



U.S. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

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This paper was first presented at a one-day bilateral workshop on April 29, 2011, held in conjunction with the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in Washington, D.C. In the papers, authors aim to assess each government's "whole-of-government" or interagency coordination of peacebuilding policies and to identify priorities, assets, and expertise as applied to Afghanistan and Sudan. The goal of the project is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of both the United States and Japan's respective initiatives with an eye toward how the two allies can best cooperate and work synergistically in a "whole of alliance" approach to peacebuilding operations in vulnerable or failing states.

Introduction

Peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, including those of the United States, began after the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001 and upon the signing of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent Institutions, more commonly known as the Bonn Agreement. This agreement, signed by members of the international community as well as Afghan leaders, led to the passing of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 on December 20, 2001, which provides the framework for international activities within a sovereign Afghanistan. These documents, quickly drafted and passed, placed the onus of security and rebuilding of the country on the Afghan Interim Authority (and later the elected government of Afghanistan) with international assistance supporting their activities, which were almost exclusively located in Kabul before 2005.

This tack proved problematic for a number of reasons: the Afghan leadership was inexperienced in national governance, donor nations allowed the inexperienced Interim Authority to drive the agenda and the Kabul-focused nature of the agreements set the conditions for a resurgent Taliban to challenge governmental control in the outlying areas of the country. As the Taliban regained its ability to fight over the next few years, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan turned its focus from peacebuilding intended to strengthen Afghan communities and governance structures to winning the war against the Taliban.

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This paper examines three key aspects of U.S. peacebuilding in Afghanistan since December 2001:

- The development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to protect the Afghan population
- The development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to defeat threats to the Afghan government
- The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed non-state groups inside Afghanistan to provide the Afghan government with a monopoly on the organized use of violence

These areas have received the preponderance of U.S. efforts and resources and are essential to building a lasting peace within Afghanistan. The United States was not necessarily in the lead for these lines of effort, but was a major donor in both personnel and other resources to each of them; with the United States often driving results through U.S. action in spite of other international programs or best practices as the United States looks to extract itself from combat. As a result, the U.S. has focused myopically on defeating insurgent groups in order to stabilize the country sufficiently for it to withdraw its military forces. In this process, it lost sight of the essential peacebuilding activities required to bring a lasting peace to Afghanistan.

U.S. Efforts at Police Development in Afghanistan

Both the Bonn Agreement and UNSCR 1386 call upon the ISAF to provide assistance to the Interim Authority “in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces[.]”² Neither compact, however, delineates what security and armed forces are required or which nation would lead the assistance effort. This was determined in a G8 ministerial conference in 2002 and subsequent conferences, which divided the Afghan security sector into five pillars with a lead nation for each to oversee and support reforms (a similar process was used by the United Nations in the Balkans).³ Under this construct, Germany was assigned leadership for Afghan police development and reform, at the request of the Interim Authority, based on their previous police development assistance to Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s. The pillar framework was designed to ensure that all major areas of development were covered and that all donor nations would contribute proportionally to their means, but it did not hold donor states to follow the lead of the responsible donor state.

² UN Security Council, “Security Council Authorizes International Security Force for Afghanistan; Welcomes United Kingdom’s Offer to be Initial Lead Nation: Resolution 1386 (2001) Adopted Unanimously,” December 20, 2001, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm>.

³ David Bayley and Robert Perito, *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), 18.

The G8 plan for police development was to raise a professional national police force of 62,000 officers by December 2005, consisting of 44,300 uniformed police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway police, and 2,300 counter-narcotics police.⁴ It was based on a European training model of police development, which included “university level education for officers and a shorter academic program for [non-commissioned officers, or NCOs]”⁵ In a country with a male literacy rate under 50 percent and no standing police force from which to draw, this police development program with a target force of that size would have likely taken decades to complete. That sort of time horizon was unacceptable to the United States, prompting it to create a parallel, but not necessarily complementary, police development program. The United States gave the Department of State’s (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) the lead on establishing seven regional police training centers throughout Afghanistan.

