Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War
Implications for U.S. Strategic Planning
and U.S. Central Command's Operations

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Executive Summary

The United States is engaged in a struggle against violent extremists who use a selective interpretation of Islam and Muslim grievances as a cover for their pursuit of political power and global influence. For most Americans, the events of recent years, including the attacks of September 11, 2001, were horrific, but, with the passage of time, largely unrelated to the ebb and flow of their daily lives. The radical extremists are counting on Americans to let their guard down, and to succumb to political pressures to withdraw U.S. forces precipitously from Iraq in the face of mounting U.S. casualties, while turning a blind eye to the proliferation of al-Qaeda cells in Europe, Asia, the wider Middle East, Africa, and even in North and South America. Geographically, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan and Somalia, have become the central theaters of operation for the new jihadists, but this is a global struggle for “hearts and minds,” one that is being waged over the Internet and directly within Western countries, exploiting the disaffection of Muslim youth and the failure of Western nations to integrate successfully immigrant Muslim communities into the fabric of their societies. It is also an internal struggle within Islam, pitting those who espouse a particular orthodoxy against those who seek a reformation of Islam.

In many respects, this Long War\(^1\) can be portrayed as a struggle between modernity and tradition, between Western cultures and values and Islam’s rejection of individual rights over the greater welfare of society, although it is not as simple as that. While it is not necessarily the clash of civilizations of which much has been written, the new jihadists certainly are seeking to make it one, by attracting moderate Muslim support for actions designed to bring the United States and its coalition allies to their knees, defeated in Iraq and Afghanistan, expelled from the Persian Gulf, and witness to the destruction of Israel. As such, the political, strategic, and operational challenges facing the United States in the global struggle against radical jihadists are twofold: on the one hand, Washington and its coalition partners must contain and, if possible, defeat the terrorists on the “battlefield” (both on the virtual battlefield of the Internet and on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other hotspots where they operate), but, on the other hand, they must also develop and communicate a credible message to the broader Muslim community that can help to de-legitimize the jihadists’ arguments and diminish their appeal. What is needed, in other words, is a better blend of hard and soft power to isolate, disrupt, and, when/where possible, destroy extremist networks, and to create lasting divides between the jihadist and non-jihadist Islamic communities.

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1 Various phrases have been used to convey the nature of the struggle in which we are currently engaged. President Bush has favored the phrase “Global War on Terror,” or GWOT, while the U.S. military tends to emphasize the “Long War,” to underscore the generational nature of this battle and the profound importance of its outcome for our way of life. Academics, on the other hand, tend to use the formulation of a “Struggle Against Violent Extremism,” or SAVE. For the purposes of this assessment, we recognize that none of these phrases fully captures the totality of this challenge, but for the purposes of brevity we have chosen to use the military’s formulation in some instances, and SAVE in others.
Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War
To succeed, the United States and its allies will also need to develop new strategic approaches, adaptive operational concepts, and more cost-effective methods of coalition and Interagency coordination. As was the Cold War, the Long War promises to be a generational struggle (or longer), requiring patience and vision, and drawing on all the tools of national power, not just the military. However, unlike the Cold War period, the struggle against radical Islamist extremists has yet to coalesce around a single, coherent, organizing framework, such as that embodied by the containment concept. Because the jihadist “threat” is not widely understood (in the way that the Soviet challenge was), Western responses have tended to be sporadic and often disconnected. Moreover, because this is for the West as much a struggle for “hearts and minds” as it is an effort to defeat radical extremists militarily, campaigns in the Long War need to be carefully tailored to local conditions, though still set within a common broader global strategy in which advancements in political liberalization and economic development are likely to be as important (if nonetheless dependent upon) improvements in security.

De-legitimizing the Islamist ideology and defeating the global jihadist threat is, of course, a multifaceted challenge. Without question, it will require, as alluded to above, a much more focused, intensive, and culturally-sensitive strategic communications strategy, with a sizable Information Operations (IO) component. Ideally, this would be organized and run by a new office on par with that of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and charged with coordinating all relevant Interagency efforts. But it will entail as well the design and development of new technologies and procedures for identifying and defeating asymmetric threats (including those that may employ WMD), and a broader capability to mitigate the consequences if such threats are actually implemented. As the jihadists embrace and exploit classical insurgency strategies, and adapt their urban warfare tactics so as to put the onus on U.S. and/or coalition forces for the generation of civilian casualties and collateral damage, it is also essential that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations assume a greater proportion of U.S./coalition operational planning.

Waging and winning a counterinsurgency, however, requires an overarching political strategy that guides specific mission taskings for U.S. and coalition partner forces, as well as for COIN-related teams from other USG agencies and their allied/partner country counterparts. Absent such a comprehensive, Interagency, and coalition-minded framework, military operations alone are likely to be much less effective than they would be if tasked on the basis of well defined political guidance agreed upon by all major players. Crafting a strategy that also takes into account broader regional dynamics is crucial, and keeping an eye on the strategic challenge that Iran presents to U.S. interests must be regarded as a crucial aspect of the Long War. If, however, Iran is the long-term strategic challenge, Iraq has become the immediate training and recruiting ground for the new jihadists, and, for this reason alone, as we prepare to transition our force deployments in Iraq, we must not lose sight of the so-called unintended consequences of our actions, including with respect to our ability to work with and influence moderate Sunni regimes (especially Jordan, Turkey, and the leaderships of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Bahrain) with respect to broader regional interests and dynamics. Saudi Arabia has a special role to play in this regard, and U.S. outreach to the Kingdom must be persistent, well
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articulated, and persuasive to bring the Saudi leadership on side with respect to de-legitimating the radical Islamist threat both to the Kingdom itself and to the wider region and indeed the world (with respect to the spread of Wahhabi Islam). Its future and that of Pakistan will remain two key long-term concerns for the United States in this volatile region.

The risk of failure in Afghanistan also is growing, and more attention must be devoted to finding ways to undermine Taliban efforts to attract support and to address the al-Qaeda threat emanating from and within Pakistan. Strengthening and building upon NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) efforts would be a useful first step, but engaging the European Union (EU) more comprehensively is a necessary step as well to keeping the NATO European nations engaged. However, it is critical in this context to understand very specifically Iran’s goals and interests in Afghanistan. Iran’s regional aspirations are a cause for particular concern, given its ongoing support for Hezbollah, its increasing role in Iraq, and now its more deliberate activities in Afghanistan, where it is strengthening economic ties, especially in the western part of the country (Herat province), in part to sustain its own campaign to win “hearts and minds.”

Some Arab grievances against the United States are real, but many are imagined, as conspiracy theories loom large in Middle Eastern life. As a result, despite our best efforts, American messages will be a hard sell for many Muslims until and unless some modus vivendi is established as well to deal with the fact that Israel exists, and that it exists as a U.S. partner in the Middle East. Obviously, settling the Arab-Israeli dispute is the long pole in the tent, but Israeli policies and Israel’s existence continue to be an irritant to Arab Muslims, whose negative perceptions of the United States are at an all time high. This state of affairs provides considerable leverage for jihadists, who are intent on using our ties (real and perceived) to Israel to discredit American ideas and to de-legitimize U.S. initiatives. In the Long War against the radical extremists, divorcing ourselves from Israel is not an option, but what is possible and should be explored is greater support for reasonable Arab positions and for ways to implement them (such as the creation of a Palestinian state as part of a broader Arab-Israeli settlement). That said, we must also recognize that if the total war construct is accepted by the new jihadists, it is unlikely that even a comprehensive peace accord (between Israel and her neighbors) will satisfy fundamental Islamist goals.

Moreover, current articulations of radical Islamist ideology are creating new cross-border, transnational alliances between groups that may rarely have cooperated in the past, leading to a globalization of the movement. Thus, while within Hamas, for example, there is little real support for Iran or for al-Qaeda’s concept of a worldwide struggle, there is, however, a willingness to create “alliances of necessity,” in order to attain specific, common ends. As a result, even secular Palestinian groups have embraced martyrdom operations, and the killing of other Muslims, although many part ways with al-Qaeda’s more extreme and grandiose global objectives. The pragmatic partnership that Hamas has forged with al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and with Hezbollah, on the other, has led to the emergence of what might be called a “a resistance movement of odd bedfellows,” spearheaded both by the Muslim Brotherhood, which rejects...
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al-Qaeda’s role in Palestine, and by Sunni Arabs, who oppose the growth of Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. This is a phenomenon that increasingly is likely to confront U.S. planners, and one which is changing the character of the struggle ahead, placing greater emphasis on non-kinetic operations to shape and influence strategic mind-sets and to help forge outcomes (i.e., end-states) that address tribal, ethnic, and religious grievances.

In this context, in particular, U.S. policy planning must be much more carefully calibrated to address and counter anti-American trends by developing sophisticated and targeted strategic communications, IO, and psychological warfare strategies, preferably managed by a Cabinet-level organization, which has responsibility for overseeing Irregular Warfare (IW). It must also be able to address individuals and small groups enraged by media portrayals of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, or swayed by Islamist propaganda on the Internet or in religious or social clubs. Such groups may take it upon themselves to act, without central direction from al-Qaeda or any other international terrorist organization. These self-starter terrorists are more difficult to track along the path to mobilization because they may avoid suspicious behavior, may not join a known organization committed to Islamist goals, and may not receive any funding from abroad. They are also likely to be more empowered by technology and able to achieve catastrophic effects, reinforcing once again the need for “actionable” intelligence and new approaches to gathering and fusing information.

The al-Qaeda Network’s (AQN) apparent interest in acquiring WMD has been well documented. For many analysts, it is not a matter of whether, but when, they acquire such capabilities. Against this looming threat, U.S. and allied efforts to upgrade force protection measures, to include cyber and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) protection, as well as broader consequence management (CM) capabilities, are essential. In CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), this must include more precisely focused and systematic efforts to engage the GCC allies and other regional allies and partners, including Jordan and Egypt, as a means of building or improving partner capacity in and around the Persian Gulf region. In particular, the leadership of CENTCOM should build upon its earlier initiatives with the GCC states, Jordan, and Egypt to create national nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) defense capabilities. Preparations to diminish the threat of WMD terrorism and to improve CM capabilities for the many contingencies that a nuclear Iran might pose may lessen the incentives for Saudi Arabia or Egypt, for example, to “go nuclear,” while fostering the development of capabilities that would help to minimize their overall exposure to any future WMD threats. For CENTCOM, this will require as well further efforts to “work the seams” across AORs to collaborate more closely with U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and with U.S. Pacific Command (PACCOM) over India, Pakistan, Kashmir, and Central Asia.

Current efforts to secure the global supply of nuclear materials at military, civilian power, and research sites continue to be important. The Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative provides a good model for cooperation among the USG, foreign governments, and the private/civil society sector. U.S. financial and political support for the effort by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to convert the numerous small nuclear research facilities around...
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the globe that operate with high-grade nuclear fuel to low-grade nuclear fuel lessens the risk as well that terrorists could steal weapons-grade nuclear material from research or civil power facilities. However, the high-risk tolerance of suicide terrorists and their demonstrated ability to inflict catastrophic damage require that we pay greater attention as well to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) plans for dealing with catastrophic events, and this will require, in turn, a more informed effort to delineate the precise roles the active duty military is likely to be required to perform in the fifteen or so select homeland defense contingencies that have been singled out by DoD as requiring a military lead. It also is incumbent upon us to clarify, in this context, the demands that will be placed on the National Guard, and to assess just how its involvement in Title 32 missions may impact the federalization of Guard units (under Title 10) and, beyond that, their capacity to back-fill for active duty rotational Army and Air Force units (that continue to be tasked to overseas missions).

Across the warfare planning spectrum, efforts to discredit and counter radical Islamist ideologies and agendas are crucial, and they must include, as noted at the outset, both kinetic operations and hearts and minds-oriented missions. However, concerted planning before (not after) a crisis erupts is essential, if we are to constrain radical Islamists from spreading their hate-inspired messages and attracting vulnerable youth to their causes. In this respect, and for DoD especially, so-called Phase 0 activities are key, although they must be better prioritized (by country and across regions), and more effectively coordinated to support broader planning guidance and U.S. strategic frameworks. Fostering foreign leadership support for efforts to combat suicide terrorism will also help, by extension, to contain extremist activities, minimize the propaganda opportunities that inevitably follow martyrdom operations, deny safe havens and state level sponsorship for trans-national terrorist organizations, increase intelligence collection (especially HUMINT), and assist in international policing efforts now being organized to confront the new, globally dispersed, grassroots-minded al-Qaeda network. The Long War, then, must of necessity be pursued as a coalition/combined force effort, as much as a joint force/Interagency one. Otherwise, the prospects for success are slim.
I. Introduction: The “Long War”

With al-Qaeda’s coordinated attacks against prominent American targets on September 11, 2001, the United States awoke to the new realization that its perceived invulnerability was illusory, and that a non-state actor, using asymmetric tactics, could and did inflict mass casualties on the U.S. homeland. While for many al-Qaeda was a new phenomenon, for counter-terror specialists the 9/11 attacks were all but inevitable, the culmination of a deadly series of well-programmed events, including the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the aborted Bojinko plot in 1995, the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1998, the disrupted millennium attacks, and in 2000, the successful attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden harbor. In fact, al-Qaeda’s leader, Usama bin Laden (UBL), had forecast as long ago as the 1980s, when he was fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan his (and what would become al-Qaeda’s) intention to bring down the power and erode the global influence of the United States.\(^2\) In 1996, he issued a declaration of war (jihad) against the United States and condemned the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq, and the on-going U.S. support for Israel.\(^3\) The declaration also condemned U.S. foreign interventions, including in Bosnia in support of the Muslim community, characterizing them as further examples of America’s “war on Islam,” while ignoring their humanitarian elements. Subsequently, in 1998, bin Laden issued a religious decree (fatwa) on the same subject, despite the fact that he lacked the proper credentials for doing so. At this time, he asserted:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the holy mosque (in Mecca) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.\(^4\)

With bin Laden’s personal stature as a “jihadist” established from fighting with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan (against the Soviet invaders), it should have come as no surprise when, at the start of the first Gulf war, he volunteered his Arabic fighters to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (and the home of Islam’s two holy cities of Mecca and Medina) against Saddam Hussein’s invading army. Some would later suggest that this was a calculated attempt to foment dissent in the Royal Kingdom and to divide the Royal Family from their American protectors. Others, however, saw it as a deliberate expansion of bin Laden’s ideology, conveying his view that the American war against Iraq marked the opening of a new “crusade” that could only end in a full-blown world war between Islam and the West. Despite all this mounting evidence, it would not be until 1995, and the discovery of the Bojinko plot, that the U.S. government (USG) placed UBL squarely in its sights as a potential problem of consequence. But even then, as the 9/11 Commission would later note,

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2 Some scholars have argued that bin Laden’s first public declaration of contempt for the United States was not made until 1990 in a Saudi Arabian mosque following his return from Afghanistan, though he obviously harbored such feelings and expressed them privately before then. The specifics of the 1990 statement are recorded in an interview Peter Bergen had with a Saudi filmmaker, Essam Deraz, who covered bin Laden during the Afghan jihad. See Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p.110.

3 “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Mosques,” *Al Islah* (London), September 2, 1996.

the seriousness of al-Qaeda’s direct threat to the U.S. homeland was largely underestimated, except by a select few who tried to raise its significance in official U.S. circles.5

After the 9/11 attacks, nonetheless, UBL and al-Qaeda became, virtually overnight, household words, although some five years after September 11, 2001, the urgency and immediacy of the threat from al-Qaeda has receded somewhat in the public’s consciousness. To some extent, this may be due to the fact that al-Qaeda itself has metastasized and grown into a more diffuse, global movement comprised of self-starter cells, with a bottom-up recruitment process that is difficult to identify and monitor. This shift has led, in turn, to a proliferation of radical/Salafist groups6 having specific, locally-derived objectives, while still sharing the broader movement’s jihadist aspirations vis-à-vis Judeo-Christian cultures, beliefs, and territorial affiliations. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, seek the ouster of the U.S.-supported Karzai government and the restoration of a strictly imposed Shariah-based government, while Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Indonesia remains a shadowy group believed to be seeking the establishment of a pan-Islamic state composed of present-day Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the southern Philippines island of Mindanao.

Both the Taliban and JI, moreover, contrast with the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks, among other goals, to re-claim lands formerly governed by Islamic rule and install an Islamic empire or caliphate running from Spain in Western Europe through the Middle East and into Central and South Asia, as depicted on page 3 in the accompanying map. Support for the Muslim Brotherhood has grown significantly throughout the Muslim world since its inception in 1928, and, except with respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute over the West Bank and Gaza, the movement has ruled out violence, preferring a more political path to power to achieve its goals. Without question, however, this approach has generated dissonance within the movement, and it has encouraged, in turn, the formation of alternative, and more radical, splinter groups — such as Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) and Al Takfir Wal Hijra (Excommunication and Migration) — that embrace the use of violence to attain political objectives. Usama bin Laden, it is worth noting, was one of those who disagreed with the non-violent approach, in part because he is said to count as an ideological mentor the late Sayyid Qutb, who wrote one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s most important and extreme tracts (Milestones), legitimizing the use of jihad in fighting against colonial oppressors.

This last point is perhaps more important than one might at first believe, since, in practical terms, the Long War in which we are now engaged has its roots in the colonial era when Western empires ruled and subjugated Muslim communities throughout the Middle East and into Southeast Asia. In the greater Middle East, the 1917 Balfour Declaration calling for the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, together with the establishment of Iraq and the final dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire after World


6 For the purposes of simplification, jihadists will be identified in this assessment as “radical Salafists” or “violent extremists,” “Islamists,” or the “new jihadists.” That said, we recognize that while the term jihadi, derived from “jihad,” connotes a negative force, jihad itself is “actually a good word in Islam,” and, as pointed out by Mary Habeck, “there’s a different word for war, and when Muhammad wanted to talk about war, he used that different word.” After Muhammad’s death, and Islam’s conquest of vast territories from Spain to India, the interpretation of jihad began to evolve, and with the collection of the “Hadith” about 150 years after Muhammad’s death, the original notion of jihad as an internal spiritual struggle began to be supplemented by the notion of jihad as the basis of modern-day Islam’s “just war” theory. For Sunnis, who comprise roughly 80% of the world’s Muslim community, the notion of an internal struggle still prevails and is central to their interpretation of Islam. Nonetheless, the concept of jihad as an external, defensive struggle has also become more widely accepted, with differences apparent over interpretations of the legal framework for waging jihad (i.e., the state or the individual), and the legitimation of the use of force against non-combatants, women and children, in particular, and indiscriminate tactics. For a fuller exposition of the concept of jihad and differences in interpretation among various Muslim sects, see: Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 243 pp.
War I, sowed the seeds for Arab unrest, and laid the basis for the jihadist movements of today. After World War II, the bipolar international system suppressed (to some extent) these anti-colonial sentiments, but, with the upsurge in post-colonial independence movements in the Third World, wars of “national liberation” were not uncommon. For the majority of jihadists, however, their current jihad against the West is justified by going even further back in time, to Charles Martel’s defeat of the Islamic armies at Poitiers in 732, in what is known in the Arabic world to have been “the Battle of the Martyrs.” Martel’s grandson, King Charlemagne, who subsequently was crowned in Rome as the Holy Roman Emperor in 800, united “Europe” as a political entity and fought to eliminate the Saracens from Spain. Like his grandfather, he was instrumental in reclaiming for the Pope lands that had been part of a Muslim caliphate.⁷

Later, the Crusades, which included nine military expeditions into the Holy Land between 1095 and 1291, sought the return of Jerusalem and the Holy Land from Muslim rule.⁸ While there were victories and defeats for both sides, by the end of the 13th century the maps of Europe and the Middle East had been redrawn, and lands that had once been held by Muslims were delivered back into European control. But the main point here is that a historical perspective is key to understanding the amalgamation of Muslim anger, animosity, and grievances against the Western world that underlies contemporary radical Islamist ideology. Without question, some of

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⁷ According to al-Qaeda’s conception, a Muslim caliphate would be an empire ruled by a pious Muslim leader who governed according to Islamic law and followed the principles of finance and social conduct as established by a council (shura) of religious authorities and Islamic legal experts who studied the Qur’an and the Hadith (i.e., the Prophet Muhammad’s messages and his interpretation of the Qur’an). The lands comprising the caliphate would be those that were inhabited by Muslims and those that had been lost to Muslims in previous wars. Bin Laden often cited the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan as the model of an Islamic state.

