



U.S. Policy and Assistance on Peacebuilding in Sudan: 2001-11

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This paper was first presented at a one-day bilateral workshop on April 29, 2011, held in conjunction with the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in Washington, D.C. In the papers, authors aim to assess each government's "whole-of-government" or interagency coordination of peacebuilding policies and to identify priorities, assets, and expertise as applied to Afghanistan and Sudan. The goal of the project is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of both the United States and Japan's respective initiatives with an eye toward how the two allies can best cooperate and work synergistically in a "whole of alliance" approach to peacebuilding operations in vulnerable or failing states.

Introduction

U.S. policy toward Sudan—particularly in the last ten years—has been deeply shaped by the country's benighted history of violence and its complicated, often fitful search for peace. The human costs of this violence, in Africa's largest country, have been catastrophic: 2 million dead, and 5 million displaced in the southern conflict alone, plus an additional 300,000 dead in Darfur and another 2 million displaced. The U.S. has been an indispensable player within efforts to stop conflict and bring about peace in Sudan, but it is not the only player, nor the most important. At most, it has been an influential outsider and generous donor, together with other countries; the main protagonists have been Sudanese. In this regard, it should be emphasized that despite considerable progress in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), stability is still precarious, particularly in the borderlands between the north and the south of the country. And indeed, peace itself has been elusive in one major region of the country: Darfur.

Nonetheless, U.S. efforts have incontrovertibly contributed to peace. It is, however, virtually impossible to talk about a narrowly circumscribed set of "peacebuilding" activities within U.S. policy toward Sudan. Rather, peacebuilding goals have suffused the U.S. approach. This paper

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will therefore use a broad definition of the term to encompass a range of activities beyond those strictly construed to support dialogue and reconciliation between belligerents. These include humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict, efforts to protect civilians from violence, aid to build up nascent institutional and social capacities to govern justly and peacefully, and indeed diplomacy and other forms of statecraft (like sanctions) that promote peace processes or strengthen implementation of signed accords. In this sense, the U.S. has been instrumental for promoting peace in Sudan. From 2005 until 2010, the U.S. spent in excess of \$8 billion for humanitarian, development, security, and peacekeeping purposes in Sudan and eastern Chad (where many Darfur refugees were forced to flee). Far beyond the numbers, however, the U.S. has invested considerable political capital in bringing about a peaceful transformation of Sudan—in the midst of costly and highly time-consuming engagements elsewhere in the world.

This paper seeks to shed further light on this role by reviewing Sudan's history of conflict, its halting progress toward peace, and U.S. policy and aid throughout this process. The final sections provide brief reflections on how the U.S. foreign policy and assistance apparatus is organized for Sudan and how effective its functioning has been. The final section concludes with some observations on how the U.S. and Japanese approaches to peacebuilding in Sudan relate to each other and can seek deeper coordination.

Sudan's Long History of Conflict: 1950s-2000

Sudan's recent experience with peacebuilding has to be seen within the context of a half-century of deep-seated, often brutal civil wars that have harmed large numbers of civilians in different parts of the country. In fact, Sudan's vast, multi-ethnic republic has been beset by conflict since before independence in 1956.² A mutiny of southern soldiers who refused transfer to the north prompted the start of the first civil war in 1955, and southern secessionism under the leadership of the Anya Nya movement gained steam by the early 1960s. Peace was reached fleetingly with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which soon broke down over southern grievances regarding the lack of implementation of autonomy provisions. A new rebellion, Anya Nya-II, then arose in the mid-1970s, around the time that oil was discovered in Bentiu, located within the boundaries of the Southern Region. The subsequent defection of the Sudanese Army's Colonel John Garang, who had been sent to put down a southern mutiny, led in 1980 to the establishment of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), based in Ethiopia. Gradually—and at times violently—the SPLM/A then supplanted Anya Nya-II as the standard-bearer of southern secessionism.

² This and the following section draws from various sources including Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon (eds.), *Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan's Conflicts*, Accord, 2006, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/contents.php> (accessed on April 6, 2011) and the reports of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, <http://www.aec-sudan.org/> (accessed on April 8, 2011). For a useful one-page overview of this period, see "Timeline of North-South Conflict in Sudan, 2000 – 2010," compiled for the Oslo Forum's 2010 annual meeting of a network of high-level mediators, <http://www.osloforum.org/system/files/retreats/Sudan%20timeline.pdf>, accessed April 11, 2011.

The 1980s saw further upheaval in Sudan as national political control alternated between civilian and military leaders. Fighting in the government-SPLM/A conflict intensified, and the war expanded from southern Sudan into the central areas of the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile. Khartoum began arming migratory Arabs against southern civilians. These militias—raised among the poor tribes in the hard-scrabble borderlands between northern and southern Sudan—came to be known as Popular Defense Forces (PDF). Meanwhile, internal divisions among southern rebels led to internecine bloodshed often along ethnic lines. The effect on civilians of this virulent combination of conflict factors was devastating. In 1988, more than 250,000 Sudanese died of famine, many of them in Bahr al-Ghazal, as a result of Khartoum’s “scorched-earth” tactics, the denial of access to relief, and the effects of drought and floods. This prompted the UN in early 1989 to sign an agreement with the government and the SPLM/A to provide relief assistance via Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)—which was to become one of the world’s largest, longest, and most logistically complex aid efforts, lasting over a decade. At the national level, a power struggle in 1989 between Islamists and traditional political forces produced yet another coup, and Brigadier Omer al-Bashir assumed power in an alliance with the National Islamic Front (NIF) and dissolved parliament, political parties, and trade unions.