As INL is staffed by Foreign Service Officers and not law enforcement officials, it must draw upon outside expertise when undertaking police development missions.⁶ For larger operations, such as its initial development efforts in Afghanistan, INL must rely upon contractors to execute the bulk of its operations, usually the contracting firm DynCorp, because of both the lack of a national U.S. police force to draw upon and also its lack of in-house police expertise. INL is also a primary funder of the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), an organization whose primary mission is to conduct police development operations as part of U.S. foreign policy. While ICITAP would have been the likely U.S. government agency to provide the U.S. contingent for Afghan police development, they were not selected to do so. The result of INL’s efforts was essentially a police train and equip program, not a police development program, and it was executed almost entirely by contractors with minimal government oversight.

INL’s training program consisted of an eight-week basic policing course for literate NCOs and patrolmen, a five-week course for illiterate patrolmen, a fifteen-day refresher course for experienced police officers, and a two-to-four-week course for police instructors.⁷ This created a semi-trained Afghan National Police (ANP) force of over 70,000 personnel by 2007. The training program was quite austere, with trainees in day-long classes on hard benches in classrooms with no temperature control. Instruction was given by contractors with little experience in police development and who did not speak the native languages and so depended upon interpreters with little grasp of policing terminology.⁸ More than 70 percent of the recruits were illiterate, which challenged further their ability to absorb and comprehend the curriculum.

⁴ Inspectors General, US Department of State and US Department of Defense, “Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness,” November 2006, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf>, 5.

⁵ Bayley and Perito, 20.

⁶ William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, “International Police: Improving Professionalism and Responsiveness,” Stimson Center, Stimson Future of Peace Operations, September 2009, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Police_Issue_Brief.pdf, 6.

⁷ Bayley and Perito, 21.

⁸ Ibid.

Beyond being ineffective at instilling basic individual skills, the short duration of the training prohibited exposure to the principles of democratic policing – possibly the most important aspect of any police development program. This led to issues in the operational ANP force which will be discussed later.

The United States transferred responsibility for police assistance from the Department of State to the Department of Defense (DoD) in 2005, as it had done in Iraq, in order to provide greater funding and manpower for the endeavor. The DoD lead for this program was given to the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a military command also responsible for Afghan National Army development. CSTC-A retained INL as the contract manager for all elements of police development, including ministry reform. INL in turn retained DynCorp as the primary provider of police trainers and advisors. There were numerous issues with the transfer so that even a year after the police assistance program fell under CSTC-A control, that command had still not received the primary contract between INL and DynCorp or the modifications to this contract. Indeed, INL’s contracting representative to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (on a temporary assignment) could not provide the required documentation for the contract to auditors in 2006.⁹ The interagency coordination between INL and CSTC-A was not executed well because of poor internal practices in each organization and murky delineation of responsibilities between the two.

The transfer of responsibility of police assistance in Afghanistan to CSTC-A coincided with a return of the Taliban and an increase in fighting between ISAF and the Taliban, causing the former to take more of a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict.¹⁰ With command of police development and employment, CSTC-A incorporated the ANP as an integral part of its counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban, shifting the ANP’s focus away from community policing and the protection of the population and towards a military auxiliary against armed groups.¹¹ In December 2009, when President Barack Obama announced a surge of U.S. military and civilian personnel into Afghanistan in support of a counterinsurgency approach, the ANP became integral to that approach. When CSTC-A was asked to produce more trained police personnel (and faster), the basic course for ANP was reduced to six weeks, further decreasing the trainees’ proficiency upon graduation.

The U.S. approach to police development in Afghanistan has been marred by a number of problems: disunity with international partners, disunity within the U.S. mission, an emphasis on quantity over quality from the training program, an inability to inculcate democratic community policing principles, poor oversight of the training program, and until recently limited mentorship

⁹ Inspectors General, 35.