⁸ The term “Crusades” is used to describe a series of military campaigns conducted on behalf of the Catholic Church against “heretics,” pagans, peoples under ban of excommunication, and for political, economic, and religious reasons. Most historians accept that there were nine major Crusades into the Holy Land during the 11th to 13th centuries, with other minor campaigns conducted through the 16th century in territories outside the Levant.
these complaints and feelings stem from instances of Western insensitivity, arrogance, and outright ineptitude in dealing with the Muslim world, and they should be more directly and objectively addressed as Western nations seek to engage Islamic leaders. Others, however, are the result of misperceptions, gossip, or the simple clash of cultures, all of which have given root to misunderstandings and miscommunications between the two worlds. Still others are projections of self-inflicted wounds, resulting from the poor governance that abounds in Middle Eastern societies or the failure of Muslim peoples to challenge what are oftentimes corrupt and authoritarian regimes, many of which are perceived to hold power because of their relationships with the West, and, in particular, the United States. Together, these realities and perceptions have generated a number of “urban myths” about the role and the culpability of the United States for all of the ills apparent in Middle Eastern politics, and this, in turn, is fueling the violent extremist movements that have declared war on the United States. The graphic below depicts the principal elements of the radical Islamists’ commitment to the Long War and points out the need for a comprehensive Interagency strategy to deal with this pernicious threat.

**Radical Islamists’ Commitment to the “Long War”**

- A committed enemy who is prepared to fight to the death for what he believes is a defense of his religion.
- Violence is an acceptable element of strategy and civilian casualties may be justified.
- Patience is a virtue, with grievances spanning centuries and the Islamists willing to wait to attain their objectives.
- The culture of Jihad has spawned a network of extremist cells and organizations.
- Some having specific local objectives
- Others having global or region-wide aspirations
- To counter the Islamist ideology and defeat extremist threats, the Long War will require Allied/coalition-partner collaboration to build new partner capacities over many years.

So, as difficult as it is for most Americans to accept, the jihadists of today really do look to the distant past for their motivation and guidance. Islam as a religion is evoked as the inspirational force behind the political and strategic agendas of the radicals, but they are, in reality, distorting the tenets of Islam, advancing interpretations of the holy Qur’an that assert justifications for suicide bombing, civilian casualties, and the targeting of women and children, to support specific contemporary goals. Geographically, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan and increasingly Somalia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria have become the central theaters of operation for the “new jihadists,” but this is a global struggle for “hearts and minds,” one that is being waged over the Internet and in the heart of Western societies, exploiting the disaffection of Muslim youth and the failure of Western nations to integrate successfully immigrant Muslim communities into the fabric of their societies. It is also an internal struggle within Islam, pitting those who espouse a particular orthodoxy against those who seek a reformation of Islam.
As a result, in many respects, the Long War can be portrayed as a struggle between modernity and tradition, or between Western cultures and values and Islam’s rejection of individual rights over the greater welfare of society. Of course, it is not as simple as that in reality. A recent Gallup Poll of 22 predominantly Muslim countries, for example, found that Muslim perspectives as a whole are more diverse and complex, and many in the Islamic world do not really subscribe to the “clash of civilizations” idea, even though the new jihadists certainly hope to popularize it as a way to attract moderate Muslim support for actions designed to bring the United States and its coalition allies to their knees, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, whatever the precise nature of the West’s relations with Islam, the political, strategic, and operational challenges posed by today’s radical jihadist movements will require the United States and its allies simultaneously to pursue two very difficult goals that require, in turn, two quite different approaches – namely, to defeat the extremists on the “battlefield” (both on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere where they operate, and on the virtual battlefield of the Internet), while, on the other hand, doing what they can to de-legitimize the jihadists’ arguments and overall appeal to the broader Muslim community, whose principal objectives are (like those of most people) to survive and thrive in a stable and prosperous security setting.

To achieve these goals, the United States and its coalition partners need to develop new strategies and operational concepts, based largely on more cost-effective methods of joint/coalition and Interagency coordination. As was the Cold War, the Long War promises to be a generational struggle (or longer), requiring patience and vision and drawing on all the tools of national power, not just the military. However, unlike the Cold War period, the struggle against radical Islamist extremists has yet to coalesce around a single, coherent, organizing framework, such as that embodied by the containment concept. Because the jihadist “threat” is not widely understood (in the way that the Soviet challenge was), Western responses have tended to be sporadic and often disconnected. Moreover because as noted above, this is for the West as much a struggle for “hearts and minds” as it is an effort to defeat radical extremists in their chosen battlespaces, campaigns in the Long War need to be carefully tailored to local conditions, though still set within a broader global strategy whose ultimate objectives are political liberalization, economic development, and regional peace and stability.

For the new jihadists, victory in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia is fundamental to their avowed objective of displacing the power and influence of the United States in the wider Muslim world. It is also essential to the jihadists’ efforts to win “hearts and minds” to their own cause and to shape and influence the strategic perspectives of Muslim elites, the so-called Arab street, and those disaffected peoples who have proven susceptible to arguments that project onto the West rationalizations for Islamic feelings of powerlessness, shame, and anger. Understanding the mindsets of both the jihadists and the broader Islamic community

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9 According to Geneive Abdo and Dalia Mogahed, writing in “What Women Want,” The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2006, p. A-18, “The survey represents the views of more than 90% of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims. Majorities of women in these (22) countries say they think women should have the same rights as men. At the same time, they also say that Shariah, the sacred law of Islam, should be a source of the nation’s laws. For many Westerners who associate Shariah with the lack of women’s rights, this might appear to be a stark contradiction. But this is not quite correct.” However, another view postulates Shariah as “an attempt to protect a patriarchal system.” Remark of Professor Abdullahi An-Na’im quoted in: Mona Eltahawy “Meanwhile: Giving Muslims the Tools to Take on Shariah,” International Herald Tribune, December 14, 2006, Internet edition.

10 The notion of a “clash of civilizations” was first popularized by Harvard University Professor Samuel Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 367 pp. However, the phrase was originally used by Princeton Professor Bernard Lewis in an article “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified,” The Atlantic, Vol. 266, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 47-58.
# Islamist Strategic Framework for the Long War

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<td>Force U.S. withdrawals from Iraq, Afghanistan and Muslim lands</td>
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<td>Exploit Arab anger, grievances, (Abu Ghraib, “Gitmo”)</td>
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<td>Seek to establish control over the region’s energy resources</td>
<td>Overthrow corrupt Arab regimes (e.g., GCC, Jordan &amp; Egypt)</td>
<td>Promote sectarian split / competition between Sunni and Shia visions of Umma</td>
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<td>Unite Umma into a political force</td>
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<td><strong>Tawhid</strong></td>
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<td>Undermine U.S. democracy-building efforts</td>
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<td>Oppose Shi’ites as idolaters for Imam worship, but also call for unity among ALL Muslim peoples</td>
<td>Undermine PRT activities in Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Highlight moral decay of the West</td>
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<td>Promote “Hearts &amp; Minds” projects</td>
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<td>Seize territory and impose Shariah law (Somalia, Afghanistan, tribal Pakistan, al-Anbar and Diyala provinces in Iraq, and the Pan Sahel)</td>
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or the “waters in which they [the jihadists] swim”\(^\text{11}\) will be essential, therefore, to any successful effort to develop a comprehensive strategic framework to counter and otherwise de-legitimize the radicals’ appeal and their messages. For that, moreover, Western analysts need to develop a better understanding of the ideology, objectives, and strategies of the different radical Islamist groups, in addition to recognizing the particular grievances of specific tribes, clans, and peoples of the wider Muslim world. Given the limited economic and educational opportunities in many Arab countries, for example, it is little wonder that anti-Western radicals are exploiting the Middle East’s “youth bulge” and the lack of gainful employment for many in this age group to recruit foot soldiers to the their cause. But the jihadists’ popularization of an “us versus them” world-view, based in part on the perceived competition between Judeo-Christian cultures and heritage and those of Islam (as interpreted through a very narrow, subjective lens), must be countered in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion, if the West is to succeed in presenting a convincing alternative view. Doing this, moreover, is crucial to setting in place a strategic framework within which ideas for refuting the arguments of Islamist-based ideologies can be developed, tailored to address specific local, regional, and global concerns, and persuasively communicated to skeptical audiences.

Currently, for example, Muslim elites around the globe are engaged in debate over the tactics used in Afghanistan by the Taliban and in Iraq among Sunni insurgents that involve or heighten the potential for civilian (non-combatant) casualties. Notable in this regard, the Taliban’s recent use of human shields to facilitate operations against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units marks a stark contrast with earlier attacks against ISAF, and quite possibly indicates a new level of collaboration among seasoned “veterans” of al-Qaeda’s operations in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Moreover, the recruitment of women, children and the elderly\(^\text{12}\) to employ suicide attacks is highly controversial and the subject of much debate in the Muslim world, and, until quite recently it had never been seen in Afghanistan. Since the summer of 2006, however, and NATO’s significant military success in what the Alliance called Operation Medusa, the incidence of both improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks employed by women and children has increased, mimicking tactics used in Iraq by the foreign fighters and Sunni insurgents. The more frequent use of these and other combat techniques that seem to run against traditional Muslim “rules of war” might provide an opportunity for the West, if handled in a skillful, culturally-sensitive way, to separate more moderate elements of Islamic society from the extremists in their midst.

Of course, the radicals’ embrace of suicide terrorism as “martyrdom” is hardly surprising, but what is somewhat unusual is their ability to adopt such tactics, thereby flouting established global societal norms, without triggering much outrage or anger from the more moderate Muslims we would hope to influence. In part, this may be due to a perceptible rise in anti-Americanism in the wider Middle East, coupled with a perceived lack of progress on the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and the strategic rise of Iran as a formidable regional actor (supporting its non-state Hezbollah proxy and Shi’ite militias in Iraq), has complicated American efforts to engage its ideological enemies. So, too, has Washington’s inability to quell the violence in Iraq, a reality that is playing into the hands of the new jihadists and fundamentalists who seek to eject

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\(^\text{11}\) China’s revolutionary leader Mao Tse-tung is credited with this idea, and as part of his broader thinking about guerrilla warfare he stressed the importance of popular support among the peasantry for the guerrilla’s cause. In his 1937 instruction manual concerning guerrilla tactics, Mao wrote “The [people] may be likened to water the [guerrilla troops] to the fish who inhabit it.” This dictum is supplemented by such practical advice as the need to “return what you borrow,” “replace what you break” and “be courteous.” Mao understood the need for guerrilla forces to operate within enemy lines and reached winning support among the peasant population to accomplish the need to infiltrate enemy-held territory. See quotations in Mao Tse-tung and Samuel B. Griffith (translator), *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2000) pg. 92-93.

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\(^\text{12}\) For example, in October 2006, a 72 year-old woman killed herself in a suicide mission in the Gaza Strip.
the United States from the Middle East, create a new caliphate, and, ultimately, challenge Western mores and perspectives here at home.\textsuperscript{13} Hence, if progress is to be made in future efforts to challenge the jihadists, the United States and its allies will need to develop a better appreciation of the following ideological roots of Islamist thinking. However, the Long War transcends the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Even if this festering problem were resolved, the mere existence of Israel continues to be an issue for many Islamist groups determined to oversee its destruction.

\textit{Towards a New Caliphate}

The notion of Islamic lands has been a central tenet of Muslim perspectives since the death of Muhammad in 632. From then until the Crusaders’ victory over the Moors in 1492, Islamic armies had conquered a swath of territory from Central Asia to Persia, across North Africa and then on to nearly all of the Iberian Peninsula and Southern Italy. By the early eighth century, Islam had even extended its reach beyond the Pyrenees into France. With trade and other cultural contacts, its adherents projected their influence throughout South Asia and into present-day Indonesia and Malaysia. Following the expulsion of the Islamic presence from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492, what Princeton Professor Bernard Lewis has termed “the House of Islam” (\textit{dar al-Islam})\textsuperscript{14} continued to expand its influence into the Balkans and Central Europe under the aegis of the Ottoman Turks. Islamic-controlled territories were ruled under a caliphate headed by a series of Arab and later Ottoman dynasties based on Islamic principles with the ruler considered to be a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. Following the Ottoman defeat at Vienna, the Islamic militaries were handed a succession of additional defeats that culminated in the formation of the secular Republic of Turkey in 1923 and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924.

Despite these losses, however, the most virulent Islamists still held to the idea that once a territory falls under Islamic rule it must forever remain a Muslim territory, and this notion has now been taken up by al-Qaeda and others. The insistence on Islamic rule in territories that at any point fell under Muslim control has commingled as well with the Prophet Muhammad’s injunction to “(l)et there not be two religions in Arabia,” which has fed a modern-day desire to eliminate all non-Islamic influences from the Muslim community, with particular focus on the Arabian peninsula and Middle East region where the caliphate was seated. The anti-Western thrust of Islamist ideology was enhanced, moreover, as the military losses of the Islamic armies led to the humiliation of being governed by non-Muslim countries during the colonial period. From Napoleon’s arrival in Egypt in 1798, through the League of Nations mandates for foreign stewardship in the Middle East, outside governments – primarily Britain and France – exercised control over major cities that held places of honor during the caliphate, such as Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem. Britain and France brought to the Muslim world non-Islamic forms of government with laws not based on Islamic teachings, drastically changing the by now rather idealized (in the minds of jihadists) system created under the caliphate. During this period, the outside world arrived in advanced ships, with modern military technology and techniques and great wealth, all of which far surpassed what the Islamic world possessed. Not surprisingly, the political influence of Islam reached a low-point, with important


\textsuperscript{14} Historian Bernard Lewis traces the basis of the Islamist ideology to the Muslim tradition of dividing the world into two opposing segments: i.e., “the House of Islam” (\textit{dar al-Islam}) and “the House of War” (\textit{dar al-harb}). The House of Islam is considered all territories governed by Muslim rule, while the House of War represents all other states. The avowed objective of the Islamists is to bring the House of War under Islamic rule through jihad. See Bernard Lewis, “The Revolt of Islam: When Did the Conflict with the West Begin and How Could it End?,” \textit{The New Yorker}, November 19, 2001, Lexis-Nexis.
decisions increasingly made in London, Paris or Geneva, with little input from local populations and leadership. But, as territory once controlled by the House of Islam was gradually lost and the “forces of the infidel” began to control the heart of the Islamic world and the once-powerful caliphate, a movement also grew to expel the non-Islamic presence and to return to the traditional caliphate system of governance.

**The Wahhabi Influence and al-Qaeda’s Ideological Roots**

The movement to return to a purer form of Islam gained support and momentum in the 18th century – before the European colonial period, but in response to the declining power of the Islamic rulers – from the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhab lived in the area of Arabia under the control of the Saud family and entered into an alliance with the House of Saud that resulted in its control over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from 1804 to 1806, until the Ottoman Turks put down the Saud forces’ rebellion. The Wahhabi teachings continued to thrive, however, and targeted any internal Muslim force that did not follow the strict interpretation of Islamic law favored by the Wahhabis. An ideological movement was thus created that matched the desire for a return to the political and military strength the Muslim world held in centuries past, and that tapped as well into the anger then created by colonial rule. The answer to current problems, the ardent Islamist ideologues argued, was to extinguish all impure forces within the Islamic world (whether native or foreign), confront and kill all infidels, and return to a governing system based on an Islam of the purest kind.

Though he was born in Yemen in 1957, Usama bin Laden spent much of his early life in Saudi Arabia, where he fell under the influence of Wahhabi religious thought (albeit not before he enjoyed the secular privileges of his birth, being the son of a wealthy businessman). As is well recorded, UBL’s world view was decisively shaped by the Wahabbi influence, and his experiences in fighting communism in Yemen and as part of the mujahideen in Afghanistan completed an ideological doctrination process that would lead him to create, with Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Jordanian who had founded the Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (MAK), al-Qaeda to educate and guide young Muslims to wage jihad against all infidels. One analyst has likened al-Qaeda’s creation to the establishment of an Islamic “rapid reaction force” whose purpose was “to channel the energies of the Afghan mujahideen into fighting on behalf of repressed Muslims worldwide.”

By all accounts, Azzam was more concerned with the future of the Islamist movement after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan than he was about building an organization to wage jihad on a global scale. He rejected the evolution of al-Qaeda into a global terrorist organization, and he condemned the use of terror tactics directed against non-combatants, other Muslims, and innocent women and children. As differences with bin Laden over strategy and tactics became more apparent, including Azzam’s support for Ahmad Shah Massoud, who subsequently formed and led the Northern Alliance to fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the two parted ways, and bin Laden emerged as the undisputed leader of al-Qaeda which increasingly began to gravitate toward operations against secular Muslims and Muslim regimes allied to the United States.

The al-Qaeda Network’s (AQN) anti-American objectives go way beyond local Islamist-inspired agendas. As such, the organization is seeking its own “coalition of the willing” among disparate Islamist groups to wage jihad against the Americans where their interests and those of al-Qaeda intertwine. Bin Laden’s anti-Americanism is rooted in power politics, but has been shaped by the ideological influences of radical

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16 Massoud was later killed by al-Qaeda agents posing as journalists two days before the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Salafist thought and by the powerful ideas of three contemporary Islamist scholars: two Egyptians, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb and one Indian Muslim, Sayyid Maududi, whose direct experiences with anti-colonial movements and the United States left them feeling angry, disempowered, and frustrated.\footnote{See Appendix A for a more precise listing of their ideological contributions to radical Islamist thought.} By all accounts, Banna, Qutb, and Maududi were repulsed by the culture and liberal inclinations of the Western world, leading them to reject all efforts to modernize Islamic societies and to disavow Western cultural influences (on traditional mores). These three scholars have exerted a profound impact on al-Qaeda and other Islamist movements through Banna’s founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, through Banna’s and Qutb’s influence on fellow Egyptian (and lead al-Qaeda ideologue) Ayman al-Zawahiri and on Usama bin Laden during their youth, and through Maududi’s influence on the South Asian Islamist movement and via his extensive travels throughout the Arab and Muslim world proselytizing his ideology.

Banna and Qutb, in particular, came to know the countries and societies they were later to recoil against quite well, and this led them to generate a movement in opposition to the modern world that has a very particular end-state in mind. Banna, as an aspiring teacher, was exposed to the British-inspired educational reforms in Cairo, and he became angered by Egyptian acquiescence to the British system, the lack of Islamic teaching, and the influence of the British military within Egypt. For his part, Qutb was sent by the Egyptian government to the United States from 1948-50 to study the U.S. educational curriculum. During his time in the United States, Qutb grew increasingly radicalized, and was angered by the U.S. lifestyle and social conventions. Despite living in Greeley, Colorado (where a temperance society held sway), Qutb was bothered by the freedom enjoyed by women, as well as by the individualism, racism, and materialism he perceived in the United States. Qutb felt these same cultural tendencies were present in Egypt through Western influence, and he eventually became determined to eliminate all non-Islamic facets of Egyptian society.

