical conditions), which helps tremendously during the immediate response. During the Kobe earthquake relief effort, for example, police officers and firefighters were responsible for over 95 percent of live rescues from collapsed buildings. In contrast, the SDF played a more significant role in the recovery of the fatal victims of that tragedy, demolishing collapsed houses, debris transport, and assisting with medical treatment or food delivery.

Since the Kobe earthquake, however, and due in part to some of the legal and organizational changes described above, awareness among local political leaders about what the SDF can contribute has grown in Japan, and the SDF is able to deploy more quickly than it could before. Local governments have come to appreciate the value of the SDF, which is relatively self-sufficient, provides unique resources under a unity of command, and is accustomed to risky work. Moreover, as local budgets tightened throughout the late 1990s, local authorities also appreciated the fact that they did not need to reimburse the central government for the cost of an SDF dispatch. As voters became more aware of the SDF’s capabilities and understood that it was now easier for local officials to request SDF assistance, there was also a political price to pay if the public perceived that a mayor or governor waited too long to seek SDF support. When in doubt, therefore, the default has largely shifted in Japan to a quicker involvement of the SDF as opposed to waiting to see if its services are really necessary.

This phenomenon was clearly evident during the response to the Niigata-Chuetsu earthquake, which struck a mountainous part of central Japan on October 23, 2004, killing sixty-seven people and injuring over four thousand. The rugged terrain complicated access and gave the SDF’s helicopters a prominent role in the relief effort. Unlike the situation in Kobe, the SDF was involved in about 35 percent of successful rescues (instead of less than 5 percent), and its troops constituted close to half of the 270,000 relief personnel dispatched to the disaster area. According to one Ground SDF officer, “The most effective thing we did was to decide the action swiftly without waiting for the official order from the prefecture, to obtain the communication method and to grasp the real-time information properly” (Nagamatsu 2006). The SDF also carried out its more traditional role of construction equipment transportation, debris removal, and the provision of food, water, shelter, and bathing facilities. It is also worth noting that the entire rescue effort was covered extensively on television and watched throughout the country, conveying the impression that the SDF is essentially an equal partner to police officers and firefighters when it comes to disaster relief operations.

The Niigata-Chuetsu earthquake was a watershed event for more than just the SDF, however, as it signaled the rise of another set of disaster relief players on the scene, namely Japan’s internationally active NGOs. Two of Japan’s larger indigenous NGOs that have contributed to relief and recovery work around the world (for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Bosnia, and Sri Lanka) for the first time responded domestically when the earthquake hit in October 2004. Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) dispatched a relief team on the night of the earthquake, equipped with satellite phones, power generators, and emergency shelter units. PWJ’s sixteen-day operation included the provision of shelter, medical, and engineering services. Another large Japanese NGO, known as JEN, sent its first domestic relief and recovery team to two particularly hard-hit towns in the region, carrying out relief activities and staying until the end of December to help with rubbish removal, relocation, and emotional support programs. The participation of NGOs like PWJ and JEN in the Niigata relief effort demonstrates a more holistic approach to disaster management in Japan, but it also complicates the central government’s drive to streamline decision making and exercise greater control over relief operations. These challenges
can certainly be overcome, as long as enough attention and resources are dedicated to preparation and communication.

For over one hundred years the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) had a de facto monopoly on well-organized, nongovernmental assistance in times of a domestic disaster. Today the JRCS still leads the way with 470 volunteer disaster response teams throughout the country (about six thousand members), and it supervises a nation-wide storage and distribution system for food and other materials needed by victims of disasters. By law, the JRCS is required to help coordinate relief activities and to cooperate with the government and other public agencies during relief operations. The JRCS response to the Niigata earthquake, for example, dwarfed that of PWJ or JEN, with almost one thousand volunteers who assisted with the provision of food, clothing, shelter, and necessities. Within one week of the disaster, over $67 million was donated to the victims through JRCS.

The Japanese Red Cross is still the largest disaster relief NGO in Japan, but it is learning to share some of these responsibilities with numerous new domestic players, as well as with the SDF. Given its experience with natural calamities, Japan has always had a fairly high rate of citizen involvement with local disaster management organizations. These issues have long been a part of school curricula, and there is a day set aside nationally each year for schools and towns to conduct training and emergency drills.20 At the time of the Kobe earthquake, for example, about 45 percent of Japanese households participated in an estimated sixty-five thousand local voluntary disaster management organizations. But this number continues to grow, reaching about 58 percent of households and nearly one hundred thousand organizations by 2001 (Cabinet Office 2002).

The extent to which these groups can contribute constructively during a large-scale disaster, however, is questionable, and in some cases they have perhaps caused more problems than they helped to solve. After the Niigata earthquake, for example, the municipal government of Nagaoka changed its policies and decided not to accept relief goods from the public if another large disaster strikes. Thousands of tiny disaster relief organizations donated goods with the best of intentions, but the generosity required an excessive amount of time to sort and distribute the items, and some clothes remained in storage up to a year after the disaster, leading to additional costs for the local government. As a result of the new policy, Nagaoka city will only accept relief goods from other local governments, companies, and organizations with which it has special agreements in place (Daily Yomiuri 2006a).

In contrast, another town in Japan has gone out of its way to recruit new volunteers to help, and it is focused particularly on citizens over sixty years old. In this case, the city of Takarazuka (near Osaka) is approaching soon-to-retire municipal government workers with experience in disaster relief and recovery from the Kobe earthquake experience, lest that institutional knowledge be unnecessarily diluted (Daily Yomiuri 2006b). In this way, the city is proactively targeting volunteers with specific skills and channeling their contributions in the area of planning, preparations, and neighborhood relations. As time goes on, Japan will need to continue in this direction of professionalizing and streamlining NGO participation in disaster relief operations, since it remains in the very early stages of integrating nongovernmental assistance into its still-evolving national disaster management architecture.

It is important to remember that Japan’s NGO community is not as mature or well funded as its counterpart in the United States. Legal and financial hurdles to establishing substantial nonprofit organizations in Japan have kept their numbers relatively low, and contributors to these organizations are not eligible for the same tax deductions

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20 Disaster Management Day in Japan falls on September 1 each year, and it commemorates the devastating Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, which killed over 140,000 people.
that Americans receive, which obviously makes fundraising a challenge. This, in turn, has limited employment opportunities, and in Japan’s rigid labor market it has been difficult for NGOs to attract and retain a professional work force. All of this is gradually changing, as Japanese NGOs work to improve their financial and technical strength, but this will take time. Japanese NGOs do have some outstanding leaders and staff members, but there are not yet enough of them to meet the needs.

The traditional government-NGO relationship in Japan is also different from that in the United States. For many years in Japan, most noteworthy nonprofit organizations had some formal affiliation with a government ministry, and even if the connection was institutionally weak, the nonprofits still required official certification from the “competent ministry,” which pretty much ensured that only groups with missions consistent with the relevant ministry’s policies would be certified. At that point, the certified nonprofits would be eligible for grants from the ministry (or maybe hire newly retired ministry bureaucrats), which further tied the organizations’ future to ministry approval. In fact, because truly independent NGOs were relatively few and far between, the common way to refer to these groups was nonprofit organizations (NPOs) so as not to mislead people into thinking there were no government strings attached.  

During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in Japan, most high-profile independent NGOs were usually small local groups vehemently opposed to some government initiative such as the Narita airport expansion, the building of a local dam, or the hosting of U.S. military forces. Even though the situation is different today, and many more indigenous NGOs and NPOs are involved in education, health care, disaster management, and other civil society sectors, the lingering impression among a good number of senior-level bureaucrats is that NGOs are predisposed to be anti-establishment or that they cannot be sufficiently professional and accountable. This can retard the growth of productive government-NGO partnerships in Japan.

One way to streamline NGO and NPO interaction with the government and to improve its level of professionalism is to enhance networking and coordination within the Japanese NGO community. One group that has taken a lead in this effort on the domestic front is Nippon Volunteer Network Active in Disasters, which grew out of the Kobe earthquake experience and has worked to coordinate partnerships with local governments, assist with local preparations and information awareness campaigns, coordinate volunteers, and share best practices among disaster response NGOs. Other, similar groups exist for domestic and international disaster management NGOs.  

Human and financial resource limitations will restrict how much time the NGOs can dedicate to professional development and networking, which is why developing clear priorities is important.

An area of discussion that could be a high priority for government-NGO discussion is the identification of appropriate roles and responsibilities. Professionals from the government will clearly be responsible for law and order, command and control, and search and rescue operations, and they will probably play an important role in logistical support. But some logistical support could be provided by NGOs and the private sector, and they can certainly assist with the care and feeding of disaster victims, as well as with relatively simple cleanup tasks. Traditionally, the SDF has played a prominent role in the longer-term care of disaster victims, but momentum is shifting in such a way that the SDF is trying to bring its resources to bear during the immediate relief and rescue operations, while at the same time civil society in Japan is becoming more capable of assisting victims and helping with recovery efforts.

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21 For the sake of simplicity in this report, NPOs and NGOs are generally referred to collectively as NGOs.

22 These include Japan Platform, the Japan NGO Center, and the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation.
In a well-managed operation, Japanese NGOs and the private sector could perhaps be mobilized to help backfill for the SDF in the area of longer-term care and recovery while the SDF moves to develop more rapid reaction capabilities. Managed poorly, this kind of combined effort will perpetuate a situation similar to the one following the Niigata earthquake described by a workshop participant, where the SDF continued to prepare and serve meals to local victims long after volunteers could have taken over the task, as long as they had access to a steady supply of fresh food. Local citizens were grateful for the SDF’s assistance, but in the future these communities might be better served by uniting with neighbors to help themselves as much as possible, and SDF personnel might be more effectively deployed to handle other tasks that only they are equipped to handle. This overall approach of improving communication and developing some degree of agreed-upon burden sharing and specialization is one that is revisited later in this report, as it has direct relevance to disaster relief CMCoord at an international level, as well as for U.S.-Japan cooperation within these multilateral networks.
CMCoord on the International Stage

The CMCoord issue takes on additional complexity and urgency in an international context, especially when relatively poor and hard-to-reach communities are overwhelmed by a disaster. As noted earlier, the number of actors in an international relief operation is generally much greater than in a domestic scenario, and communication and coordination are more difficult to carry out effectively. Moreover, as challenging as it is domestically for different agencies and departments to share and integrate response plans, it is near impossible to do so on an international scale. Likely locations or circumstances for large-scale disasters in third countries are too numerous to plan for productively. Perhaps the best that can be done is to consistently build awareness among likely affected and aid-giving nations and NGOs regarding how they operate and the capabilities they can offer. A central player in these situations is the United Nations and its related agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The United Nations

The United Nations has long been providing humanitarian assistance and coordinating the efforts of the international community to respond to natural disasters and complex emergencies that are beyond the capacities of an affected nation. In 1991, after the UN struggled to curb the Kurdish refugee crisis and other emergencies, the organization introduced a series of reform measures to strengthen its ability to coordinate humanitarian action in the field. In 1998, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established, and the under secretary general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator (ERC), as its head, was appointed to prepare for and oversee future UN relief operations. The affected nation always leads the relief operation, but OCHA assists by coordinating as much as possible the supporting relief efforts of the UN and international community, including national militaries, the private sector, and local and international NGOs. In addition, OCHA monitors and issues situation reports on emerging crises and natural disasters on a twenty-four hour basis through its network of information management services. Today, OCHA has over one thousand staff members in forty countries and maintains nearly fifty field offices and six regional offices. OCHA’s budget requirements for 2007 are $159 million, of which $12.7 million will come from the regular UN budget and $146.3 million from member states and donor organizations (OCHA 2007, 13).

