This paper is a follow-on to a one-day bilateral workshop on April 29, 2011, held in conjunction with the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in Washington, D.C. In the papers, authors aim to assess each government’s whole-of-government, or interagency, coordination of peacebuilding policies and to identify priorities, assets, and expertise as applied to Afghanistan and Sudan. The goal of the project is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of both the United States and Japan’s respective initiatives with an eye toward how the two allies can best cooperate and work synergistically in a whole-of-alliance approach to peacebuilding operations in vulnerable or failing states.

Civil war between the north and south of Sudan continued for over twenty years, until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. Since the signing, the international community has assisted with the implementation of the CPA and sought to provide peace dividends to the people of Sudan. Based on the spirit of making unity attractive through power sharing and wealth sharing among the parties as well as respecting the self-determination of the southern population, which is articulated in the CPA, the parties progressed with the implementation of agreed agendas under one country with two systems, consisting of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), in cooperation with the international community. In the final phase of implementation of the CPA, the southern Sudan referendum was conducted in January 2011, and secession of the south has been confirmed as the final result of the southerners’ will. Following official endorsement of the final result of the referendum by the GNU in Khartoum, it is expected that the GOSS will declare its independence at the end of the interim period of the CPA in July. The GOSS has been substantially preparing for independence. In this process, there are two challenges to be tackled. First, there are still pending issues of the CPA and post-CPA issues to be resolved through negotiation with the North. To some extent, it is essential to explore how the south can create a relationship with the north as well as how the international community can create an environment for dialogue between the parties. Second, creating state institutions and promoting development poses a big challenge for the GOSS.

Japanese assistance for peacebuilding in Sudan has continued since the signing of the CPA. Practices of Japan’s assistance to Sudan represent a transition in Japan’s approach to assisting peacebuilding in Africa. While the process of peacebuilding consists of political settlement of conflict, peacekeeping, consolidation of peace, and reconstruction and development, the main feature is that Japanese assistance focuses on components of peace consolidation as well as reconstruction and development. This article describes the features of the Japanese approach to supporting peacebuilding in the case of Sudan in order to understand the difference from the

---

1 The information and views presented in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Japan. Dr. Murakami Yasuhito is currently desk officer on Sudan, Chad, and Central Africa, and Peace and Security in Africa in the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. He has over ten years of national and international experience in the field of post-conflict development and peacebuilding work, especially in post-conflict situations in areas of democratization, electoral assistance, and DDR in management of programs and projects with UN agencies, regional organizations, donor agencies, and NGOs in seven developing countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sri Lanka.
American approach, and it aims to provide hints for creating complementarity between Japan and the United States in assisting peacebuilding.

**Japan-Sudan Relationship and Support of Peacebuilding in Sudan**

Japan has maintained relatively good bilateral relations with Sudan since 1956, although the two countries have engaged in little active trade or exchange of nationals. Japan has actively assisted Sudan in development cooperation, especially in the field of basic human needs (BHNs) such as food security, primary health care, water, and sanitation from the 1980s to the early 1990s. However, the security, political rights, and human rights situation in Sudan has thrown a shadow over its relationship with the international community and has had negative effects on the bilateral relationship with Japan. In 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which is the main opposition component in southern Sudan, started a second civil war against the government of Sudan. The war greatly raised concerns about the security situation, especially in the boundary areas between north and south. The government applied a national emergency law and inflicted human rights abuses in the country. The international community, deeply concerned with the situation in the country, urged the Sudanese government to fully respect human rights. Moreover, the international community suspected that the government might be harboring terrorists within the country. Under these situations, major donors suspended their bilateral assistance (ODA) in 1993, except for humanitarian relief. Suspension of Japanese ODA made bilateral involvement in Sudan issues limited, and, as a result, infrastructure for keeping close communication with governmental counterparts in various levels has been lost.

In the early 2000s, the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and its partners including the United States, the UK, Norway, and others conducted mediation efforts. However, Japan did not have active engagement in the IGAD partnership forum or involvement in the mediation activities for north-south negotiation that took place in Sudan and neighboring countries. As mediation efforts led by IGAD progressed, Japan carefully monitored the negotiation progress without direct engagement in the mediation. After the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed the CPA in 2005, Japan undertook to become more involved in Sudan issues, especially implementation of the CPA. During the period from 1993 to 2005 when the political situation in Sudan progressed, Japan’s policies for the assistance of peacebuilding evolved, and it developed modalities to conduct assistance and it accumulated on-the-ground practical experience.