¹⁰ Throughout this paper, the term “Taliban” refers to the myriad groups that could be classified as insurgents in Afghanistan, understanding that there is more than one Taliban group as well as other insurgent groups not associated with a particular Taliban group and that these many organizations do not necessarily coordinate or associate with each other as part of a monolithic hierarchy

¹¹ Inspectors General, 95.

of ANP units in the field, to name a few. The result of these missteps has been an ANP force that not only is generally incapable of conducting policing in its assigned jurisdictions, but is corrupt and incompetent to the extent that officers are often drivers of conflict within their own communities. This is all predominately due to the United States' insistence on training and developing the ANP to be a counterinsurgent force instead of a police force, especially after the transition of responsibility from INL to CSTC-A. The ANP is now an organization incapable of community policing and yet is neither trained nor equipped for the essentially counterinsurgent infantry role its members now fill.

The development of democratic community police is an essential element of peacebuilding, particularly in an environment such as Afghanistan where the central government has difficulty in exercising control in large swathes of the country. The police, the ANP in this case, should provide a vital and everyday link between the citizens and the government and should be there to protect the people from violence. The U.S. approach to police development has not supported this and instead of forming an Afghan entity capable of pacifying communities, it has turned it into another element of the war effort. An indicator of this mindset is the fact that between 2002 and 2009, the United States had given more than \$21 billion in aid to the Afghan National Army and Police, while only providing \$2.5 billion in aid for rule of law, democracy, and governance initiatives combined.¹² The fact that the United States has not invested a proportional share of resources in the reform of the Afghan judicial system (particularly the corrections and courts elements) suggests its focus, when it comes to ANP development, remains on war fighting. The peacebuilding objective is little more than an afterthought, to the detriment of both progress in war and long-term prospects for civilian order through effective community policing.

U.S. Efforts at ANA Development in Afghanistan

The United States was given the responsibility of leading the army pillar of Afghan development and, with the assistance of international partners, began recruiting for the ANA in 2002. End strength goals for 2005 were set at 70,000 members of the ANA, to be drawn from the pre-war militia groups and the populace at large. Subsequent goals as the security situation deteriorated were expanded to 100,000 troops by the end of 2009 and then again to 171,600 by October 2011.¹³ The ANA is based on a standard military hierarchy from platoons up to corps commands and its members classified in rank as enlisted, NCOs, or officers.

Officer training in the ANA can take one of three forms for entry-level officer candidates, all of whom must demonstrate basic reading and writing skills. Former Afghan Army officers receive an eight week Officer Training Course, which includes professional ethics training. New officers attend either a six-month Officer Candidate School or the four-year National Military Academy

¹² Marc J. Cohen and Tara R. Gingerich, "Protect and Serve or Train and Equip? US Security Assistance and Protection of Civilians," Oxfam America, 2009, 3.

¹³ International Security Assistance Force, "International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown," February 1, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>.

of Afghanistan (which is modeled in part on the United States Military Academy at West Point).¹⁴ ANA officer training has been the longest and most thorough in Afghan security sector training.

Basic training for enlisted recruits consists of a seven-week basic training course followed by another six weeks of advanced individual training, much like in the U.S. Army. Those identified as having leadership potential are then sent to the NCO course in lieu of the advanced individual training course and are assigned to lead a new unit at the end of their and their units' respective courses. These organizations are then tested in collective training to examine their ability to react to common tactical situations they will likely face after training.¹⁵ Some training programs are occasionally shortened in order to train more individuals and units faster.

The ANA has been a relative success story for the United States in Afghanistan. It is an institution that is designed to fight extremists within Afghanistan and does an adequate job at that. The members of the ANA have lower casualty and desertion rates than the ANP and are widely regarded by the Afghan people as relatively honest (particularly when compared to the ANP). This is mainly thanks to their receiving better equipment and training and to the fact that an ethos of service has generally been adopted by the Army.