In response to the sudden onset of a disaster or complex emergency, OCHA can deploy disaster management personnel within twelve to forty-eight hours. Managed by the Field Coord...
In Times of Crisis

| CMCoord on the International Stage |

Coordination Support Section (FCSS), a UN disaster assessment and coordination (UNDAC) team rushes to the site, assesses the disaster situation, and assists local authorities in coordinating international response efforts. UNDAC runs an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC) and an internet-based virtual OSOCC (V-OSOCC) to facilitate the immediate exchange of information between responding governments and organizations during the relief operation. OCHA also administers ReliefWeb, which is an open, online gateway to updated information about humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The FCSS also acts as the secretariat for the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), a global network of urban search and rescue teams, and for the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) and the Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Partnership (APHP), which provide UNDAC teams with technical, logistics, and communications support modules and personnel during humanitarian missions.

Depending on the demands of the emergency, the ERC may also appoint a humanitarian coordinator (HC) to serve as the most senior UN humanitarian official on the ground. Since 1993, UNDAC has participated in over 150 relief operations, including the Pakistan earthquake, hurricane Katrina, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and, most recently, flash flooding in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. The FCSS also conducts UNDAC training to increase interaction between OCHA staff and emergency managers from contributing member states, teach techniques on emergency response, and familiarize trainees with the UN system.

During a relief operation, OCHA’s Logistics Support Unit (LSU) is responsible for the procurement and delivery of emergency relief goods.
from OCHA stockpiles and donor countries and organizations.\textsuperscript{25} In close cooperation with the host nation, the HC, and the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), the LSU coordinates the logistics capabilities of all cooperating humanitarian agencies and governments in order to meet host nation needs and prevent logistical bottlenecks or duplication.\textsuperscript{26} The LSU also supports the international community with logistics-related items, such as customs facilitation, establishing common warehousing, identifying delivery routes, and managing transport schedules. LSU and UNJLC staffs are integrated into UNDAC teams.

When military or civil defense assets (MCDA) are deployed for use in humanitarian emergencies, the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is usually the OCHA focal point for integrating these components of the relief mission.\textsuperscript{27} To ensure effective civil-military coordination in the field, the unit regularly conducts CMCoord courses and participates in military training exercises with other civil humanitarian actors. Moreover, the CMCS manages the OCHA Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities, a database of personnel and disaster management assets within the UN system and from contributing governments and NGOs. The database includes directories on MCDA, emergency stockpiles of disaster relief material, donors of emergency humanitarian assistance, and contact points for disaster response, such as experts in search and rescue missions. The unit also embeds CMCoord officers in the field to serve as liaisons for governments, organizations, and militaries contributing to or requiring MCDA during an operation. During the tsunami response, for example, OCHA had CMCoord officers in Sri Lanka (Colombo), Indonesia (Banda Aceh, Meuleboh, Medan, and Jakarta), and Thailand (Bangkok and Utapao).

In view of the steady increase of military involvement and assets in support of humanitarian emergencies and to improve consistency with other UN documents, the CMCS recently worked with other stakeholders to update the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of MCDA in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines). Updates to the guidelines continue to emphasize the core principles of humanitarian assistance (humanity, neutrality, and impartiality) and define the types of humanitarian activities that are appropriate to support with international military resources. For example, the guidelines encourage military forces to provide infrastructure support such as road repair, power generation, and airspace management, but they discourage the direct distribution of goods and services by military personnel to the affected population, fearing such actions may blur the lines between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders. To keep these lines clear, the guidelines recommend that humanitarian actors maintain the lead role in humanitarian relief operations, particularly in areas also seized in conflict. “You need a long-term understanding of the situation on the ground in the affected country to recognize the potential impact of short-term actions, and NGOs and UN agencies will usually be better positioned on this front,” advised one participant at IFPA’s December 2006 workshop.

Though the UN prefers member states to let their military assets be directed by the OSOCC to facilitate coordination, most donor countries deploy military assistance based on bilateral agreements with the affected nation or multilateral treaties. Of the approximately thirty-five countries providing military assets during the tsunami relief effort, only two, Switzerland and Denmark, agreed to place their military assets under UN direction. Switzerland provided three Super Puma helicopters, flight crew, logistics, and ground personnel, and Den-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{OCHA relief items are stored at the Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi, Italy.}
\footnote{The UNJLC is an interagency logistics coordination facility for emergency response established in 2002 under the custodianship of the World Food Program (WFP). The UNJLC reports to the HC during a crisis and coordinates the logistics capabilities of humanitarian organizations involved in the operation.}
\footnote{MCDA include standby relief personnel, equipment, supplies, and even services (such as weather reports) provided by foreign governments and militaries during a disaster relief operation.}
\end{footnotes}
mark offered a C-130 Hercules aircraft, flight crew, and some support personnel (Hobson 2005).

Unfortunately, donor state reluctance to put military assets under UN direction has complicated relief efforts in the past, particularly since national contributions to humanitarian operations are often not known to the UN in the initial stages of the disaster response, making it difficult for UN officials to identify available resources during this critical time. Moreover, protracted negotiations between nations over the deployment of military and air relief operations, such as landing authorization and customs clearance, have also delayed the transit of goods and equipment for emergency assistance. As a result, relief operations can suffer from logistical bottlenecks, duplication of assistance efforts in some locations, and supply shortages in other places. Still, one must keep in mind the need for speed in these situations, so it is often useful for donor countries to provide military resources quickly on their own initiative, rather than wait for a central coordinating group to mobilize, assess, and request specific assistance.

In an effort to bridge this gap, the UN Joint Inspection Unit has recommended that the UN review existing rules and guiding principles on international humanitarian assistance in order to help formulate an international framework for disaster response. In theory, establishing a set of regulatory norms and legal instruments on disaster management that disaster-affected countries and assisting governments and relief agencies would agree to apply on the ground would certainly enhance the efficiency of relief operations. However, accomplishing this could take many years, given the number of potential players involved, if it is even possible. In the short term, assisting a core group of member states in establishing standby arrangements among their national civil and military stakeholders in order to improve bilateral and multilateral disaster assistance and coordination mechanisms is a more manageable undertaking. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has already begun its own disaster relief standby arrangement process, based on an ASEAN agreement signed in July 2005. Harmonizing policies and procedures among close allies and regional groupings would improve how these partners cooperate as members of a UN or multilateral coalition, as well as pave the way for later achieving an international regulatory framework on disaster response and recovery.

The United States and Japan already have in place the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which governs the reciprocal provision of logistics support and supplies between the SDF and U.S. armed forces for bilateral exercises and training, humanitarian international relief operations, UN peacekeeping operations, and operations in response to an armed attack against Japan. This is a good start, but it does not yet take into account the nonmilitary side of the equation. Improving the ability of the United States and Japan to pool their civilian and military resources in response to domestic or international large-scale disasters will not only strengthen linkages between the two countries, but also improve how the two coordinate their efforts with the United Nations.

Establishing standby arrangements between the UN and individual member states is yet another way to enhance UN access to MCDA for humanitarian operations. In fact, the UN already has such an arrangement in place for peacekeeping operations: the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS). As part of UNSAS, participating member states pledge to maintain and make available pre-specified resources (military formations, civilian and military personnel, material and equipment, or support assets) for use by the UN Department

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28 The Joint Inspection Unit is an external oversight body of the UN, mandated to conduct evaluations and investigations of the UN system.

29 The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the U.S. and Japan enables the two countries to exchange logistics support and supplies and services, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, equipment, base support, medical services, and use of airport and seaport services.
of Peacekeeping. Of course, the final decision to actually deploy these resources remains a national decision. However, when deployed, these resources are under the operational control of the United Nations. Data available as of April 2005 identified eighty-three members of UNSAS, including Australia, Canada, China, France, the Republic of Korea, India, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States.30 Japan was not among the member states listed.

If member states have made conditional commitments to the UN for peacekeeping operations, it should be possible to establish a similar arrangement for HA/DR activities, particularly in the area of infrastructure support. The same is true for the private sector, and there is some progress in this area. The package delivery company DHL, for example, signed a memorandum of understanding with OCHA in 2006 to assist with logistics. Both peacekeeping and disaster response missions require military and civilian agents to deliver daily necessities, repair damaged infrastructure, protect displaced persons, offer medical assistance, and provide security. Adapting UNSAS for disaster relief operations (perhaps a more robust version of OCHA’s Central Register of Disaster Management Capabilities) could enhance the capacity for international disaster response and promote greater coordination among participating member states.

In addition to improving the UN’s resource capacity through bilateral and multilateral standby arrangements, strengthening civil-military coordination mechanisms (such as joint training, shared communication networks, and liaison officers) may also help to improve the UN’s capability for rapid response, as well as minimize the cultural divide between civil and military partners in approaching HA/DR activities, including differences in exit strategies, command structures, and needs assessments. Indeed, matching resources to local needs is a significant challenge for first responders, particularly for military forces normally equipped for combat support missions. A U.S. military review of the relief operation in Pakistan stated, “The biggest challenge noted early on was the lack of a clear, common situational understanding of the humanitarian needs and outstanding requirements. This led to inefficient use of resources and an excess of aid resources arriving in more accessible areas while insufficient amounts reached areas that were less accessible or cut off” (Center for Excellence 2006).

Though a lack of local capacity and information awareness during the early days of a response often necessitates a “supply push” system, in which external responders assume what kind of assistance is required, the UN and other humanitarian groups believe that the most effective humanitarian operations over the long term are “demand pull” systems dictated by sector-based needs (Hobson 2005). To help negotiate the transition from push to pull and to strengthen overall cooperation in the field, the UN conducted a series of reviews on humanitarian action. The tsunami response experience revealed weaknesses in the coordination of military assets and logistics, as well as gaps in capacity and communications in sectors such as water and sanitation, shelter and camp management, and recovery.

As a result of these reviews, the UN developed a new framework for dividing up different aspects of a relief operation into clusters and assigning leadership responsibility to certain key stakeholders. These are not unlike ESFs in the United States, though they are fewer in number. By mapping the response capacities of national, regional, and international actors, the UN grouped civil and military stakeholders into these clusters dealing with either services (logistics, emergency telecommunications, and data commu-

30 There are three levels of commitment within UNSAS: Level 1 requires member states to simply identify their capabilities. Level 2 members must provide an inventory list detailing the types of contributions available for use, including the organization of units, a list of major equipment, and data on personnel. Finally, level 3 members have signed MOUs specifying all available resources, response times, and conditions for employment. China, the Republic of Korea, and the United States are level 1 member states. Australia and India are level 2 member states, and Canada, France, Russia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom are level 3 member states.
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communications), relief and assistance (emergency shelter, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene), or cross-cutting issues (early recovery, camp coordination and management, and protection).

The Pakistan earthquake presented an opportunity to introduce the cluster approach as the new UN framework for coordinating emergency response, even though it was not yet fully developed. Within twenty-four hours of the disaster, OCHA established ten clusters in Islamabad: food and nutrition, water and sanitation, health, telecommunications, emergency shelter, early recovery and reconstruction, logistics, camp management and protection, and education (ActionAid International 2006). Each of the four regional UNDAC field presences also established cluster sites, called humanitarian hubs. Initially, clusters were only intended to fill gaps between sector responsibilities, but as the emergency progressed, the number of clusters and sub-clusters grew exponentially, making it difficult for stakeholders to harmonize tasks and avoid duplication and overlap. A UN assessment of the cluster approach later acknowledged that “inter-cluster coordination was deficient as was the lack of a nexus between field hubs and Islamabad” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006, 3).

Poor coordination and weak information management, compounded by unclear terms of references, vague exit strategies for clusters, over-centralized decision making, insufficient support and training, and high turnover among UN staff, hindered the effectiveness of the cluster approach in Pakistan. Limited engagement with local NGOs and civil society further frustrated relief and recovery efforts, prompting many to criticize the cluster approach as being too “UN centric” and an “exclusive club” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006, 9).