**Japan’s Tools for Assisting Peacebuilding**

_Policies and Modalities_

As discourses and practices on peacebuilding evolved in the international community, Japan also developed regulations and policies for assisting peacebuilding. First, the International Peace Cooperation Law, the so-called PKO act, came into effect in 1992 and opened opportunities for 1) participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in UN peacekeeping operations and other operations.
Forces (JSDF) in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), 2) humanitarian relief operations by the JSDF and other governmental units, and 3) conducting observations of international elections. Second, Japan shifted its ODA approach to include assistance in peacebuilding in the revised ODA policies and expressed commitment on various occasions to international initiatives. Japan developed an ODA charter in 2003, and conducted an ODA mid-term review in 2005. These documents defined and confirmed the direction of ODA reform toward making assistance in peacebuilding one of the most important components of Japanese ODA policy. The charter stated that “Japan will extend bilateral and multilateral assistance flexibly and continuously for peacebuilding in accordance with the changing situation, ranging from assistance to expedite the ending of conflicts to assistance for the consolidation of peace and nation-building in post-conflict situations.” According to the charter, ODA will be used for the following: “assistance to facilitate the peace processes; humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, such as assistance with displaced persons and in the restoration of basic infrastructure; assistance in assuring domestic stability and security, including DDR of ex-combatants, and the collection and disposal of weapons, including demining; and assistance in reconstruction, including social and economic development and the enhancement of the administrative capacities of governments.” These efforts for policy development created an opportunity to apply resources to Sudan issues, but other incentives or leverage on the decision-making level have been needed to ensure those modalities are utilized on the ground.

**Leverage for Engagement on Sudan Issues**

With support from its revised policy framework, Japan has embarked on many initiatives for assisting peacebuilding activities in Africa, including Sudan. These new activities have been sustained by practices on the ground as well as commitment in international forums.

At the Third Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Japan put forth the consolidation of peace in Africa as one of the important pillars to be addressed. Involvement in Sudan is one good example of Japan’s pursuing practices sustained by policies and internationally expressed commitments. When the CPA was signed between the government of Sudan and SPLM in January 2005 to end the longest civil war in Africa, the international community understood that sustaining and implementing the CPA would contribute to achieving a sustainable peace in the country as well as to maintaining stability in the region. In this context, Japan decided to support the consolidation of peace in Sudan and to explore possibilities to conduct emergency relief and to provide aid, technical assistance, and international peace cooperation, while still restricting ODA to cover only the conflict-affected region since the humanitarian situation in Darfur was still unresolved.

International donors have provided substantial support to make peace sustainable in Sudan, as donor conferences have strongly promoted efforts toward peacebuilding in the country. Japan has also actively participated in these international initiatives. In April 2005, at the Oslo donor conference on Sudan, Japan pledged $100 million for delivering the peace dividend for the south and north. In January 2006, Japan’s development agency, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), resumed bilateral assistance in southern Sudan for rehabilitating water supply facilities, assisting community development, and reconstructing the river port in Juba. However, earlier suspension of bilateral aid caused difficulties in reestablishing aid infrastructure and delayed the delivery of assistance. In March 2006, when the first Sudan consortium took place in Paris, Japan had already disbursed 80 percent of the aid it had pledged at the Oslo conference through UN agencies, funds, and programs. Japan’s


prompt action aimed to create a safer environment by providing peace dividends for further dialogues between the CPA parties and to facilitate the implementation of the CPA. Moreover, JICA started a capacity development program in vocational training in Juba and other training in third-party countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. By the beginning of the second Sudan consortium at Khartoum and Juba in March 2007, Japan had already delivered assistance amounting to $140 million and met the commitment it had made at the Oslo conference. Furthermore, Japan pledged an additional $200 million at the third Sudan consortium held in Oslo, targeting its assistance to support conflict-affected people as well as to meet the basic human needs in the country.

Japan’s Assistance in Peacebuilding in Sudan

When we look at the peacebuilding process as defined by Japan’s ODA charter, consisting of the facilitation of peace negotiation, stabilization by UN peacekeeping forces, consolidation of peace, and reconstruction and development, we can see that Japan’s involvement is heavily focused on peace consolidation as well as reconstruction and development through ODA. Japan has supported Sudan by delivering peace dividends to the country and Sudanese people as well as by supporting the agendas of the CPA. After setting targets in its own policy documents and commitments in international forums such as donor conferences to overcome the challenges in peacebuilding in the conflict-affected country, Japan has fully utilized modalities of ODA in accordance with the policy and indicated goals working with UN agencies and one of Japan’s development agencies.