The 1990s were no less bloody or cataclysmic for the country as the NIF sought to consolidate its power and impose shari’a. Conflict worsened in the Nuba Mountains, and the region was beset by a war-induced famine, as was Bahr al-Ghazal (for the second time in a decade). Meanwhile, the SPLM/A and northern opposition parties—united as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—sought to coordinate their efforts against the regime. With Ethiopian and SPLA help, the NDA launched an insurgency in eastern Sudan. The decade of the 1990s, however, also saw the launch of regional peace efforts, led by a consortium of Ethiopian, Eritrean, Ugandan, and Kenyan governments under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD, which later shortened its name to IGAD). Six rounds of talks in 1994 posted successes in gaining President Al-Bashir’s and SPLM/A leader John Garang’s acceptance of the mediation process, but IGAD’s initial efforts yielded no peace accord. In fact, the regime negotiated a separate deal with other southern factions, including that of Riek Machar, and signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997. IGAD-mediated talks between the government and the SPLM/A resumed in the last years of the decade, but without significant effect. Sudan also became an oil producer in 1999, underscoring a highly contentious issue in the north-south relationship (and one that has remained problematic despite the advances achieved under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005).

Sudan’s Uncertain Struggle toward Peace: 2001-2009

With the start of the new millennium, peace efforts entered into a qualitatively different phase. As discussed in greater detail below, this period coincided with an increase in the focus and level of U.S. commitment in pushing for an end to the government-SPLM/A war. Greater pressure from key domestic constituencies within the U.S. and from the Congress itself—which was seeking to pass a proposed Sudan Peace Act—led the Bush administration in early September

2001 to appoint the first U.S. special envoy on Sudan, former Senator (and Episcopalian pastor) John Danforth. Days later, al-Qaeda carried out the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington. This dramatically changed the context in which Khartoum saw its relations with the United States and the war against southern secessionism. Meanwhile, IGAD had advanced in its efforts to facilitate a peace process, and the international community was in a position to cooperate more directly with Khartoum, including lifting UN diplomatic sanctions which had been in place since 1996.

By late 2001, sizeable strides were made in reinvigorating a peace process. Special Envoy Danforth was particularly keen to establish a series of “litmus tests” to verify the parties’ willingness to negotiate in good faith. Mediated by the U.S. and Switzerland, a six-month, renewable cease-fire was signed in January 2002 by the government and SPLM/A to allow for humanitarian assistance to enter the Nuba Mountains, which would be monitored by unarmed foreign personnel through joint military monitors and a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team. With the inclusion of international monitors and provisions for unimpeded aid to the Nuba Mountains, the cease-fire was a signal achievement. In the meantime, through the Nairobi Declaration, also agreed to in January 2002, Riek Machar’s faction reconciled with the SPLM/A, overcoming a major hurdle to greater southern unity and cohesiveness and increasing chances of a successful peace process. The other monumental breakthrough reached in 2002 was the Machakos Protocol, signed in July by the government and SPLM. It acknowledged southern Sudan’s right to a referendum on secession after a six-and-a-half-year transition period while allowing the north to keep shari’a law.

The year 2003 saw the continuation of IGAD talks, bolstered by the inclusion of the U.S., UK, Norway, and others as observers. Separate talks in Kenya facilitated by the IGAD mediator—retired Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo—focused on the status of the so-called Transition Zones (now called the Three Areas) along the presumptive north-south border at the time of Sudanese independence on January 1, 1956, also known as “1-1-56.”³ Eventually shifted to Naivasha, the IGAD process marked yet another success in bringing together SPLM/A leader John Garang and Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha and brokering the “Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period” in September. Unfortunately, however, 2003 was also the year that a new insurgency was launched in Sudan’s western region, under the name Front for the Liberation of Darfur. In part because of the example and influence of the SPLM/A, the Darfur rebels then changed their name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A); their support came mainly from the Fur, Masalit, smaller allied tribes, and parts of the Zaghawa ethnic group. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—which traces its origins to the Muslim Brotherhood and disaffected NIF members from Darfur but draws heavily on other elements of the Zaghawa for its membership—also entered the fray in

³ The Three Areas of Abyei, southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains became ensnared in the SPLM/A uprising for different historical reasons than the south, but their position along the ill-defined 1-1-56 border and their role in the rebellion made the resolution of their status all the more nettlesome.

Darfur and the east. Paralleling Khartoum's earlier use of Arab PDF militias against southern civilians, the Sudanese government armed and supported Arab militias in Darfur known as *janjaweed*. These militias were tasked with burning villages and attacking civilians from mostly African tribes as part of the military's counter-insurgency effort. Large-scale death, destruction, and displacement of civilians commenced in 2003, continuing into and reaching international notoriety in 2004. By the end of 2004, some 2 million Darfurians were estimated to have been displaced, including some 200,000 in refugee camps in eastern Chad and over 1.5 million within camps in Darfur.

In 2004-05, the Sudanese government simultaneously pursued peace negotiations with the SPLM/A while prosecuting an indiscriminate counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur against areas suspected of SLM/A or JEM sympathies (and half-heartedly negotiating with the Darfur rebels). As discussed below, this led to strong tensions in U.S. policy and peacebuilding efforts. On the one hand, the Naivasha process produced in early 2004 the Agreement on Wealth-Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, a pioneering deal regarding Sudan's oil wealth (which is located in the south but has to transit the north via a pipeline to reach Port Sudan and export markets). Soon thereafter, the government and SPLM/A agreed on a power-sharing deal as well as protocols for the Three Areas. These are highly significant, both in terms of substance and in terms of U.S. assistance. The power-sharing accord officially divided executive and legislative positions between the government party and opposition parties (including but not exclusively the SPLM), and its primary focus was the national political institutions, in other words those located in the north (and which would remain in the north if the south were to secede). The protocols for the Three Areas—which in essence were miniature peace agreements—involved a special U.S. role as mediator and have therefore implied a special U.S. commitment to the Three Areas.