Similar to the way in which Karl Marx came to communism, Giovanni Gentile to fascism, and Michel Aflaq to Ba’athism, the Islamist ideologues were opposed to the dominant political, economic, and social forces that shaped contemporary life in their countries, and they used kernels of truth to rally others dissatisfied with the ruling order. However, in contrast to the detailed manifestos offered by those other political movements mentioned above, Islamists have fallen back on simple utopian proposals, such as “Islam is the answer” and “the Qur’an is our constitution.” The social critiques advanced by Banna, Maududi, and Qutb, in part through their resonance with secular causes, have won substantial popular support for the Islamist agenda, and they continue to do so as the various secular movements once embraced by Arab/Islamic nationalists (e.g., anti-colonialism, fascism, communism, pan-Arabism, Ba’athism, etc.) have lost their appeal. Though leaving the details of governance vague, the primary objectives of the Islamist movement are clear – namely, to overthrow the secular governments in the Muslim (primarily Arab) world, and to create governing systems modeled on the period following the Prophet Muhammad’s death. Some Islamist groups also believe that these objectives require the destruction of the United States, due to its perceived role in propping up secular Muslim leaders.

Although the Islamist doctrines of Saudi Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT or Party of Liberation), and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are different in important ways, they all share a desire to return to a past idealized form of Islam, a commitment to implementing Islamic governance based on Shariah law, a belief that Western influences must be purged from their society, a conviction that aggressive action against internal forces deemed insufficiently pure in their commitment to the Islamist version
of Islam is essential, including the use of terrorism and suicide bombers to achieve their objectives. The belief underlying the ideology is that God is sovereign and humans (through democracy, monarchy, or any other form of secular government) do not have the right to implement laws except those strictly following the Islamic code or Shariah law. Bin Laden himself elaborated on this theme, stating, in December 2004, that in his view “democracies, constitutional governments, and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally unacceptable forms of governance for pious Islamic societies because they empower human rulers and man-made legal systems rather than the laws of God.” He then went on to urge Muslims to oppose the creation of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories.

The Islamist ideology is absolute in its insistence on placing God and his divine knowledge as given to Muhammad in charge of all political, economic and social structures. This insistence on the implementation of divine knowledge transfers into the rejection of man-made governing systems, because they are interpreted as placing free will and individual action above God’s intentions for humankind (as revealed in the Qur’an and Muhammad’s teachings). From the Islamist perspective, therefore, American citizens should be held accountable for the policies of their government. According to bin Laden, “(b)y electing their leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq.” Because, in his eyes, “the American people are not innocent,” they are legitimate targets and should be held accountable for choosing their leaders and approving their actions.

In contrast, in the Islamist view, Islam anticipates and can accommodate all human needs and desires. This perspective further pushes its adherents to suggest that Shariah-inspired governance is inherently democratic because it is informed by Islam’s laws and principles which provide for the material and spiritual well-being of the Islamic community (i.e., Umma). Western democratic models, on the other hand, are viewed as “undemocratic,” as the governance they inspire is divorced from religious practices. For Islamists, then, it is not necessarily the notion of democracy that is in dispute, but rather the manner of its implementation in the Western world. To this point, it is noteworthy that Islamists have begun to recognize the power of the ballot box, that is, of using Western democratic ideas to promote their own political and strategic agendas. Increasingly, throughout the Arab world, Islamic parties, including those with radical extremist tendencies, are making headway in winning parliamentary seats and places in governments. The 2006 Palestinian elections produced a government that is markedly Islamic, and free elections in Iraq, Morocco, and just recently in Bahrain have also handed the Islamists significant victories. In Egypt, too, recent elections—though hardly free—yielded a larger number of Islamist parliamentarians, and in countries as diverse as Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, and Kuwait, ideological Muslims are becoming more prominent. According to the political advisor to Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haneya, Dr. Ahmed Yousef, “there is no escaping

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18 According to Abdo and Mogahed, Op. Cit., “Shariah literally means ‘the road to water,’ and represents the moral compass of a Muslim’s personal and public life. Historically, the principles of Shariah could be used to limit the powers of the sultan; after all, he would never claim he was above God’s law. Therefore, when Muslims call for Shariah and gender equality, both are calls for the rule of law and an end to inequality. In many countries, Muslims are calling for the application of Shariah because even when the constitution states that Shariah is the primary basis of law, in practice, this is not enforced by officially secular governments.”


20 Quoted from “Statement of Sheik Usama bin Laden, May God Protect Him and the al-Qaeda Organization,” IBID., p.4, Footnote 15.

21 The Islamist party in Morocco, the Justice and Development Party is currently the third largest party in parliament, and on the rise in popularity. In Bahrain, the three Islamist parties – the Shia-based Al Wefeq and the Sunni-based Al-Asalah and Al-Menbar – account for more 70% of the seats in parliament.
the fact that an ideological Islam ‘as formative as it still is’ is on its way in and the old order of nationalists, socialists, and seculars are on their way out."

Current articulations of radical Islamist ideology, moreover, are creating new cross-border, transnational alliances between groups that may rarely have cooperated in the past, leading to a globalization of the movement. Within Hamas, for example, there is little real support for Iran or for al-Qaeda’s concept of worldwide struggle. There is, however, a willingness to create “alliances of necessity,” in order to attain specific, common ends. Thus, while many Palestinians would prefer not to work with Iran (or its Hezbollah proxy), or even with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Iran), they are doing so to forward their own political agendas and to strengthen their hand in dealing with Israel. As a result, even secular Palestinian groups have embraced martyrdom operations, and the killing of other Muslims, although many part ways with al-Qaeda’s more extreme and grandiose global objectives. The pragmatic partnership that Hamas has forged with al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and with Hezbollah, on the other, has led to the emergence of what might be called a “resistance movement of odd bedfellows,” spearheaded both by the Muslim Brotherhood, which rejects al-Qaeda’s role in Palestine, and by Sunni Arabs, who oppose the growth of Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon.


According to one assessment, al-Qaeda is expanding its presence in the Palestinian territories, operating secretly in and from the West Bank, and openly in Gaza, at Hamas’ invitation, under the name “al-Qaeda Organization in the Border Districts.” It is also reported to be operating in the Sinai, under the name “al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Nile.”
II. Core Themes of the Islamist Ideology and Opportunities to Leverage Divisions Among Muslim Populations

Recently, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center produced what its authors called *The Militant Ideology Atlas*, which charts the Islamists most influential thinkers and delineates key vulnerabilities that, in the authors’ eyes at least, can be used to counter and defeat the jihadists.²⁴ As assessed by the authors, modern-day jihadists are motivated to act for several specific reasons, and these motivations are drawn both from medieval texts and from the writings of modern scholars and clerics who seek Qur’anic justifications for particular activities and interpret the Qur’an to fit modern-day conceptions of the laws of warfare. The West Point study identifies five principal themes that recur throughout modern-day jihadist literature (including fatwas and public relations statements), and they correlate to ideas that Western scholars have flagged as important to address to counter the jihadists’ appeal. Basically, they include: (1) the rejection of pluralism and secular governance; (2) restoration of the caliphate; (3) legitimization of violence, including against Muslims; (4) the persecution of Islam and all Muslims by Judeo-Christian societies; and (5) the need for revolutionary change as opposed to evolutionary transformation. Depending on the particular terrorist group and its precise objectives, these themes are prioritized and elaborated upon to suit specific agendas.

Principal Themes of al-Qaeda’s Ideology

With respect to al-Qaeda, for instance, an analysis of bin Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s statements reveals five principal themes that, in turn, have provided the basis for operationalizing al-Qaeda’s goals. In the early days, particularly before 9/11, bin Laden concentrated his rhetoric on anti-Semitic themes, covering the need to exterminate all those of the Jewish faith and to reverse the Zionist state’s illegal occupation of Jerusalem and, very specifically, the Al Aqsa mosque. What is striking, in this regard, is the absence prior to 9/11 of any explicit reference to the Palestinian cause, widely considered among occidental scholars as a principal Islamic grievance against the Western world. This contrasts starkly to statements attributed to Hamas and Hezbollah, for example, and sets bin Laden and al-Qaeda apart from other groups attempting to exploit Muslim grievances against the West. However, as noted earlier, since 9/11, and explicitly since the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, al-Qaeda appears to “have set its sights on Israel and on an incremental takeover of the Palestinian cause. This is the next phase of its campaign to dominate the Muslim world and re-establish an Islamic caliphate.”²⁵

Indeed, in the aftermath of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 and Hezbollah’s perceived victory over Israel in the summer of 2006, al-Qaeda is said to have sharpened its focus on Palestine, as chaos grips both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Lebanese political scene. In recent videotapes, al-Zawahiri has explicitly noted that al-Qaeda’s goal is to use Iraq as a base for future operations aimed at liberating Palestinian territories from Israeli control. As early as 2002, however, al-Qaeda established the Islamic

²⁴ William McCants, Jarret Brachman, and LTC Joe Felter, *The Militant Ideology Atlas* (Combating Terrorism Center, the United States Military Academy at West Point, November 2006). Among the many contributions that this study makes, it provides a useful description of the “jihadi constituencies,” and it suggests viable options for governments combating the jihadist movement. Using “citation analysis,” the authors set out to determine the extent to which modern jihadists are or have been influenced by medieval and modern scholars. See Appendix A: Prominent Islamist Ideologues for an assessment of major themes contributed by specific Islamic thinkers to the new jihadists’ ideology and their “justification” for war against modernity and the Judeo-Christian world.

al-Maida Organization in Palestine, and, at that time, most observers viewed it as an attempt to counter Hezbollah’s growing influence within the region. In hindsight, it appears to have been part of a broader strategy to confront more directly U.S. interests in the Middle East, and to put more pressure not only on Israel, but on Jordan and Lebanon as well. More recently, it has become clear that al-Qaeda’s foothold in the Palestinian territories may also be part of an effort to counter Iran’s Shi’ite expansion, while providing a sanctuary from which to mount al-Qaeda-sponsored operations against Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Al-Qaeda’s tactical alliances with both local Islamist groups (namely, Hamas and Fatah) have created a political environment in which Hamas may feel free to resume suicide bombings and other attacks against Israeli population centers, especially while the United States is “distracted” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.

Nevertheless, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders have not lost sight of their original objectives, and, accordingly, have focused greater resources and attention on confronting the United States in the CENTCOM AOR, in the expectation of forcing a broader withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the wider Gulf region. One of bin Laden’s earliest calls for action against the United States, it will be recalled, focused on removing American troops from what was portrayed as “their occupation of sacred lands and sites” in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden’s complaints on this issue reached a crescendo in the run up to the first Gulf War, when the Saudi leadership dismissed UBL’s offers of help and relied instead on the United States (and coalition forces) to expel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. As a result, the U.S. force presence in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf region, emerged as a second major theme in al-Qaeda literature/statements, and the proximity of the “crusader’s” troops to Islam’s two most holy sites, Mecca and Medina, provided a forceful rallying call for attracting recruits to the jihadist cause. In 1998, bin Laden artfully combined his anger at the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia with his anti-Semitic perspective, issuing a statement declaring “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” In this inflammatory tract, bin Laden lashed out against Israel and the United States, and for the first time, set forth a new theme, namely, the need to destroy the “corrupt” Saudi regime and other “corrupt” Arab states that facilitate and perpetuate the American regional presence.26

Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri frequently set their statements within the context of the Qur’an, presumably to gain wider acceptability in the Muslim world. They also likely do this to engender the notion of a “clash of civilizations” and to erode the perception that al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization. As noted elsewhere, for UBL and his followers this is a war for Islam and for the future of the Muslim peoples. Within the context of Middle Eastern history, and particularly the humiliation that is widely perceived in the Arab Muslim world to have been inflicted on Muslim peoples, bin Laden and his al-Qaeda cohorts weave carefully chosen passages of the Qur’an into their messages to incite modern youth to take up the struggle against the infidels. It is a powerful message that plays on the perceptions and suspicions of the Muslim world about the West, and about the United States in particular, as the sole remaining superpower left standing after the Soviet Union’s demise.

Bin Laden and his followers are not, in this context, above using the Qur’an to justify their anti-Semitic and anti-Western messages, even though Qur’anic scholars, Bernard Lewis among them, are quick to point out that the Qur’an acknowledges the legitimacy of Jews and Christians—the so-called peoples of the

book—and respects their prophets. Western scholars, including Professor Lewis, also contend that a verse rarely stands on its own without context, and that context is often more nuanced than its literal meaning. Hence, interpreting any single verse requires knowledge of a wider body of Islamic literature and law. Removed from their appropriate context, some verses may appear biased or to carry extremely negative connotations. For example, a verse from the Qur’an that bin Laden and others have frequently used to rally support in the Muslim world, especially from the so-called Arab street, states:

(5.51, Qur’an) O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for friends; they are friends of each other; and whoever amongst you takes them for a friend, then surely he is one of them; surely Allah does not guide the unjust people.

The “us against them” suggestion contained in this passage is ideal for extremist propaganda, as is the alleged assertion that God will look unfavorably on those Muslims who side with Christians or Jews. The latter point is custom-made to support bin Laden’s third jihadist focus — namely, Arab and Muslim regimes that provide political cover and logistical basing for U.S.-led military operations in the Muslim world, including recent and ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consider, for example, the statement that was attributed to bin Laden on October 7, 2001, the day air strikes commenced against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. That statement condemns “hypocrites,” e.g., Muslims who profess the faith but who do not support and are even critical of militant Islamist attacks. More explicitly, it also contains an implicit threat against moderate Arab regimes, warning that “the Arab nation… is not being ruled according to what God has decreed.”

Shortly after this statement, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, a spokesman for al-Qaeda at the time, cited verse 5.51 of the Qur’an (noted above) to rally the Arab street against Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, whereupon he then went on to criticize “confederate nations”— i.e., Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and the Gulf Arabs—which align with the “Crusaders and the Jews against the Islamic nation.” Specifically, he said:

…I address this message to the entire Muslim nation to tell them that the confederates have joined forces against the Islamic nation and the Crusader War, promised by Bush, has been launched against Afghanistan and against this people who have faith in God… The Arabian Peninsula is being defiled by the feet of those who came to occupy these lands, usurp these holy places, and plunder its resources.

On November 3, about a month after OEF commenced, bin Laden issued another statement through Al Jazeera, the Arab satellite network broadcasting from Qatar. This was, perhaps, the clearest indication to date of his intent to expand the jihadist battlespace, and to make other Muslims believe that OEF was about religion not terrorism. Once again, he evoked the “us versus them” theme, and sought to play on the alienation and resentment felt by many in the Muslim world, asserting that:

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7 Judith Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names, Reporting From a Militant Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) p. 89 and pp. 93-98. “It must be admitted, however, that Jews and Christians have been treated as decidedly second-class citizens in Islamic countries where adherence to traditional Qur’anic virtues is strict.”


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Mass demonstrations have spread from the farthest point in the eastern part of the Islamic world to the farthest point in the western part of the Islamic world, and from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan to the Arab world, Nigeria, and Mauritania…This war is fundamentally religious.\(^{29}\)

Since 2001, these themes and phrases from the Qur’an have been replayed and re-packaged for broader transmission in the wider Muslim world. In Europe, where fundamentalist Islam has also taken root among disaffected youth and immigrant populations, radical Imams, including Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad, founder of the London branch of the Islamic Liberation Party, issued, shortly after OEF began, a fatwa calling for the assassination of President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, adding targeted killings to the list of tactics now acceptable to the jihadists. One of his colleagues, Abd Al-Rahman Salim, singled out Prime Minister Tony Blair for assassination, arguing that:

\textbf{If any Muslim wants to kill or get rid of him, I would not shed a tear for him.}

\textbf{In the Islamic view, such a man (i.e., who kills Blair) would not be punished for his deeds, but would be praised.}\(^{30}\)

Such radical statements resonate well in Europe where large concentrations of Muslims live in poverty or survive by relying on benefits and income from social welfare-based societies. From Richard Reid’s abortive attempt to bring down a U.S. airline flying across the Atlantic, to the Madrid subway bombs and the July 7, 2005 London transport attacks, Europe, especially Italy, the Netherlands, and France, where there are, as in England and Spain, quite strong Islamist movements, is producing a recruiting pool for radical Islamists who put their allegiance to Islam ahead of any national identity. Professor Bernard Lewis, writing in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, has noted this trend and points out that the nation-state, essentially codified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, has no meaning in the Middle East, whose countries, in many cases, were artificially carved out of the Ottoman empire after World War I, and whose basic loyalties are tied to local and regional tribes, clans, and ethnicities. As described by Professor Lewis,

\begin{quote}
(T)he positioning of lines on maps is a relic of the imperial age…the advent of Islam, the adoption of the Arabic language, brought a new identity, and with it a new past, and a new set of memories.\(^{31}\)
\end{quote}

Following Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF), bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have been again readjusting their ideological rhetoric to rally support to their cause and attack the United States. Bin Laden’s messages to Muslim audiences have continued to stress the “us against them” view of the world, and have attempted to revive the spirit of the Afghan resistance in the 1980s which drew volunteers from across the Muslim world. Bin Laden has argued that the war in Iraq is part of a broader war to destroy Islam, and will be followed by the invasion of a series of other Muslim countries. Shortly before Operation *Iraqi Freedom* began in March 2003, bin Laden summarized this opinion as follows:

\begin{quote}
…the preparations underway at present for an attack upon Iraq are but one link in a chain of attacks — [currently] in preparation — on the countries of
\end{quote}


\(^{30}\) Quoted in: “Fundamentalist Group Pinpoints Blair as Legitimate Target,” Agence France Press, October 9, 2001 (Lexis-Nexis)

In order to rally violent opposition to the coalition forces in Iraq, bin Laden reiterated his claim that jihadists could be, and have been, successful in their efforts to defeat a superpower on the battlefield, arguing that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was basically attributable to the military campaign that had been waged by the Mujahideen. Bin Laden has also referenced as well what he has characterized as the American proclivity to “cut and run,” highlighting, in this context, the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994 as proof of the jihadists’ ability to inflict unacceptable casualties on U.S. forces. Bin Laden’s advice is to “unite around the jihad warriors and those who resist the occupiers.”

In recent years, al-Qaeda’s ideological statements have often been issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri, fueling considerable debate over the state of bin Laden’s health, his whereabouts, and his control over the organization. In addition to bin Laden’s exhortations to fight the international troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, Zawahiri’s statements feature ideological attacks on U.S. democracy-building efforts, with a specific, more recent focus on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories. Notably, Zawahiri’s propagandizing against elections goes beyond religious opposition to attacks on democracy-building initiatives overall, and he has begun to tie military defeat of U.S. troops in Iraq (and ISAF forces in Afghanistan) to efforts to undermine “the post-American government in Iraq by using political action along with military attacks so that al-Qaeda could set up or co-opt the new regime and direct it to become an Islamist state.”

On this point, al-Zawahiri continues:

The aftermath of American power in Vietnam—and how they ran and left their agents—is noteworthy. Because of that, we must be ready, starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them. We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us, whereupon our lot would be to merely resist their schemes.