While there have certainly been some positive outcomes with regards to ANA development, the ANA is still under-equipped (a situation not likely to improve with such drastic increases to ANA personnel strength), the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not embraced all of the institutional reforms required to truly professionalize and sustain the Army, the ANA cannot maintain itself well in the field (mainly with regard to pay and logistics), nepotism exists within the MoD and ANA, ANA units are involved in narcotics trafficking, the officer corps is disproportionately Tajik, and the costs of maintaining the ANA are dependent upon donors – a situation that is unsustainable in the long term.¹⁶

Developing a sustainable and professional ANA is an essential element to U.S. peacebuilding, as doing so provides the government of Afghanistan with the means to maintain peace on its own. As with other peacebuilding efforts, however, the United States has been focused on the short-term objective of quick defeat of the Taliban through rapid train-and-equip programs. Increased numbers of trainees and shorter training periods lead to improperly trained soldiers and units who are incapable of succeeding on the battlefield and are also less likely to be the professional organization that could be a stabilizing factor in a peaceful Afghanistan once the United States has withdrawn.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces: Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act,” June 2008, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/united_states_plan_for_sustaining_the_afghanistan_national_security_forces_1231.pdf, 18.

¹⁵ Naval Postgraduate School, “Summary of Afghan National Army,” http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/ANA_Summary_Web.pdf, 4.

¹⁶ Naval Postgraduate School, 7-8.

U.S. DDR Activities in Afghanistan

The DDR program in Afghanistan, begun in 2002 under the direction of Japan and the UN Development Program (UNDP), aimed specifically at militias that had been part of or associated with the Northern Alliance during the Afghan civil war. Under the umbrella of the Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), the DDR program was run in conjunction with the Afghan MoD and at first federalized the militias into the initial elements of the ANA to form the Afghan Military Force (AMF) (this plan was eventually abandoned in favor of the U.S. plan to raise the ANA from scratch) and to demobilize 50,000 AMF members.¹⁷ The program was scheduled for a five-year duration with the intent to remove weapons from Afghanistan and either transition AMF members into the ANA or ANP or retrain them for civilian occupations. ANBP faced many challenges from the start. One main issue was the fact that DDR was not discussed as part of the Bonn Agreement or UNSCR 1386 and was instead agreed upon by the AMF commanders and international partners at the donors' conference in Geneva in 2002. This immediately excluded armed groups in the west and south of Afghanistan as the Afghan voices at the conference were only those from the AMF and excluded those from the problematic Pashtun regions on the Pakistani border.

As the AMF commanders were part of the planning and decision making to initiate the DDR process, they used their influence to ensure that they benefited from the program politically, monetarily, or militarily. Initially, the AMF commanders had inflated the number of combatants under their command to the international community in order to increase their share of DDR aid. This became problematic when DDR implementers realized this and were then required to decrease the number of combatants to support through the program,¹⁸ a situation that disillusioned many combatants towards the program.¹⁹ Regional biases persisted within the AMF so that the most powerful militias received a disproportionate amount of DDR assistance, as depicted in the figure below which shows the disparity in assistance by province. This chart provides a visual example of how the ANBP focused on a small area of the country. Additionally, funneling DDR aid through the militia commanders also precluded a community-based approach to DDR (a fairer system of DDR) and allowed those who commanded the guns to decide which guns to give up and where.

¹⁷ Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities," London School of Economics, Crisis States Research Center, June 2006, 4.

¹⁸ One estimate states that fully 80 percent of the persons registered for DDR were not actually combatants. See Shamsul Hadi Shams, "Assessing the Role of DDR in Afghanistan: Internal Security Provision and External Environment," in *Toward Bringing Stability in Afghanistan: A Review of the Peacebuilding Strategy*, ed. Yuji Uesugi (Hiroshima: Institute for Peace Science Hiroshima University, 2010), 62.