Yet despite these shortcomings, the UN concluded that the “cluster approach did successfully provide a single and recognizable framework for coordination, collaboration, decision-making, and practical solutions in a chaotic operational environment” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006, 9).

UN engagement with the Pakistani military and national government was strong, which helped promote full government ownership of the clusters. OCHA co-chaired cluster meetings with government representatives and worked closely with the army to ensure that sufficient humanitarian assistance reached even the most remote areas of Pakistan. In the end, the cluster system was considered useful in that “it developed to become an important organizing mechanism,” according to one U.S. military assessment (Center for Excellence 2006). One workshop participant remarked, “The key to making the clusters work was leadership. Some were run mainly from the perspective of the lead agency or were poorly managed, while others were able to efficiently coordinate the contributions of all the members.”

In addition to identifying capacity gaps, the cluster approach is a tool for UN agencies, foreign militaries, local and international NGOs, and private-sector donors to operate as partners. “We need to create familiarity in the field. The military needs to understand how the UN and NGO communities operate. They are the military’s exit strategy,” recommended one workshop participant. “The cluster system provides a logistical structure for the military to plug into,” added another participant. Integrating response strategies in this way allows stakeholders to focus on areas where they have a comparative advantage (security, logistics, and transport for militaries and recovery and rehabilitation for aid workers), thus ensuring the military and civilian components of HA/DR activities remain distinct. The clusters also create a smaller pool of responsible people to work with, which makes it easier for the different organizations to develop personal and institutional relationships.

Coordinated planning between militaries and civil agents for disaster response will also help standardize data management and reporting techniques among stakeholders in order to better identify logistical needs during a disaster and also address common communication challenges, such as military
classification policies and incompatible communication systems (such as mobile phones and e-mail accounts versus fax communications). The further development of existing programs, such as UNDAC and INSARAG training, CMCoord courses, and other bilateral and multinational exercises and courses, should be leveraged to help improve civil-military coordination for future operations. One workshop participant weary of seeing individual countries take steps to upgrade their military and national response plans for HA/DR activities without coordinating with the UN advised, “At the end of the day, we need to integrate our planning efforts and adopt a holistic approach to humanitarian action. Let us not politicize civil-military coordination. By doing so, we destroy it.”

**The United States**

The United States has consistently contributed to international disaster relief operations throughout the years, which it coordinates through the State Department, spearheaded by the relevant regional bureau and USAID/OFDA. The U.S. embassy in the affected nation reaches out immediately to the State Department’s Operations Center in Washington, and for large-scale events it will probably also contact the relevant U.S. military regional command, such as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu. The State Department is the government’s lead agency for dealing with nonmilitary incidents abroad, and its office for crisis management support can quickly set up a department-wide JTF led by the regional bureau.  

The deployment of military assets during such incidents, however, is ordered by the secretary of defense, and for large events an intense period of consultation ensues among the embassy, State, the regional command, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the extent of the operation and the optimal military deployment, which is then formalized in a written State Department request submitted to the Pentagon. Timely and effective U.S.-Japan communication during this brief stage in the process should help to make deployments more compatible and reduce redundancy. To the extent that U.S. assets are pulled from bases in Japan, it will also help to ensure that defense capabilities are maintained.

The State Department’s JTF is usually staffed by people from the operations center and the bureaus of Political-Military Affairs, Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and Public Affairs, among other relevant offices, such as OFDA. The Defense Department and USAID might establish similar, parallel JTFs, and they can all be linked together with the White House and other agencies at the State Department’s crisis management center, a small room in the Harry S. Truman Building packed with computers, phones, and faxes. In the tsunami case, the crisis management center operated twenty-four hours a day for seventeen days, with over 280 people rotating through in shifts. The NSC also chaired a daily video conference with the various JTF heads that focused on operational issues, led by the NSC’s director for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the International Economic Affairs section.  

Unlike the debate on civil-military coordination and the role of the military in response to domestic incidents, U.S. policy makers are generally more willing to mobilize military assets for overseas relief missions, as well as to give DoD relatively wide latitude to work directly with its military counterpart in the affected nation, especially when that nation lies within a region of strategic interest, as was the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the 2006 Philippines mud-
slide. With regard to those disasters, the rapid and massive military response was as much an opportunity to restore the U.S. public image, win hearts and minds, and further U.S. foreign policy goals as it was a humanitarian call to deliver assistance and save lives. Indeed, General John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), reportedly acknowledged that the decision to launch a massive military relief effort in Pakistan was spurred by national security reasons in addition to humanitarian concerns. According to one participant at the December 2006 workshop, “What we’re doing here is just as important as what we’re doing in Iraq and Afghanistan in the global war on terror.”

That said, the humanitarian imperative is still paramount in these cases. “You don’t go into something like this thinking about what impact it will have on our image,” remarked Rear Admiral LeFever, USN, former commander of joint task force Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (DAC). “You go into it focusing on doing the right thing to help people” (Braithwaite 2007). The U.S. military has rapid reaction and follow-on capabilities, such as emergency medical capabilities and sealift for heavy-volume equipment, and can provide a range of technical support, mobility, and lift capacity to improve the delivery of assistance to the affected nation. Moreover, many U.S. military assets are forward deployed and able to respond to a crisis within forty-eight hours. During the response to the Pakistan earthquake, for example, U.S. military assets, most notably its fleet of high altitude, heavy lift CH-47 Chinooks (often referred to as “angels of mercy” by the local population) were indispensable to local responders to be able to deliver assistance, provide shelter, conduct medical evacuations, or distribute relief supplies to remote villages (workshop 2006).

Whatever the motivation behind deploying military resources to respond to large-scale disasters overseas, the challenges associated with these missions are constant. Chief among these is training personnel to understand and interact efficiently with all of the complex moving parts that make up such an operation (both domestically and internationally). As noted earlier OFDA is a key U.S. government responder to international disasters and crises. OFDA works in close cooperation with other parts of USAID, such as the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, bilateral and multilateral donors, OCHA, and other U.S. government agencies that provide humanitarian assistance, including the departments of agriculture, health and human services, and defense. In catastrophic emergencies, OFDA deploys a disaster assistance response team (DART) to an affected area to conduct rapid assessments of the disaster situation, analyze the existing capacity of the host nation and other relief agencies, and coordinate U.S. government relief efforts with the affected country, other private donors and international organizations, and, when present, U.S. and foreign militaries.

During the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami response, OFDA dispatched over fifty-five DART members and one hundred field-based USAID staff to India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Through fifteen airlifts of emergency relief commodities, OFDA delivered hygiene kits to meet the emergency needs of more than 80,000 people, water containers for over 143,000 people, and emergency medical kits from the World Health Organization with sufficient supplies for 10,000 people for three months (USAID OFDA, 16). In addition, OFDA partners, which included over fifty NGOs and UN agencies, provided employment to over 70,000 people through cash-for-work activities, such as waste management, debris removal, and shelter construction.33 In total, OFDA funding to local and international NGOs and UN agencies providing relief to tsunami-affected countries reached $84 million (USAID OFDA, 17).

Over fifteen thousand U.S. soldiers and sailors also worked alongside OFDA during the tsunami

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response. The U.S. military deployed twenty-six ships, eighty-two planes, and fifty-one helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5 million tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and other relief agencies to move relief items to inaccessible areas (USAID OFDA, 17). The U.S. Navy hospital ship USNS Mercy also arrived off the coast of Banda Aceh and personnel onboard performed over twenty thousand medical procedures. Moreover, the U.S. military facilitated a six-day, interagency, multi-sector assessment of the disaster situation to provide the humanitarian community with a baseline from which to measure the impact of the relief and recovery programming.

In an effort to formalize a working relationship with U.S. and foreign militaries during disaster relief operations, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in 2005 as the focal point for USAID interaction with military planners during disaster response activities and stability operations. To date, OMA has facilitated the establishment of a joint USAID and DoD emergency supply warehouse in Bulgaria, provided pre-deployment briefings to U.S. military units en route to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, and served as a liaison between the humanitarian community and DoD during disaster response efforts in Pakistan. USAID also updated its Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response in 2005, which included reference material for OFDA staff working with U.S., coalition, and multinational military forces, including NATO. While OMA tends to focus on policy issues related to U.S. CMCoord, another group within OFDA concentrates on the operational aspects. This group, the Operational Liaison Unit (OLU), conducts joint humanitarian operations training courses in cooperation with the U.S. military regional commands, and it dispatches CMCoord officers to onsite locations to assist with coordination.

Though not specifically charged with responding to global disasters, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is another State Department office with its hand in CMCoord policy issues. The Bush administration established this office in 2004 to institutionalize the civilian capacity of the U.S. government to prepare for and respond to post-conflict crises and to help provide military personnel with a viable exit strategy. The S/CRS interagency team includes staff from USAID, DoD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the departments of Justice and Treasury. S/CRS also participates in military training exercises and plans to deploy humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction teams (HSRTs) to regional combatant commands during operations to facilitate the integration of civilian planning into military campaigns.

For its part, the U.S. military has established new doctrine that incorporates S/CRS, USAID, other U.S. government departments, international organizations, foreign governments, and nonprofit and private-sector organizations into planning efforts for stability operations. DoD Directive 3000.05, released in November 2005, redesigned how the military will respond to future post-conflict situations (including HA/DR activities), potentially committing U.S. troops to provide security, meet humanitarian needs, develop democratic institutions, and revive the private sector. So anomalous was this directive with traditional DoD policy, since it assigned some responsibilities to the U.S. military normally carried out by the Department of State and other civilian agencies, that it prompted the immediate release of a national security presidential directive by the White House (NSPD-44) to clarify State’s overall primacy. NSPD-44 was titled “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” and it identified the Department of State as the main body “to coordinate and lead integrated United States government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities” (White House 2005).

Harmonizing policy in Washington, D.C., however, does not guarantee effective civil-military
coordination in the field, particularly as the role (and budget) of the military expands in the area of foreign assistance. To ensure that the lines of authority between State and Defense do not become blurred, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee visited selected embassies around the world to assess the two departments’ coordinating efforts on the ground. In several cases, the committee found that military-conducted humanitarian and civic projects, such as the delivery of medical care and the construction of transportation systems, sanitation facilities, and schools, were carried out with limited embassy oversight or approval. “One ambassador lamented that his effectiveness in representing the U.S. to foreign officials was beginning to wane as more resources were being directed to military projects in the country” (U.S. Senate 2006, 12).

In an effort to maximize coordination and efficiency, the committee recommended that all ambassadors pursue memoranda of understanding (MOUs), as some already have, regarding the military presence to clarify lines of authority. The committee also recommended that ambassadors have the authority to approve all military-related programs implemented in the country where they serve, and that the secretary of state administer all foreign assistance funding, including that authorized through defense budgets.

This nexus of civilian government and military coordination across the full spectrum from development assistance planning to disaster relief missions will reach a new level of institutionalization as the U.S. government stands up a new unified combatant command in Africa (AFRICOM) in 2008. With agreement from both State and Defense, AFRICOM will have more civilians in key positions than other commands (one Joint Staff general called it “combatant command plus”), and it will focus as much on nonmilitary means to complete missions, such as humanitarian aid and local training activities, as it will on the military tools at its disposal (Aerospace Daily & Defense Report 2007). Already at U.S. bases in Africa, as one U.S. military officer describes it, “Our mission is 95 percent at least civil affairs,” and military forces have spent much of their time drilling wells, building hospitals, or responding to local tragedies such as a collapsed building in Kenya or a capsized ferry in Djibouti (Kristof 2007).