Official Development Assistance

Japan has fulfilled its responsibility and successfully met the commitments it made in international initiatives on Sudan issues and Africa. Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, Japan revitalized its assistance in peacebuilding in Sudan and sustained its assistance through revised ODA policies. The amount of Japanese assistance to Sudan has reached $550 million since 2005, and Sudan was the largest recipient of Japanese ODA among sub-Saharan African countries in 2008 and 2009. Approximately 60 percent of the assistance was directed to southern Sudan, while the remainder was distributed to Darfur and the eastern regions of the country. The first priority of Japan’s assistance to Sudan is to provide assistance for conflict-affected people in southern Sudan and three protocol areas (also known as the Three Areas)—the Southern Kordofan state, Blue Nile state, and Abyei, the border area between the north and south as well as with the Darfur region. A second priority is assistance for basic human needs such as primary health care, water, health, and sanitation, food security, primary education, and vocational training for self-sustainable livelihoods. Japan tries to promote the consolidation of peace by filling gaps in needs in these targeted areas. In addition to this assistance, Japan actively supported national programs such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), elections, and the southern Sudan referendum, which are articulated in the CPA.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

The DDR program in Sudan is one of the essential components of the security protocol of the CPA. The security arrangement protocol of the CPA discharged in total 180,000 soldiers from the armed forces of the north and south. However, there was a lack of common understanding and operational procedures on DDR among the armed forces, as well as a lack of capacity in the executive body of the program. The DDR program is assisted by the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIS) for the demobilization component and by the UNDP for the

---

reintegration component. Japan is a leading donor for the DDR program in Sudan and has assisted the interim DDR program since 2005 through the UNDP. In 2009, Japan again provided assistance to the DDR program through the UNDP, creating enough leverage to officially launch the program in February 2009. Moreover, JICA provided technical assistance to the vocational training sector in the three protocol areas as well as Juba. Those beneficiaries, which are training institutes, are expected to provide vocational training for discharged soldiers. Japan contributed financial support to the DDR program and strengthened the service delivery architecture of the reintegration component of the program.

The DDR program created opportunities to provide peace dividends for ex-soldiers, and encouraged discharged soldiers to re integrate into civilian life. However, both parties of the CPA persisted in conducting disarmament of their units without proper monitoring and assessment from international partners to ensure the integrity of the disarmament, insisting instead on their right to have regular forces. Therefore, the DDR program has not played a notable role in either transforming the security sector or right-sizing the military. In this sense, the program has had the effect of a social security program, but it is difficult to confirm whether the program has had an impact on reforming the security sector of both parties. It is expected that the number of discharged soldiers from the armed forces will not be achieved as spelled out in the agreement.

**Elections (Legislative and Executive)**

In 2010, the first multi-party (legislative and executive) elections were held since 1996. There are many technical and logistical difficulties to managing the referendum given the lack of access in remote areas to electoral materials and the weak electoral management capacity on the local level. Japan provided financial assistance amounting to $10 million to procure electoral materials such as ballot papers, ballot boxes, and other materials, and it supported women’s awareness projects through a UNDP basket fund. This assistance is the largest-scale contribution among Japan’s electoral assistance efforts ever provided in Africa, and this contribution is expected to promote the democratization process in the country through sustained electoral processes.\(^9\) Moreover, Japan dispatched an election observation mission to ensure the openness of the electoral process amidst the political environment in the country, and the mission monitored voting and counting processes in Khartom, Juba, and El Fashir.\(^10\)

**Southern Sudan Referendum**

The referendum, which is an opportunity to confirm the right of the people of Sudan to choose national unity or secession, is one of the most important components of the CPA. A lack of capacity in the management of the referendum and bad road conditions are constraints for delivering the referendum-related materials to polling stations to ensure the credible management of the exercise of the referendum. Moreover, the illiteracy of many southerners prevents broader participation in the referendum process and understanding on the proper procedure of the referendum. Japan extended its financial assistance to $8 million through a UNDP basket fund to procure referendum-related materials, voter education activities, and capacity building for the media in order to assist the implementation of the referendum in a fair manner.