¹⁹ Shams, 62.




Figure 1: Distribution of ANBP DDRed Personnel by Province²⁰

Disarmament was conducted by mobile units who traveled to regional sites to collect weapons. ANBP collected 57,629 light and medium weapons and 12,248 heavy weapons (most of which were not serviceable) from 63,380 AMF members. The program also boasts the demobilization of 62,376 ex-combatants (and 260 AMF units), of whom 55,804 entered the reintegration program with a 97 percent completion rate. While these numbers seem impressive, the number of weapons collected represents a mere 56 percent of the weapons known to be in the hands of the AMF, and the poor state of the Afghan economy created many challenges for employing retrained former militiamen.²¹ Implementation of the reintegration process produced a number of other issues. While high-level AMF commanders received contested political positions within the Afghan Security Forces and ministries, mid- and low-level commanders were treated as equal to their soldiers within ANBP. This reduced status, both socially and financially, has caused a number of them to engage in illicit trades, furthering the conflict, in order to maintain the standard of living to which they had been accustomed.²²

Upon completion of the initial ANBP in 2006, international partners realized that the program had failed to attain its desired effects. A second phase was initiated, still under the direction of Japan and UNDP, and was titled the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). DIAG was scheduled to run until March 2011 and had two lines of operation: Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (AMPASD) and DDR and heavy weapons cantonment. It was geared towards illegal armed groups (IAGs), defined as armed groups outside of the control

²⁰ Shams, p. 62.

²¹ UN Development Programme, "United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre: Afghanistan," undated on the UNDP website at <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121>, accessed April 23, 2011.

²² Caroline A. Hartzell, *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR270-Missed_Opportunities.pdf, 10.

of the government. Unlike its predecessor, DIAG is district-focused, not militia-focused, and is being implemented throughout Afghanistan. From 2005 until late 2010, the program disbanded 743 IAGs and collected 51,873 weapons.²³ DIAG faces a number of challenges: poor security that makes implantation very dangerous, local and tribal leaders who are generally unwilling to disarm and demobilize, and some provincial and district leaders who do not support implementation.

Both the ANBP and DIAG were programs led by Japan, UNDP, and the government of Afghanistan and were supported by other donor nations, including the United States. The United States engages in little active leadership in the implementation of DDR in Afghanistan, but supports it through interagency efforts and funding – mainly from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Yet the biggest effect the United States has on DDR in Afghanistan is not its involvement within it, but the actions it takes outside of it.

The initial U.S. plan for security sector reform – specifically how to raise the ANA and ANP – contradicted the international plan for DDR as well as DDR best practices. Ideally, the preponderance of the Afghan Security Forces could have been drawn from the AMF initially, reintegrating them into a governmental structure instead of releasing them into a bleak economic environment. In addition to providing former combatants with work (decreasing the likelihood that they would join insurgent groups), integrating former militiamen into the military would have provided the ANA with proven battlefield leaders. There would have been challenges to such a program: training would still be required on civil rights, professional military standards, and higher-level skills; personal connections acquired in the militias would have to be broken to promote unity of command within the Army; and ethnic proportions within the ANA's leadership and rank-and-file would need to be adjusted. In spite of these challenges, reintegration of the AMF into the ANA would have given the ANBP a better chance of success (some 70 percent to 80 percent of ANBP reintegration alumni are dissatisfied with the services they received).²⁴ The United States' insistence on starting the ANA from scratch prevented such large-scale reintegration measures, with only 2 percent of new ANA and ANP recruits coming from the AMF through ANBP.

The second way in which the United States has inadvertently derailed the DDR process from the outside is through rearmament programs. These programs have come in many forms over the course of the conflict, but have become a mainstay (even if controversial) of U.S. counterinsurgency practices. Inspired by the legitimization of Sunni militias as part of the Awakening Councils in Iraq in 2007 and 2008, U.S. military leaders have supported the rearming of tribal or local militias throughout Afghanistan in order to gain support in fighting the Taliban.