Unfortunately, 2004-2005 also saw an intensification of the conflict in Darfur, a listless peace process for the region, and increasing pressure from the United States (and others) on Khartoum to change its bellicose policies toward the west of the country. Talks commenced in N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, between the government and the SLM/A and JEM, but only yielded a renewable 45-day cease-fire, the creation of the Joint Ceasefire Commission, and a commitment to further negotiations. The African Union (AU) then received the mandate both to lead the peace process and to establish the cease-fire commission and deploy observers. Deploying cease-fire monitors was an enormously taxing undertaking for the body, given its limited operational capacity. In mid-2004, the first contingent of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeeping force began arriving in Darfur, but it required significant Western (mainly U.S.) airlift and even on-the-ground logistical support (provided via a U.S. civilian contractor hired to operate AMIS bases and installations). AU-mediated peace talks limped along in late 2004, making lackluster progress through 2005 and into 2006.

Meanwhile, pressure increased enormously in 2004 within UN, U.S., and other policy-making circles to declare the Darfur crisis a "genocide." The U.S. Congress officially labeled it as such,

and following large-scale, in-depth interviews of Darfur refugees in eastern Chad (an effort paid for and organized by USAID), then-Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress in September of that year that “genocide has been committed” through a “consistent and widespread” pattern of atrocities, including killings, rapes, and destruction of livelihoods and property.⁴ In part through U.S. advocacy, the UN Security Council mandated the Independent Commission of Inquiry into Darfur and threatened sanctions if civilians were not protected. An early-2005 UN Security Council Resolution went even further and allowed for sanctions against Darfur cease-fire violators and for referrals of suspected perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

It was in this schizophrenic context that talks in Kenya resumed regarding a final settlement between the government and SPLM/A. In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was formally signed. Soon thereafter, the report of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)—prepared by the government, the SPLM/A, and donor institutions—was released, estimating the costs of initial reconstruction assistance for southern Sudan and the Three Areas at close to \$8 billion. To strengthen implementation of the CPA’s security provisions, the UN Security Council authorized the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with 10,000 troops and up to 715 civilian police to be deployed, primarily in the south and Three Areas but also in other contentious zones, like the east.

With the end of the six-month “pre-interim period,” the formal, six-year-long interim period envisioned by the CPA commenced on July 9, 2005, when John Garang was sworn in as president of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and Sudan’s first vice president. His untimely death in an accidental helicopter crash—occurring within mere weeks of his dual appointment—provoked widespread violence in Khartoum, Juba, and some other towns. However, setting up GOSS institutions and the Government of National Unity (GNU) at the central level continued apace with the appointment of the new SPLM leader Salva Kiir Mayardit as first vice president and president of GOSS and with the inclusion of SPLM ministers in the GNU. By the end of 2005, Sudan had a new interim national constitution and a new interim constitution for Southern Sudan. By early- to mid-2006, myriad new institutions mandated by the CPA were established. Progress beyond these initial steps, however, was slow and uneven.

Adding to Sudan’s complex patchwork of power-sharing agreements, security arrangements, and autonomy provisions under the CPA, two further peace agreements were inked in 2006. In May, the government and Menawi’s SLM/A faction sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), but the JEM and Abdelwahid’s SLM faction refuse to sign. The U.S. was heavily engaged in helping to

⁴ On September 9, 2004, the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research jointly published a report, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur,” summarizing these findings. This report was previously available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm>, but appears no longer to be archived on the State Department’s public website. For more on then-Secretary Powell’s testimony, see Steven R. Weisman, “Powell Declares Genocide in Sudan in Bid to Raise Pressure,” *New York Times*, September 9, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/international/africa/09CND-SUDA.html>, accessed April 6, 2011.

bring about the DPA, pushing for its broader acceptance, and assisting with implementation of key provisions. In fact, following assertive U.S. diplomacy in edging the parties toward an agreement and mustering expanded international support, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick arrived in Abuja, the site of the talks, in early May, together with UK International Secretary Hilary Benn. The plan was to cajole the parties into signing the deal, but only the Sudanese government and Minni Menawi's SLM/A faction acceded.⁵ (Though Menawi was sworn in as assistant to the president, the DPA ultimately failed, for myriad reasons.) In November, the Sudanese government agreed in principle to a hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, a key demand of the international community as part of overall stabilization efforts.

The second peace agreement in 2006 came in October, when the government and the Eastern Front rebels signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA). Mediated by the Eritrean government—which had previously supported the Eastern Front as an irritant against its erstwhile antagonists in Khartoum—the ESPA envisioned power- and revenue-sharing between the GNU and the three eastern states of Kassala, Red Sea, and Gedaref. With each successive accord, however, cynicism mounted regarding the robustness and durability of Sudan's "kaleidoscope" of peace deals. To make matters worse, confrontation between Sudan and Chad escalated in 2006, with each country supporting rebels fighting against its neighbor. (Libya also backed some of the Darfur rebels, particularly JEM.)

The messiness continued throughout 2007-09 as tensions surfaced on multiple fronts. At the national level, the SPLM temporarily withdrew from the Government of National Unity in 2007 over disputes with President Bashir's National Congress Party regarding the pace of implementation of CPA provisions, including agreements on Abyei, wealth-sharing, withdrawal of government security forces from the south, and demarcation of the 1-1-56 north-south border. In fact, Abyei became a major flashpoint in 2008 as government forces and Arab militias clashed with the SPLA and destroyed the town. The parties eventually agreed to submit resolution of Abyei's status to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The year 2008 also saw the census, stipulated by the CPA, finally take place after successive delays (it was originally to be held in early 2007) and despite problems, including an SPLM boycott in South Kordofan and contested results.

