Japan’s New National Security Initiatives
And the Future of the Japan-US Alliance
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Dr. Charles Perry and all the distinguished members of the Fletcher community and Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, thank you very much for inviting me to this wonderful event. I am very much honored to be back here at the Fletcher School to discuss Japan’s national security policy in this timely and important conference.

As an alumnus of F86, I am excited today but at the same time feel nervous because the presence of Fletcher professors reminds me of the one-hour oral examination for M.A.L.D. degree. I had a very hard time back then. My dear professors, please do not grill your old student with hard questions today.

Before getting down to business, I would like to extend my sincerest condolences on the passing of my academic advisor, Distinguished Professor Alfred P. Rubin. His profound thought is exactly relevant to today’s world, which is trying hard to reinforce and advance the rules-based international order. His positivist thought never withers and today it is increasingly important when we examine a rules-based order in this complex world. We, the students, always said after his classes that his middle initial “P” stood for “positivist”. We lost the great mind. My thought goes not only to his family but also to the entire Fletcher community.

Today, I am expected to express my view on one question: how much
implication the recent developments in Japan’s national security policy have for the future of the Japan-US alliance and the bilateral security cooperation. Very simply put, the implication will be enormous. I wish I could stop here, but there is a plenty of time left for me and I know that there is no such thing as free lunch. Thus, I would like to add my own personal footnotes to this simple answer for the rest of the time given to me.

My footnotes are outlined as follows: First, the basic guiding principles of the national security and defense policy of Japan. Second, agenda for bilateral security cooperation in the coming age. Third, what the review of the bilateral politico-military document called “the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” means to the future of the alliance. Fourth and finally, I would like to discuss this alliance in the context of the regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.

Now, at the outset, I would like to briefly cover the basic guiding principles of the national security and defense policy of Japan. There are two points here. One is Japan’s own strong resolve to defend its own territory no matter what. The other is the policy of proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation. These two exactly provide the underlying precepts for not only the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2013 but also for other major developments in recent years such as last July’s reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution, the review of “the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” to which I will come back later, and also the new principles on the transfer of defense equipment and technology in April 2014.

The National Defense Program Guidelines document describes as Japan’s basic defense policy one set of three pillars, i.e. Japan’s own efforts, strengthening of the Japan-US alliance, and active promotion of security cooperation, out of which I would like to focus on the second one, i.e. the bilateral alliance relationship with the US.
The bilateral alliance is in the center of the three pillars of Japan’s defense policy. This central pillar is to connect Japan’s own national efforts to the third pillar, i.e. its regional and global security cooperation with wider international community, because, from my point of view, Japan is, by being aligned with the US, able to more actively and effectively work with the region and the entire world and contribute to them rather than to act alone.

Having these points in mind, I would like to move on to my second footnote, i.e. agenda for bilateral security cooperation in the coming age. Here, let me touch upon the following two points: One, the change of the security environment surrounding Japan and the US, and two, how to define new cooperative relationship between the two countries.

First, I would like to point out some features of the security environment before both of us. Simply put, the security environment is more acute, complex, and fluid than ever. We have to continue to address traditional security agenda for the purpose of maintaining the nation-state-based international legal order. In this respect, it is critically important to keep expressing our common belief in the long established fundamental principles of international order including peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force as means to alter the status quo, and freedom of navigation and over-flight on and over the high seas.

At the same time, we have to address non-traditional, transnational, or post-modern agenda such as international terrorism, piracy, cyber warfare, pandemic and large-scale natural disasters, some of which are called “dark side of globalization” or “deviant globalization.” These threats do not recognize any national borders and they spread wherever deterrence is inadequate and wherever we are ill-prepared. We have problems even in outer space – space debris and anti-satellite weapons, for example. In these new domains, we need to begin with rule-setting.

In addition, we see some other serious pre-modern threats, such as attempts to deny the notion of national borders and to even revive slavery.
It is not simply a cause of lawlessness and disorder, but rather denial of the modern concepts of sovereignty and human rights.

The second point is new definition of Japan-US security and defense cooperation. In developing new division of labor to cope with the aforementioned hybrid threats, we need to broaden our scope in the following six terms: Number 1, functions. Number 2, actors. Number 3, phases. Number 4, domain. Number 5, instruments, and finally Number 6, speed.

Number 1, functions. Originally, when both countries established the first Guidelines document in 1978, it focused on joint defense operations in time of an armed attack against Japan. Today, however, bilateral defense cooperation is more than military operations for the defense of Japan. It is already expanded, reflecting the global nature of the alliance, to encompass such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peace-keeping, HA/DR, capacity building, and technology and equipment cooperation.