Thus, despite the political wrangling over the respective roles and responsibilities of the departments of State and Defense, DoD has forged ahead with its planning efforts to prepare for the full spectrum of operations, including humanitarian assistance, disaster response, peace operations, stabilization and reconstruction, and war. For example, DoD has adjusted its procurement and training strategies to enhance its readiness for crisis response, including initiatives to improve CMCoord for humanitarian assistance and operations with NGOs and international organizations. Military planners are also developing a new vocabulary for HA/DR versus combat operations. “There is a large focus to ensure that this directive is implemented,” remarked one workshop participant. Yet, DoD efforts to prepare for, and at times lead, disaster relief operations, have raised fears over the militarization of humanitarian aid. “The traditional distinction between the military and nonmilitary domains of humanitarian aid is becoming obscure, and this is leading to a diminishing humanitarian space,” commented one workshop participant. “The military should focus on areas where it has a comparative advantage, such as security, logistics, transport, and communications, rather than attempt to control the humanitarian response,” added another.

Resistance to military involvement in disaster relief activities, however, is not about whether or not the military should participate in HA/DR operations, but how best to integrate military and civilian assets to improve coordination. One NGO worker involved in the disaster response to the Pakistan earthquake criticized U.S. forces for taking on projects without consulting local relief workers. “We were grateful that the U.S. military delivered need-
ed construction material, but we did not need them to also rebuild damaged infrastructure. By doing so, they were ignoring our efforts to engage the local populace in the recovery effort, build local capacity, and provide cash-for-work opportunities.” Another workshop participant noted that military firewalls and classification policies also restricted the timely exchange of information, including weather forecasts.

Narrowing the cultural divide between civilian and military responders necessitates an increased understanding of the roles and resources of each actor involved in disaster relief, as well as their response to and assessment of a disaster situation. Educational tools, expert meetings, and joint training and exercises help create familiarity in the field and identify critical gaps in disaster response capabilities. To this end, the U.S. military has conducted numerous exercises to improve crisis response coordination and interaction with nonmilitary actors, and USAID is looking to develop a joint training plan with DoD. The NGO community also has attempted to increase collaboration with the military, while preserving their impartiality.

InterAction, a coalition of over 160 U.S.-based international development and humanitarian NGOs, produced a DVD, Civil-Military Relations: Working with NGOs, to raise awareness of the working practices of NGOs. The Center for Excellence and U.S. PACOM subsequently produced a complementary DVD, Civil-Military Relations: Working with the Military. As these two DVDs demonstrate, striking the right balance between military and civilian relief workers during a disaster depends on greater interaction and planning before a disaster hits. “We need to think collectively about the core competencies of each actor to determine how best to coordinate our relief efforts and where to invest our resources,” urged one workshop participant.

Japan

In Japan, MOFA does not have the equivalent of the State Department’s crisis management center to coordinate a government operation, but it will often establish a JTF similar to that at the State Department when word of a disaster comes in from Japan’s embassies.34 In the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami, MOFA’s task force was led by the relevant regional bureau, the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, but a key role was played by the Economic Cooperation Bureau, which managed Japan’s overseas development and humanitarian assistance programs at that time. Another important player is Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which among other responsibilities serves as the secretariat for Japanese disaster relief teams frequently dispatched to assist overseas.

Recent reforms at MOFA have altered slightly the way that it handles overseas development (and disaster) assistance (ODA), and more adjustments are planned for 2008. In 2006, MOFA renamed the Economic Cooperation Bureau to be the International Cooperation Bureau and folded in certain components of MOFA’s Global Issues Department. The Overseas Disaster Assistance Division (similar to OFDA in the United States) is situated within the International Cooperation Bureau. That same year the Japanese government also established the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council to reinforce the ODA strategy formulation function of the Cabinet. The council is chaired by the prime minister and consists of the chief cabinet secretary, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of finance, and the minister of economy, trade, and industry. The final step in this reform process will be the establishment of a new JICA in 2008 that will merge a substantial portion of grant aid from MOFA and the ODA loan function now handled by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

Despite the recent and pending reforms, Japan’s response to the tsunami is still a useful example

34 MOFA did establish a Crisis Management Coordination Division in 2005 (within the Management and Coordination Division), which is meant to strengthen the foreign minister’s oversight of MOFA’s response. This followed the assignment of a deputy assistant vice-minister for crisis management within the Minister’s Secretariat in 2004.
of the basic way in which the government contributes to international disaster relief operations, and together with the Pakistan earthquake experience and new challenges such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, Japan has learned some useful lessons that are informing future adjustments. In the wake of the tsunami, MOFA was the first in Japan to set up an emergency liaison office, on December 26, 2004. A day later the Cabinet Secretariat established a prime minister's liaison office, which was quickly upgraded to an emergency response headquarters. Within a few days, however, at an interagency meeting on January 4, it was decided that the foreign affairs section of the Cabinet Secretariat, rather than the Office for National Security and Crisis Management (which blends the MOD, MOFA, and the National Police Agency), would manage policy coordination for the relief operations. The Cabinet Secretariat helped to collect information from different ministries and agencies for the prime minister's office, but MOFA had its own channel to the prime minister, so the Secretariat's role was supplemental to MOFA.

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA, before it became MOD in 2007) and the SDF quickly understood the scope of the U.S. military response to the tsunami disaster as it was being ramped up in Honolulu, since a Japanese liaison officer is permanently stationed at PACOM. The United States was seeking Japanese participation in the operation, and the JDA was keen to join. The JDA could immediately order three Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships, which were in the region already, to assist with rescue operations, but it needed a request from the affected country to enable deployment within sovereign borders, and that required help from MOFA. In addition, the SDF could not be dispatched without a request to the JDA chief by the foreign minister, as per Japan's JDR Law.

MOFA, meanwhile, was initially focused on the health and safety of Japanese nationals affected by the tsunami, as opposed to the broader relief effort, so there was a brief period of disconnect before the Ground SDF on-call unit and other assets were mobilized. It did not help matters that the MOFA task force did not include personnel from the North American Bureau or the National Security Division in the Foreign Policy Bureau, which are the two offices with the most frequent interaction with the JDA and maintain the strongest interpersonal contacts there. It did not take long, however, for the JDA to dispatch some of its own people into MOFA's Economic Cooperation Bureau for the duration of the operation. And overall, MOFA moved relatively quickly to engage the JDA. On December 28, Japan's foreign minister formally requested the SDF's assistance (via the JDA) for the relief effort, even if actual deployment took some additional time. As SDF dispatches in the region become more common, the MOFA-MOD relationship should continue to strengthen.

It is worthwhile noting, however, that MOFA's Overseas Disaster Assistance Division does not have an office similar to the Office of Military Affairs or the Operational Liaison Unit at OFDA in the United States. This is something that MOFA might want to consider establishing as the SDF increases its involvement in overseas disaster relief and peacekeeping missions. OMA plays an important role in fostering dialogue between civilian and military actors involved in U.S. relief missions, and it makes important contributions to the development of USAID's Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, among other policies. Moreover, OLU has the critical responsibility of bridging the gap between policy made in Washington and how it is carried out in the field (from "the suits to the boots," as one OFDA coordinator described it). To some extent, this is being managed now in Japan by the MOD's Joint Staff Office in collaboration with the divisions for policy and training. But while this is improving MOD's and the SDF's interaction with international players such as OCHA and OFDA, it does not necessarily strengthen the MOFA-MOD connection. Seconding MOD personnel into a MOFA task force during an
international crisis is a useful measure, but more regular interaction between the two organizations will be useful.

To provide a sense of scale regarding some of the Japanese government’s recent relief contributions, Japan responded to the tsunami by pledging $540 million, donating twenty thousand tons of rice, sending twelve medical and relief teams, and deploying its largest-ever disaster relief contingent. More than sixteen hundred SDF personnel were sent to the affected region, including three senior military officers (from the Joint Staff Office) tasked with helping to organize the aid effort on the ground. A C-130 cargo plane was also sent to Indonesia with forty SDF personnel to transport relief supplies. To coordinate with the U.S. military and other governments in the operation, Japan sent about twenty individuals to the regional operating headquarters at Utapao, Thailand. In response to the Pakistan earthquake, Japan provided about $20 million in emergency grant assistance and dispatched four SDF helicopters, two C-130 cargo planes, and over one hundred SDF personnel to help with relief deliveries, among other assistance. The government also followed up with a $100 million loan for recovery and rehabilitation efforts.

An important part of Japan’s contributions to overseas disasters are its disaster relief teams, trained and managed by JICA and dispatched by MOFA. These are pre-registered, volunteer civilian teams of medical and search-and-rescue professionals who are prepared to be dispatched anywhere in the world within forty-eight hours. JICA’s disaster relief program divides the JDR teams into three types: 1) rescue teams, to search for missing people, rescue victims, and provide first aid; 2) medical teams; and 3) expert teams, often including engineers or other specialists whose expertise corresponds to the type of disaster who can assist with stopgap measures to help protect the population and speed recovery.

Within two days after the Pakistan earthquake, for example, MOFA dispatched a JDR rescue team consisting of forty-nine members (one from MOFA, fifteen from NPA, thirteen from FDMA, thirteen from the Coast Guard, three from JICA, two doctors, and two nurses). Eight days later that team returned, but it was followed by two medical teams of twenty-one members each (one from MOFA, five from JICA, four doctors, seven nurses, three paramedics, and one pharmacist). The Japanese Red Cross also sent its own medical relief team to Pakistan. Over seven hundred medical volunteers are now registered with the JDR medical teams, along with and close to two thousand search and rescue specialists. By including MOFA and JICA personnel in the JDR teams, those organizations get a hands-on perspective of local conditions which can be fed back to their headquarters in Tokyo as they plan for medium- and long-term recovery assistance.

The United States has similar teams in the area of search and rescue, though these are not assembled through individual volunteers and are instead existing emergency response units that have developed special partnerships with USAID and DHS. These units are also available to respond to domestic crises. Two examples are Virginia Task Force 1 from Fairfax County Fire and Rescue and a team from Los Angeles County Fire Department, which have deployed to disaster sites overseas as well as to assist after hurricane Katrina and the World Trade Center terrorist attacks in New York in 2001.

SDF involvement in international disaster relief operations will no doubt continue and will likely grow over time, not only because politicians and MOD want to see this happen, but also because the public increasingly approves of this trend. Cabinet office polls from 1991, 1998, and 2006 tested public support for the SDF’s activities in international disaster relief, demonstrating a growth in support from about 54 percent in 1991 to over 90 percent in 2006. Opposition dropped from just over 30 percent to less than 6 percent (Yoshizaki 2006). As a result, MOD and the SDF have been rigorously studying CMCoord and CIMIC issues in the past few years. The two most recent (annu-
al) Tokyo Defense Forum conferences, for example, were focused exclusively on CMCoord and disaster relief operations. The same was true for the Asia Pacific Security Seminar hosted in 2005 by Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, as well as recent initiatives by Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) as part of its so-called MCAP program (Multinational Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region).

Although there are many similarities between Japan and the United States with regard to motivations for expanding military involvement in disaster relief and peace-building operations, there are also some important differences. Both countries are responding to rising international expectations that wealthy nations will make appropriate military assets available when needed, and they both see opportunities to promote national interests by doing so. Japan tends to welcome these missions as an opportunity to enhance operational readiness, however, while the U.S. military is stretched to the limit and will only take on additional obligations when it is absolutely necessary.

For decades, for example, the U.S. Army has kept a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division on constant alert to be able to respond to a crisis anywhere in the world within one to two days. But extended combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the 82nd to begin transferring responsibility as a “division ready brigade” to the 101st airborne, which could extend its response time in certain situations (Price 2007). In contrast, Japan’s SDF is creating a new Central Readiness Force for the first time as part of the GSDF. This underscores the gap in operational tempo between the two countries’ forces. An interesting point from an alliance perspective is that this new rapid reaction force, which is being formally stood up in 2007, will eventually be co-located with U.S. military personnel at Camp Zama in Japan, after new facilities are constructed a few years from now, offering unique coordination opportunities.