---


Peace Process

While international efforts by concerned countries such as the United States, the UK, and Norway (the so-called troika), as well as by IGAD countries and its partners, to achieve the final peace agreement between the Sudan government and SPLM made gradual progress from 2002 to 2005, Japan carefully followed the situation. Japan did not, however, participate as a witness to the CPA. This led Japan to miss out on participating in monitoring and the follow-up mechanism of the CPA, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC). Therefore, Japan did not have a direct track to facilitate the implementation of agendas indicated in the protocols, and it faced difficulties in establishing channels through which to take any measures to assist the parties. However, as mentioned above, Japan assisted technically and financially with the benchmarks of the CPA in areas such as DDR, elections, and the southern referendum, and its assistance helped ensure an environment conducive to the implementation of the CPA.

International Peace Cooperation

Japan covers 12.5 percent of the UN PKO budget, including UNMIS. In 2005, Japan extended in-kind contributions such as vehicles and equipment for mine action to UNMIS. Moreover, two JSDF staff officers have been dispatched to UNMIS since 2008. High officials of the UN informally expressed requests to send Japanese units to UNMIS on several occasions.  

Moreover, Japan dispatched a governmental observation mission under the PKO act to Juba and Khartoum to monitor the administration of the referendum and to ensure a better political environment for free and fair polling exercises.  

Challenges for Sustaining Peace in the South Sudan

The final result of the southern Sudan referendum clearly indicated secession, and the presidency of the Government of National Unity endorsed the outcome. Many expect when the interim period of the CPA expires in July 2011, the GOSS will declare its independence. President Basir has already expressed his will to recognize the new state if the South declares its independence after the CPA period. Moreover, some Western countries indicated their intention to recognize the independence of the south. In the event that South Sudan becomes the newest nation-state, many challenges await it.

North-South Relationship: Pending Issues of the CPA and Post-CPA Arrangement

The bilateral relationship with Khartoum is essential even after the CPA period. Many issues are still pending, such as 1) final status of Abyei, where oil has been produced and conflicts have occurred between local southerners, the Dinka Ngok tribe, and the Arab-pastoralist Misseriya; 2) demarcation of the boundary between north and south. Both of the CPA parties are reluctant to extend the CPA period. Even if these pending issues are not resolved, the Government of South Sudan is expected to declare independence in July 2011. Many are concerned that pending issues will be internationalized, which may complicate issues after independence. Currently, the priority of the GOSS is its independence, and it is fully occupied with preparing to set up core state functions as a new nation. It is unclear whether consultation on pending issues can be resolved before the end of the CPA. Furthermore, many other issues, so-called post-CPA issues, such as people’s rights and the nationality of southerners in the north and northerners in the south, economic issues such as natural resources and foreign


debt, and the security arrangement between the north and the south need to be further discussed and settled. Currently, the National Congress Party (NCP), represented in the dialogue by Salaha Gosh, adviser to the president, and SPLM, represented by Pagan Amum, minister of CPA affairs, are in the process of consultation, but progress is slow.

When the CPA expires, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission—a national international body for monitoring progress of CPA matters and dialogue between the parties—and the UN PKO mission will also have finished their stated duties. Given the remaining mistrust between the parties, many believe that international mechanisms should be established to ensure dialogue between the parties on pending issues as well as post-CPA issues. In November 2010, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), headed by Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, and accompanied by U.S. special envoy Scott Gration, hosted a meeting on post-CPA arrangement in Ethiopia. In this meeting, NCP and SPLM promised they would consult further and clear pending issues and other post-CPA issues. Although it is unclear whether they can solve all issues by July 2011, the meeting could make a good example of the involvement of third parties in the consultation process regarding post-CPA issues.

Many argue that it is important to reorganize the international community’s participation in confidence-building measures and in the consultation process between the North and the South by establishing a new UN mission post-AEC.

State Building of South Sudan and Conflicts within the South

A state does not exist inherently. State institutions must work effectively in fulfilling their function. The authority of the state will depend on the consent of the people to be governed, and this support will depend on what the state has achieved. Currently, the GOSS is preparing to build and enhance governmental institutions ahead of independence anticipated for July 2011. Moreover, the GOSS is in the process of revising its interim constitution, since the current interim constitution includes some articles that regulate the Government of National Unity and is therefore unfit for the reality after the secession of the south. In addition, this modification shows that the GOSS is willing to establish permanent legal frameworks for the new government. However, there are still many problems and challenges, such as the inadequate capacity of institutional structures and security threats from within the region. This lays out expected agendas and difficulties for the South as a new nation-state after independence.