CPA Milestones and a Renewed Darfur Peace Process in Doha

The census set the stage for the remaining events of the interim period, namely the 2010 general elections and the 2011 referendum. These milestones were not reached easily, however, as the parties (particularly on the NCP side) ratcheted up demands and dragged out decision making. In

⁵ For a trenchant critique of the "deadline diplomacy" that the U.S. and others practiced in Abuja, see insider Laurie Nathan's account of the talks, "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur," Small Arms Survey, Human Security Baseline Assessment, no. 4, December 2006, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-4-Darfur.pdf>, accessed April 11, 2011.

fact, talks mediated by the U.S. in 2009 led the NCP and SPLM eventually to agree on the terms of the referendum: it would be considered valid if at least a 60 percent turnout was achieved, and a simple majority voted for independence. Though far from a smooth year, 2010 constituted a turning point for Sudan in many respects. The parties agreed to re-do the census in South Kordofan and to resolve disputes about the overall census results by augmenting the number of southern seats in the national assembly by 40. General elections were finally held in April, although the SPLM and other opposition parties boycotted the vote in the north out of protest over what they saw as unfair tactics and abuse of incumbency by the NCP. President Bashir, who had been charged in 2008 with genocide in Darfur by the ICC prosecutor, was elected president with 68 percent of the vote, and Salva Kiir won 93 percent of the vote for presidency of the south. In addition, “popular consultations” envisioned for Blue Nile and South Kordofan as part of the CPA were finally initiated in 2010.

In early 2011, Sudan reached the definitive milestone of the CPA’s interim period with the January referendum on whether southern Sudan should remain part of the country or become independent. The one major footnote to this event was that Abyei’s status still remains unresolved. A simultaneous referendum was to be held there on whether it would become part of Southern Sudan or stay with the north, but the vote was delayed due to differences between the NCP-dominated central government and the SPLM over boundary demarcation for Abyei and residency rights. Nevertheless, close to 99 percent of southerners voted for independence; despite irregularities in a number of counties, the vote’s results were announced officially in February and are considered valid, setting the stage for southern independence on July 9, 2011.

The period from 2007 to 2011 presented a very mixed picture for Darfur as well. Inter-tribal violence following the collapse of the DPA persisted into 2007. Throughout that year, the United States was extremely active in pushing for renewed talks and particularly in encouraging rebel unification, although a renewed peace process launched in October 2007 in Sirte, Libya, ultimately proved stillborn. In 2008 the security situation in Darfur deteriorated further, bringing the total deaths since 2003 to an estimated 300,000. A JEM attack in May 2008—which reached Khartoum’s twin city Omdurman and almost carried the rebels across the Nile River—broadened the war and unleashed a government crackdown. Eventually, however, a new Darfur peace process began in Qatar in 2009 and continues as of the time of this writing, in April 2011. Its prospects are uncertain.

U.S. Policy on Sudan since 2001

Against this tortured background of wars, atrocities, and peace processes, U.S. policy on Sudan has sought to function effectively across a number of issues. Although an extremely important priority, promoting durable peace and assisting with implementation of viable accords are but one element of U.S. policy. Dynamics in the bilateral relationship have been complicated because of numerous issues—including those important to a number of influential lobbies within

the United States⁶—and relations have often been fraught. Part of this stems from highly antagonistic relations dating back to the 1990s, when Bashir and the NIF first came to power. The regime’s support for international terrorists and its overt flirtation with Osama bin Laden, who resided in Sudan in 1991-96, put it on a collision course with U.S. policy along many dimensions, and international sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Khartoum duly followed. Indeed, in the wake of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar-as-Salam and Nairobi, the United States conducted a missile strike in the outskirts of Khartoum against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, allegedly the site of a chemical weapons factory. Sanctions and restrictions imposed by President Bill Clinton in 1997 were affirmed by President George W. Bush in 2001 and subsequently thereafter.

The U.S. posture has gradually shifted as Khartoum’s support for al-Qaeda waned, as the Sudanese government explicitly sought to assist the U.S. following the September 2001 attacks, and as Sudan implements the provisions of the CPA. Regarding purportedly greater intelligence cooperation since 2001, Sudan was characterized by the State Department in yearly Country Reports on Terrorism—based on information provided by U.S. intelligence agencies—as a “strong partner in the War on Terror” despite the evident backing of militias in Darfur against civilians and support for non-state terrorist groups elsewhere.⁷ Open sources report that Sudan was allegedly providing spies for U.S. purposes in Iraq, tracking al-Qaeda in Somalia, and offering other intelligence assistance.⁸ The 2005 visit of Sudan’s then-intelligence chief, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, to the U.S. for meetings at CIA headquarters is often cited as evidence of this closer relationship.

U.S. policy also seeks to remain cognizant of Sudan’s importance as an oil producer and a large, influential country in a volatile region. Sudan’s oil exports, some 65 percent of which go to China but provide close to all of southern Sudan’s revenues, require the U.S. to take a nuanced approach.⁹ Sudanese cooperation—for example, in withdrawing Khartoum’s earlier support for the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda—has also been instrumental in progress on regional issues.

⁶ These have included, since the 1990s and into the new millennium, the following: Christian conservatives concerned about religious persecution under the NIF regime, such as the imposition of shari’a; the Congressional Black Caucus and other African-American advocates, who were first concerned about modern-day slavery in Sudan but then became engaged more broadly on the north-south war; human rights groups focused on war crimes, genocide, and large-scale violations in the north-south war and then later on Darfur; and the wellspring of campus, youth, religious, and other groups (assembled via Save Darfur and other networks) agitating for a robust U.S. policy regarding Darfur.

⁷ See, for example, Josh Meyer, “Sudan Called a Key U.S. Ally,” *LA Times*, May 5, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/05/world/fg-ussudan5>, accessed on April 11, 2011.

⁸ See Greg Miller and Josh Meyer, “U.S. Relies on Sudan despite Condemning It,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/print/2007/jun/11/world/fg-ussudan1>, accessed April 11, 2011.

⁹ Sudan produces close to a half-million barrels a day, some of which is consumed domestically, and the rest is exported mostly to China and in lesser quantities to Indonesia, Japan, India, Malaysia, and others. For more, see <http://www.eurasiareview.com/sudan-energy-profile-oil-over-90-percent-of-total-export-revenues-26022011/>, accessed April 17, 2011.