Despite general political and MOD enthusiasm for SDF contributions abroad, as well as broad public approval, the trend is by no means without controversy, especially in the NGO community and to some extent also within MOFA. Though SDF participation in disaster relief operations is less controversial than peacekeeping or peace-building missions, there is still concern that the inclusion of the SDF can diminish humanitarian space for aid workers and that it is rarely cost effective, thereby drawing precious government resources away from struggling Japanese NGOs. Many of these NGOs recognize that the SDF can provide necessary capabilities and assets during certain emergencies, but even those NGOs considered to be “SDF friendly” would prefer that these contributions be kept to a minimum and restricted to infrastructure support or, in rare cases, indirect assistance.

The primary means by which Japanese NGOs participate in overseas disaster relief missions is through Japan Platform and its NGO unit, consisting of about twenty-four participating NGOs such as Peace Winds Japan, Japan Mine Action Service, the Japanese Red Cross Society, JEN, and Shanti Volunteer Association. Japan Platform began operations in 2001, largely at the initiative of MOFA, and it is a system to provide emergency relief in natural disasters and refugee situations more quickly and efficiently than had previously been possible. It serves as a platform for NGOs to mobilize and to carry out immediate relief activities, and it provides a way for these NGOs to pool resources for initial assessments at a disaster site and for operational and policy-oriented interaction with UN agencies and international organizations. Its activities are funded primarily through support from the government and to a smaller extent by contributions from corporations and individuals.

35 The annual Tokyo Defense Forum involves military and defense officials from roughly two dozen countries (e.g., Australia, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, Korea, Russia, the United States), as well as representatives from UN OCHA, the European Union, and the ASEAN Secretariat. A summary of the 11th Tokyo Defense Forum (October 2006) can be found at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index.htm.
Japan Platform is the vanguard of Japan’s disaster relief NGOs, with about fifteen members directly providing roughly $6 million in assistance following the Indian Ocean tsunami and at least eight members distributing $5 million worth of relief in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake. Japan Platform members have also provided assistance in Iran, Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Their ability to organize collectively in close association with MOFA has been critical to improving their overall capabilities, in particular their capacity to respond quickly. This collective approach, however, also means that a consensus is hard to achieve among its members with regard to CMCoord and the SDF. As noted earlier, a number of Japanese NGOs are ideologically opposed to SDF involvement in missions overseas, whatever their configuration, which limits the degree of direct dialogue between Japan Platform and the SDF. This is problematic when one considers the limited financial and logistical strength that most Japanese NGOs possess, since some form of partnership with the SDF in terms of logistics and communications could be particularly helpful to Japanese civilian actors. The leadership at Japan Platform is trying to bridge this gap by working with MOFA, MOD, and the SDF to identify certain specific disaster relief scenarios that would be least controversial and that could benefit from closer coordination and cooperation.
In response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, thirty-five countries contributed military assets and deployed a total of more than thirty thousand personnel to disaster-affected areas (workshop 2006). In 2005, about nineteen countries sent military equipment and soldiers into Pakistan following the South Asia earthquake (Center for Excellence 2006). In both cases the UN and its affiliated agencies and organizations, along with countless NGOs, international organizations, private-sector companies, and government agencies provided valuable support and relief. The huge scale and impromptu nature of these types of operations mean that no amount of centralized planning or organizational bureaucracy will be able to manage an initial response as a single coherent and cohesive mission. Still, incremental improvements can be made each year if the most influential contributors (such as the United States, Japan, the UN, and a few others) can agree on a set of CMCoord and related priorities for joint action.

As noted throughout this report, civilian and military planners worldwide are exploring various means to improve crisis response coordination, such as introducing revised national response plans and drafting new military protocols to address HA/DR activities. Despite sincere efforts to enhance disaster preparedness planning and response, there is still a long way to go, and relatively few attempts have been made to connect all actors involved in HA/DR activities in concrete policy discussions. In fact, in some cases even national government agencies and militaries are reevaluating policies for crisis response without sufficiently coordinating their efforts with one another in the same country, let alone with other nations, the UN, NGOs, and the private sector.

Addressing disaster management issues without engaging all parties involved in relief operations, however, only leads to ineffective reform and poorly coordinated action on the ground. The inadequate response to hurricane Katrina illustrates this point. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government introduced a new emergency response system that did not sufficiently involve DoD and representatives from the NGO and private-sector communities in the planning process. As a result, the response to the hurricane was beset with communication problems, inaccurate damage assessments, and poor coordination among local, federal, and military actors. “If disaster preparedness planning and training is not inclusive, we will continue to face coordination challenges on the ground regardless of the policy changes in place,” warned one workshop participant.

Effective interagency and civil-military coordination is crucial for gaining situational awareness, assessing needs, matching supply and demand, sharing assets and capabilities, and providing timely relief during a crisis. Joint planning and exercises between civilian and military actors in either a domestic, bilateral, or multilateral framework can greatly enhance the capacity for domestic and international humanitarian and disaster response. As mentioned earlier, the relative success of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was in many ways a result of the joint training done earlier at the annual, multilateral Cobra Gold
exercise in Thailand. Another valuable multilateral initiative is the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), which works to improve crisis response and force interoperability in the Asia-Pacific region through a series of workshops and seminars among the thirty-three member states and several UN, international, and nongovernmental agencies, such as the World Health Organization, Doctors Without Borders, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and OCHA. An MPAT workshop in summer 2007, for example, will focus on responding to a pandemic flu outbreak in the region, and it will involve a wide range of UN agencies and NGOs.

Though multinational exercises allow participants to develop standard operating procedures and enhance nation-to-nation cooperation, they are difficult to coordinate, time-consuming, costly, and less focused as the number of partners increases. That is, in order to meet all participants' training priorities and political objectives (or avoid political sensitivities), the exercises can get watered down and fail to address in sufficient detail certain key issues common to disaster relief operations, such as public safety and security, information exchange, and medical assistance. Outside of OCHA, CMCoord does not really have an institutional champion to promote its training priorities, and since OCHA is not normally a lead player in these types of exercises, CMCoord issues are often inadequately addressed.

As a result, CMCoord mechanisms are tested rarely, especially as the number of nonmilitary participants present at these exercises remains low. “We don’t have the budget or staff to attend all training programs,” explained one NGO representative at the workshop. Moreover, concerns over the potential militarization of humanitarian aid also have kept some relief agencies away from exercises or seminars that involve military personnel. “In Japan, NGOs hesitate to work or even train alongside the military, fearing it will impact their ability to operate with impartiality and independence,” added another workshop participant, who went on to explain how difficult it was to receive authorization to even attend the IFPA workshop.

Given these challenges, periodic exercises, workshops, and expert meetings within a bilateral framework may enable more candid, constructive dialogue between civil and military planners, as long as it reinforces the efforts of OCHA and regional organizations. Close allies are better able to tackle sensitive issues, such as mutual support and assistance agreements, security and customs clearances, aircraft use and landing authorizations, and shared information and communication networks. During hurricane Mitch, for example, Japan’s Air SDF (ASDF) operated a significant airlift operation to Honduras involving six C-130 transports and over one hundred ASDF personnel out of Kelly Air Force Base near San Antonio, Texas. Moreover, with fewer countries and training priorities to compete with, civil and military planners can better tackle field coordination issues, harmonize operating procedures, and achieve greater mutual awareness and understanding. The United States and Japan can make important contributions in this regard, and alliance managers have been working to enhance the bilateral security relationship on this front.

Since 2002, the allies have held a series of working- and high-level consultations to clarify their common strategic objectives and outline steps to transform and strengthen the alliance. Pursuant to these discussions, the two countries made some important commitments regarding force posture realignment and the delineation of shared and complementary roles and missions. These commitments were outlined in October 2005 by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), also known as a “2+2” meeting since it consists of the cabinet-level leadership for defense and foreign affairs in both countries.

That SCC document, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” identified key areas for alliance improvement such as air defense, counter-proliferation, search and
rescue, humanitarian relief, reconstruction assistance, and non-combatant evacuation operations. Specifically, the document emphasized close and continuous bilateral policy coordination at every level of government, enhancing information sharing and intelligence cooperation among related ministries and agencies, developing common operational procedures, and conducting regular military exercises, including with third parties. As an example, the United States, Japan, and India recently announced plans to conduct joint naval exercises focused on the necessary safety measures to be taken in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in the Pacific. The United States, Japan, and Australia are also working together on certain military-related initiatives, including airlift cooperation applicable to disaster relief missions.

With regard to civil-military coordination, the SCC document proposed the civil-military dual-use of USFJ facilities in Japan to meet local emergency needs during disasters and other crises, as well as for commercial use. At a subsequent 2+2 meeting in May 2006, the two countries agreed to study the specific conditions for possible dual-use strategies over the course of twelve months. This is an important opportunity for two main reasons. First, dual use and co-location increase opportunities to enhance CMCoord. In just one example, during the initial stages of the hurricane Mitch operation, nearly all commercial flights to the disaster area out of Miami airport were canceled because of bad weather, but across the airfield U.S. military flights operated under fewer restrictions and were able to take off. This allowed some of the initial civilian assessment and relief teams that were waiting at the airport to reach disaster sites more quickly. Second, to the extent that dual use can deliver some added value to local communities in Japan (either through a quicker response in times of crisis or just through greater access to high-quality facilities in normal times), then USFJ realignment and alliance transformation should enjoy that much more political and public support (interview 2007a).

In an effort to help improve U.S.-Japan CMCoord, the second year of the In Times of Crisis project will focus its research and dialogue on the most promising areas for enhanced cooperation. Our findings from year 1 of the project suggest that it might be too difficult (and unnecessary) to try to bridge the gaps between the military and civilian sectors for disaster relief situations in a comprehensive way. In other words, U.S.-Japan military-to-military interactions and parallel civilian-to-civilian interactions are likely to be much more productive than trying to integrate civil-military dialogues and policies across the alliance.

Of course, these parallel civilian and military interactions need to be connected to each other in some way in order to set complementary goals and maintain communication and mutual awareness as they progress, but it not necessary to impose common CMCoord solutions on the alliance. In this sense, American CMCoord and Japanese CMCoord will be like two different doors that open with their own key, but there should be a master key that can work both doors when the need arises. Developing this link between the two, in conjunction with the UN and other partners in the region, will be an important focus of this project’s second year.

Overall, these interactions should focus most on planning, preparation, communication, and assessment issues related to disaster relief, since actual operations are more likely to be carried out separately by U.S. and Japanese forces and civilian teams. Promoting joint U.S.-Japan disaster relief operations, therefore, is not a particular goal of this project, but more efficient and productive coordination of U.S. and Japanese contributions to these operations is a central objective. This can start at the far end of the preparation/planning spectrum to include coordinated disaster reduction and management capacity building through development assistance to disaster-prone countries, as well as adjusting (or perhaps adding to) pre-positioned stockpiles of disaster relief supplies throughout the region.
Bilateral cooperation in this area can also move into more detailed planning tasks by identifying complementary specialties or a viable division of labor in certain circumstances, standardizing information flows (such as scripting requests for assistance and collaborating on advance contracting arrangements), and harmonizing damage/needs assessment procedures. The fact that there is an explicit commitment to strengthening security cooperation overall provides a useful framework for addressing disaster relief scenarios and CMCoord issues.

Periodic tabletop exercises and expert meetings on disaster relief operations can help to identify the gaps and opportunities for enhanced U.S.-Japan cooperation. Given the expected role of U.S. and Japanese military forces in disaster relief missions, military-to-military exercises and consultations are essential to identifying the capacities of each country; they also help to standardize operating procedures, planning efforts, and communication and information-sharing networks. Predominately civilian interactions should be fostered as well, and some degree of cross-fertilization must be incorporated. These bilateral activities can be expanded in certain situations to include third countries, as noted above, concentrating on more traditional partners such as Australia and South Korea, but also including new partners such as India, Russia, and possibly even China at some point. Joint training exercises may lead to some degree of specialization or division of labor between U.S. and Japanese forces and civilian actors, as well as with those from other countries.