²³ UN Development Programme, "Afghanistan Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups: Third Quarter Project Progress Report [2010]," <http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/03%20QuarterRep.2010/2010-11-01-%20Third%20Quarter%20Progress%20Report%20of%20DIAG.pdf>, 1.

²⁴ Hartzell, 10.

ISAF leadership has done this on the assumption that local leaders feel that the central government of Afghanistan is failing to meet their basic needs, specifically in the area of security, and they also assume that permitting locals to defend themselves would contribute to solving a number of issues. These include, first, that local leaders can meet local needs and the distrusted central government security forces (specifically the ANP) will not exacerbate the security situation. Second, such groups are required to vouch for their loyalty to the government of Afghanistan in order to be recognized as legitimate armed groups. Third, such programs provide additional troops to fight the Taliban beyond the limited number of Afghan and ISAF forces. Early indications are that ISAF's planning assumptions are incorrect and that locally armed groups are unable to drive these effects.

Essentially, the U.S. is subverting the DDR process in pursuit of military interests. By doing so, it allows the reintroduction (or re-legitimization) of the militia structures that proved so difficult to break in the initial years of the war, and it deprives the government of its monopoly on legitimate violence. These programs have proven disastrous in the past as local leaders may be somewhat difficult to accurately identify (a designated militia leader may not lead what ISAF thinks he does), have flexible ideas on loyalty, or may have entered such a program with the specific intent of defecting later once they have collected all they can from coalition forces. Experience has shown that ISAF's assumptions need to be reexamined. The rearmament of local militias is reversing the few gains seen by ANBP and DIAG.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on three elements of peacebuilding in Afghanistan and how the United States has contributed to them: building the Afghan National Police, building the Afghan National Army, and disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating armed groups. This focus was based on the large scale of these endeavors and their long-term effects on building a stable peace. There are of course many other peacebuilding activities ongoing in Afghanistan: economic development, agricultural support, drug eradication, governmental and constitutional reforms and development, education support, and medical support, to name but a few. These activities and programs are supported by the international community of donor nations as well as many agencies from within the U.S. government, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Education, and Health and Human Services. Based on U.S. government policies, however, supporting agencies develop their own policies based on DoS and DoD guidance and receive most of their funding for these activities from DoS and DoD.

While peacebuilding in Afghanistan is an interagency endeavor, the non-DoS and non-DoD elements usually provide only expertise to DoS and DoD operations, ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are controlled by DoS and DoD. Even within this construct, the amount of resources that DoD brings to Afghanistan is so significantly larger than those available to DoS (which, again, funds most of the interagency's programs) that DoD often drives peacebuilding efforts whether it

intends to or not. From a personnel perspective, DoD has over 90,000 uniformed personnel on the ground in Afghanistan fulfilling a number of combat and noncombat roles, whereas there are fewer than 1,000 civilians on the ground to conduct all of State’s noncombat roles. Collecting this many civilian government officials was difficult for the U.S. government under such circumstances, as civilian agencies are not funded, authorized, or trained to conduct deployed operations without special congressional approval.

From a fiscal perspective, since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the combined budget in Afghanistan of DoS and USAID has been on average 5 percent of the U.S. Afghanistan budget, with DoD receiving the remainder.²⁵ This is not to say that combat operations consume 95 percent of the U.S. Afghanistan budget, because DoD does spend some of its funds on noncombat operations (particularly with the Commander’s Emergency Response Program), but with such a significant share of the overall budget DoD has the ability to drive U.S. policy in Afghanistan, which in turn means that policy is geared towards DoD’s primary mission: winning the war. Civilian USG contingents in Afghanistan, although they share this objective to some extent, often see DoD’s focus on short-term security gains negatively impact their programs. Such influence has ensured that most U.S. government activities support the current counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban, often at the expense of long-term peacebuilding initiatives. This is apparent in the marked increase in proportional spending on security assistance as a total of U.S. assistance to the government of Afghanistan, as depicted in figure 2 below.