Nevertheless, the major issue for U.S. policy regarding Sudan has been the country's internal conflicts and the regime's often-wanton disregard for civilian life in the course of countering the regional rebellions. This engagement first developed in the 1980s and particularly the 1990s with the intensification of the north-south war, but the past decade's carnage and displacement in Darfur has again brought humanitarian concerns strongly to the fore. The U.S. has become Sudan's largest aid donor almost exclusively because of the magnitude of its humanitarian needs and peacekeeping operations. Over time, this concern has garnered greater awareness and support among U.S. voters than for any other foreign policy issue in Africa, particularly among grassroots humanitarian and religious organizations mobilized by the Darfur genocide. This higher level of popular awareness about Sudan—and now particularly Darfur—is reflected in vigorous engagement by Congress, members of which have been some of the longest-standing U.S. observers of the country. A highly noteworthy dimension of this popular groundswell for an energetic U.S. policy on Sudan is the role of celebrities—particularly big names in the movie industry like Mia Farrow, George Clooney, Don Cheadle, Ben Affleck, Matt Damon, Angelina Jolie, and Steven Spielberg—to push publicly for more muscular international responses against Sudanese government for its depredations against civilians.

Given this domestic concern, pushing for and helping to achieve the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement was, therefore, an important Bush administration foreign policy success. This focus has continued under President Barack Obama. Following his inauguration in 2009, his administration initiated a Sudan policy review, which was formally released in October of that year. Entitled “Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach,”¹⁰ it lays out a vision clearly grounded in humanitarian concerns for the fate of the CPA and civilians in Darfur, but also focuses on integrating disparate elements of U.S. Sudan policy into a more cohesive whole. It advocates for “a more effective multilateral approach,” in which U.S. leadership is crucial and seeks to construct an “expanded coalition . . . to promote security, justice, and development” in Sudan. Balancing simultaneous focus on Darfur and CPA implementation as well as conflict prevention elsewhere, the policy aims to “be agile enough to address discrete emerging crises, while maintaining a sustained focus on long-term stability.” Similarly, it seeks to avoid that Sudanese support for counterterrorism objectives “be used as a bargaining chip to evade responsibilities in Darfur or in implementing the CPA.” The policy review then articulates three principal U.S. strategic priorities, including the following (reproduced verbatim):

- (1) A definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur.
- (2) Implementation of the North-South CPA that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other.
- (3) Ensure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

¹⁰ Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm>, accessed April 11, 2011.

This set of priorities hinges on a relatively narrow array of policy options, however, especially given the geopolitical realities of the region. (The last decade has seen U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the ongoing Taliban insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a seemingly intractable Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and now the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria, as well as a NATO-imposed no-fly zone in Libya.) The major carrot in U.S. policy toward Khartoum is the prospect of removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and normalizing relations with Washington, which are being held out as inducements for full implementation of the CPA and substantive progress on resolving the Darfur conflict.

U.S. Peacebuilding Priorities in Sudan: An Evolution over Time

U.S. peacebuilding efforts have remained a consistently high bilateral and multilateral priority. Largely flexible and responsive to the circumstances in Sudan, the exact mix of elements and their relative emphasis within peacebuilding efforts have evolved over time. Seven major elements can be discerned, though, each one fluctuating in relation to the exigencies of the moment. These are as follows:

- Using diplomatic pressure to secure—and implement—durable and just peace agreements between the belligerents.
- Encouraging rebel/opposition groups to resolve internal differences and present a more cohesive front externally.
- Helping parties to avoid the escalation of local disputes into more destabilizing conflicts.
- Building up southern capabilities, particularly during the interim period, so that southern Sudan can become a viable counterpart to Khartoum and survive as a state if it opted for independence.
- Seeking to expand the access of average Sudanese to information about issues and events that affect the country, like peace agreements, constitutional and institutional changes—and seeking to increase popular participation in key events, like the census, elections, popular consultations, and referenda.
- Calling attention to large-scale abuses, for example in Darfur, and providing concrete assistance that aims to protect civilians.
- Providing large-scale assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilians and begin the process of post-war reconstruction and recovery.

Pressing for Peace—and for Peace Implementation: Arguably the most important and at times the most influential role played by the U.S. in Sudan has been to press for peace: before and during negotiations and throughout the vitally critical implementation period *after* a deal has been signed. The stand-out achievement for the U.S. in this regard was to work closely with

IGAD, regional governments, the UK, Norway, and other international parties to bring together the Sudanese regime and the SPLM in the Naivasha process. This ultimately yielded the CPA.¹¹ A specific example of leadership was to assure the SPLM that concerted U.S. assistance and vigilance regarding the Three Areas would be provided in exchange for decisive concessions that Abyei could have a referendum on its status and association with the south while the SPLM-held zones of the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile would remain in the north (albeit with substantial autonomy envisioned during the interim period). The United States has sought to play a similarly active role with regard to the Darfur conflict, serving as a key broker of the 2004 N'Djamena cease-fire and the 2006 Abuja peace accord and continuing to push for peace in the Doha talks.

This role, however, has not been limited to the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases of formal talks, but extends to the implementation of often-vague, contentious issues conveniently left ill-defined or even undecided in an accord. The U.S. has been a vital participant in the CPA's formal oversight process led by the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and it breathed new life into the "troika" of CPA guarantors (U.S., UK, and Norway). More significantly, it has been an instrumental broker of post-accord agreements for disputes that have arisen during CPA implementation. The U.S. was indispensable in bringing about the SPLM-NCP deal to refer the Abyei dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and in overcoming obstacles created by the census results. The 2009 policy review recommitted the U.S. to working with international partners to address unimplemented elements of the CPA, such as the 2010 elections, the 2011 referendum, border demarcation, and confidence-building measures along the 1-1-56 line.