Another step in improving the ability of the United States and Japan to effectively pool their civilian and military resources in response to humanitarian crises is to identify and catalogue what assets (civil and military personnel, material and equipment, and support assets) are available to each country for HA/DR activities, particularly in Asia. This process should help familiarize U.S. and Japanese officials with one another’s capacities to respond to a crisis, without necessarily committing either party to exchange logistics support and services. This exercise could also go beyond pinpointing available military assets, such as heavy-lift helicopters, naval vessels, and surveillance equipment, to reach into private-sector and NGO capabilities.

Understanding the roles and resources of each actor involved in disaster relief creates familiarity at the strategic and operational levels of a mission, as well as helping to identify the critical gaps in each country’s disaster response capacities. In time, this process may lead to the development of a disaster management database, similar to OCHA’s Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities. A bilateral inventory list specifying the civilian and military assets, support services, and personnel available for or, at minimum, trained for complex emergencies could enhance the capacity of the United States and of Japan to respond, either alone or together, to an emerging crisis. Exchanging information on the availability of military assets would also help U.S. and Japanese planning efforts.

But a bilateral effort in this area should be well coordinated with OCHA and other regional efforts, such as the contact points for the disaster relief database compiled by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Databases such as these are notorious for becoming quickly outdated and inaccurate. An internet search for the ARF contact list, for example, yields two different versions. The more recent (and presumably more accurate) version identifies for Japan MOFA’s National Security Policy Division as a contact point, but while this division does generally handle ARF matters, it is not directly involved in disaster relief issues. There is significant room to improve database development and management, and this could be a productive area for enhancing efficiency through bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks.

Including database information on NGO and private-sector companies might also enable gov-

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36 One list can be found at http://www.aseansec.org/17069.htm, and a similar (but slightly different) list is at http://www.asianregionalforum.org/Contacts/ARFContactPointsforDisasterRelief/tabid/137/Default.aspx.
ernment officials to share the response burden and delegate responsibilities to those more experienced or equipped to handle certain crisis situations. Indeed, many local and international NGOs were working in Pakistan long before the earthquake hit. For example, Mercy Corps, a humanitarian organization that provides relief and development assistance worldwide, has been working in Pakistan since 1985, and had over 180 staff in the country prior to the earthquake (Mercy Corps 2007). Like Mercy Corps, local and international NGOs are embedded in local society. They are familiar with local customs and are better able to determine the short- and long-term needs of the local community than the foreign militaries are, particularly with regard to gender issues, nutrition assistance, and recovery efforts. Here might be an opportunity for Japan and the United States each to work with its own NGOs to enhance their ability to tap into these local networks, and then to develop a mechanism for sharing information in an appropriate manner.

The private sector remains another relatively untapped resource despite its increasing role in recent disaster relief efforts. In addition to making substantial financial contributions, the private sector can supply operational support across several functional areas, including transport, logistics, and communications. Digital Globe, a U.S.-based earth-imaging and information company, provided satellite imagery to disaster officials and local aid workers in Indonesia following the tsunami to help determine where to build refugee camps, medical facilities, communication networks, and transportation routes (DigitalGlobe 2005a). The company offered similar assistance to officials in New Orleans following hurricane Katrina. Digital Globe’s satellite imagery showed officials the extent of the flooding and the locations of levee breaks (DigitalGlobe 2005b). Moreover, the company launched an online clearinghouse (http://www.katrina.telascience.org) of satellite images for officials, relief workers, and private citizens to access (DigitalGlobe 2005a).

The Japanese business community has also provided valuable support in times of crisis. In collaboration with Japan Platform, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, a shipping company, delivered containers loaded with such aid supplies as power generators, blankets, and rice, from Taiwan and Japan to ports near earthquake-stricken areas in Pakistan from October 2005 to June 2006 (Nippon Yusen Kaisha 2006). Several Japanese companies made financial contributions to past disaster relief efforts as well, including Toshiba and Hitachi Global. Directly managing private-sector cooperation and contributions is probably not the proper role for the U.S. or Japanese government, but they can perhaps encourage a bilateral dialogue through the respective chambers of commerce in each country by way of seminars or even working groups that include some government and UN officials.

Promoting a comprehensive civilian-to-civilian bilateral dialogue on these issues will be difficult and unwieldy, which is why sector-specific forums might prove the most productive. On this point, one workshop participant remarked, “In the United States, policy makers, military officials, and aid workers are ready to talk about CMCoord, but this is not the case in Japan. To begin with, the civil side of the civil-military equation is not coordinated. Partnerships between NGOs, the private sector, and the government do not exist. Increased interaction with U.S. NGO and private-sector representatives should help Japan establish networks similar to those in the United States, such as InterAction, the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, and Disaster Resource Network.” In fact, all three of these organizations are actively pursuing professional partnerships in Japan, although this can be time consuming and requires some financial commitment to sustain. Considering how to efficiently support these kinds of interactions is an additional task for the second year of this project.
Another means to improve government and military relations with NGOs and the private sector, as well as enhance U.S.-Japan cooperation overall, is the establishment of mutual assistance and support agreements, or MOUs, for disaster relief operations. As mentioned earlier, the current U.S.-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement enables U.S. and Japanese forces to provide mutual logistics support and exchange supplies, including food, fuel, and use of transportation and communications equipment, for reimbursement either in cash, replacement in kind, or equal value exchange. But the potential applicability of this agreement is not well understood in the broader disaster relief community, and although it can be used in disaster relief situations, it is not specifically designed to do so. “Plans need to be made and agreed upon. We need to assess ahead of time what is needed, when will it be needed, and who will provide it,” urged one workshop participant. Developing basic scripted RFAs or MOUs tailored to general disaster relief scenarios might be useful in this regard.

In addition to military-to-military MOUs, the two countries might study the benefits of signing MOUs with humanitarian and private sector organizations. UN agencies, for example, have signed MOUs with several NGO and private-sector organizations, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, OXFAM GB, and Deutsche Post World Net, the parent company of DHL, an international express and logistics company. Under the UN-DHL disaster management partnership, DHL has agreed to set up disaster response teams in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. In April 2006, the company launched its first disaster response team in Singapore. In the event of a crisis, specially trained DHL employees will help manage logistics operations in airports close to disaster-affected regions. Though DHL did not formalize its relations with the UN until late 2005, the company had already participated in several disaster relief missions. DHL provided airport freight handling and assistance to international relief teams in Sri Lanka following the tsunami and in Pakistan and Iran following major earthquakes in 2005 and 2003, respectively.

In addition to MOUs, standby arrangements for disaster management and emergency response between U.S. and Japanese civil and military partners would enhance the ability of the two countries to mobilize resources quickly. A standby arrangement would commit each party to maintain specified resources on standby, such as technical and logistics resources, field staff, and material and equipment. Joint capacity-mapping exercises could help identify the allies’ strengths and weaknesses, reveal which areas require additional investment, in terms of resources, personnel, and training, as well as determine which assets U.S. and Japanese forces should leverage from one another to avoid duplications in assistance efforts. Moreover, this process could identify how best to integrate the UN, NGOs, and private-sector companies into disaster preparedness plans and relief efforts.

For now, standby arrangements for military capabilities might be difficult to implement. On the other hand, introducing bilateral standby arrangements between U.S. and Japanese government agencies, NGOs, and private-sector companies may be more feasible. For some time now, OCHA has had in place standby arrangements with governments and humanitarian organizations for the provision of emergency staff and equipment during disasters. The UN Department of Peacekeeping has a similar arrangement in place, UNSAS. Furthermore, in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the ARF proposed establishing similar arrangements for regional disaster response and humanitarian activities. The degree of U.S. and Japanese involvement in these programs, however, has been limited, and neither is well aware of the other’s national agreements, such as they are. The two countries could consider comparing and, when appropriate, further developing bilateral standby arrangements with relief agencies and commercial aircraft carriers and shipping companies, for example, with an
eye toward establishing some element of reciprocity with each other and perhaps with other nations and organizations.

Information management is an overriding challenge for CMCoord, though this seemingly simple objective can mean slightly different things to different stakeholders. For many at OCHA, greater standardization of how information is provided by and managed among crisis response partners is the top priority for improving CMCoord going forward (interview 2006b). From their perspective, this includes information about the availability and capability of certain assets or personnel, the terms for their deployment, standardization of assessment reports and procedures, and a high degree of interoperability among the contributing organizations and governments.

For some this is a process of developing compatible systems, but others might emphasize the development of compatible people (people trained to understand how different responding organizations operate and what they can offer) (interview 2006c). Still others take this a step further and emphasize the personal relationships among responders in the field as the key factor (interview 2007b). All of these perspectives are valid, but each of them suggests a slightly different focus for CMCoord training and cooperation in a bilateral (or minilateral) context. Developing practical options to increase and strengthen U.S.-Japan peer-to-peer interactions on CMCoord issues, while maintaining connections between these groups, should help the two countries to clarify how they can best contribute to the process of CMCoord improvement.

Overall, strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance for disaster response may increase the two countries’ participation in regional and multilateral HA/DR missions, which will be a good thing for affected nations and for the alliance. Harmonizing policies and procedures among close allies would improve how they cooperate together or as members of a coalition, as well as pave the way for achieving a more efficient international framework for disaster response and recovery. Finally, opportunities for enhanced U.S.-Japan civil-military cooperation in disaster management and emergency response can serve as a catalyst for greater cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region for missions such as peacekeeping, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and maritime security. Step 1, however, is to improve U.S.-Japan CMCoord cooperation in times of crisis, and this will be our objective in year 2 of this project.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Proposed U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<td>APHP</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Partnership</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Forces (Japan)</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process (United Nations)</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Revolving Fund (United Nations)</td>
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<td>CGP</td>
<td>Center for Global Partnership, Japan Foundation</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<td>CMCoord</td>
<td>civil-military coordination</td>
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<td>CMCS</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination Section (United Nations)</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Center</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team (United States)</td>
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<td>DCO</td>
<td>Defense Coordinating Officer (United States)</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities (United States)</td>
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<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact (United States)</td>
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<td>EMT</td>
<td>emergency medical technician</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator (United Nations)</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>emergency support function</td>
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<td>FCSS</td>
<td>Field Coordination Support Section (United Nations)</td>
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<td>FDMA</td>
<td>Fire Disaster Management Agency (Japan)</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (United States)</td>
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<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Forces (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance/disaster relief</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator (United Nations)</td>
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<td>HDC</td>
<td>Headquarters for Disaster Countermeasures (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSRT</td>
<td>humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction team (United States)</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee (United Nations)</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System (United States)</td>
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<td>IFPA</td>
<td>Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>IHP</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Partnership</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSARAG</td>
<td>International Search &amp; Rescue Advisory Group</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<td>JDR Law</td>
<td>Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams</td>
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<td>JFO</td>
<td>joint field office (United States)</td>
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<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group (United States)</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan's International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>J-Net</td>
<td>Japan Disaster Relief Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRCS</td>
<td>Japanese Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSU</td>
<td>Logistics Support Unit (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAP</td>
<td>Multinational Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>military or civil defense assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAT</td>
<td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Forces (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guideline (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Police Agency (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>nonprofit organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Response Plan (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVNAD</td>
<td>Nippon Volunteer Network Active in Disaster (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVOAD</td>
<td>National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Disaster Assistance (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLU</td>
<td>Operational Liaison Unit (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSIPP</td>
<td>Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>On-site Operations Coordination Center (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFO</td>
<td>Principal Field Officer (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWJ</td>
<td>Peace Winds Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>request for assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Security Consultative Committee (United States-Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction &amp; Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>UN disaster assessment and coordination team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHRD</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Response Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>UN Joint Logistics Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>UN Stand-by Arrangement System</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>U.S. Forces in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-OSOCC</td>
<td>Virtual On-site Operations Coordination Center (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Aerospace Daily & Defense Report. 2007. African command likely to have more civilians, but not more troops. February 8.