Figure 2: U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY 2001 - FY 2010 (in \$ millions)²⁶

²⁵ Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>, 14.

²⁶ Rebecca Williams, “US Assistance to Afghanistan,” *The Will and the Wallet*, a Stimson Center blog, September 3, 2009, <http://thewillandthewallet.org/2009/09/03/us-assistance-to-afghanistan/>.

As shown in the section above on ANP development, DoD has a vested interest in producing as many policemen as possible, as fast as possible. The ANP is employed as a counterinsurgent force that has been focused on defeating the Taliban instead of protecting the citizens of its members' jurisdictions. The short-duration training regimen is intended to be a solution for counterinsurgency, but instead creates ill-trained and ill-equipped counterinsurgents and police. This has made the ANP more a driver of conflict than a key element of peacebuilding. The ANA, too, may be destabilizing in the long term. While ANA development has been a relative success story in Afghanistan, the U.S. has supported such an ambitious growth of the end strength of the ANA that the government of Afghanistan will be unable to sustain it after the United States draws down its support (which presents a future DDR requirement). Again, U.S. counterinsurgency needs are driving decisions with short-term benefits and long-term costs, costs that will likely preclude a lasting peace.

DDR has been a peacebuilding effort for which the United States has been a supporting donor, yet its actions with regard to the war against the Taliban have derailed, subverted, and in some cases reversed international efforts at DDR. With so many resources focused on military success, the United States has affected peacebuilding initiatives without intending to. This phenomenon exists in other aspects of peacebuilding not discussed in depth here. For example, drug production is seen to fund insurgent groups, so the United States undertakes drug eradication measures to wipe out poppy fields. This is done with the purpose of destroying an insurgent funding stream without concern for actual second-order effects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that eradication has become a driver of conflict in many cases as the poppy farmers lose their livelihood and turn to the Taliban for sources of income.

The United States is spending a significant amount of resources in Afghanistan in order to defeat the Taliban and is unlikely to completely withdraw its troops until some modicum of security is established. The U.S. government has determined that a counterinsurgency strategy is its best method of achieving that and has geared its activities towards that end, often to the detriment of achieving a lasting peace. With waning public support for the war, the United States is looking to disengage as quickly as possible and is taking steps to hasten its withdrawal to meet domestic public sentiment and risks prolonging the conflict as a result. This is not to say that the United States has difficulty with peacebuilding in every setting, only that in war zones in which the United States is a primary combatant, it will treat peacebuilding as supporting the war effort and not as a necessary process of its own. The United States should strive to change how it approaches peacebuilding in conflict zones.

Implications for Cooperation with Japan

When engaged in conflict, as in Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States tends to disproportionately and myopically center its resource allocation on combat tasks. The United States is usually the largest overall donor to these types of operations and feels that because of this it should be able to drive all aspects of the combat and peacebuilding missions. When

possible, both financially and politically, Japan should attempt to partner with the United States as an equal donor for the peacebuilding process – with both money and expertise – in order to gain equitable standing in decision making. With fewer vested interests in actual combat in these conflicts, Japan could prove to be a neutral broker in driving peacebuilding activities that could provide for a lasting peace as well as the ability to effectively end the conflict as quickly as is realistically possible. Given Japan’s reputation for competency in the peacebuilding arena and the fact that it is non-Western (removing a significant source of bias in many parts of the world), the United States would hardly be able to ignore that country’s expertise as long as Japan brings enough resources to be able to support the United States towards better peacebuilding in its wars. In this capacity, Japan could prove to be the ideal parity partner for peacebuilding in areas of the world in which the United States is militarily engaged.