Unifying Political Forces for Managing the New State

The relationship with Khartoum has made southerners unified, but many point out that the political culture in the south is characterized by ethnic and tribal kinship as well as a winner-takes-all mentality. SPLM’s influential power dominates political discourse within the south. The SPLM appears reluctant to agree to power-sharing arrangements with opposition parties. Such attitudes came out after the April 2010 elections, with the landslide win of the party in legislative and executive elections in the south. After the final result of the southern Sudan referendum came out, President Salva Kiir indicated his willingness to make a broader-based transitional government in South Sudan after the CPA period before moving toward permanent governmental structures. Currently, the SPLM is in the process of revising the interim constitution as articulated by the CPA and calling for opposition leaders to participate in the process. Embedding and ensuring political pluralism in South Sudan is a key component to ensure democratic governance in the new state. However, it is unclear how the SPLM can deal with these difficult tasks and how the international community can assist these political processes to make a pluralist political culture.

Mitigating Intra-South Conflict

Other armed groups should be integrated into the regular armed forces and regional political groups, or else discharged into civilian life. However, un-unified forces of the SPLA are still potential security threats, especially in Jonglei, the Upper Nile, and the Unity states. For example, the Shilluk tribe in Jonglei state and the Nuer tribe groups of the former Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), which is pro-Khartoum militia component, are still making security threats. Some components are bargaining over a better rank within the SPLA and to try to get more benefits from the mainstream of the SPLA. Others are suspected of having links to or being manipulated from the north. These elements hinder the government’s monopolized power, which is one of the conditions of any nation-state institution. Currently, the GOSS and SPLA are in the process of attaining political and military control over these areas where many tribal militias were previously under control of the SSDF and supported the SAF during the civil war. This operation has caused tension between the SPLA and militias in the southern region.

Establishing Core State Functions of the New Government

To make governmental institutions work as a nation-state, the GOSS established task forces to build the core functions of the state. One of the subcommittees of the task force, chaired by Riek Machar, vice president of the GOSS, has been mandated to prepare a plan for creating the core functions of the governmental institutions, and the subcommittee has identified six priority areas: 1) international relations, to be led by the Ministry of Regional Cooperation; 2) rule of law, to be led by the Ministry of Legal Affairs; 3) governance, to be led by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs; 4) economy and natural resources, led by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; 5) service delivery, led by the Ministry of Labor and Social Services; and 6) security and intelligence, led by the Ministry of SPLA. The GOSS, in cooperation with UN agencies and donors, has worked to identify gaps in state functions and to develop the plan. In these works, the European Commission hosted a high-level international conference on core-function building for southern Sudan in September 2010. The meeting boosted initiatives to prepare core state functions with the help of international institutions and donors. Faced with time and resource constraints to complete all tasks, unresolved agendas within the established plan will be handed over to the mid-term development plan.

Making and Implementing a Development Plan

The GOSS is preparing a mid-term development plan, and effort chaired by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in cooperation with other ministries as well as UN agencies and the World Bank, and has indicated its intention that the development plan will be finalized by June 2011. The development plan prioritizes five areas for ensuring the development process of South Sudan: 1) executive leadership; 2) security sector, ensuring rule of law; 3) fiduciary management; 4) governance; and 5) management of natural resources. At its annual meeting in April 2011, the World Bank organized a roundtable on Sudan to update the progress of drafting a development plan, to consult on debt relief and other issues, and to accelerate the effort to resolve difficulties in establishing development architecture in South Sudan. The development plan is expected to identify gaps in the needs of each prioritized area and to provide donors with the platform to harmonize their assistance to South Sudan. In this case, donor conferences will be held, and international partners will be expected to ensure


that their assistance is in accordance with this plan. However, the plan itself has been developed within a short timeframe.

Establishing a New PKO Mission

UNMIS’s mandate will expire by the end of the CPA. However, as mentioned above, the north-south relationship is threatened by the inability to resolve the pending issues of the CPA. Khartoum is unwilling to allow the presence of UNMIS after the interim period. On the other hand, the south has expressed a request to the UN for its presence after the mission.17 Currently, the UN continues to study whether there is a need for a new mission in the south. Many experts indicate the need for the UN mission’s involvement in 1) assisting the GOSS, including mediation of disputes with political and ethnic groups; 2) assisting security sector reform, including the professionalization of regular forces in the south and the rule of law; 3) protecting civilians in the region. The scale of the new mission, such as deploying into rural areas as well as measures for ensuring mobility of the military and civilian components, is a critical issue in this mission’s design.