With respect to Afghanistan, he has alleged that voting irregularities were widespread and that the international community, under U.S. control, has turned a blind eye to the corrupt process. According to Zawahiri:

Middle East Media Research Institute, “Bin Laden's Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice,” Special Dispatch Series, No. 476, March 5, 2003

Middle East Media Research Institute, “Usama bin Laden to the Iraqi People,” Special Dispatch Series, No. 837, December 30, 2004. Indeed, recent reports suggest that the U.S. Black Hawk helicopter downed in Somalia was likely hit by weapons bought and provided to the Somalis by bin Laden. In 2006, Somalia once again was on the brink of both a civil war, this time however, between U.S.-backed warlords in the Baidoan government and Islamist radicals who took over the capital city of Mogadishu and a war between the Islamists in Somalia and Ethiopia. According to one report, “residents of Mogadishu say hundreds of fighters from other Muslim countries have arrived at the city’s main airport in recent days, drawn by the Islamists’ blaring call for a holy war against Ethiopia and against America, which is especially despised here. Memories are still fresh of the botched American-led relief operation in the early 1990s, and more recently of the covert American effort to bolster Mogadishu’s warlords in an 11th hour bid to prevent an Islamist takeover. ‘I'll be honest’, said Sheik Muktar Robow Abu Monsur, the deputy security chief for the Islamists, ‘America is the best friend of Islam. It wakes up the sleeping Muslim.’” Quoted in Jeffrey Gettleman and Mark Mazzetti, “Somalia’s Islamists and Ethiopia Grid for War,” The New York Times, December 14, 2006, p. A-21

Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War
While the UN rejects the elections held in Zimbabwe, for example, because the time dedicated to voting was insufficient, it is silent as a graveyard about the elections in Afghanistan, which were held under the terrorism of the warlords. For fifteen days, the ballot boxes were passed around among the highway bandits and the American collaborators, and no one knows what happened to them before they appeared at the ballot-counting centers.\textsuperscript{36}

Zawahiri’s critique reflects a more recent theme of al-Qaeda “literature,” namely, the de-legitimization of secular, democratic models of governance. In this context, al-Qaeda appears to be adopting a political strategy similar to that of Hezbollah, seeking at once to criticize secular political processes, while at the same time attempting to enter the political competition for office, running on platforms that are highly critical of incumbent governments. Thus, for example, while retaining capacity for de-stabilizing authoritarian Sunni regimes in Jordan, Egypt, and the GCC states, al-Qaeda appears to be trying to shape and radicalize indigenous opposition movements by influencing the mindsets of candidates running for political offices. In this way, al-Qaeda and violent extremists of all of Islam’s sects are seeking to de-stabilize friendly, pro-Western-oriented Arab regimes (e.g., in Egypt, the GCC states, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey), which are accused of being the corrupt “lackeys” of Western — and particularly U.S. — imperial power. In tying these regimes to the United States in particular, Islamists use Western democratic processes against Western interests.\textsuperscript{37} To support this strategy, the Islamists have now embraced, as noted earlier, the idea of actively participating in the political process, and they are using modern tools, including the Internet, media, and aid organizations, to spread their ideas and to attract new recruits to the cause.

\textit{Abu Ghraib—A Self-Inflicted Wound}

The spread of radical messages in the Islamic world and beyond is being facilitated, in particular, by the widespread use of the Internet, blogging, and the manipulation of cultural centers and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are operating worldwide. The “us against them” theme is apparent in all these fora, as it taps into lingering animosity among some Muslims towards the West, draws on historical humiliations of Islam at the West’s hands, and plays upon the Arab world’s governance and corruption problems. In recent years, nothing has so coalesced Muslim and, in particular, Arab feelings of humiliation and resentment against the West as has the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. Coming after the fall of Saddam Hussein, amidst the growing insurgency in Iraq, the allegations of


\textsuperscript{37} Of course, Hamas’ electoral victory is the case in point. Just as noteworthy, in this context, is the emergence of Hezbollah, after the summer of 2006, as the most important political actor in Lebanon. Following the July-August 2006 clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hezbollah has moved aggressively to assert itself politically. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has threatened the stability of the Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora by demanding greater representation for Hezbollah within the government. Negotiations for an increase in Shi’ite ministers in the government have failed thus far and resulted in mid-November in the resignation of the two existing Hezbollah ministers along with the rest of the Shi’ite ministers in government. After the Shi’ite faction’s resignation, Nasrallah called for street protests in Beirut and the resignation of Siniora or early elections. Hezbollah’s political emergence was enabled by Nasrallah’s new-found popularity, as a result of the 2006 clashes with Israel and the perception that non-state Hezbollah performed better against the Israeli military than had Arab states in the past. Hezbollah is also assessed as being behind recent protests to topple Lebanon’s government. These protests began just as the Lebanese government began to try to disarm Hezbollah and as Prime Minister Siniora expressed support for the creation of an international tribunal to try the murderer(s) of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, assassinated February 14, 2005, in a plot believed to have been developed and implemented by Hezbollah ally Syria.
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraiib were widely documented, with photos portraying prisoner humiliation replayed across the Internet. In addition to taking the moral high ground away from U.S. efforts in and for Iraq, Abu Ghraiib was a propaganda bonanza for the jihadists, many of whom sought to portray the incidents as proof of American intentions to subjugate what it considered an inferior religion. U.S. efforts to contain and dissipate the effects of the damage done to the American image by Abu Ghraiib were too long in coming, and not substantive enough to make a difference to those in the Muslim world who had begun to doubt U.S. intentions in going into Iraq in the first place. Abu Ghraiib, together with ongoing American support for unpopular (and widely perceived as corrupt) and authoritarian regimes in many Middle Eastern and Central Asian states, undercut U.S. messages about human rights and efforts to gain support for the rule of law (i.e., secular governments) across the Muslim world. Together, they contributed to building broader Muslim support for some type of Shariah governance, and they gave rise to conspiracy theories in the Arab street about U.S. intentions. At the same time, Islamist terrorist groups have videotaped the beheadings of their Western victims and used television and the Internet to publicize their barbaric acts.

**Oil, Development and Globalization Themes**

One of the most prevalent suspicions that continues to stoke Islamist arguments is that the United States invaded Iraq to gain control of its oil. U.S. dependence on Middle East energy imports is a fact of life that the radicals are manipulating for their own purposes. Across the wider Middle East, many Muslims and in particular Arab peoples have failed to benefit from the global economy, and in fact they point to a growing economic disparity between so-called “have and have not” nations. This, together with the steady encroachment of Western culture and ideas into the Islamic world through global communications, entertainment, and economic interdependence, has helped to convey the message that the only interest the West has in the Middle East is access to resources and its use to market Western exports. Past actions, including the West’s _de facto_ abandonment of the Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the perceived betrayal of the Kurds and Shia in Iraq after the first Gulf War, only serve to heighten this view of the United States as an imperial power, using Muslims to achieve its narrow objectives, and then abandoning them, once its objectives are attained.

In this regard, it is worth noting that when Usama bin Laden and other extremists evoke the “us versus them” theme, they are not inventing propaganda, but exploiting existing sentiments to suit their purposes. This is significant because though bin Laden may be a charismatic presence, and al-Qaeda the focus of much of our current counter-terrorism efforts, anti-Western sentiment runs deep and is widely shared throughout the Islamic world. For this reason, it is likely to remain a powerful force long after bin Laden is gone. U.S. policy, therefore, must be much more carefully calibrated to address and counter anti-American trends by developing sophisticated and targeted strategic communications, information operations, and psychological “warfare” strategies, preferably managed by a Cabinet-level organization, as suggested by various efforts to re-organize the U.S. national security

38 In a December 2004 audio cassette attributed to bin Laden, while urging attacks in Iraq, he references the “stealing” of oil: “One of the main causes for our enemies’ gaining hegemony over our country is their stealing our oil; therefore, you should make every effort in your power to stop the greatest theft in history of the natural resources of both present and future generations, which is being carried out through collaboration between foreigners and [native] agents… Focus your operations on it [oil production], especially in Iraq and the Gulf area, since this [lack of oil] will cause them to die off [on their own].” Translation from Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series No. 838, December 30, 2004.
decision-making structure that was put into place sixty years ago by the 1947 National Security Act.\textsuperscript{39} The phenomena of the “Houses of Islam and War,”\textsuperscript{40} offers a basis for promoting jihad against the United States and the West, and with or without al-Qaeda’s theology, jihadists look to the United States as the focus of their ire. Some psychologists refer to this phenomenon as projection, in other words, blaming someone or something else for your own failings. However it is characterized, it is clear that the struggle against radical Islam has opened a Pandora’s Box, the outcome of which will be decided over time (i.e., a generational struggle via the Long War) and through the use of all the tools in our Interagency tool-kit.

\textbf{Ideology of Martyrdom}

The radical Islamist ideology has manifested itself most notably in the growth of support for the reward of martyrdom by those who perpetrate suicide attacks. Consequently, martyrdom operations have emerged as a serious challenge to U.S. interests and forces operating overseas. Suicide attacks, moreover, have become the weapon of choice for the insurgents and for the proponents of sectarian violence in Iraq and, increasingly, as noted in the \textit{Introduction}, for the Taliban in Afghanistan. For trans-national, non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and disaffected political movements, suicide terrorism is one among a number of preferred asymmetric strategies designed to defeat a stronger state entity. It is also, as demonstrated in attacks against U.S. and non-U.S. coalition forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, a powerful tool to induce political action, in this case, the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq and the failure of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{41} The U.S. debate over troop redeployments from Iraq has already begun, with the results of the 2006 Congressional elections more or less being interpreted by some as a mandate to bring U.S. troops home.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} The U.S. Commission on National Security (Hart-Rudman) offered recommendations to prepare the United States for new security challenges of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, highlighting reforms to make the Executive branch more responsive to new and emerging threats. Among the report’s recommendations was the need to create a coordinated strategic communications’ effort to ensure that we get our messages out and transmitted in appropriate manner to targeted audiences. See Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman (Co-Chairs), \textit{Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21\textsuperscript{st} Century}, February 15, 2001. Similarly, a 2004 Defense Science Board study recommended the creation of a “permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC.” See \textit{Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication}, September 2004, pg. 6. And, more recently, the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also flagged the need for a coherent U.S. strategic communications strategy, as part of a larger effort to reform the U.S. national security decision-making apparatus to meet the challenges posed by 21\textsuperscript{st} century threats. See Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy (Lead Investigators), \textit{Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 2 Report}, CSIS, Washington DC, July 2005.

\textsuperscript{40} Lewis, \textit{Op. Cit.}, “The Revolt of Islam: When Did the Conflict with the West Begin and How Could it End?” Lewis writes that “between the two there was to be a perpetual state of war, until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state.”

\textsuperscript{41} Without belaboring the obvious, al-Qaeda is attempting to create a self-fulfilling prophesy by contending in blogs and through the media (Al-Jazeera, for example) that the United States is a feckless ally that is casualty adverse. When the going gets tough, it withdraws—a theme that the results of the November 2006 U.S. Congressional elections are propounding with respect to American troop deployments in Iraq, at least in the eyes of many in the wider Muslim world.

\textsuperscript{42} In addition to the 2006 election results, the report of the Baker Hamilton Commission is widely seen as providing additional political cover for advocates of withdrawal from Iraq. Early speculation on the likely findings of the Commission suggested that they may include a solid deadline and plan for withdrawing all troops from Iraq. As it happened, the report of the Commission pointed to 2008 as a possible timeline for the withdrawal of a portion of the U.S. military from Iraq, but provided a major caveat and did not specify troop numbers: “The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” See: James A. Baker III, and Lee H. Hamilton, et al., \textit{The Iraq Study Group Report} (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) pg. xvi.
Martyrdom is a crucial tenet in the founding of the Shia faith. Muslims practicing the Shia interpretation of Islam differ from their Sunni counterparts in their adherence to the Prophet Muhammad’s succession line; and while Shia venerate Ali, the first Imam, and al-Husayn, the third Imam and martyr of the Battle of Karbala, the Sunni consider the Shia Imams apostate. The prominence that Shia Muslims give to martyrdom translates into support for the after-life being more desirable than the earthly world and to recognition of the honor of sacrificing one’s life for a greater cause. The act of martyrdom and the subsequent journey into “paradise” is, many Shia claim, what Allah asks of all good Muslims. Except in Iran and now in post-Saddam Iraq, Shi’ite status as a minority has resulted in perpetual disenfranchisement contrasted with their Sunni counterparts. This encourages them to take greater risks and to challenge political authority in a way that is only now just beginning to manifest itself among Sunni Arab communities.

Iraq has brought to the fore the tensions that have always existed between Sunni and Shia interpretations of Islam. With the overthrow of the Shah and the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the two strands of Islam began to converge in the sense that many Sunni Arabs welcomed what was widely perceived in the Muslim world as a defeat for the United States, particularly after Israel’s military victories over the Arabs in 1967. Under the leadership of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and as expressed in his *Vilayat-i Faqih*, jihad against oppressive rulers is justified according to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, al-Husayn, who was martyred at Karbala in 680. However, Khomeini also expanded the concept to include wars of “national liberation” (from colonial exploitation), and, more importantly, to convey the nature of the struggle that Iranian Shi’ites were then waging to establish an independent Islamic state. After Iranian Revolutionary Guards stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took embassy personnel as hostages in November of 1979, Khomeini delivered a speech in which he proclaimed the Iranian Revolution to be the vanguard of Islam’s militant advance.

From 1980-1988, however, the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq created a fissure in Iranian attempts to portray a common Islamic front in the face of Western (colonial) threats. In an attempt to wrest control of the Shatt al Arab waterway (flowing into the Persian Gulf and forming a part of the border between Iraq and Iran) from the newly installed Revolutionary government in Tehran, Saddam Hussein’s secular Ba’athist regime sought to diminish (in the eyes of the Arab world) Persian Iran’s pretensions to leadership over Islamist efforts to restore the caliphate.

After eight years of fighting, which included Saddam’s use of chemical weapons, Iran was forced to accept a United Nations-brokered cease-fire, but not before U.S. forces became involved, as a result of Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers traversing Persian Gulf waters. Throughout the decade of the 1990s, Iran’s Revolutionary government consolidated its power inside of Iran, while keeping a watchful eye on events in neighboring countries. Iraq’s defeat in *Desert Storm*, and events throughout the period leading up to

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44 Ibid., p. 111.
### Differences Between Sunni and Shia Branches of Islam

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<tr>
<th>Disagreement</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Succession to Muhammad</td>
<td>Believe Muhammad chose Abu Bakr as successor and support consultation ((shura)) to choose caliphs to lead Islam</td>
<td>Support familial succession, Muhammad's cousin Ali and Imams are rightful leaders of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>Tradition of (shura) stresses consensus and builds support for leadership</td>
<td>Minority status within Islam and tradition of martyrdom Support for radical action to bolster Shia political and religious power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tawhid</strong></td>
<td>Succession through Muhammad's appointment of Abu Bakr results in worship only of Allah and Muhammad (accuse Shia of Imam worship) Divine revelation ended with Muhammad; no belief in the coming of the Mahdi (i.e., 12(^{th}) Imam)</td>
<td>Succession through family of Muhammad legitimizes the Imams' authority As a result the martyred Imams Ali, Hussayn, and Mahdi are venerated, and the anticipated return of the 12(^{th}) Imam (Mahdi) has yet to materialize Coming of the Mahdi may bring about the Apocalypse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing History</td>
<td>Majority status and Western alliances ensured control over governing institutions</td>
<td>Minority status left Shia Muslims with little state power until Safavid dynasty established the Shi’ite theology as the state religion in Persia/Iran Shia political power enhanced by non-state organizations (e.g., Hezbollah, Iraqi militias)</td>
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9/11 and Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, provided a respite for the Iranians, during which time they were able to mend relations with the Europeans and with Russia, and, in so doing, rebuild their armed forces and strengthen their internal control over dissident elements in Iranian society. However, against the backdrop of the post-OIF Sunni insurgency, the introduction of foreign fighters into Iraq, and the rise of sectarian violence, bringing Baghdad—at least—to the brink of civil war, the Iranian government has become more active again, providing (officially and through its Hezbollah proxy) material, logistic, and spiritual support for various factions of the Shia militias in Iraq, especially Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Badr Organization and, increasingly, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) army as well.\(^45\) Hakim’s Badr Organization appears to be morphing into a Hezbollah-type framework, with a strong inclination to use “soft” power and political leverage to strengthen the Shia-led government in Iraq. It also is using military power for ethnic cleansing (of Sunni populations), and with JAM, it is stoking the sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad, using suicide tactics to achieve its objectives of forcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops, weakening or eliminating the possibility of a Sunni revival (of power), and augmenting the influence of Shia Islamic traditions, beliefs, and jurisprudence throughout the territory of Iraq.

Sunni and Shia convergence around jihad against foreign oppressors still unites these two branches of Islam, but its application in Iraq has more to do with specific political ends than with religious objectives. The Sunni insurgents, supported variously by Syrian Ba’athists and al-Qaeda, desire the ejection of American forces from Iraq and a greater say in governing Iraq. For the Ba’athists in Iraq, it means an enhanced role in Iraq’s governance and a share in Iraq’s oil profits, while for al-Qaeda it leads to the codification of an Iraqi sanctuary from which to mount operations against regional states. Each of these groups is contributing to the current violence in Iraq, and all have evoked martyrdom operations in the name of Islam as part of a broader political and military strategy to achieve their (respective) ends. *Shahid*, or martyr, in Arabic is defined in multiple ways, although the new jihadists prefer to emphasize its original connotation as “a fighter for the cause of Allah,” according to which:

> A Bedouin came to the Messenger of Allah and said: ‘A man can fight for fame, another can fight in order to receive praise, yet another to receive spoils, and another to show off.’ The Messenger of Allah said: ‘Whoever fights in order to make the Word of Allah the highest (see Qur’an 9.40), that person is (fighting) in the way of Allah.’\(^6\)

However, more moderate Muslims tend to reject the notion of jihad as a war against non-believers, preferring to conceptualize jihad thusly:

> …From the earliest period the notion of jihad (struggle) as a spiritual concept for individual Muslims was paramount. Two kinds of jihad were identified: the greater jihad (*al-jihad al-akbar*) and the lesser jihad (*al-jihad al-asghar*). The greater jihad is the struggle which man has to wage against his lower self and is, indeed, more meritorious than the military struggle conducted against infidels.\(^7\)

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\(^{45}\) The Badr Organization is the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), located principally in and around the holy city of Karbala. SCIRI is closely associated with Iran, and indeed was founded in Iran in the 1980s. The JAM is the militia created by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in June 2003.


As noted earlier, the Shi’ite branch of Islam, received a boost in prominence with the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran and the growing regional influence of Tehran, together with Iran’s brand of Shi’ite theology has prominently featured the use of martyrdom, including during the Iran-Iraq War when even children were encouraged to seek “paradise” by detonating mines, and as part of Hezbollah strategy against Israel. The ideology of martyrdom – of dying for a cause, of heavenly rewards, of posthumous hero status on earth – has proven so successful against free and open societies that it was not very long before other Islamist groups, from Sunni insurgents in Iraq to the Taliban in Afghanistan, began to import the tactic. It should be noted as well that while the Shia may have been the first to use suicide attacks, they were not the first to popularize their strategic use. Indeed, the Chechen rebels in the former Soviet Union have used this tactic extensively, as have the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka even before the Chechens. Nonetheless, contemporary Islamist fundamentalists have taken the tactic to new heights, introducing devices capable of killing ever-larger groups of people, and fielding technologies to defeat Western efforts to disrupt suicide attacks.