Number 2, actors. Security and defense cooperation cannot be conducted by the military establishments alone. It naturally involves many others including all the relevant ministries and agencies of the respective governments. Whole-of-government approach is indispensable in order to address such security agenda as international terrorism, piracy and natural disaster. At the same time, in this globalized world, networking of like-minded countries is always important, and Japan-US bilateral relationship must be appropriately placed in the multilateral networking. Similar to the reality that Japan’s own national security does not stand alone independently from that of other nations, Japan-US security relationship does not stand alone independently from a variety of other security relationships of like-minded countries in today’s world. Thus, it is natural even in the context of Japan-US bilateral cooperation to work together for promoting deeper security cooperation especially with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and goals.
Number 3, phases. We need to comprise all imaginable phases of cooperation from peacetime to gray zone and to all-out military contingencies. In this context, it is increasingly important to address cooperation in gray zone situations in order not to escalate the situation, and therefore, a key here is unity of efforts especially between the military and the law-enforcement agencies.

Number 4, domains. We need to expand our geographical horizons of cooperation far beyond Japan’s territory and to include new strategic domains such as outer space and even cyber space. The two governments share a commitment to strengthen stability and security in outer space and cyber space, and in particular the militaries of both countries are expected to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in securing safe and stable use of these domains.

Number 5, instruments, both hardware and software. In 1997, the Japanese did not have missile defense capability. They did not have legislation to deal with contingencies or the new principles on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, either. The Americans put more emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region today than in 1997, implementing the policy of rebalancing. For instance, US force structure will be rebalanced shifting from a ratio of 50/50 for Asia and Europe to 60/40 respectively. All these changes are to be appropriately reflected in a new framework of bilateral security and defense cooperation.

Finally, Number 6, speed. Contemporary threats may develop with enormous speed. Incidents may escalate so easily. It means timely response supported by quick coordination and equally quick decision-making is critical. Thus, we need to be more time conscious than ever.

Now, my third footnote is about the implication of the current review of “the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” for us and for the region.

For those of you who are interested in the review of “the Guidelines,”
please look closely at the two key bilateral statements on this subject with all the aforementioned points kept in mind. One is the Japan-US “2+2” Joint Statement issued on October 3, 2013, which set forth the 7 objectives of the review. The other is the Interim Report on the revision of the bilateral Guidelines, released on October 8, 2014. Although there is a large public attention on how to reflect the new interpretation of the Japanese constitution to the new Guidelines, the revision of the Guidelines is not just about the right of collective self-defense. There should be a lot more meat there, as I have pointed out.

The original role of the Japan-US Guidelines was to define bilateral military roles and missions to establish a division of labor in time of an armed attack against Japan. The Guidelines were supposed to serve as the politico-military framework for joint defense planning. It was the achievement in 1978, when the first ever Guidelines were established. This original purpose still matters because the core of the Japan-US Alliance is US commitment to the defense of Japan, as enshrined in Article 5 of the Security Treaty. Now, this purpose has been expanded to include many more ends, and it will continue to expand as I alluded to.

A second role was its contribution to the crisis management mechanism of the Japanese government. Just think about how positively the bilateral coordination mechanism established by the Guidelines of 1997 influenced the whole-of-government approach to national security in Japan. Or, recall a series of legislation to deal with contingencies at the turn of the century. This role is also relevant, or even more relevant to the current revision. The “2+2” Joint Statement on December 19, 2014 clearly states, “Recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process ..., the Ministers have decided to deepen the discussions further to work toward finalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the first half of this year (note: 2015), taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process.”

There is one more role of the Guidelines. The Guidelines document
or even the revision process itself works as an important instrument of strategic communications and assurance in relation with the Asia-Pacific region, Japan’s immediate neighbors in particular. The 1997 version of the Guidelines should be read as one set of policy documents together with the Joint Declaration on Security of 1996. While the Joint Declaration was the answer to the question on why the Japan-US alliance was necessary in the post-Cold War era, the 1997 version of the Guidelines was the answer to the question of how both countries should capitalize on the alliance relationship for the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. With these two answers, both Japan and the US tried to convey joint message for assurance to the entire region. Similarly, the revision of this time will mean a lot to the region and it will contribute to deepening further regional understanding of a new shape of the Japan-US Alliance based on enhanced roles of the Japanese Defense Forces in the coming age.

So much for the Guidelines revision, and fourth and finally, I would like to further discuss the bilateral alliance in the context of the Asia-Pacific regional security architecture.

Asia is an engine of global economic growth and a center stage of maritime trade. It has a huge potential, but it does not have an over-arching security mechanism to harness such a potential. We, the Asians, will continue to need US security commitment over there.

The US is, geographically, economically, politically, historically, and in many ways, a part of the Asia-Pacific region, as consistently reiterated by the US Government. The US policy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific is, from this point of view, very natural. Japan welcomes the policy of rebalancing and has great security interests in supporting it.