Therefore, close communication and information sharing with the UN PKO and other countries are essential to identify needs and gaps in the mission’s organization as well as to explore the possibility for dispatching personnel to the mission. Based on information obtained through better communication, expected troop-contribution countries (TCC) can start to consider what the mission’s needs are on the ground and assess the best match between the identified needs and what the TCC can offer to the mission.

Japan’s Challenges in Involvement in Peacebuilding in Sudan

Based on the understanding that the stability of Sudan can lead to a sustainable peace in the region, Japan will actively extend its support to Sudan since the country is one of the first-priority countries for providing investment for peace as well as towards improving human security in Africa. However, there are some difficulties for Japan in playing a greater role in peacebuilding in Sudan, including South Sudan. In this section, possible broader areas of Japan’s involvement in peacebuilding in the South and its difficulties are considered.

Involvement of International Mechanisms in North-South Dialogue in Post-CPA Period

Monitoring and facilitation mechanisms for further dialogue between the north and the south have still not been established, except the AUHIP, chaired by Thabo Mbeki. Many international partners have shared concerns about the need to set up an internationally recognized device such as post-AEC or post-UNMIS to monitor and follow up the parties’ consultations on many issues to reduce the risk of further conflict and to ensure stability in the region.

Japan has supported benchmarks of the CPA such as DDR, elections, and the southern Sudan referendum. The parties have recognized that Japan is keen to support implementation of the agreement, although Japan was not a witness to the CPA document. Involvement in the internationally recognized mechanism for facilitating dialogue could lead to a larger role for Japan in supporting the peacebuilding process in the country. Therefore, Japan should participate in political processes such as monitoring and facilitating mechanisms in the area of peacebuilding in Sudan through encouraging consultation between the parties.

17 At the request of the GOSS, the UN has commenced planning of a possible post-UNMIS presence in South; United Nations Security Council, S/2011/239, paragraph 90.
Development Assistance and Its Architecture in the South

Although modalities of Japan’s assistance to Sudan have diversified in areas such as humanitarian assistance, involvement in peacekeeping missions, and reconstruction and development, Japan’s contributions have mainly been in the form of financial and technical assistance to development-oriented programs through ODA. In the Japanese fiscal year 2009, the amount of ODA to Sudan was the highest of all ODA to sub-Saharan Africa. However, the amount of Japanese ODA to Sudan is fifth among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. After the independence of the south, Japanese ODA will be divided between the north and the south. This means that it will become a big challenge to maintain the same volume of Japanese assistance through ODA given the various needs for peacebuilding in Sudan, especially in the south.

As described earlier, Japan used modalities of ODA in assisting peacebuilding in Sudan. However, Japan’s presence in the south is very weak compared with the enormous assistance in state building that the south needs. Major international players have already set up compounds, consulates, or liaison offices to establish closer communication with the GOSS and other international partners in the south. Although Japan’s ODA-implementing agency has a field office in Juba, the lack of human resources on the ground limits its capacity to identify needs on the ground, to ensure assistance projects, and to follow up policy discussions in donor forums with coordination in development assistance. This has led to less input from on-the-ground aid workers in the formation of policy documents on development of the country, creating significant challenges for effective development progress in state building in the south.

Establishing a New PKO Mission and Assisting Its Mandate

Recently, many have argued for a new UN mission in South Sudan for the post-CPA period, but because these plans are still in the initial planning phase the structure of the mission remains unclear. This ambiguity will create difficulties for experts to scrutinize what the mission needs and what troop-contribution countries can offer to the mission.

Besides, once the details of the mandates of a new UN mission become clear, it will be better to consider what kind of ODA modalities can provide the financial and technical support to facilitate the mandates of the mission, such as security-sector reform or mitigating tribal tensions through community development. In these tasks, Japan and other international partners must have close communication to share information in areas where they can work together while maintaining complementarity with the UN mission.

Towards Strengthening Japan’s Assistance in Peacebuilding in Sudan

Japan’s assistance in Sudan has been a showcase of Japan’s practices based on an evolving concept of Japan’s assistance in peacebuilding. Japan focused heavily on the development assistance modality in its assistance to Sudan, but it needs to modify its modality or find alternatives to conduct more effective peacebuilding assistance in a whole-of-government approach, since there are many challenges in peacebuilding in Sudan.
References