The Growth of Suicide Terrorism 1991-2005

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48 It is said the a 13 year old Iranian boy, Hossein Fahmideh was the first to use the tactic, blowing himself up under an Iraqi tank in the Iraq-Iran War.
III. The New Face of Warfare: Asymmetric Strategies, Irregular Tactics, and Insurgency Operations

Confronting the ideological basis of suicide operations requires recognizing that the cult of martyrdom is not purely nihilistic, but instead based on a concrete program designed to achieve specific goals. As part of a broader strategy that includes irregular warfare (IW) and insurgency operations, suicide tactics have the potential to change the center of gravity of military campaigns, while influencing indigenous populations for or against the insurgents, depending on the nature and extent of the responses such action can provoke (from U.S. and coalition armies). In this context, it is important to note at the outset that there are weaknesses inherent in pursuing such strategies, including the very real danger of losing sight of desired objectives when, for example, operations result in high levels of civilian casualties. This perhaps helps to explain why not all terrorist organizations have resorted to the use of suicide attacks. Moreover, as was seen in the period following the July 7, 2005 London subway and bus attacks, the resolve of the Blair government to remain in Iraq was strengthened not diminished, although the attacks did have a deleterious impact on Labour party perceptions of “staying the course,” and, over time, they may actually secure the intended effect of pushing a new British government to alter course from its present policy line. That said, there is no question that the upward trend in violence in both Iraq and Afghanistan, together with the enemies’ adaptation of strategies, tactics, and even technologies (i.e., more sophisticated use of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs), and with a consequent rise in overall casualties, is having a perceptible impact on public opinion both in the United States and overseas in allied/coalition partner countries, raising concerns about the capacity of Western societies to sustain long-term commitments to defeat violent extremist threats.

Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that after the Black Hawk incident in Mogadishu in 1993, enemies of the United States absorbed very quickly two significant lessons about how to deal with America. First, they concluded that our staying power for long drawn-out and messy conflict was limited, and second, that the infliction of casualties had the potential to sway public and political support against military operations. In an effort to leverage both tendencies and to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. conventional military power, asymmetric strategies, tactics, and concepts for engaging the United States have become the hallmark of jihadist activity, including al-Qaeda efforts to target civilians. Unlike previous struggles, the new jihadists are sharing and disseminating over the Internet tactical knowledge and lessons-learned to provide a virtual training facility to teach new recruits to assemble bombs and weapons, deliver ideological messages to aspiring recruits and even to launch warriors into action.


50 Of course, perceptions surrounding the “staying power” of the United States were shaped a decade before in the Muslim world, when U.S. troops withdrew from Lebanon after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, and then again in 1994, after our ill-fated effort to quell the violence in Haiti. After our withdrawal from Mogadishu, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia reinforced for many in the wider Muslim world the U.S. aversion to casualties and our preference for “off-shore” wars. By all accounts, this has had a lasting influence on our enemies, and it has made U.S. friends and allies very cautious about committing to long-term cooperation. See for example, Middle East Research Institute, “Bin Laden’s Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice,” Special Dispatch Series 476, March 5, 2003.
Suicide Attacks as a Component of Irregular Warfare

The use of suicide tactics against the United States and its coalition partners has emerged as a central tenet of violent Islamist operations, as discussed earlier. As part of the global struggle against the West, such operations are justified in the context of jihad, and are embraced as necessary to defeat a much stronger conventionally-armed enemy. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, suicide operations and the widespread use of IEDs have become key elements of the fight, although it is important to note as well that the dynamics of the insurgency in Iraq and the foreign fighter threat are very different phenomena from the sectarian violence that is ongoing between the Shia and Sunni factions in Iraq. Each is employing suicide attacks, but, in the case of the foreign fighters, their use of suicide tactics is designed very specifically to force a U.S. withdrawal and to establish a new sanctuary in Iraq for the al-Qaeda movement.

In this context, it is useful to recall, as portrayed in the chart on p. 27, that the precise motivations of violent extremist groups flow from specific political, economic, or societal circumstances, and, more often than not, have to do with (political) power relationships. Thus, for example, the Shi’ite sectarian militias in Iraq serve different interests in the political struggle for power. Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army very clearly is operating in support of Sadr’s efforts to control the levers of power in Baghdad, while Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Badr Organization appears to be trying to contest Sadr’s power and, more generally, to pull down the national unity government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (who holds his job thanks to Sadr’s support). Disempowering the Sunnis appears to be a common goal of both groups, but there are differences over the extent to which either is willing to promote Iranian interests in Iraq, though Iranian interests would de facto be supported if the Ba’athist Arabs were to be disenfranchised.

Invoking cultural traditions and themes of humiliation has in many ways been the most important factor in pushing individuals to participate in or support extremist causes. Radical extremists will often zero in on specific grievances that may have particular relevance for specific groups, e.g., the detention of Islamic women or Israel’s targeting of women and children during its 2006 conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon. They also frequently articulate messages concerning the inaction of leading Muslim countries and their rulers in the face of perceived injustices caused by the United States and other Western nations. By drawing on secular grievances and a perceived lack of official government action, terrorist organizations often convince susceptible individuals that they must take matters into their own hands, thereby also legitimating the use of all means to do so.

Secular grievances and feelings that feed on revenge are powerful motivations for jihadi action, as well as for recruiting the foot soldiers for martyrdom missions. The idea that the new jihadists are striving to establish a new caliphate by expelling foreign “occupiers” from Muslim lands is an especially attractive recruiting tool, and one that resonates well, as noted earlier in this report, in areas where youth unemployment is great. Some analysts even go so far as to hypothesize that U.S. foreign and security policies over the last decades are the approximate cause of the rise of militant Islam. Pointing to our so-called “occupation” of Iraq as a major theme in their media outreach, the new jihadists have been able to enhance the attractiveness of their arguments. In the eyes of the new jihadists, all means of defeating the United States and coalition forces are now legitimate because in their view their cause is just and resistance is mandated by Allah (as set forth in the Qur’an).

51 This is a variation of University of Chicago’s Dr. Robert Pape’s thesis in which he alleges that the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq has engendered more suicide attackers, whose ultimate purpose is to force a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and from the wider CENTCOM Area of Operations (AOR). See: Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005) 335 pp.
### Islamist Groups’ Ideologies and Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Gain territory for base to export conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provoke clash between Islam and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force U.S. to withdraw to CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New caliphate with Shariah governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Topple the Karzai government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expel/defeat U.S.-NATO forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restore Shariah-based governance across the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Ba’athists (Secular Ba’athist alliance with Sunni Islamists)</td>
<td>Expel U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topple the “unity” government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-establish Sunni governance in al-Anbar and Diyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM)</td>
<td>Expel foreign troops from Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consolidate control of government in Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exert control over security institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement Shariah governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) / Badr</td>
<td>Create autonomous Shia region in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Establish SCIRI control in Shia south through the Badr Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement Shariah governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Establish Palestinian state from the territories of Israel, the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bank and Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic governance in Palestine, defeat of secular PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Shia control of Lebanese government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent peace with Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bring Lebanon into the Syria/Iran sphere of influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted earlier as well, projecting blame onto an outside force is often an aspect of the victim persona. According to social psychologists, this phenomenon tends to generate a desire to lash out, and to search for ways to empower oneself or cause, oftentimes by taking actions that are self-destructive and that inflict misery. A number of proximate factors can be cited in this regard, including unemployment, as noted earlier, feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness, and frustration with particular circumstances in life. The need to avenge “honor” is also a frequently referenced motivation: honor of family, women, tribe, or individual honor. Thus, for example, the personal humiliation of living under occupation, the imposition of checkpoints and curfews, the consequent limitation on individual freedoms, and the humiliation of house-to-house searches, all contribute at one point or another to deeply rooted resentments and feelings of powerlessness that combine to create a psychological and sociological climate in which one group feels it must act against another by which it is harmed. The result is individuals willing to engage in sectarian violence, insurgency operations, and suicide terrorism (arguably the most desperate and extreme way to strike the enemy group), and a society that has become imperious to the culture of violence that it supports.52

Islamist extremists assert that (an outward directed) jihad is required of all Muslims. Fundamentalist Islamist scholars continuously contort Islamic scripture to convince their followers that killing themselves in order to kill members of the enemy is not suicide, but martyrdom. Through a rather self-serving interpretation of Islamic scripture, fundamentalists have updated their thinking to accommodate various methods: striking civilians, using female suicide bombers, using young suicide bombers and seeking access to WMD. Extremist scholars and religious leaders argue that Muslims everywhere are in danger of being suffocated, and of having their faith, cultural achievements, and way of life eradicated at the hands of Western societies. These extremists are fueling a clash of civilizations, at the same time as they reject any olive branch that is extended by Western leaders. Thus, for example, there was a deliberate effort to foment Muslim anger over the statements of Pope Benedict XVI, when he quoted an obscure Byzantine emperor who had characterized Islam as a violent religion, just as there was an attempt to punish the Danes for their defense of free speech when the newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, published, in September 2005, cartoons caricaturing the Prophet Muhammad. Critics of the cartoons described them as “Islamophobic,” and argued that they were intended to humiliate and marginalize people of the Muslim faith, especially the Muslim minority in Denmark. Before the controversy was defused, some European nations boycotted Danish goods, while Imams from all over Europe and the Arab world requested a formal governmental investigation of the “affair,” with some recommending judicial punishment. More radical Islamists imposed death threats upon the editor of the newspaper and two suitcase bombs were discovered in trains near the

52 For a fuller discussion of the suicide bomber psychology, see, IFPA's Deterring, Dissuading, Defeating, and Countering Suicide Bomber Attacks, A Workshop Report, released in July 2006.

53 The offending passage was: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as the command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” This passage originally appeared in “Dialogue Held with a Certain Persian, the Worthy Mouterizes, in Anakara of Galatia,” which was written as an expression of the views of the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus (1391) on such issues as forced conversion, holy war, and the relationship between faith and reason. For full text of speech: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html
German towns of Dortmund and Koblenz, put there, according to police reports, by jihadists who “saw the Muhammad cartoons as an ‘assault by the West on Islam.’” In the wake of both affairs, there was intensive support for an inter-faith dialogue between Islamic leaders and their religious counterparts in the West, but thus far such efforts have fallen short in their capacity to shape thinking in a positive way in the wider Muslim world, or to help discredit the ideas and tactics of the radical extremists.

Clearly, the use of asymmetric tactics by such groups, including suicide and IED attacks, imposes a tremendous operational challenge to free and open societies. Force protection and homeland security have taken on a new urgency, and efforts to influence the strategic perceptions of the wider Muslim world, using information operations and psychological warfare techniques have attracted greater interest among Western governments. On the ground, and in the wider theater of operations, military planners have employed classic direct action means, including retaliatory attacks, threats of escalation, and the exploitation of new technologies to enhance situational awareness and to mitigate the effects of an attack should it occur. New ideas for containing (if not defeating) the suicide terrorist threat, such as the Israeli “fishnet” concept, together with enhanced intelligence gathering methods, have registered some real successes in reducing suicide attacks, in particular, and the effectiveness of irregular warfare techniques, more generally. However, because of the sheer numbers of Islamist recruits ready and willing to die for the jihadist cause, and given the increased interest on the part of some Muslims in inflicting mass casualties, suicide attacks have not only become more prevalent, they reflect a profound change in the way violence is discussed and employed in the Muslim world. In an article published in the New York Times Magazine, New York University Law Professor Noah Feldman contends that while “suicide bombing as a tool of stateless terrorists was dreamed up a hundred years ago by the European anarchists immortalized in Joseph Conrad’s “Secret Agent,” it became a tool of modern terrorist warfare only in 1983, when Shi’ite militants blew up the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon.” Since then, suicide terrorism has permeated Islamic cultural consciousness, although until its use in Iraq, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Hindu group fighting for an independent state separate from the Sinhalese Buddhist majority on Sri Lanka, was responsible for more suicide terrorism operations than any other group. That said, the insurgency in Iraq, and now the Sunni-Shia sectarian violence, has employed suicide attacks to promote, in the former case, al-Qaeda’s cause, and in the latter case, to undermine the unity government’s prospects for reconciliation, by demonstrating its weakness relative to the Shia militias and by causing chaos for U.S. forces trying to achieve strategic stability.

54 Joerg Ziercke, head of the Bundeskriminalamt has publicly stated that the bombs were intended to detonate during the 2006 World Cup matches in Germany.

55 According to Scott Atran, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, in a private interview, suggested that if America were to engage his government, “it would be its best opportunity to reverse the steep decline in (America’s) esteem in the Arab and Muslim world.” Moreover, he is said to agree that “we need a dialogue of civilizations, not a clash of civilizations,” a theme that has been echoed by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who warned in October 2006 “that continued Middle East hostilities involving Israel will radicalize the Muslim world, even those of us who are moderate. From there, it will be just one step to that ultimate nightmare: a clash of civilizations.” From remarks to the CNO’s CEP Middle East Task Force on October 26, 2006, Op. Cit.

56 See, Deterring, Dissing and Defeating Suicide Terrorism, Op. Cit.


58 IBID.
A Culture of Violence and the Promotion of Chaos

It has been suggested that violent extremist movements benefit from a culture of violence that has long dominated the Middle East landscape. In the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute, where targeted assassinations, kidnappings, and suicide attacks have been a staple of everyday life, as well as past sectarian violence against the Kurds and the Shia (in Saddam’s Iraq), and between Sunnis and Shia in the Arab Gulf states, people of the wider Middle East have become almost inured to the culture of violence that surrounds them. Younger people may also be motivated to act because they are growing up in a society in which terrorism and suicide attacks are acceptable modes of behavior. A Palestinian suicide bomber likely will have grown up hearing about the alleged injustices caused by Israel, injustices which the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be cast as having been powerless to prevent, while prominent local non-state actors, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, may be seen as having effectively taken action to combat the “oppressor” and redress the humiliation.

Radical extremists are exploiting this phenomenon and leveraging it for their sinister purposes. They have the advantage, as discussed earlier, of using the Qur’an (however inappropriately) to legitimate their promotion of a culture of violence and even to attract secular terrorist groups to their causes. The glorification of violence, they might suggest, is justified according to the Qur’an’s pronouncement that:

The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Prophet and strive to make mischief in the land, is only this—that they should be murdered or crucified, or their hands and their feet should be cut off on opposite sides, or they should be imprisoned or exiled.  

In this, the extremists make no distinction between men or women, or between the infidels and Muslims, who allegedly collaborate with the United States and/or its coalition partners, noting that:

It is permissible to shed the blood of a woman who is a heretic even if her fighting is limited to singing.

Fomenting violence leads to chaos and that is precisely what the extremists hope to achieve, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other states in the region as well. By de-stabilizing regional governments, the radicals are better positioned to bring pressure upon friendly, pro-American regimes, to enhance indigenous support for their efforts (including in the political realm), and to force the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the region by drawing attention to the high numbers of civilian casualties in places (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan) where U.S. forces are conducting operations. This is why, for example, the U.S. debate over whether or not Iraq has descended into a “civil war” is very useful to al-Qaeda and even to the Sunni Ba’athists, who continue to cling to the hope of some day regaining power in Iraq. The very notion of civil war gives a certain legitimacy to these groups, even if they lack the popular bases of support that are characteristic of warring parties in a classic civil war conflict. According to one analyst, the civil war tag also benefits the militias operating in Iraq, some of which are empowered solely by criminal elements, others of which benefit from external support.

59 The quote is from 5:33. The complete verse from the Noble Qur’an is: “The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter.”


Interestingly, however, upon closer analysis it is apparent that there is a visible double standard among radical extremist organizations. On the one hand, the leaderships of groups such as Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad embrace the culture of violence and exhort recruits to become martyrs to the cause. On the other hand, they themselves go to great pains to escape becoming martyrs, allegedly because they are essential to the future function of their organizations. Despite seeming to be a bit disingenuous when it comes to the equal application of Qur’anic justice, the leaders of violent extremist groups portray their need for survival as essential to ensuring the health of the organization, which in turn has caused them to adopt tactics (e.g., the use of human shields or hiding in heavily populated urban areas) that will produce larger casualties if they are located and targeted by U.S. or coalition forces, thereby placing the onus for high civilian losses on the West. According to Gary Berntsen, leader of the CIA operation at Tora Bora, Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden since Operation Enduring Freedom has been “sacrificing the lives of young jihadists to save his own skin. This is not a man interested in martyring himself. He’ll martyr a thousand others; he doesn’t want to martyr himself.”

The gap between rhetoric and behavior among terrorist leaderships regarding their preparedness to die does not imply that terrorist leaders are cowardly, avoid confrontation, or are unwilling to die for their

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cause. The gap should be viewed as highlighting the different roles of the several people involved in each suicide terrorist attack. Terrorist leaders rationalize this reality on the basis that they can best serve their organizations by remaining alive to plan new attacks and to provide inspiration for their foot soldiers. From the terrorist organization’s perspective, the largest benefit of a senior figure dying in action is the martyrdom and propaganda bonanza. But the negative impact of the loss of leadership on the organization often outweighs the benefit. Up to now, Palestinian terrorist organizations have been the only groups able to demonstrate consistently the ability to continue operating following the loss of senior leadership. Al-Qaeda, of course, has survived significant leadership losses (most notably Zarqawi in Iraq among its top leadership), but it has also evolved into a bottom-up, “franchise”-type organization, against which a strategy that seeks to decapitate the organization may not be sufficient or decisive. Additionally, as has been recently reported in the press, Iran may be involved in grooming a new generation of al-Qaeda leaders, and, according to British intelligence, it has recently been actively promoting Saif al-Adel, a former colonel in Egypt’s special forces, to become al-Qaeda’s third in command, after UBL and Zawahiri. For years, it has been the conventional wisdom that Shia Iran and Salafist al-Qaeda would never set aside their religious differences to join together to fight the West. However, with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be Iran’s president (succeeding the more “liberal” Muhammad Khatami), all bets are off, despite the avowed hope of some Western officials and analysts that the time may be right to engage the Iranian leadership in a constructive way on Iraq and counter-terrorism issues. In particular, Tehran’s covert pursuit of nuclear weapons technologies, in violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments (including its signing of the Additional Protocol), together with its support of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias, raises fundamental questions as to Iran’s ultimate intentions regarding regional stability.

A New Strategic Challenge: Containing, Deterring, and Quite Possibly, Having to Engage/Defeat Iranian Forces or Proxy Organizations

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons technologies, in particular, raises a number of concerns for U.S. deterrence and operational planning, and U.S. allies in the GCC, Iraq, and Afghanistan all have cause for alarm. To begin with, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could undermine the credibility of U.S. extended security guarantees, throwing into question whether Washington would really risk nuclear confrontation to counter, for example, increased pressure by a nuclear Iran against a GCC state or other local U.S. allies. Given its past and ongoing ties to al-Qaeda members (to whom it gave sanctuary after the American attack on Afghanistan), as well as its longstanding use of terrorist surrogates to advance Iranian aims, Tehran’s access to nuclear weapons materials and technologies carries with it the implicit threat that such assets could be transferred to, or perhaps fall unwittingly into the hands of, terrorist groups actually willing to use WMD. Just how credible a threat this may be remains to be seen, and it may depend somewhat on how and whether the Iranian Shia leaders are able (and

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63 It is rumored, for example, that bin Laden has five armed bodyguards with him at all times whose mission is to kill (or “martyr”) him, should he be on the verge of being captured.

64 See, for example, “Iran Plotting to Groom bin Laden’s Successor,” The Daily Telegraph, November 14, 2006.

65 It should be noted that while Iran did sign the Additional Protocol, it was never ratified by the Iranian Parliament. For further discussion of Iran’s presumed nuclear weapons development and options for the United States, see: IFPA, The Way Ahead with Iran: A Libya in Waiting, A Nuclear Pariah, or Something in Between? August 11, 2006.
willing) to reconcile their views on the 12th Imam with the Salafist interpretation of Islam. In the end, this may not be as great a stumbling block as some make it out to be, particularly if al-Qaeda’s political agenda is seen as taking priority over any need to maintain Sunni Islamist ideological purity. An al-Qaeda alliance with Iran, however, might also offer the West a powerful opportunity to undercut al-Qaeda’s appeal with large segments of the Muslim population. Moreover, with respect to conditions in Iraq in particular, there ought to be a way as well to turn any Iranian interventionist strategies against Tehran, encouraging the Sunni population in Iraq (and in the region) that opposes the presence of foreign insurgents to cooperate with dissident Iranian groups, such as the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) at Camp Ashra, in Iraq, to offset the growth of Iran’s influence in Iraq and its ambitions in the wider region.