At the same time, the future of Japan’s relations with the US depends on how to establish and maintain stable, constructive and forward-looking relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors. Rise of China and its wanton behaviors, enigmatic North Korea, assertive Russia, proliferation of WMDs,
international terrorism, and cyber space instability – all these factors illustrate acute and complex nature of the today’s security environment in the region. In order to survive and prosper in this environment, we, the two countries need to more closely work together.

In building a more robust alliance, we have to keep the following four points in mind: First, shared values. Second, upholding established rules of international law. Third, improvement of regional transparency. Fourth and finally, promotion of regional dialogue.

First, shared values. The sovereign state system is important as the basis for international cooperation for peace and order, even though the natures of today’s threats and agenda are often transnational. Without cooperation among sovereign states, freedom of navigation on the high seas or even stable use of transnational domain such as cyber space cannot be guaranteed. Sharing values is the foundation of our joint effort for achieving common security in this complex world. As Professor Yuichi HOSOYA of Keio University argues, it is not machines but nations that establish international order. Therefore, shared values are keys to heart-to-heart relationship. As explicitly stated in abundant bilateral documents, the foundation of the Japan-US relationship lies in our shared values of individual freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, none of which could be more emphasized than today in any part of the world. An alliance simply for the balance of power alone would not last.

Second, cooperation in upholding established rules of international law. If we acquiesced in an act to jeopardize the sovereignty of states or to damage the postwar rules-based international order in one hemisphere, we could not ensure the globally established norms are observed in the other hemisphere, either. Although the pace of technological innovation particularly in weapons field outstrips the pace of the development of international legal thinking, everyone knows what rules are firmly established in today’s international community, including peaceful settlement of disputes and freedom of navigation on the high seas. Thus,
George F. Kennan was exactly right when he wrote in his telegram in 1946, “We must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us … is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.” Although I am fully aware that he wrote this in the Cold War context in order to cope with Soviet communism, we must carefully take our path with his caveat in mind today.

Third, advancing transparency in the Asia-Pacific. Transparency in policies, strategies, budgets, and all that jazz generates predictability to help avoid misunderstanding. The US and Japan can cooperate to uphold transparency in the region and to work on the world to familiarize it, as both have already a good track record of presenting it. For example, China released its military budget for 2015 just recently, according to which it is 10.1% increase from last year’s declared figure. China’s declared military expenditure has become 41 times as large as that of 27 years ago and 3.6 times as large as that of a decade ago. The rapid increase itself is a problem, but China’s opaqueness in the details of the expenditures and in the security policy is of a more serious concern for us. We must continue to encourage China to be more transparent so that we can build more stable regional environment.

Fourth and finally, promotion of regional dialogue. The US and Japan can cooperate in keeping lines of communication and dialogue with regional countries always open in order to avoid any misunderstanding and mishaps and also make it work as an instrument of regional crisis management. Region-wide habit of talks must continue to be cultivated. Japan is always open to dialogue with its neighbors. Steady implementation of Code for Unexpected Encounter at Sea (CUES), a great achievement of Western Pacific Naval Symposium, provides us with a useful tool. Japan truly welcomes this success. Also, the Japanese government continues to work on China to achieve early launch of the maritime communication mechanism between the two militaries. Just
recently, we did control-alt-delete the dialogue aiming for it. Japan is always open to dialogue with China. Bluntly speaking, it is important to sharpen our tools for communication.

Dialogue and communication is always important, but at the same time, in order to make dialogue and communication more effective, deterrent is also needed. That is why we need continuous defense efforts in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines to achieve Dynamic Joint Defense Force, truly interoperable with the US.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. Japan’s national security and prosperity continues to depend on the rules-based international order which has been established through abundant experiences of civilized nations through these 70 years. We are lucky to be able to witness the progress of the alliance relationship in this special year.

As explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy, Japan will continue to take the course as a peace-loving nation. Year 2015 also commemorates the 150th anniversary of the end of the Civil War. Integration and reconciliation – these lessons from history may provide very important suggestions for us to think about the future of Northeast Asia and Japan’s relations with its neighbors.

Let me conclude my remarks by saying that we, the Japanese, look forward to working more closely and extensively with the United States of America for common security in accordance with our firm commitment to proactive contribution to peace.

Professors, I cannot overstate my deep appreciation of the Fletcher School’s intellectual support to us. Educational and research exchanges constitute another aspect of Japan-US security and defense cooperation, as stated in the Interim Report of the Revision of the Guidelines. I sincerely ask for your continuous support for the future of the Alliance.

Once again, to all the distinguished guests here today, thank you very, very much for this wonderful opportunity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