Contain and Defuse Tensions in Potential Flashpoints: The Darfur crisis—as tragic and brutal as it has been for civilians—also drew enormous foreign policy attention away from the north-south peace process precisely at a time when the international community was trying to push for signatures on the CPA. This experience and the presence of myriad hot-spots throughout Sudan, particularly in the Three Areas and the oil-rich borderlands, underscored for U.S. policy makers and aid managers the need to remain vigilant about potential flashpoints. The flare-ups in Abyei in 2008 and again now in early 2011 are a case in point. U.S. policy and assistance therefore seek to help Sudanese head off or otherwise manage tensions in about a half-dozen priority areas and to support others, like the UN and international NGOs, to implement conflict prevention activities and/or disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. A specific concern is that local conflicts can be escalated by unscrupulous elites and derail the CPA or other peace processes. Particularly through targeted, highly flexible programming mechanisms

¹¹ At the time of its signing and immediately thereafter, the U.S. and other CPA proponents argued that if properly implemented, the accord could "make unity attractive," and that national authorities, particularly those associated with the National Congress Party and the security forces, should engage in efforts to do so. Underlying this hope, however, were the assumptions that power- and wealth-sharing accords would be fully implemented and thereby undercut secessionist grievances, and that the national elections envisioned under CPA would be free, fair, and competitive and bring about a different political dispensation that could make continued union between the north and south viable. These assumptions were not borne out by subsequent events.

managed by USAID, the United States is seeking to mount high-impact, visible programmatic responses to such flashpoints and crises. At a diplomatic level—whether via the special envoy (see below), Friends of the CPA, and/or like-minded embassies—the idea is to bring pressure to bear on spoilers or their recalcitrant backers in order to resolve conflicts early and peacefully.

Resolving Inter-Group Differences: An issue related to these potential flashpoints is divisive inter-group relations. The underlying assumption in promoting reconciliation within groups or regions is that greater internal cohesion will enable parties to achieve more vigorous, more durable settlements with their counterparts. The danger is that unresolved conflicts could undermine or imperil a broader peace. This strategy was first employed in the south and the Nuba Mountains, where internal divisions during the 1990s left communities fragmented, mutually hostile, and often open to the machinations if not manipulations of outside elites. The central government in Khartoum was well-versed in pitting Arabs against Nuba in South Kordofan, for example, or in exploiting Dinka-Nuer-Shilluk rifts in the south, often arming one group against the other.

Early milestones in overcoming some of these internal divisions came with the 1999 Wunlit meeting that helped lay the groundwork for Dinka-Nuer reconciliation and thereby for the SPLM's rapprochement with other southern factions, including those under the command of Riek Machar. An almost identical strategy was pursued in Darfur, when the U.S. and other like-minded outsiders encouraged the deeply fractured western rebels to reconcile with each other in 2007, via meetings in Mombasa, Kenya, and in Arusha, Tanzania, in the run-up to the resumption of peace talks in Sirte, Libya. (Both the pre-meetings and the Sirte talks ultimately proved unsuccessful.)

In a similar vein, USAID funded the All-Nuba Conference in December 2002, which helped to undergird the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains and the re-launching of humanitarian operations in that area.¹² During the Kenya-based negotiations in Machakos and Naivasha in 2003-04 and in the immediate post-CPA period of 2005-06, USAID energetically supported grassroots, "people-to-people" peacebuilding in southern Sudan as part of an effort to help southerners show their ability to overcome their differences and prepare for regional autonomy and self-governance. This approach has also been extended to dealing with local disputes in other places, including where USAID funded implementing partners to promote community-based peace mechanisms. For example, in an insecure area of Upper Nile where three contending tribes vie for access to water and control over cattle, a USAID partner established six "early warning" monitoring posts through which communities could contact local authorities and police in the event of an impending conflict.

¹² For more information, see http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/nuba_conference.doc, accessed April 17, 2011.

Building up Southern Capabilities: It is difficult to overstate the role of the U.S. in providing assistance to the emerging institutions of the Government of South Sudan. Assistance to the south covers a vast realm ranging from managing public resources, including oil revenues, to helping the SPLA transform itself into a more professional (and less costly) army while promoting community disarmament and security programs. In terms of building GOSS institutions and ensuring some modicum of transparency and effectiveness in political processes like elections, the U.S. role is unequalled. Help was provided for writing a Southern constitution, standing up key institutions, and training or advising GOSS officials and technical staff. This assistance has included direct USAID support to the GOSS Office of the President and Ministry of Presidential Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Bank of Southern Sudan, and myriad other ministries and government organizations in an effort to build up a professional civil service and establish systems and skills for transparent government functioning at both the regional (i.e., Juba) and southern state levels.

At the state level, USAID has gone so far in the south and the Three Areas as to (1) support local civil authorities with developing plans, policies, governing bodies, procedures, and infrastructure; (2) provide basic office furniture and equipment (sometimes called “Government in a Box” for short), capacity-building training, and technical assistance to emerging governance structures; and (3) promote the ability of local governments to deliver services to citizens and increase the opportunities for—and the quality of—dialogue between local officials and their constituents.

Assistance to Southern institutions involved in preparing for and carrying out key processes like the census, elections, and the referendum has been monumental. Transparency in fiscal expenditures and governance more generally is seen as essential for the GOSS to function effectively and to be able to attract outside investment. Shortcomings in this area prompted donors, the U.S. included, to insist with the GOSS on the 2009 Juba Compact to promote greater transparency. Shortcomings in governance were also highlighted by severe irregularities in the 2010 elections, including, among other deficiencies, abuse of incumbency and diversion of public resources for electoral purposes in the south (not to mention the harassment of opposition candidates and other more blatant abuses in the north).

“Democratizing” Peace Agreements and Related Political Processes: Elite-brokered peace agreements are fundamentally undemocratic and involve a small group of leaders who have generally earned a spot at the negotiating table via the muzzle of a gun and not the ballot box or the will of the people. A key challenge following signature of any peace deal is therefore to “democratize” it, making it more intelligible and accessible to the average citizen, particularly those who are still armed or might otherwise want to express specific grievances. Sudan’s vast size, low literacy, and authoritarian history have posed additional challenges in popularizing the CPA, arguably the most complex peace accord to ever settle a civil war. Particularly through USAID programming, the U.S. has been the most energetic donor in disseminating information about the CPA (and the other regional peace accords, as they were concluded), increasing

popular access to reliable information on public affairs, and seeking to improve the quality and professionalism of the media generally. This has been all the more important—and indeed difficult—in the closed political atmosphere of northern Sudan.