Further on the specific issue of how Iran might use nuclear weapons, it is argued by a number of scholars, including by Professor Feldman in the article mentioned earlier, that an extreme strand of Shia ideology might be evoked by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and those who share his views to justify the notion of Iran’s riding out a nuclear strike (presumably from either or both Israel and the United States), and then retaliating even if this means bringing about the apocalypse. Indeed, for a devout Shia holding such perspectives, triggering such a nuclear exchange might even be seen as a religious duty, knowing that it would, according to their belief, then usher in the appearance of the 12th Imam “at the end of time.” An Iranian leadership holding such perspectives might also seek to “eliminate” once and for all the Israeli problem (as Ahmadinejad has implied ought to be done) by striking Israel with nuclear weapons, even if that meant, again, a wider nuclear exchange (if not an apocalypse). Clearly, if such thinking were to take root in a future nuclear Iran, it would hold profound implications for U.S. regional deterrence assumptions, including calculations with respect to conflict and crisis management, escalation dominance, and war termination.

Iran’s pan-Islamic aspirations also dovetail nicely with its regional power ambitions, leading Tehran (and Ahmadinejad, in particular) to try to downplay and/or rise above Sunni-Shia divisions by advancing a more aggressive foreign policy against Israel and the United States that would appeal to a broader Muslim audience and the Arab street. Empowering Hezbollah and providing it with more sophisticated and long-range weapons technologies, for example, allowed the group to challenge Israel’s military might, generating the post-conflict perception, widespread in the Arab world, that Hezbollah (and, by extension, Iran) achieved a significant victory against the Israelis in the summer of 2006. In regional power terms, Iran unquestionably emerged from the Lebanon episode as a major “behind-the-scenes” winner, and, with the chaos that

66 The 12th, and indeed the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, is seen by Shia Muslims and some Sunnis to be the savior of humanity. He is said to have disappeared as a 5 year-old boy just prior to giving the final prayer during his father’s funeral. Similar to the Christian belief in the ‘second coming’ of Christ, the 12th Imam is meant to return to reality just prior to the end of the world and the ‘day of judgment.’ It is believed that the Imam will bring absolute peace and justice to the world by establishing Islam as the only world religion. The return of the 12th Imam is said to be signaled by a number of prophetic events during 3 years of world chaos and tyranny. The differences in Sunni and Shia belief concerning the 12th Imam concern where this person has been. Shi’ites believe that the Imam has been in a higher state of existence while those Sunnis who do believe in the Imam say that he is yet to be born or has been born recently and is yet to emerge.

67 Although the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) has been designated by the United States as a terrorist group, it now serves as an informal interlocutor between the United States and Sunni insurgents, and it could, under certain conditions, do even more for the United States. One way to implement the policy of reaching out to the Sunnis is to have a balanced approach toward the Iranian regime and its main political opposition, the MEK. While keeping on the table direct talks with Tehran via the UN Security Council Permanent Five (plus Germany) diplomacy and/or via a U.S. initiative, as proposed by the Baker-Hamilton commission, Washington should also consider facilitating direct talks with the MEK and the Sunnis at Camp Ashraf. An approach along these lines could provide an answer to those who would oppose upsetting the regime in Tehran by softening U.S. policy toward the MEK. Such an even-handed approach would also reinforce the U.S. policy (developed by Ambassador Khalilzad) of reaching out to the Sunni insurgents.

prevails in Iraq, it appears to believe that it has gained considerable leverage in the past few months in the Gulf and elsewhere over the United States. This is a calculus that must be changed if Washington is to be successful in dealing with a nuclear Iran.

Changing that calculus, however, will not be easy in the face of Islamist ideology, especially the extreme Shia brand, whatever the “facts on the ground.” As with the Christian doctrine of “just war,” Islam has established rules of war rooted in religious theology, and over time they have been reinterpreted to take into account changing tactics (e.g., that the use of human shields is permissible) and technologies (e.g., no consensus on the use of indiscriminate air strikes). In the more than twenty years since suicide bombings have become a favored technique of non-state actors, for example, Islamists have challenged the Qur’an’s original prohibition “Do not kill yourselves; for surely God has been merciful to you.” Rather than refuting this statement directly, however, the Islamists have reworded the argument to focus, as noted earlier, on martyrdom, and, in so doing, they have given rise to a new defensive doctrine that rationalizes the killing of innocent non-combatants solely on the basis of their nationality. This is done in part by inferring the “collective responsibility” of certain non-combatant groups based on their participation in general elections that have placed in power governments “hostile” to the Muslim world. Again, as noted by Feldman, for many Islamists, the asymmetrical nature of the threat posed by the United States (given its vastly superior firepower) justifies the defensive use of any means that will bring about the defeat of “the great Satan.”

“Acquiring chemical and nuclear weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.”

Against the prospect of non-state actor access to and threatened use of WMD, Western deterrence paradigms developed in Cold War days have little relevance, especially if attribution of a WMD strike is unresolved. Still, some of those who participated in the Bush administration’s nuclear posture review (NPR) have argued that holding state sponsors of terrorism at risk might deter some terrorist actions, particularly nuclear weapons use or a dirty bomb explosion. Classical Western deterrence theories, however, contain assumptions about value structures, acceptable levels of violence a society is willing to endure, and the risk calculus that a leadership would weigh when considering the use of nuclear weapons, that may not apply to a terrorist group. For al-Qaeda, the mass killings of 9/11 seem to indicate little hesitation on its part about inflicting mass casualties on innocent civilians in the United States. Likewise, for a nuclear Iran awaiting the 12th Imam, and certain that the United States was (or had been) in Iraq in part to prevent his return (or so some stories go), the nuclear decision calculus may be entirely different from that on which Western deterrence models are based. Massive retaliation may be welcomed by those seeking martyrdom. There is, in this context, a logical connection between the Islamist (and terrorist) support for suicide terrorism and the possibility that a nuclear bomb in the hands of radical Islamic extremists could be used for an “apocalyptic mission” that could not be deterred.

This is not to say that Islamic states, such as Pakistan, already a nuclear power, would act contrary to their national interests in deciding on nuclear use. But in a region where violence is ingrained and culturally acceptable, and where radical ideologies are used as cover for politically motivated actions, it is not impossible

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69 Feldman, *Op. Cit.* In his article, Feldman notes that “probably the most sophisticated effort from a legal standpoint (to justify civilian killings) is contained in a document entitled “A Treatise on the Law of the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Against the Unbelievers” written in 2003 by a Saudi dissident called Sheik Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd, who is now in prison in Saudi Arabia. See Appendix A for more on Fahd.
to imagine a radicalized government rationalizing nuclear weapons use by extrapolating from the suicide bomber case, arguing the legitimacy of killing other Muslims and bringing upon the region mass civilian casualties if it is done in the name of a just cause. While such suppositions remain purely hypothetical right now, it is not too much of a stretch to imagine al-Qaeda’s search for WMD options leading to such scenarios. Indeed, the next major step in terrorist operations is likely to be the use of WMD against a high value Western target.
IV. Strategic and Operational Implications for the United States: Essential Elements of a New National Strategy

De-legitimizing the Islamist ideology and defeating the global jihadist threat is a multifaceted challenge that requires the application of all aspects of American and allied/coalition power. It will require, without question, a much more focused and intensive Strategic Communications strategy, having sizable Information Operations (IO) components, preferably organized and run by a new office on par with that of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and focused on coordinating all Interagency efforts in this regard. But it will entail as well the development and incorporation of tactics, technologies, and new concepts for identifying and defeating operational threats, or at least mitigating their consequences. As the jihadists embrace and exploit classical insurgency strategies and, where appropriate, adapt their urban warfare tactics to put the onus on U.S. and/or coalition forces with respect to casualties and collateral damage, it is also essential that counterinsurgency operations assume a greater aspect of U.S./coalition operational planning, in concert with direct action and other non-kinetic, proactive measures including efforts to shape some insurgency operations to support U.S. and regional stability interests.

Shaping insurgencies and defeating counterinsurgencies, however, require an overarching political strategy that delineates mission taskings for military forces, the assignment of Interagency resources, and the employment of coalition partner assets. Absent such a comprehensive strategic framework, the effectiveness of military operations alone is likely to be much less than they would be if tasked on the basis of well-defined political guidance agreed upon by all major Intergency players. This type of tight Interagency cooperation, under the direction of a comprehensive, but regionally sensitive strategy, is essential for engaging in the Long War. Without it, we are likely to falter in the face of an increasingly sophisticated enemy, one whose jihad transcends tribal considerations, emphasizing the overarching importance of promoting Shariah governance, and one whose appeal spans nation-states and regional identities, in part due to its highly inventive exploitation of the new Internet frontier. A strategy with a chance to counter successfully such an adaptive and determined adversary must also be flexible, able to adjust quickly to changing circumstances, threats, and enemy actions. Among its key elements the following components are essential.

Strategic Communications and “Hearts and Minds”

Shaping an environment that is politically and ideologically as favorable as possible to the United States stands as a central task in any effort to de-legitimize the Islamist ideology and prevail against Islamist extremists. Maximizing soft power does not require ceasing or curtailing direct action against radical jihadist organizations. Increasing soft power does, however, call for proactive methods to explain and defend legitimate U.S. military action against suicide terrorists and other extremists. Creating a broader political framework that favors Western values and rejects suicide terrorism as illegitimate will facilitate U.S. efforts in the Long War, help to combat suicide terrorism overall, and decrease the flow of potential suicide bombers to terrorist organizations.

The hearts and minds campaign being conducted as part of the Long War will increasingly determine the shape and direction of the conflict against Islamists in the mid-to-long term future. Policies adopted by the United States will need to be examined through the lens of how a particular policy – as well as U.S. grand strategy – will impact the goal of de-legitimiizing the Islamist movement and draw support to the democratic, modern, free market models that have been promoted by the United States and its allies. It is important to note in this regard that with respect to democracy promotion efforts, one size does not fit all.
circumstances, and there is more than the U.S. federal model by which democracy, or popular participation in democratic processes, can flourish. With that caveat in mind, it is important to regain the initiative with respect to public outreach programs, relying upon well established State Department initiatives and non-governmental organizations that have the ability to promote democratic ideals without compromising the integrity of the message because of preconceived notions about secret agendas. The Middle East is an area in which conspiracy theories thrive and suspicions of U.S. motives are commonplace. Even if we get movement on the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process,” we will still face formidable obstacles in developing a credible alternative to the jihadists’ messages. We should be under no illusions that an Israeli-Palestinian settlement will do more than separate moderate Arab elements from Islamists committed to the destruction of Israel and the United States. Working with and through non-governmental organizations (including universities) and international movements (e.g., labor, human rights, women’s organizations) offers at least one useful and under-utilized strategy to organize, promote, and empower moderate Muslims who have no interest in seeing the radicals succeed.

An operational environment in which U.S. “soft power” is influential will also empower U.S. military forces operating overseas, both in war zones and in the context of security cooperation or “Phase 0” activities. Special Operations’ Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) teams, operating in Africa and elsewhere, for example, have been critically important in building partner capacity and influencing hearts and minds. This concept needs to be enlarged and/or replicated through the augmentation of SOF in regions of looming risk. Similarly, U.S. forces engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly had tremendous potential to separate the jihadists from the local populations, employing classic counterinsurgency techniques and working at platoon, company, and battalion levels, if there had been in place a broad political strategy that was resourced to support such operations. It is very clear, moreover, that in both Iraq and Afghanistan al-Qaeda is pursuing goals that differ from those of local insurgents. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is more interested in restoring its Shariah-based governance than it is in supporting al-Qaeda’s jihad against the United States and the coalition forces. So, too, in Iraq, al-Qaeda is more interested in waging an insurgency, using suicide tactics, to force a U.S. withdrawal and cause enough chaos in Iraq to prompt either the country’s dissolution into ethnic partitions (thereby creating a Sunni sanctuary from which it could operate with impunity) or the downfall of the Shia-dominated government, opening the door to a full-scale civil war and systematic ethnic cleansing.

In Afghanistan, moreover, a large percentage of the population remains to be convinced of the staying power of NATO/ISAF forces and of their ultimate contribution to the betterment of life in Afghanistan’s provinces, away from Kabul. And in Iraq, the results of the 2006 U.S. mid-term elections have raised new anxieties among the Sunni population, which would be at the mercy of the Shi’ite militias and forced to rely on the foreign fighters (perhaps funded by the Saudis) for its protection, were U.S. forces to withdraw. If it is in America’s interests to separate the foreign fighters from local populations, then, it is surely worth spending the time and effort required to achieve, or at least create a credible path toward sectarian reconciliation in Iraq and to continue efforts to reach out to the Sunni minority.

To implement such an approach, the United States needs to engage more vigorously with its Arab (Sunni) coalition partners, and work specifically to attain greater Jordanian, Saudi, and other GCC support in this endeavor.\footnote{It should be noted in this regard that the Bush administration appears to be attempting to do so, with Vice-President Cheney’s November 2006 trip to Saudi Arabia, the President’s trip to Jordan in November 2006 to meet with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and King Abdullah,} CENTCOM is particularly well established to work with the Gulf allies and Jordan in this area,
but State must also become more engaged, even if its Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communications efforts have been less than compelling so far, with the possible exception of work being undertaken in the counter-terrorism realm. There, at least, as the accompanying graphic developed in the CT office illustrates, the elements of a strategy to deal with the ideological challenge posed by the radical Salafists are in place, and creative minds are attempting to tailor messages to specific audiences, a key aspect of developing an effective strategy to de-construct the Islamists’ messages and hence, their appeal.

**DOS CT’s Extremist Conveyor Belt**

![Diagram of the Extremist Conveyor Belt]

Note: Developed by DOS' CT office

**Leveraging U.S. “Soft Power” to Supplement Kinetic Operations to Erode the Extremists’ Appeal**

Over the last six months, public opinion polling has indicated a growing dichotomy between the Salafists and indigenous populations in the wider Middle East. In Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, Pashtun and Sunni people are rejecting al-Qaeda tactics that involve the targeting or use of non-combatants as human shields or human bombs (for suicide missions), arguing that such tactics are a mortal sin for practicing Muslims. Wahhabism, however, has chosen to adjust more traditional interpretations of the Qur’an on this point, putting forth arguments that, in the context of jihad (broadly defined), martyrdom is not only...
an acceptable practice, but also that it is meritorious, and that the death of innocent civilians for such a cause is acceptable in a struggle to defeat the infidels. Perhaps stimulated by such views (whatever the perspectives of local tribes), there has been an increased frequency in suicide bombing attacks, which has created new strategic and operational challenges for the U.S. military and its coalition partners engaged in counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan, forcing U.S. and allied/coalition partner planners to identify and adopt alternative measures to defeat and de-legitimize the suicide terrorism strategy. Hence, dealing with, and countering, the suicide attacker threat remains one of the abiding realities of modern warfare, and the identification of ways to de-legitimize indiscriminate attacks and to influence “hearts and minds” so as to blunt such attacks must remain a major objective.

The importance of this challenge is magnified by the high level of commitment given by the United States and its allies to the new governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq after decades of war and misrule has seen a number of successes, including the swift overthrow of corrupt governing regimes, the negotiation and completion of a process to transition to a permanent representative governing system, the successful staging of nation-wide elections with broad participation, and the establishment of nascent national army training to meet each country’s security needs. Yet, progress throughout the region has also been hampered by the persistence of Islamic jihadists, who have supported attempts by Sunni insurgents to alter the new status quo in Iraq, helped to fuel broader Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian violence in that country, and facilitated a reconstitution of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Particularly over the summer of 2006 and into the winter, there is evidence to suggest that the radical extremists (and organized crime) perceive new opportunities for disrupting ISAF and coalition operations in Afghanistan, while in Iraq, since the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Mosque, al-Qaeda fighters, particularly in al-Anbar province, have stoked the sectarian violence and are using it as a foil to undertake bolder operations against U.S. and Iraqi security forces and civilian targets.  

In both countries, al-Qaeda franchises are operating in the expectation that they can wait out the Western presence, and that they might even be able to influence Western re-deployment decisions if they can telegraph to Western audiences through sophisticated information operations and direct action that the price of “staying the course” is disproportionate to the benefits of doing so. And, indeed, the prospects for making more serious headway in Iraq at an acceptable cost seem to be declining, with many analysts in the United States suggesting that the window of opportunity for stemming the slide to civil war in Iraq is rapidly closing. General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command, has suggested, in fact, that we may have as little as six months time before the situation in Iraq becomes untenable for meeting the security and governance objectives that were established as part of post-OIF stability planning.

Again, to the extent that there is cause for optimism, it may be found in the aforementioned polling data that suggests a fissure between ordinary citizens and the radical Islamists with regard to certain extremist

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71 Over the summer of 2006, reports emerged that suggest that “Sunni militant groups suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia have established training camps east of Baghdad (in Diyala province) that are turning out well-disciplined units willing to fight American forces in set-piece battles.” Moreover, some U.S. officers have reported that recently, in November 2006, “unlike the vast majority of engagements in Diyala, insurgents stood and fought, even deploying a platoon-size unit that showed remarkable discipline. One captain said the unit was ‘in perfect military formation’” Reported in: Edward Wong, “Some Fighters in Iraq Adopt New Tactics to Battle U.S.,” The New York Times, November 24, 2006, p. 16.

72 Testimony of General John P. Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command, before the Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, November 15, 2006.
strategies. As noted elsewhere, these Islamists play on themes of victimization, humiliation, and cultural encroachment to attract popular support for their cause, while countering traditional interpretations of religious prohibitions against suicide operations, the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, and the use of women and children to conduct operations with persuasive ideas about the joys and benefits of martyrdom. The combination of appealing to mainstream secular grievances (e.g., Western exploitation of the natural resources in Arab lands) with extreme religious interpretations is one way to bridge the gap between the relatively small group of extremists and the general population, and it poses a special challenge to Western governments and their regional allies in trying to isolate the Islamists in order to de-legitimize their arguments and tactics, including the use of suicide bombings. For these and related reasons, taking action to widen the gap between Islamic extremists and mainstream Muslims may also give rise to other benefits, including an increased willingness among moderate Muslims to share intelligence and information, a reduction in funding for Islamist causes, and, in time, a diminution in the overall appeal of radical ideologies, as more and more of the general population gain access to and/or benefit from the global economy.

There are many factors or dynamics that push individuals toward embracing fundamentalist ideologies. These have been amply documented and discussed in the behavioral and social science communities and in sociological and psychological theories of group dynamics. Overall, it is very likely that the process of radicalization begins in early childhood, and involves formal and informal relationships, group dynamics (e.g., education/indoctrination, etc.), and personal experiences, from associations with peers to engaging in Internet chat rooms. Each case of radicalization is unique, but what they all have in common is a socialization process that provides a more acceptable explanation for personal failings and limitations, grievances, and societal alienation. In some cases, financial considerations are paramount, but more often than not, as interviews with former Islamists have revealed, perceived injustices and the urge to belong to a group whose messages correspond to an individual’s subjective reality provide an even stronger motivational pull toward the Islamist agenda.