GAO. 2006a. Hurricane Katrina: Better plans and exercises need to guide the military’s response to catastrophic natural disasters. Statement for the Record to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capa-
References

In Times of Crisis


Appendix A - Workshop Agenda and Participants

Agenda

DECEMBER 12, 2006

8:30-8:45 Welcome and Introduction
Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

The main objectives of this workshop are: 1) to identify and discuss the key (and most current) organizational, legal, and cultural parameters of civil-military coordination (CIMIC) in the United States and Japan when it comes to large-scale domestic and international disaster relief operations (for the sake of improving bilateral cooperation); and 2) to build upon other recent workshops, case studies, and lessons-learned events to prioritize areas for improvement and further joint study.

Workshop Moderator:
Mr. James L. Schoff, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Session 1: Civil-Military Coordination for Domestic Disasters
8:45-10:15

The basic U.S. concept of CIMIC for domestic catastrophic disasters is currently being rethought and revised, with potential implications for the domestic civil-military relationship in certain catastrophic situations, as well as for broader U.S. organizational approaches and capabilities applied to international events. A similar debate is underway in Japan (though with different characteristics), and so it is useful to update each other about these developments and to examine their potential implications.

Presenters:
• Mr. James M. Castle, Deputy Director of Interagency Coordination, North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States Northern Command
• Dr. Nagamatsu Shingo, Research Scientist, Disaster Reduction & Human Renovation Institution (DRI)
• Dr. Robert D. Eldridge, Associate Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Commentators:
• Dr. Atsumi Tomohide, Professor, Osaka University and Vice President, Nippon Volunteer Network Active in Disaster
• Mr. Leo Bosner, Emergency Management Program Specialist, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Former Fellow, Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program* (*Affiliation shown for identification purposes only – not officially representing the cited organizations)

Key questions for this session include:
• How is each country approaching CIMIC improvement for domestic disasters and what are the potential implications for bilateral/international cooperation? As different segments of the disaster relief community (domestic and international) address these issues, are we in danger of establishing redundant (or possibly even conflicting) methods and capabilities?
How does each country manage the offer of assistance from foreign governments, corporations, or international organizations? Can anything be done bilaterally on this front, particularly given the location of U.S. military assets in Japan or the SDF’s experience with post-earthquake search and rescue, for example?

10:15-10:30  **Morning Break**  

**Session 2: Civil-Military Coordination for Overseas Disasters – Pakistan Earthquake Case Study**

10:30-12:00  Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever will share his insights and ideas from his experience supporting the U.S. response to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake disaster. Specifically, Rear Admiral LeFever will discuss the challenges faced during the operation (e.g., communications, logistics, and combat support) and recommend solutions to improve the U.S. response to disaster relief.

**Presenter:**  
Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever, USN, Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel and Former Commander of the Combined Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) in Pakistan

**Session 3:**  
**Lunch Panel - Civil-Military Coordination for Overseas Disasters**

12:00-14:00  The most likely area for U.S.-Japan cooperation in disaster relief operations is overseas, as a leading component of an international / multilateral response team. Though some attention has been paid in recent years to what each country can do to improve multilateral and bilateral CIMIC and cooperation, awareness of these efforts (via workshops, exercises, and symposiums) is limited and priorities are not well understood. This session will examine current debates and lessons learned from U.S., Japan, and UN perspectives in order to highlight strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for cooperation going forward.

**Presenters:**  
- Ms. Seki Kaoruko, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA)  
- Mr. Tom Baltazar, Director, Office of Military Affairs, USAID  
- Dr. Yoshizaki Tomonori, Professor and Chief, 5th Research Office, Research Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan Defense Agency

**Commentators:**  
- Mr. Barry Pavel, Principal Director for Policy Planning, Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense  
- Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President, Mercy Corps  
- Ms. Yamamoto Rika, Chief, Program Unit, Peace Winds Japan

**Key questions for this session include:**

- How is each country approaching CIMIC improvement for overseas disasters and what are the potential implications for bilateral/international cooperation?

- Are there opportunities to pool resources or invest in certain capabilities outside of the military arena that can fill critical needs in the event of catastrophic disasters? In other words, should the military be the first place to turn when civilian resources are inadequate, or does this suggest the need for greater investment in nonmilitary capacity building for these types of events?

- What are some of the most important recent efforts to improve CIMIC for international disaster relief operations and how do organizations from our two countries and the UN evaluate progress and priorities on this front?
Session 4: Case Study and Issue Area Focus
14:00-15:30  Building upon the previous sessions, the goal in the afternoon is to delve deeper into specific issue areas that could benefit from joint and coordinated attention. Examples of CIMIC issue areas to discuss include damage and needs assessment, communications, information sharing and management, logistical support, training and pre-positioning of supplies, the potential role of the private sector, and legal issues such as liability or contracting.

Presenters:
• Mr. Yokoi Yutaka, Minister for Economic Affairs, Embassy of Japan
• Ms. Bailey Hand, Stability Operations Coordinator, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense
• Colonel Okimura Yoshihiko, JGSDF, Researcher, Ground Research and Development Command, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

Commentators:
• Ms. Linda Poteat, Senior Program Manager, Humanitarian Policy and Practice, InterAction
• Mr. Rabih Torbay, Vice President, International Operations, International Medical Corps

Key questions for this session include:
• By discussing some of these specific issue areas in more detail and in the context of recent case studies, what differences or similarities are noticeable with regard to how each country (and each country’s civilian and military sectors) view the challenges, opportunities, dangers and priorities for CIMIC improvement?
• Can the militaries utilize the cluster system to improve coordination with civilian agencies? Is more extensive cross-detailing or seconding of personnel a useful response to improve planning, training, and coordination? What are the operational or organizational implications of increasing “jointness” among Japan’s defense forces?
• How do these perceptions and assessments correspond to those in the broader disaster relief community and international organizations? Can the United States and Japan play a leadership role in this regard (perhaps together with a small number of other countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Singapore), and if so, how?

15:30-15:45  Afternoon Break

Session 5: Developing a Bilateral Agenda for CIMIC Collaboration
18:45-17:00  The final session is an opportunity to facilitate group discussion toward developing a bilateral agenda for CIMIC collaboration that our project research team can pursue throughout 2007.

Key discussion topics for this session include:
• Which issue areas show the most promise for greater collaboration, and what further study is required to help take advantage of these opportunities?
• Where might more dialogue be necessary for avoiding unproductive or even damaging misunderstandings?
• Is it useful to study bilateral (or possibly regional) CIMIC responses to specific scenarios beyond natural disasters (e.g., a political/economic implosion in North Korea or a similar situation in East Timor or other locations)?
Participants (In Alphabetical Order)

Mr. AKAZAWA Tomoki (Observer)
Deputy Director
Center for Global Partnership
The Japan Foundation
Dr. ATSUMI Tomohide
Professor, Osaka University
Vice President, Nippon Volunteer Network Active in Disaster
Mr. Tom BALTAZAR
Director
Office of Military Affairs, USAID
Mr. Leo BOSNER
Emergency Management Program Specialist, Federal Emergency Management Agency*
Former Fellow, Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program* (*Affiliations shown for identification purposes only – not officially representing the cited organizations)
Mr. Gerard BRADFORD, III
Director, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (COE DMHA)
Mr. James M. CASTLE
Deputy Director of Interagency Coordination, North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States Northern Command
Ms. Kathleen CONNOLLY
Associate Director
Disaster Resources Network (DRN)
Dr. Robert D. ELDRIDGE
Associate Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Director, U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Division Center for International Security Studies and Policy, Osaka University
Mr. Mark A. FLANIGAN
Mr. Paul N. FUJIMURA
Director for Asia/Pacific
Office of International Affairs
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Ms. Bailey HAND
Stability Operations Coordinator
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and Interdependent Capabilities
U.S. Department of Defense
Colonel HARADA Tomofusa
Military and Assistant Defense Attaché
Defense Section
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Deputy Director
Japan International Transport Institute
Mr. ISHII Masafume
Minister, Political Affairs
Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.
Mr. KANAZAWA Yusuke
Second Secretary, Economic Section
Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.
Dr. James LAWLER, M.D.
Director for Biodefense Policy
Medicine and Public Health
White House Homeland Security Council
Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFEVER, USN
Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), Bureau of Naval Personnel, Former Commander of the Combined Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) in Pakistan
Ms. Nancy LINDBORG
President
Mercy Corps
Rear Admiral Eric McVADON, USN (Ret)
Director, Asia-Pacific Studies
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Dr. Douglas J. MEFFERT
Professor of River and Coastal Studies
Deputy Director of the Tulane/Xavier Center for Bioenvironmental Research
Tulane University
Mr. MIWA Tsuneyoshi
Visiting Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Mr. MORITA Satoshi
Section Chief, Personnel Division
Japan Defense Agency
Dr. NAGAMATSU Shingo
Research Scientist
Disaster Reduction & Human Renovation Institution (DRI)
Ms. Ha N. NGUYEN
Policy Advisor for Asia/Pacific
Office of International Affairs
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Mr. Gary G. OBA
Political Military Officer
Office of Japanese Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Colonel OKIMURA Yoshihiko, JGSDF
Researcher, Ground Research and Development Command, Japan Ground Self Defense Force
Mr. Andrew Hak OU
The Republic of Korea Desk Officer
Office of Korean Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Ms. Carole PALMA
Interagency Division
Joint Innovation and Experimentation (J9)
U.S. Joint Forces Command

Mr. Barry PAVEL
Principal Director for Policy Planning, Office of the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Charles M. PERRY
Vice President and Director of Studies
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Ms. Linda POTEAT
Senior Program Manager
Humanitarian Policy and Practice
InterAction

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Planning Officer
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, U.S. Department of State

Mr. SATO Masaru Masaru
First Secretary, Economic Section
Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.

Mr. James L. SCHOFF
Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Ms. SEKI Kaoruko
Humanitarian Affairs Officer
United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA)

Mr. Rob THAYER
Regional Coordinator for Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
USAID

Mr. Rabih TORBAY
Vice President, International Operations
International Medical Corps

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(SAIS)
Johns Hopkins University

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Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Mr. Phil WILHELM
Humanitarian Assistance Advisor/Military
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

Ms. YAMAMOTO Rika
Chief, Programming Unit
Peace Winds Japan

Mr. YOKOI Yutaka
Minister, Economic Affairs
Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.

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Agenda and Participants | In Times of Crisis
Appendix B
Guide to CMCoord Studies and Activities

The table on the following pages lists selected upcoming and recent CMCoord meetings, workshops, and exercises focused on disaster preparedness hosted or attended by civil and military planners from the United States, Japan, and other parties in the Asia-Pacific area. Not all U.S. or Japanese events focused on civil-military affairs are represented in the table below.

In addition to the events identified below, OCHA regularly conducts CMCoord seminars and training courses focused on the planning and use of military and civil defense assets in international humanitarian relief operations as part of the United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Training and Education Program. OCHA supports additional training and simulation exercises conducted by OSOCC, INSARAG, and UNDAC. OCHA also developed an online training course (UN CMCoord IMPACT) to reinforce aspects of CMCoord from a humanitarian perspective. Moreover, OCHA frequently participates in exercises sponsored by other parties, such as NATO or the United States.