Noteworthy initiatives include funding Sudan’s first shortwave radio broadcasts in native languages other than Arabic; establishing community FM radio stations throughout the south and the Three Areas; distributing solar-powered and wind-up radios and promoting village listening groups; and supporting independent print media, especially in the north, and training journalists. Given the new regulatory environment for independent media in the south, USAID also worked with the GOSS Ministry of Information to develop and vet policies and regulations. A specific effort was focused on disseminating information on the CPA (and later the DPA and ESPA) through accessible forms for illiterate citizens, including using local languages, street theater, music, and other popular media. (Authorities blocked similar efforts in and around Khartoum.)

Exposing Atrocities and Protecting Civilians: The Darfur crisis of 2003-04 highlighted with tragic clarity the Sudanese government’s capacity for prosecuting a brutal counter-insurgency that disproportionately affected civilians while simultaneously seeking to engage in high-profile peace talks. U.S. government attention to such atrocities in Darfur garnered both policy action and programmatic support. For example, the United States was an early champion of the N’Djamena cease-fire process while pushing for the deployment of AU monitors (under an operation known as AMIS, which the U.S. aided with airlift and other logistical support). Similarly, USAID sought to fund a number of initiatives in both Darfur and eastern Chad that focused explicitly on protection of civilians, including interviews with Darfur refugees in eastern Chad that provided the basis for then-Secretary of State Powell’s above-mentioned testimony in September 2004, declaring the official U.S. government view that genocide had occurred. In mid-2005, his successor, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, was similarly moved on a trip to Sudan to call for a multi-million-dollar program specifically to counter violence against women that she heard about first-hand during meetings in Darfur. This led to a multi-year effort funded largely by USAID and implemented through UN and community development partners to monitor abuses, minimize women’s exposure to violence, increase awareness of the damaging effects of violence against women, and improve victims’ access to legal and medical services.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance: While not strictly considered “peacebuilding,” the U.S. humanitarian assistance for Sudan’s conflict-affected populations has been the single largest source of bilateral aid to the country. This assistance includes one of the largest food aid programs in the world and support in virtually every other humanitarian sector, including health, water, sanitation, shelter, livelihoods, and economic recovery. It has spanned the country from the conflict-affected parts of the east to the west of Darfur (and the refugee camps of eastern Chad) and from the large IDP settlements near Khartoum to the Three Areas and the south.

Assets and Expertise of U.S. Peacebuilding Efforts in Sudan

This review covers only civilian U.S. agencies engaged in peacebuilding efforts in Sudan and not defense or intelligence agencies (though their role will be touched on in the subsequent section). Broadly speaking, the executive branch has provided the main leadership for developing and implementing peacebuilding policies and programs, but Congress has historically also played an important role dating back to the advocacy and legislative action of the 1990s. In terms of the executive branch, the State Department and USAID have been the key agencies engaged on Sudan. Though access has fluctuated depending on security factors and the state of U.S.-Sudanese relations, the United States has had a diplomatic presence in Khartoum and, since 2005, in the southern capital of Juba. During certain periods of more intensive diplomatic engagement around peace processes, the State Department has augmented or reassigned staff to follow and support talks more closely, in countries ranging from Kenya (during the CPA negotiations) to Chad, Nigeria, Libya, and now Qatar (for Darfur-related negotiations). In addition, diplomats were deployed on an extended basis in El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and focus of DPA-related activity, from 2006 onward. While USAID's presence has varied over time—including using Nairobi as its base for assistance to southern Sudan until 2005—the development agency has had a sizeable field presence in Khartoum, throughout the south, in the Three Areas, and in parts of Darfur for most of the last five to six years.¹³

Unlike policy on most other countries, Sudan policy has the added benefit of a presidentially appointed special envoy, who not only provides top-level policy direction but also a direct link to the White House. The role of the special envoy has helped to distinguish U.S. policy and engagement on Sudan over the last decade. Created in 2001 when former Senator John Danforth was first appointed to the job, the special envoy post has been occupied by a series of appointees over the years. Particularly in the wake of relatively broad-based popular awareness and grassroots activism on Darfur in the U.S., the special envoy has been increasingly forced into the policy spotlight, particularly as statements are disseminated instantaneously via the internet and social media favored by activist groups.

In theory, the special envoy role allows for top-down coordination of policy across various agencies to minimize stove-piping or disconnects in the U.S. approach to a country like Sudan. It also enables a more direct, high-level dialogue to take place between the White House and key Sudanese interlocutors, beyond the profile that in-country U.S. diplomats can bring to such problems. The 2009 policy review¹⁴ pointedly stated that the special envoy's role “includes frank dialogue with the Government of Sudan about what needs to be accomplished, how the bilateral relationship can improve if conditions transform, and how the government will become even

¹³ Some of USAID's senior-most officials over the last ten years—like former administrator Andrew Natsios, former assistant administrator Roger Winter, former assistant administrator Kate Almquist, former mission director Allen Reed, and senior advisors Brian Da Silva and John Marks – are Sudan specialists in their own right and brought years if not decades of high-level contacts to bear on their work in the country, particularly the south.