The mobilization of jihadists through small group social networks has also become a growing problem in the new post-9/11 decentralized terrorist world. Individuals or small groups see and become enraged by media portrayals of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, or they become swayed by Islamist propaganda on the Internet or in small religious or social clubs, and they take it upon themselves to act, without central direction from al-Qaeda or any other international terrorist organization. These self-starter terrorists are more difficult to track along the path to mobilization because they may avoid suspicious behavior, may not join a known organization committed to Islamist goals, and may not receive any funding from abroad. Further on this last point, a number of terrorism experts have noted the tendency of suicide terrorists to brag about how much of their own money, for example, they had to spend to travel to Iraq to participate in waging jihad. The self-starters often travel to Iraq through legal means and use legitimate documentation for travel. Alternatively, self-starters may choose to remain at home and commit attacks in the pattern of the July 7, 2005 subway and bus bombings in London. In either case, to address the difficult task of tracking self-starters (sometimes called “lone wolves”), there is a clear need for tailored information operational campaigns as part of a broader “battle of ideas” aimed at easing the emotional intensity that may drive certain individuals to take action, and at countering the ideological propaganda that may help to spur on such action.

73 See, for example, IFPA’s report on Dissuading, Deterring, Defeating, De-Legitimizing the Suicide Bomber Threat: Addressing Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges, Op. Cit.
Moreover, information operations that track and seek to influence patterns of behavior established by self-starters may also hold potential for tracking and influencing homegrown terrorists. To the extent that such operations are able to access and leverage new police and intelligence methods to uncover previously undetected behavior, they can also be used to expose and stop the self-starter suicide terrorists in their tracks, well before any damage is done. In the struggle against radical extremists information operations, including information warfare and computer network operations (CNOs) have a substantial role to play. This is true with respect to the tracking of financial support networks, and it is essential to the development of a strategic communications strategy designed to influence and shape opinion on the “Arab street.” Thus far, we have allowed the Islamists to find a “virtual safe haven” in the Internet, where, for example, al-Qaeda cells actively recruit new converts, offer training, including in bomb-making techniques, and “educate” young Muslims about the evils of Western societies. Outside of government, the SITE Institute has been extremely proactive in engaging, challenging, and manipulating the radicals’ blogs, as well as their network communications. The U.S. government should be mounting a comprehensive and systematic effort, both as part of a government-wide strategic communications strategy and in support of operational planning.

**Countering Radical Extremist Efforts to Acquire and Use WMD**

The security problem posed by non-state actor efforts to acquire WMD has long been considered far more difficult to handle than state-centered nuclear (or other WMD) proliferation. However, if the tenets of Professor Feldman’s thesis are true, our ability to deter a nuclear Iran or to control the escalation chain in a crisis with a nuclear-armed Iran may also be problematic, at best. The Cold War deterrence framework that still serves as the basis of U.S. deterrence planning was developed in concert with an adversary who had an interest in maintaining and safeguarding the territorial integrity of its homeland, the Soviet Union. A radicalized Shia-based theocratic state (such as Iran) may in fact not share the same strategic interests and visions as the Cold War superpowers did, and may be willing, as Feldman postulates, to risk mass casualties to attain larger goals. Hence, as with the challenge created by the implementation of suicide bombing tactics, deterring a radical Islamist leadership or non-state jihadists is likely to be a more tenuous and risky task.

The assured destruction (AD) and mutually assured destruction (MAD) constructs of deterrence developed during the Cold War were applicable in the context of the bipolar superpower world of the United States and the Soviet Union, in which each deployed large strategic nuclear arsenals and military capabilities capable of destroying the other were a conflict between the two to break out and escalate to nuclear weapons use. Each superpower possessed large urban centers and military/economic complexes that could be readily targeted and thus held at risk by the nuclear forces of the other. Though engaged in a long-term standoff, the leaderships of the United States and Soviet Union understood very well the implications of their putative nuclear relationship. Over time, they came to appreciate, even in the face of serious crises over Berlin and Cuba, that strategic stability rested on what was the essential equivalence of their strategic forces, even if each superpower emphasized different force structures and deployment modalities to implement its deterrence policies.

Unfortunately perhaps, and as mentioned elsewhere in this report, the elements that contributed to the success of this Cold War deterrence paradigm are lacking when it comes to deterring non-state actors and states whose leaderships may operate according to a very different decision calculus. Organizations and/or

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74 The SITE Institute was founded by a young Iraqi woman named Rita Katz. SITE stands for the Search for International Terrorist Entities, and can be referenced at: http://www.siteinstitute.org
individuals engaging in suicide attacks, for example, are not states and do not directly represent a state, although they may have state sponsors the targeting of which can offer one means of deterring or denying suicide terrorists their objectives. Generally speaking, however, non-state actor terrorists do not have identifiable footprints or associated geographical reference points similar to a state's population centers or military sites that can be held at risk of retaliation. They do not even have supporting infrastructures that can easily be identified or traced, as the networks they do depend on often exist across state borders and can be embedded in legitimate concerns. Moreover, an organization such as al-Qaeda is difficult to locate because its leadership is in hiding and its affiliates are strewn across national boundaries, using the Internet and cut-outs to pass messages, communicate decisions, and plan and implement operations.

However, since deterrence is a psychological construct whose objective is to influence enemy decision-making, it may still be applicable, if fine-tuned, to help deny terrorist groups their strategic objectives, although challenges will certainly persist. Most notably, modern-day jihadists, as noted above, embrace martyrdom and have demonstrated a willingness to die or risk death for their cause; this makes imposing unacceptable costs as part of a deterrence strategy difficult if the target of deterrence is willing to accept deadly retaliation. On the other hand, strategies that deal with coercion may hold some value in influencing the behavior of those who support the jihadist cause but who are themselves unwilling to sacrifice their lives or risk the destruction of their lands. Using discriminate force to threaten or, if need be, to strike these jihadist fellow travelers as part of a broader deterrence strategy is an option that should be retained, but it should be remembered, nonetheless, that such an approach also runs the risk of creating, in certain situations, unintended second or third order effects that can leave the United States in a worse situation than if it had not acted at all.

More to the point, establishing a new deterrence paradigm capable of deterring the efforts of a radicalized Shia Iran or al-Qaeda-like organization to acquire WMD will remain a tall order, given the proclivity of radical extremists to embrace martyrdom tactics. Iran, with its highly educated and more Western-oriented population, may be deterrable, although, as noted earlier, this is not a foregone conclusion. For their part, transnational organizations and non-state actors must hide within states, so, while they themselves may be “undeterrable,” elements of their surrounding host-nation support infrastructure may be. For example, in this respect, there has been considerable debate about the deterrence value of holding host countries accountable for terrorist activities conceived or implemented from their soil. In this context, Syria and Iran could be held accountable for Hezbollah activities in Lebanon, and for fueling the insurgency in Iraq. Almost no one, however, is willing to make an argument for using military forces (much less contemplate the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons) to do so, even in the face of Iran's illegal development of nuclear weapons technologies. For the credibility of Cold War nuclear strategies depended to a considerable extent on convincing the leaderships of our enemies that the risks inherent in nuclear weapons use far outweighed any likely political or strategic gain to be obtained from such use. Against a mindset that willingly targets one’s own people, sends young recruits to die, and contemplates the potential importance of martyrdom on a mass scale, as some in Shia Iran are now doing in the context of developing an Iranian bomb, it is difficult to see where and how Western deterrence models can be effectively and consistently applied.

That said, if we think about deterrence in new ways, including with respect to placing a greater emphasis on shaping strategic perspectives and the politico-psychological dimensions of deterrence planning, we may at least be better positioned to lessen the attraction of the terrorists’ and Islamists’ arguments among
those who might be more “detrerrable” than the hard-core fanatics, and to mitigate the effects of any
terrorist attacks that are not deterred. Influence operations are psychological and political in nature,
and should be exercised according to a tailored strategy designed to exploit the extremists’ weak links
and to make life difficult for their financiers and other rear-guard supporters who may be “living the
good life,” untouched by the chaos of non-state actor warfare. Deterrence in this respect departs from its
classical nuclear roots, and falls back upon kinetic and non-kinetic strategies designed to attack the net-
work surrounding and supporting radical Islamist and terrorist operations. As depicted below, al-Qaeda’s
organizational structure is global, temporal, and virtual. As such, it offers targets of opportunity for both
kinetic and non-kinetic action.

A Temporal and Virtual Threat

Placing the Rest of the Interagency (beyond DoD) on a War Footing

By enhancing force protection measures, improving intelligence gathering, and focusing on broader terror
networks, opportunities for defending against terrorist attacks can also be greatly improved, and the use
of kinetic measures to defeat the terrorists in operational theaters, including Iraq and Afghanistan, much
more likely to register at least some successes. However, it should be noted that the best way to defeat the
jihadists is to take away their allure and to empower moderate Muslims to attack the jihadists’ messages of
hate and destruction. Obviously, the need exists, therefore, for more creative thinking about how best to
utilize and coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic responses to radical jihadist threats. In the Long War against
the radical Salafists, tools from all elements of the Interagency will be needed, just as they were in the Cold
War. During the Cold War, integrated strategies to deter the Soviet Union and to influence thinking in allied
and adversary capitals depended not only on the use of force and military forces to implement policies
and protect Western interests, but on a broader Interagency tool kit as well, including the use of sanctions,
restrictions on trade, and a highly developed communications strategy, tailored to reach particular audi-
ences and to shape elite opinion in the Warsaw Pact nations and elsewhere around the world.

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76 Much of this was discussed at an IFP–Bradley Workshop on Strengthening Forces for Democracy in the Greater Middle East: Lessons from the Past and Strategies for the Future. The after-action report was issued in March 2006, and can be found on IFPA’s web site: http://www.IFPA.org
Such deliberative planning and Interagency coordination does not exist today with respect to the global struggle against the radical jihadists, although this is precisely what is required, especially with respect to efforts to defeat the use of suicide terror tactics. As part of a larger “hearts and minds” campaign, isolating the radicals and the weak links in their support structures, using Treasury’s tools to cut off funding or Commerce’s infrastructure to disrupt terrorist commercial networks, for example, may open the door to setting in place a focused strategy that could deter and defeat efforts to fund and otherwise support radicals who employ terrorist tactics (including suicide operations). If we can identify the nodal linkages between and among terrorist cells and networks, then there may also be a role for military forces in the creation of a new deterrence paradigm that calls for the use of non-nuclear and non-lethal technologies to implement strikes on high value targets that support these terrorist networks. Even more, when thinking about a group like Hezbollah, holding the families, tribes, or societies to which terrorists belong accountable for their actions may also provide an important element in a new paradigm for defeating radical extremist threats.

Creating a New Paradigm for “Actionable” Intelligence

Combating the Islamist movement and suicide terrorism requires new forward-leaning intelligence methods that disseminate actionable warnings to the proper intelligence consumers in a timely manner. This requirement places enhanced emphasis as well on tracking evolving trends in the thinking and internal ideological debates within the Islamist community, as well as on monitoring the changing structures and modes of operation adopted by key networks supporting terrorist and/or insurgent attacks. The fact that a good part of this network exits as a loosely tied web of independent local operators connected via Internet links that are frequently adjusted to avoid detection or operations to shut them down poses an especially demanding intelligence challenge. Preventing terrorist or insurgent attacks also requires the active management of several layers of intelligence simultaneously, ranging from tactical military intelligence at the field level to more comprehensive analytical intelligence estimates that consider future trends in Islamism and extremist attack strategies (e.g., suicide bombings, IEDs, assassinations, etc.). Israel, to be sure, is the gold standard for using intelligence collection in creative ways to thwart suicide attacks, but, applying some of Israel’s methods will not be easy for the United States, given that it faces a much more diverse and global threat than Israel does, and that makes real-time, actionable intelligence very hard to come by.

Still, it is worth reviewing how Israel responded to the suicide bomber threat as an illustration of methods that might work against Islamist extremists more generally, as intelligence combined with other defensive measures seems to have reduced significantly the number of suicide attacks with which Israel has had to contend. Specifically, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) claim to have stopped in the act 69% of the suicide attacks launched against Israel during a four-year period of the Palestinian uprising.\textsuperscript{77} This was done through a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT), population controls using enhanced barrier protection procedures (i.e., checkpoints) and devices (e.g., fences, etc.), new intelligence-gathering techniques and models

(e.g., what is called an intelligence dominance approach)\textsuperscript{78}, and the institutional flexibility to process and operationalize new flows of information in a timely manner. Without doubt, Israel has perfected the art of HUMINT, using classic tactics to embed agents and/or develop sources within local communities and tribes, in neighborhoods where insurgents or terrorists tend to hide. Obviously, the United States has extremely limited HUMINT assets for employment in the wider Middle East, but this is one area where DoD and the Intelligence Community, more generally, really must move faster to develop assets, including recruiting more native language speakers, and larger numbers of culturally-attuned soldiers. In practice, this implies the need for more special forces, whose skills, cultural sensitivity, and awareness generally surpass that of regular military forces. However, this means that the SOF community may have to consider augmenting its end-strength by developing some kind of “reserve capability” that can be tapped into — especially local language and cultural expertise — as needs arise.

More than this, however, the United States must develop a more sophisticated analytical capacity for identifying and countering the ideological permutations of the extremists’ arguments, and it must be more capable of identifying emerging radical leaders and their sources of support. This suggests the need to identify and track broad strategic trends within the radical Islamist movement, and at the same time to identify the unique features, distinct leadership, and operating styles of its various constituent organizations. Such an approach requires tools and capabilities that go far beyond a one-size-fits-all approach. Suicide terrorism organizations, in particular, have often depended on the leadership and charisma of a single leader to inspire suicidal attacks; the PKK, LTTE and, to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda are examples of this phenomenon. As the suicide terrorism problem evolves over the coming years, analyses of organizational structure and psychological profiles of both terrorist leaders and the terrorist rank and file can help policy-makers decide when a decapitating strike against a terrorist leadership might hold the promise of crippling an organization. Intelligence analysis can also help distinguish between the different operating modes of suicide terrorism and other irregular attacks. There are, for example, diverse extremists’ threat patterns against the United States that can be detected in advance of an attack, and each may require different strategies to prevent attacks: small local cells may be driven by group pressures and social dynamics; recruiting and training may be done locally or at larger camps; a strong leader may be driving individuals toward terrorist attacks; ideas and ideology may be especially important for some terrorists but not others; and for still other terrorists, more secular, political grievances may provide the essential motivation. But the main point is that providing this level of detail to intelligence consumers is the best way to ensure tailored, responsive, and effective strategies that are more likely to advance U.S. efforts in the battle for hearts and minds, while also disrupting and destroying extremist support networks.

**Coalition Partners are an Essential Component of U.S. CT Efforts**

Experience shows that operations to take down extremist networks are much more effective than targeting terrorist leaders, although this is very much dependent on the nature of the particular leadership targeted and the operating structure of its organization. Thus, while, for example, Turkey’s capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in the crippling of the PKK and its abandonment of suicide terrorist campaigns, it is doubtful that the death of Usama bin Laden will end al-Qaeda’s drive to destroy the power and global influence

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\textsuperscript{78} Intelligence Dominance is a concept that has been articulated by Professors Roy Godson (of Georgetown and President of the National Strategy Information Center) and Richard Shultz (Chairman of the Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School at Tufts University). According to Godson and Shultz in “Intelligence Dominance: A Better Way Forward in Iraq,” *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 11, Issue 43, Internet version, intelligence dominance requires cultural awareness, the development of local sources, and an analytical capability to process raw data to prioritize information and its timeliness.
of the United States and other Western societies. Nevertheless, as the Israeli experience demonstrates, even loosely organized terrorist organizations that operate in many small cells can have their effectiveness diminished by the persistent targeting of key leadership assets. At a minimum, the strategy of targeting radical Islamist leadership puts pressure on those leaders, forcing them to devote considerable time to ensuring their own protection, which in turn has the added bonus of limiting their mobility and diminishing the amount of time available for planning operations against Western interests.

To some extent, this may have happened already with al-Qaeda as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom, which broke up the al-Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, caught many of the top-level leaders, and forced the remaining leadership to live in deep hiding. It is, on the one hand, impossible to measure accurately this effect, because al-Qaeda-motivated terrorism overall has increased since 9/11. On the other hand, there has not been an attack on U.S. territory or major interests similar in scale to those against America’s East African embassies, the U.S.S. Cole, or the World Trade Center. Of course, al-Qaeda has also been presented with more convenient targets for suicide attack and other types of assault closer to home in the form of U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, so it is possible that al-Qaeda has simply chosen to concentrate, for now, on attacking U.S. forces in the region instead of U.S. territory. But taking the fight to the al-Qaeda leadership has undoubtedly denied it access to training bases in Afghanistan, forcing it to find new sanctuaries (in Pakistan, Somalia, and Iraq), and this, in turn, has created new stresses on al-Qaeda’s C3 capabilities, as well as on its training, logistics, and recruitment operations.

But again, as alluded to earlier, tracking, capturing and/or killing terrorist leaders is as much a diplomatic and intelligence challenge as it is a military one. Countries with nominally friendly leaderships – such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – need a mix of pressure and encouragement to elicit a maximum effort on their part at capturing terrorist leaders and avoiding an Islamist takeover. More hostile countries – such as Iran and Syria – also require special attention to prevent their governments from offering a safe haven to terrorist leaders. Financial, trade, military, and political leverage can all be used to win allies (and punish adversaries) in tracking terrorist leaders and denying safe havens. The civilian and military intelligence community, therefore, should place particular emphasis on nimble and creative intelligence gathering and analysis techniques that identify possible transformations in organizational structures of terrorist and extremist groups and spotlight the emergence of new terrorist leaders. For example, as al-Qaeda continues to transform from a top-down organization centered around bin Laden and Afghanistan to an organization inspired by bin Laden but structured on small cells that operate mostly independently in many countries, the United States must pay very close attention to the rise of new leaders, perhaps much closer to home (if not in America itself), who seek to strike the United States.

To capture and/or eliminate rising and established terrorist leaders, the United States will have to focus on spreading its influence to the areas where the new diffused, decentralized style of terrorist operations prevails. In lawless, ungoverned areas, military-to-military cooperation on the pattern of U.S. European Command’s Pan Sahel Initiative, CENTCOM’s Combined Joint Task Force/ Horn of Africa, or U.S. Special Operations Command’s Joint Special Operations Task Force in the Philippines offer possible models of how to do this. By partnering with tribes and/or local governments, the U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities can gain access to normally hard to reach areas to search for and track terrorist assets. Still, in the United States and other Western countries, the more common pattern of terrorism, unfortunately, will likely be attacks like those in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, undertaken closer to home by home-grown extremists. The United States can offer to assist high-risk countries with law
enforcement and intelligence cooperation in order to try and prevent such attacks and slow the momentum that successful attacks might give to the Islamist cause. But U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials should also be learning all they can from allied countries that have already been targeted about how local populations become pools for terrorist and Islamist recruitment. Learning the patterns of motivation, recruitment, organization, incitement, planning, and execution that went into the Madrid and London attacks, for instance, could go a long way to help the United States defend itself against potential future similar attacks by groups based on American soil.

**Homeland Security and Force Protection Considerations**

Finally, with respect to homeland security and force protection, the United States has learned hard lessons from its engagement with violent Islamic extremists in recent years. From the attack against the U.S. Marines in Beirut to the *Black Hawk* downed in Mogadishu, the destruction of the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole* in Aden harbor, and, ultimately from the September 11th attacks, homeland defense and force protection have emerged as critical aspects of operational planning against irregular and extremist threats. The terrorists’ use of civilian aircraft as missiles, and the way in which they have hidden IEDs in animal carcasses or in piles of garbage, both underscore the need to develop new operational concepts and technologies, as well as better intelligence streams, to counter, mitigate, or defeat 21st century warfare threats. However, as serious as current threats are, the future may hold an even starker challenge, if terrorist organizations finally acquire or gain access to WMD. And while there are many preventive programs and strategies in place to try to deal with this looming threat, much more needs to be done by way of training and equipping military forces, the general public, and partner/allied nations.