37 For a list of scheduled courses, visit the OCHA website at http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=1004#d.
38 See http://ocha.unog.ch/uncmcoord/ to download UN CMCoord IMPACT.
39 A complete list of the 2007 exercises that OCHA has been invited to and agreed to participate in is available at http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?ParentID=12561&MenuID=12570&Page=985.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date / Location</th>
<th>Meeting / Exercise</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 27-29, 2007</td>
<td>Second International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction (CUDR)</td>
<td>This conference will focus on the management of large-scale natural and man-made disasters. First held in 2007 by the U.S. and Japanese governments, and officials from the two countries will advise the current organizing board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 8-10, 2007</td>
<td>International Disaster and Emergency Response Simulation Exercise</td>
<td>An annual, international conference on disaster readiness and emergency management sponsored by the International Association of Emergency Managers, the Institute of Civil Defense and Disaster Studies, and the European Training and Simulation Association. Experts in emergency, health, search and rescue, fire, and defense from over thirty countries are expected to attend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-20, 2007</td>
<td>MPAT: Pandemic Influenza Exercise</td>
<td>The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is planning a tabletop exercise to test strategic and operational level civil-military concepts for a pandemic influenza scenario.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6-8, 2007</td>
<td>MPAT: Disaster Management Workshop (DMW)</td>
<td>The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program will conduct a disaster management workshop and exchange, co-hosted by the Indonesian government and armed forces, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, the U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces. On the agenda for both events are discussions on disaster preparedness and planning, the role of international organizations and NGOs in disaster relief, and public health disaster mitigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>US-Japan Civil-Military Disaster Assistance Seminar/Workshop</td>
<td>The third in this series by the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and other partners. To be held in Tokyo, this particular seminar will focus on transition CMCoord issues following deployment to an overseas natural disaster recovery site. It will include civilian and military actors of both countries in HA/DR relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14-June 1, 2007</td>
<td>35th Regional Training Course on Disaster Management</td>
<td>The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center is organizing a course on disaster preparedness, prevention, and mitigation. The course is for senior-level disaster managers and development workers from the Asia and Pacific region, including officials of national governments, defense forces, police, and emergency services, national and international NGOs, UN agencies, and the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8-18, 2007</td>
<td>Cobra Gold 2007</td>
<td>An annual multinational exercise co-sponsored by the United States and Thailand in joint and multinational operations. In 2007, the exercise will demonstrate joint interoperability to conduct UN-sanctioned peace-support operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 2007</td>
<td>U.S.-Japan-India Naval Exercise</td>
<td>One-day military naval exercise to improve communications, coordination, and interoperability. Among the vessels taking part in the exercise were the Mysore, an Indian guided-missile destroyer, two U.S. destroyers, and three escort ships of Japan’s Self-Defense Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17-20, 2007</td>
<td>15th Annual VOAD Conference: Partnerships in Motion</td>
<td>The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) will host a conference focused on areas of preparedness, planning, response, and recovery. Training opportunities will be provided to encourage better coordination, collaboration, and communication among all community resources, including government, private business, and volunteer and faith-based agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11-16, 2007</td>
<td>UN-CMCoord Training Course</td>
<td>OCHA regularly conducts week-long CMCoord training courses on UN-led humanitarian operations, the use of military and civil defense assets, and CMCoord challenges. See the OCHA website for future scheduled courses: <a href="http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?ParentID=12795&amp;MenuID=12804&amp;Page=1004">http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?ParentID=12795&amp;MenuID=12804&amp;Page=1004</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Date / Location</td>
<td>Meeting / Exercise</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2007 Hawaii</td>
<td>Trilateral Disaster Relief Workshop</td>
<td>The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS, Japan), and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA, United States) have co-hosted a series of trilateral workshops on disaster relief, the most recent of which was held at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 2006 Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>In Times of Crisis: Global and Local Civil-Military Disaster Relief Cooperation in the United States and Japan</td>
<td>Hosted by IFPA, this workshop brought together government and military officials from the U.S. and Japan, along with UN officials and American and Japanese NGO and private sector representatives to discuss the key organizational, legal, and cultural parameters of civil-military coordination in the U.S. and Japan and prioritize areas for improved bilateral cooperation in this area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 2006 Japan</td>
<td>US-Japan Civil-Military Disaster Assistance Seminar/Workshop</td>
<td>The second in this series by the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and other partners. Held in Tokyo, this particular seminar focused on operational CMCoord issues during an overseas natural disaster and included civilian and military actors of both countries in HA/DR relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24-25, 2006 Japan</td>
<td>The 11th Tokyo Defense Forum</td>
<td>Sponsored by the Japan Defense Agency, this forum discussed efforts to develop strategies and procedures for civil-military coordination in disaster relief operations. Representatives from the United States, Japan, the European Union, OCHA, and ASEAN were present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15-19, 2006 Monterey, CA</td>
<td>Working Effectively in Post-conflict, Reconstruction and Humanitarian Situations</td>
<td>A biannual course conducted by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and United States Institute for Peace for civil and military professionals involved in international humanitarian operations. The goal of the October course was enhancing civil-military cooperation in complex contingency operations. The workshop included representatives from humanitarian NGOs, U.S. and foreign government agencies and militaries, and NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24-27, 2006 Cambodia</td>
<td>ARDEX-06: ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise</td>
<td>An annual disaster simulation exercise in joint disaster management operations conducted by ASEAN. In 2006, the exercise tested regional response and humanitarian assistance capacities in a simulated flood disaster in Cambodia. Participants practiced search and rescue operations, including large-area evacuations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 18-20, 2006 China</td>
<td>6th ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief</td>
<td>Jointly organized and chaired by China and Indonesia, the meeting discussed disaster preparedness and disaster management ideas. Participants include representatives from the governments of Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and ASEAN. Officials from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent were also present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 14-15, 2006 Vietnam</td>
<td>The Role of Military and Civil Cooperation in the Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases such as SARS and Avian Influenza</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum members met to discuss and renew strategies for cooperation and coordination between civil and military sectors in controlling and preventing the spread of communicable diseases such as SARS and avian influenza. Participants included military officials, foreign affairs representatives, and health experts from 26 countries, including the U.S. and Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11-15, 2006 Fiji</td>
<td>Pacific Armies Management Seminar: Army Challenges in Coalition Operations</td>
<td>Co-sponsored by the Republic of Fiji and United States Pacific Command, twenty-nine countries from the Pacific region were invited to discuss tactics to improve cooperation between regional nations in conflict and disaster situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27-Sept. 2, 2006 Japan</td>
<td>MCAP06: Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific 2006</td>
<td>MCAP06, a workshop hosted by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces, focused on civil-military cooperation for large-scale international disaster relief activities. Participants included military and civilian officials from eighteen countries, including Australia, China, Korea, Russia, and the United States, and representatives from international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations such as the Center for Excellence, Japan Platform, and OCHA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 21-26, 2006 San Diego, CA</td>
<td>Strong Angel III: Integrated Disaster Response Situation</td>
<td>A week-long series of demonstrations to field-test techniques to improve information flow and cooperation across civil and military boundaries in delivering humanitarian relief. Members of the Strong Angel team include medical, military, humanitarian, and technology experts from the public and private sectors. Participants included officials from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, state and local first responders, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Northern Command, NATO, the UN, several humanitarian non-governmental organizations, and representatives from Canada, England, China, Singapore, Sweden and Turkey, among others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15-16, 2006 Hawaii</td>
<td>Mega Disasters: A Global Tipping Point in Natural Disaster Policy, Planning &amp; Development</td>
<td>The Pacific Disaster Center hosted a senior policy forum on disaster preparedness planning. A broad spectrum of public, private, and academic figures from international, regional, national, and local agencies, including officials from OCHA, ASEAN, Lockheed-Martin, and Sun Microsystems, participated in this event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1, 2006 Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>The Declining Neutral Space: USAID Working with the Military</td>
<td>Part of the USAID Summer Seminar Series, this seminar discussed the impact of increased U.S. military presence on the work of USAID and how USAID has adapted itself to deal with this reality.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date / Location</td>
<td>Meeting/ Exercise</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>July 11-12, 2006 Japan</td>
<td>US-Japan Civil-Military Disaster Assistance Seminar/Workshop</td>
<td>The Japan Institute of International Affairs (IIIA), USAID, U.S. Embassy in Japan, Tokyo Public Affairs, and the Tokyo American Center co-hosted a seminar on the role of civilian and military actors of both countries in HA/DR relief. This workshop focused on pre-deployment CMCord issues.</td>
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<td>May 15-26, 2006 Thailand</td>
<td>Cobra Gold 2006</td>
<td>An annual multinational exercise co-sponsored by the United States and Thailand in joint and multinational operations, which in 2006 included humanitarian/civic assistance exercises and computer simulation exercises on UN-led multinational peacekeeping scenarios.</td>
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<td>February 14-15, 2006 Quantico, VA</td>
<td>Emerald Express 06-1: Military Support in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief</td>
<td>The Emerald Express program is a core component of the Small Wars Center of Excellence, managed within the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. The purpose of the exercise was to review recent operational experience in HA/DR efforts. Key participating organizations included military officials, representatives from the departments of State and Homeland Security, USAID, NGOs, and academic community.</td>
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<td>November 14-22, 2005 Japan</td>
<td>Study Meeting of the Twelfth Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (APSS)</td>
<td>Held at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo, the Twelfth APSS addressed the role of the armed forces in disaster relief operations, in post-conflict reconstruction, and issues of regional cooperation. Participants reflected on the lessons learned from the tsunami and compared the roles of the armed forces in post-conflict situations versus disaster relief operations, stressing the need to improve civil-military cooperation in both types of operations, as well as develop standard operating procedures. Officials from twenty-one countries participated, including China, Japan, Korea, the U.S., Russia, Indonesia, and Canada.</td>
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<td>September 19-22, 2005 Malaysia</td>
<td>ARDEX-05: ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise</td>
<td>The first regional simulation exercise involving a number of ASEAN member countries. The exercise simulated a series of earthquakes in Malaysia, which required urban search and rescue teams and the mobilization of light to medium equipment across borders. The exercise was followed by an evaluation meeting and a workshop to review standing operation procedures, and another workshop with the UNJLC.</td>
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<td>September 27-29, 2005 China</td>
<td>Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction</td>
<td>Representatives from forty-two countries from the Asia-Pacific region, including the United States, and thirteen UN agencies and international organizations met to exchange best practices and lessons learned in disaster risk reduction and share views on how to enhance regional cooperation in the field, with a specific focus on civil-military cooperation. The conference was sponsored by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, a UN agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 18, 2005 Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Civil-military Medicine Symposium</td>
<td>Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense, the symposium focused on civil-military health activities focusing on international humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and stability operations. Participants included officials from the military services, joint staff, combatant commands, the state department, the department of health and human services, OFDA, the World Health Organization, International Committee of the Red Cross, and other nongovernmental organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2-13, 2005 Thailand</td>
<td>Cobra Gold 2005</td>
<td>An annual multinational exercise co-sponsored by the United States and Thailand in joint and multinational operations, which in 2005 focused on the lessons learned from disaster-relief operations following the Indian Ocean tsunami. The exercises included a disaster-relief workshop, a computer-assisted staff exercise, and field training. More than twenty SDF personnel participated in the exercise since Japan joined Cobra Gold as an observer in 2001.</td>
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<td>June 28-29, 2005 Japan</td>
<td>10th Tokyo Defense Forum</td>
<td>Representatives from OCHA, ASEAN, twenty-two countries, including the United States, met to discuss the roles of armed forces in disaster relief and the future challenges and the potential for enhanced regional cooperation concerning disaster relief operations. The forum was sponsored by the Japan Defense Agency.</td>
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<td>January 18-20, 2005 Japan</td>
<td>First International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction</td>
<td>Over 150 professionals from around the world involved in disaster management and research met to address disaster vulnerabilities and methods to reduce risks from natural hazards. The event was sponsored by the U.S. and Japanese governments, the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, the U.S. National Science Foundation, and the Japan Institute of Social Safety Science.</td>
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<td>2005 Japan</td>
<td>MCAP05: Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific 2005</td>
<td>MCAP05 addressed large-scale international disaster relief activities, focusing on the lessons learned from the tsunami. Workshop participants agreed that measures should be taken to improve rapid deployment, local coordination mechanisms, and initial assessments to ensure effective disaster response. Military and civil offices from over sixteen countries and representatives from international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations participated in the program.</td>
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