¹⁴ For more information, see <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm>, accessed April 11, 2011.

more isolated if conditions remain the same or worsen.” The special envoy can also serve as the counterpart for similarly senior officials from the UN (like the secretary-general’s special representative) or other countries.¹⁵ This is particularly relevant given that the 2009 policy review explicitly noted that the U.S. “will seek to broaden and deepen the multilateral coalition actively working to achieve peace in Darfur and full implementation of the CPA such that backsliding by any party is met with credible, meaningful disincentives, leveraged by the United States and the international community.” High turnover in the special envoy position over the last five years, however, has bedeviled efforts to achieve and maintain a consistent sense of momentum and direction, although the recent appointment of the former U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Princeton Lyman, to this role has been seen positively.¹⁶

Assessing a Whole-of-Government Approach to Peacebuilding in Sudan

Over the last ten years, the U.S. government has been reasonably successful at establishing a more or less coherent policy framework on Sudan—despite the multifaceted and often vexing challenges that the country presents. The U.S. government has also created more or less effective mechanisms for interagency coordination (these are not unique to Sudan policy but have been used to good effect on it). Since the time of the Naivasha talks, which saw both State and USAID personnel participating in U.S. delegations and advising on the peace process, there has been a high degree of coordination across the main civilian agencies engaged on Sudan. Relatively robust interagency coordination mechanisms have included Department of Defense and intelligence agencies at key moments. A noteworthy example was the June 2004 release of commercial satellite imagery by the State Department’s Humanitarian Information Unit depicting the widespread, systematic destruction of villages in Darfur.¹⁷

While internal policy-making deliberations on Sudan have not been disclosed, public expressions like congressional testimony, special envoy speeches, or the above-mentioned Sudan policy review released in 2009 provide snapshots of U.S. policy at different points. By and large, these have been consistent over time. This relative coherence within the U.S. government also reflects and is translated into active interagency consultations. By 2004-05—at the height of the Naivasha end-game and the depths of the Darfur crisis—National Security Council staff and State Department personnel were managing an intensive process of interagency meetings and consultations at multiple levels and across multiple time zones. These processes have persisted in similar forms since then.¹⁸ One set of stakeholders who are not formally of the U.S. government

¹⁵ Norway and China, for example, have both nominated high-ranking diplomats—in addition to in-country ambassadors—to work exclusively on peace and security issues regarding Sudan.

¹⁶ For more on the newest special envoy appointment, see Rebecca Hamilton, “Our New Man in Sudan: Can Washington’s Fourth Envoy in Five Years Finally Get Things Right?” *Foreign Policy*, April 4, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/04/our_new_man_in_sudan?page=0,0, accessed April 11, 2011.

¹⁷ See http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/sudan/images/Darfur_villages_0621.pdf, accessed April 12, 2011.

¹⁸ The State Department’s public report on the 2009 policy review indicates that “[e]ach quarter, the interagency at senior levels will assess a variety of indicators of progress or of deepening crisis, and that assessment will include

but nonetheless highly influential is the Congress, which has played a strong advocacy and legislative role on Sudan since the 1990s.¹⁹ Similarly, while sometimes critical of U.S. decision making, civil society actors, including high-profile celebrity spokespeople, have largely sought to shape policy debates and influence key players in the administration and Congress constructively.

Complementarity: How Do U.S. and Japanese Peacebuilding Efforts Work Together in Sudan?

Do the US and Japan share common interests and objectives in Sudan?

Both Japan and the U.S. share an interest in ending Sudan's conflict, protecting civilians, addressing humanitarian needs, and preventing terrorism. The U.S. objectives to stop the conflict and human rights abuses in Darfur, to support successful implementation of the CPA, and to end state support for terrorism reflect Japan's focus as well (Japan has also funded projects in eastern Sudan). Both countries are investing their efforts in a stable and viable Southern Sudan, a positive relationship between the north and the south, and the continued viability of the north. The U.S. and Japan, however, face questions and a lack of policy clarity on what sort of relationship with and future for northern Sudan they envision, beyond its continued viability as a country. Is the objective to preserve the status quo, or to encourage reform of the ruling party (the NCP) and the authoritarian system it controls and push for "north-north" political dialogue, leading to a more inclusive multi-party, decentralized democracy?

Do the U.S. and Japan share common approaches and analysis?

Both Japanese and U.S. peacebuilding efforts cover a similar range of activities. The United States, however, has dedicated the highest level of executive, legislative, and foreign assistance focus to resolving the conflicts in Sudan. This focus has been backed by strong and committed domestic political constituencies, which have generally transcended clear ideological lines. The same depth of political support for peacebuilding in Sudan does not exist within Japan, despite its commitment to pursue similar objectives. Nonetheless, the two countries are bound by common programs that have supported implementation of the CPA, including elections, the referendum, and DDR. The United States and Japan are the largest funders of the UN and share mechanisms that could be enhanced for improved collaboration. Situation analysis is also an area where the U.S. and Japan share similar viewpoints, and there are other examples of joint coordination, especially on approaches to Sudan's Three Areas—Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

calibrated steps to bolster support for positive change and to discourage backsliding." For more information, see <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm>, accessed April 11, 2011.

¹⁹ For a good overview in 2002 of the state of congressional action on Sudan, see Ted Dagne, "Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief*, no. IB98043, <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/872.pdf>, accessed on April 18, 2011.

Over the last half-century, Sudan has been caught in the throes of deep-seated, often brutal conflicts. These will not be durably resolved without a “whole-of-Sudan” approach that decentralizes and democratizes power in such a vast and diverse country. To be effective, outside support for peacebuilding efforts has to take a comprehensive, integrated approach. The effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach pursued by the U.S. stems from many factors: special envoys reporting directly to the president, close coordination between the State Department and USAID, individual U.S. government officials with years of experience and relationships in Sudan, high-level and sustained engagement of Congress, committed and diverse civil society constituencies (including celebrities) pushing for a robust policy, and the Sudanese government’s interest in negotiating with the U.S. on diplomatic normalization. Japan’s engagement on Sudan started later—really only with the signing of the CPA—but it has quickly relied mostly on development assistance to support key aspects of the peace processes and help provide “peace dividends.” There is clearly a commonality of interests, objectives, and approaches between the U.S. and Japan on Sudan policy, and this creates an opportunity to increase collaboration on peacebuilding. As top funders to the UN, both countries also have a shared mechanism to move such collaboration forward. The citizens of one of Africa’s most troubled nations—soon to become citizens of two separate Sudans—certainly deserve as much.