**Contending U.S. and Islamist Strategies for the Long War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>al-Qaeda’s Strategic Imperatives</th>
<th>Commonalities / Intersection Between the Two</th>
<th>Necessary Elements of a U.S. Strategy to Counter Extremist Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committed enemy prepared to fight for Islamist goals</td>
<td>Long term, sustainable, comprehensive effort required</td>
<td>Develop strategic communications and “hearts and mind” IO plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erode U.S. power and influence and attack “targets of opportunity” in Western societies</td>
<td>Focus on ideology to wage a “battle of ideas”</td>
<td>Combine “soft power” and kinetic tools to counter and defeat threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroy Israel and rally all Muslims under its ideological banner</td>
<td>Global in scope, with campaigns carefully tailored to local conditions</td>
<td>Counter extremist efforts to obtain WMD and enhance consequence management (CM)/defensive capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use Western laws and moral code against all enemies</td>
<td>Need to leverage all aspects of power and build “coalitions of the willing”</td>
<td>Enhance PSI-type operations and other cooperative exercises / collaboration with key partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generational perspective, patience is key</td>
<td>Communications strategy with multi-regional, multi-cultural focus</td>
<td>Develop a comprehensive Interagency effort that moves beyond DoD to have entire USG, allies, and partners working toward same goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad is flexible: can be top-down or self-generating</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operationalize new paradigm for “actionable intelligence”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global jihadist ideology leverages local grievances and regional aspirations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus new attention to homeland security requirements and force protection measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyrdom operations justified by ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td>Generate and sustain domestic political support for the Long War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailored strategic communications for different audiences</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accelerate R&amp;D efforts to counter technology threats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Recommendations for the Way Ahead

• The United States and its principal partners must examine policies and strategies to counter radical Islamist ideologies through the lens of how specific actions proposed will affect the battle of ideas. The ideological component of the Long War highlights the need to create a strategic environment hostile to the Islamists’ messages that will force Islamist extremists to wither on the vine from lack of support and new recruits. This will demand a much more focused, Interagency effort in the United States and closer strategic collaboration with key allies abroad, aimed, among other things, at promoting political, economic, and social reform in countries most vulnerable to Islamist radicalization. Without doubt, the current U.S. strategic communications effort is woefully inadequate to the task at hand, and this reflects a major shortcoming in the way the U.S. government has organized so far to meet the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups seeking to erode U.S. global power and influence.

• For much of the effort since 9/11, the Department of Defense (DoD) has borne the brunt of U.S. counterterrorism planning. Even the State Department, which has been contributing quite extensively to active CT efforts abroad, runs a distant second to DoD, which is on a war footing and is providing troops and resources to the fight. The U.S. Army and, to a lesser extent, the Marine Corps risk being over-stretched to the point of “breaking” while performing their assigned missions, as well as those that ought to be undertaken by other Agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in support of a comprehensive plan to thwart and counter the Salafist ideology and violent extremist threats. Within DoD, military transformation to emphasize counterinsurgency planning, shaping and influencing, and creating/coordinating with allied/coalition partner capabilities is crucial to fighting the Long War and to the dissemination of ideas to win hearts and minds. We need to keep these efforts on track, but without sacrificing other crucial missions that our military forces may be tasked to undertake in the years ahead. Balancing training and acquisitions for COIN and more conventional operations will not be easy, and greater thought needs to be put into prioritizing for tomorrow’s wars. In Iraq, in recent months, it is apparent that the insurgents are adapting their strategies and tactics, using, in some cases, established military practices (to engage U.S. and Iraqi units) rather than asymmetric tactics (which are also still being employed).

• While staying the course in Iraq may not be politically sustainable in the United States, withdrawing American troops in precipitous fashion would have profoundly negative and long-term consequences for U.S. policy and standing in the Gulf and in the wider Arab/Muslim world. Crafting a strategy that takes into account broader regional dynamics is crucial, and keeping an eye on the strategic challenge that Iran presents to U.S. interests is central. If, however, Iran is the long-term strategic challenge, Iraq has become the training and recruiting ground for the new jihadists. For this reason alone, as we prepare to transition our force presence in Iraq, we must not lose sight of the unintended consequences of our actions, including our future ability to work with and influence moderate Muslim regimes (especially Sunni regimes in Jordan, Turkey, and the leaderships of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Bahrain).

• The risk of failure in Afghanistan is growing, and more attention must be devoted to finding ways to undermine the Taliban’s resurgence and its ability to leverage al-Qaeda support from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Strengthening and building upon NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
efforts would be a useful first step, but engaging the European Union (EU) more comprehensively is a necessary step as well to keeping the NATO European nations engaged. Moreover, it is critical in this context to understand very specifically Iran’s goals and interests in Afghanistan. Iran’s regional aspirations are a cause for concern, given the country’s ongoing support for Hezbollah and its increasing influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is strengthening its economic ties, especially in the western part of the country (Herat province), while engaging in a very deliberate campaign of its own to win hearts and minds.

- It should also be recognized that by its very nature the ideology of Islamist movements does not allow the prospect of negotiation, compromise, or coexistence. The reconstruction of the *Umma* (i.e., the community of believers) and the restoration of the caliphate are only tactical objectives. The ultimate strategic goal is to extend *Shariah* governance and Islamic belief throughout the whole world. This means, in practice, that nearly all Western countries are fair game for an attack, and that the war zone (*Dar al Harb*) can be extended to wherever *Shariah* does not apply. Total war is the movement’s mantra, and its timelines transcend generations. For the West (and the United States, in particular), it will take that long as well to foster and shape alternative perspectives in the Islamic world, and to demonstrate to a skeptical Arab and Muslim street that Abu Ghraib was an aberration and not the norm (for U.S. behavior).

- Some Arab grievances against the United States are real, but many are imagined, as conspiracy theories loom large in Middle Eastern life. As a result, despite our best efforts, American messages will be a hard sell for many Muslims until and unless some *modus vivendi* is established to deal with the fact that Israel exists, and that it exists as a U.S. partner in the Middle East. Obviously, settling the Arab-Israeli dispute is important if we are to separate moderate Arabs from Islamists committed to Israel’s destruction. This state of affairs provides considerable leverage for the new jihadists, who are intent on using our ties to Israel to discredit American ideas and to de-legitimize U.S. initiatives. In the Long War against the radical Islamists, divorcing ourselves from Israel is not an option, but what is possible and should be explored is greater support for reasonable Arab positions and ways to implement them. That said, we must also recognize that if the total war construct is accepted by the new jihadists, it is unlikely that even an Oslo-type peace accord will modify Islamist goals.

- If this is, as French analyst Bruno Tertrais suggests, a “war without end,” what happens next will be determined by the future of “two of the planet’s most unstable societies…Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.” Both are nominal U.S. allies, but each has created challenges for U.S. policy at the operational and strategic levels. Saudi Arabia, with its vast petroleum reserves and containing Islam’s most holy sites, has sponsored the spread of Wahhabi/Salafist Islam through its funding of questionable charitable organizations and its endowment of Madrassahs (dedicated to the propagation of radical Islam) throughout the world. While the Kingdom under the leadership of King Abdullah has cracked down internally on the radical Islamists, it has done far too little to support stability operations in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and there is some question about its collaboration with Pakistan on nuclear technologies. Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia, supports a large youth population, many of whom are unemployed and radicalized. President Musharraf’s position is very precarious, and his security service, the notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, is famously

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divided when it comes to loyalties and objectives. Currently, Musharraf’s well-known animosity towards Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai is complicating U.S. and NATO efforts to create regional economic zones designed to bring development to the region. Moreover, his unwillingness to allow U.S. cross-border operations against the Taliban is complicating U.S. and NATO efforts to fight the insurgency in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda also has a sanctuary in the mountains of Pakistan, and, if either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia were to implode, the consequences would be profound throughout the region and the world. For these reasons, U.S. policymakers must keep their eyes on strategic trends in both countries, and work to ensure that our current preoccupation with Iraq does not obscure our broader longer-term interests in this volatile region.

- Al-Qaeda’s apparent interest in acquiring WMD has been well documented. For many analysts, it is not a matter of whether, but when they will acquire such capabilities. Against this looming threat, U.S. and allied efforts to upgrade force protection measures, defense and deterrence planning concepts (to include cyber and EMP protection), and consequence management capabilities are essential. In CENTCOM’s AOR, this includes additional comprehensive efforts to engage the GCC allies, and other key partners, including Jordan and Egypt, and it means, for CENTCOM, working across AORs to collaborate more closely with U.S. European Command and with U.S. Pacific Command over India, Pakistan, Kashmir, and Central Asia.

- Current efforts to secure the global supply of nuclear materials at military, civilian power, and research sites continue to be important. The Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative provides a good model for cooperation among the USG, foreign governments, and the private/civil society sector. U.S. financial and political support for the effort by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to convert the numerous small nuclear research facilities around the globe that operate with high-grade nuclear fuel to low-grade nuclear fuel lessens the risk that terrorists could steal weapons-grade nuclear material from research facilities. Given the high-risk tolerance of suicide terrorists and their demonstrated ability to inflict catastrophic damage, we must pay greater attention to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) plans for dealing with catastrophic events. This will also require a more informed effort to delineate with greater precision what roles the active duty military is likely to be required to perform in the fifteen or so select homeland defense contingencies that have been singled out by DoD as requiring a military lead. It also is incumbent upon us to clarify, in this context, the demands that will be placed on the National Guard, and to assess just how involvement in Title 32 missions may impact federalization (under Title 10) and, beyond that, its capacity to back-fill for active duty rotational Army units (that continue to be tasked to overseas missions).

- These efforts, together with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism unveiled at the July 2006 G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, offer new frameworks within which to tackle the problems associated with terrorist access to WMD, although new technologies will also need to be developed to help detect WMD cargoes at greater distances and to alert law enforcement authorities more quickly so as to facilitate interdiction efforts against ocean-borne cargo in international waters. CENTCOM’s recent PSI exercise with Bahrain and extra-regional U.S. partners is a start, but more intensified efforts to get the other GCC states involved actively and to enhance and increase consequence management (CM) initiatives to help mitigate the effects of a WMD terrorist attack are needed. In particular, the leadership of CENTCOM should build upon its earlier
initiatives with the GCC states, and with Jordan and Egypt, to create national nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) defense capabilities. Preparations to diminish the threat of WMD terrorism and to improve consequence management capabilities for the many contingencies that a nuclear Iran might pose may lessen the incentives for Saudi Arabia or Egypt, for example, to “go nuclear,” while fostering the development of capabilities that would help to minimize their overall exposure to any future WMD threats.

- Across the warfare planning spectrum, efforts to discredit and counter radical Islamist ideologies and agendas are crucial, and they must include both kinetic operations and hearts and minds-oriented missions. However, concerted planning before (not after) a crisis erupts is essential, if we are to constrain radical Islamists from spreading their hate-filled messages and attracting vulnerable youth to their causes. In this respect, and for DoD especially, so-called Phase 0 activities are key, although they must be better prioritized (by country and across regions) and coordinated to support broader planning guidance and U.S. strategic frameworks. Missions featuring combined operations that include military and humanitarian components, such as the tsunami relief effort, the Pakistan earthquake relief, the Balikatan exercises with the Philippines, and the activities of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, are uniquely suited to promote goodwill (often where it was latent at best), foster closer military ties, train local forces, and gain access to otherwise denied areas. The missions listed above and similar missions in the future will require a large DoD role, especially in the guise of U.S. Special Forces and for irregular warfare (IW) missions. In particular, fostering foreign leadership support in efforts to combat suicide terrorism will help to counter anti-Western ideology, deny safe havens and state-level sponsorship, increase intelligence collection, and assist in the international policing effort now being organized to confront the new, dispersed, grassroots al-Qaeda structure.

- However, it will also require augmented participation from the Interagency and other departments, far beyond what they are currently contributing to the Long War effort. It is essential that the rest of the Interagency be placed on a war-footing to meet the challenges of 21st century terrorist, radical Islamist, and emerging, new threats. This may require increased defense spending and augmentation of the end-strength of the Army and the Marine Corps—although to do so, Congress will need to address the rising costs of health care in the armed services, and the short-falls in future procurement accounts.
## Appendix A: Prominent Islamist Ideologues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alias/es</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Alive/Dead</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sayyid Qutb</td>
<td></td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Died 1966</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Died 1979</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan al-Banna</td>
<td></td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Died 1949</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Basir al-Tartusi</td>
<td>Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa Halima</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qutb worked for the Egyptian Ministry of Education and later studied in the United States from 1948-50. His experiences in the United States formed his political/religious beliefs for life. He subsequently returned to Egypt, resigned from the civil service and joined the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin). He came to be known as one of the most important 20th century ideologues of Salafist belief. He wrote extensively on the subject, often focusing on the concept of *jahiliyya* (ignorance - referring to the pre-Islamic pagan era). He articulated a militant and anti-modernist view of modernity. He was executed in 1966 by the Egyptian government for treason.

Founder of Jamaat-e-Islami and arguably one of the founders of Islam's revivalist movement. From his creation of Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941 through to 1972, Maududi was the group's elected Amir (leader). Following its creation Maududi moved to Pakistan and relentlessly denounced the impurity of its leadership, leading to his imprisonment. In 1953 he was sentenced to death, but due to his widespread popular support this was first decreased to life imprisonment, then he was released altogether. Following this he traveled the world spreading his views. He died aged 76 in Buffalo, New York. His focus was upon presenting Islam to the modern Islamic world as the correct 'way of life.' Maududi wrote more than 120 books/pamphlets and gave over 1000 speeches. His most famous piece was an enormous Urdu analysis of the Qur'an which has since been translated into more than 12 languages. Maududi never specifically supported the use of violence for his cause and also only focused on the revival of true Islam within the Islamic world.

One of the most influential Islamist revivalists and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He opposed the ascendancy of secularist thought in Egypt and the Middle East and voiced strong disappointment at al-Azhar scholars for not showing opposition to secularism. His extensive writings and speeches led to an amazing growth of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the creation of Brotherhood groups across the Middle East. Al-Banna dedicated himself towards being "a counsellor and a teacher" of the importance of Islam in life. He gave day and night classes to school pupils and their parents and preached in mosques and coffee houses. He specifically stated that the re-introduction of pure Islam was to be done through institution building, grassroots level activism and through mass communication. Although a violent wing of the Brotherhood assassinated Egypt's Prime Minister in 1949 (which led to al-Banna's murder, likely ordered by the Egyptian government) he never publicly supported the use of violence for his cause.

Al-Qaeda second in command under Usama bin Laden and former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Born to a prominent middle class Egyptian family, he studied medicine at Cairo University. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood at 14 and at 28 joined the more radical Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat, Zawahiri was arrested, thought to have been tortured in prison but later released. He fought in the 1980s against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where he met bin Laden. In Afghanistan he was deeply influenced by Abdullah Azzam (who had taught bin Laden at university). In 1990 he returned to Egypt; was arrested in Russia in 1996 for allegedly recruiting jihadists in Chechnya but was released soon after. In 1998 he merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad into al-Qaeda. The Egyptian government sentenced him to death in absentia in 1999 for the massacre of 62 foreign tourists in Luxor. Following 9/11, Interpol issued a warrant for his arrest and the FBI placed him on the 'Most Wanted Terrorists' list with a bounty of up to $25 million.

Abd al-Qadir founded Islamic Jihad in Egypt and was its first leader (replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1991). For his alleged part in the assassination of Anwar Sadat he was pursued by police. However, he managed to escape; first to UAE, then Saudi Arabia and then Pakistan. Abd al-Qadir moved to Sudan in 1993 and Yemen in the late 1990s. Following 9/11 he was arrested in Yemen and remained in prison for 2 years when he was extradited to Egypt in February 2004. He has authored famous 'Risalat al-umda fi l-dad al-udda l'l-jihad fi sabil allah,' the jihad manual found in raided homes across Europe.

Abu Basir al-Tartusi was, among radicals, a highly respected, prominent and vociferously militant jihadi sheik. He has had links with al-Qaeda and groups in Algeria. However, living in London he became critical of Hamas and Hezbollah for their deviation from 'true jihad' and he publicly condemned the London bombers for being 'cowardly and Islamically illegitimate.' In mid-2005 he published a fatwa denouncing suicide bombing as he claimed it was closer to suicide than martyrdom. This created a storm among Islamists, especially those linked with al-Qaeda who immediately produced a counter-fatwa and claimed al-Tartusi had become pacified by the impure British lifestyle.
### Appendix A: Prominent Islamist Ideologues Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alias/es</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Alive/Dead</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Azzam</td>
<td>Shaykh Azzam, Abd Allah Azzam</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Died 1989</td>
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<td>Usama bin Laden</td>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi</td>
<td>Isam Muhammad Taher al-Barqawi</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sayf al-Din al-Ansari</td>
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Abu Muhammad Asem al-Sayf al-Din al-Ansari
Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi
Usama bin Laden
Muhammad Atef
Abdullah Azzam
Nasir al-Fahd
Maqdisi

Name
Abu Hafs al-Misri, Abu Fatima, al-Khabir, Abu Khadija, Saykh

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Abu Hafs, Abu Hafs al-Misri
al-Aziz Muhammad, Taysri, Taysir Abdullah Sobhi Abd
Isam Muhammad Taher

The Egyptian
al-Barqawi

Died 00
R968
Alive
Saudi Arabia
Bio
Palestine
Alive
9
Saudi Arabia
Alive/Palestine 99
Country of Origin
97
Shaykh Azzam, Abd Allah Azzam
Died 989
Alive
Born

Famous for his fatwa justifying the use of WMD in jihad.

Since then little has been heard from him in the jihadi circles and his jihad website has closed down. He soon became heavily involved in fighting and gained a reputation as a great leader.

A Jordanian/Palestinian Islamist scholar who was the main influence on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After university he traveled to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and met many sheikhs whom he later described as ignorant of Islam. He went on to study the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibnul Qayyim and Abd al-Wahhab, all of whom had a great influence in his religious thinking. He then traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan and met with many jihadi groups. In 1992 he returned to Jordan and began his public denunciations of the government. Between 1995-99 he was imprisoned with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to whom he spread his views. Abu Muhammad was released and re-arrested on two separate occasions and during the resistance in Iraq he still managed to smuggle out letters of advice to al-Zarqawi.

A senior member of al-Qaeda and a prominent military/jihadi analyst who publishes his works largely in the jihadi journal, Al Ansar. He has written many articles discussing the tactics (and weaknesses) of Western militaries and he often analyzes past jihad battles in order to develop more efficient and successful tactics for future jihad.

Sayf al-Din al-Ansari is among a small group of al-Qaeda members who over the last few years have been labeled al-Qaeda’s next generation but whose specific involvement in the network of Islamists remains unclear. It is known that he has co-authored numerous articles in prominent jihadi journals with other ideologues such as Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi, Abu Sa’ad al-Amili and Abu Ayman al-Hilali (other members of al-Qaeda’s next generation). In one such article, Al-Ansari explicitly called for the total annihilation of all infidels in the world in jihad.

A member of the ‘takfir-jihadi’ circle under Hammud b. Uqla al-Shu’aybi and close friend and ‘colleague’ of Ali al-Khudayr and Salih al-Jarbu. He was arrested and held in jail in Saudi Arabia from 1994-97 for his radical positions and in 2003 he was again arrested along with Ali al-Khudayr and soon after, surprisingly, denounced all of his past radical positions and publications. Since then little has been heard from him in the jihadi circles and his jihad website has closed down. He was most famous for his fatwa justifying the use of WMD in jihad.
## Appendix A: Prominent Islamist Ideologues Continued

<table>
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<th>Alias/es</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Alive/Dead</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
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<tr>
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