




Conference Report

conference organized by
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
International Security Studies Program,
The Fletcher School, Tufts University

with the cosponsorship of
United States Marine Corps
Defense Threat Reduction Agency





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The International Security Studies Program (ISSP) of The Fletcher School, Tufts University, is dedicated to teaching and research across the international security spectrum. As a distinct field of study within the multidisciplinary curriculum of The Fletcher School, the ISSP offers a full schedule of graduate-level courses and seminars. The ISSP sponsors a diverse range of “outside the classroom” educational activities, including annual conferences devoted to critical defense-related issues, a simulation exercise, a lecture series, field trips, and publications.

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Photography by Guy Noffsinger



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The 33rd IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy

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Introduction

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), The International Security Studies Program (ISSP) of The Fletcher School, Tufts University, the United States Marine Corps, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency cosponsored *The 33rd IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy* in Washington, D.C. on October 16-17, 2002. The conference examined evolving U.S. national security strategy and the role of the instruments of national power, including military capabilities, in the transformed security environment.

The conference provided a high-level forum for over 300 participants from the executive branch, Congress, the military services, the academic community, industry, and the media. In an effort to stimulate an exchange of views among attendees, an impressive group of distinguished speakers addressed various issues that included: the emerging threat environment, including transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and its implications for the United States; the policy of preemption in the new national security strategy; restructuring the intelligence community to support the national security strategy; reorganizing for homeland security; the role of allies and coalition partners in a new security strategy; service perspectives on transformation; and future challenges for acquisition reform. This is the latest in a series of major conferences organized by IFPA and The Fletcher School with the co-sponsorship and support of one of the military services.

The conference consisted of five panels and six addresses. Addresses were delivered by General James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.), President and Chief Executive Officer of Business Executives for National Security (BENS), and Executive Director, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission); General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Gordon R. England, Secretary of



the Navy; and RADM Stanley Szemborski, USN, Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In the context of shaping America's response to the post-September 11 security environment, Day One of the conference was designed to examine both the key national security issues facing the United States and the implementation of the new national security strategy. Topics included the challenges facing the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, strategic responses to the security challenges and the progress made thus far, and the importance of allies and coalition partners. A major focus was identifying emerging threats as well as an evaluation of how the new national security strategy addresses these issues.

The focus of the first panel was the transformed security setting and the challenges that are posed for U.S. national security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11. The panel featured Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University; Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director, the Investigative Project, and author of *Jihad America*; Dr. Robert Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council; Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Director, International Security Studies Program, and Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University; Dr. Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews; Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and Mr. Richard Marshall, Principal Deputy Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce.

The second panel examined the strategic responses to new security challenges which are designed to help deter and respond to terrorist attacks since 9/11. The panel featured Dr. Christopher C. Harmon, Professor of International Relations, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University; Dr. William J. Luti, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command; Mr. Bill Gertz, the *Washington Times* and author of *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11*; Mr. James Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and author of *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*; and Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.

The third session addressed the role of allies and coalition partners to help meet the security threats of the twenty-first century. It featured presentations by Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice President, the

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, and former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; and Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret.), President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

After setting forth the challenges of, and responses to, the emerging security setting on the opening day, Day Two of the conference included more in-depth discussion of the nature and type of transformation needed to confront the emerging security setting. Topics included transformation strategies needed to create essential military capabilities and the resources required to implement the new national security strategy.

The fourth session, or Chiefs Panel, considered the key issues and priorities for building military forces for the twenty-first century from the perspective of the individual military services. Panelists included General James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; General John P. Jumper, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General John M. Keane, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and Admiral Thomas H. Collins, USCG, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.

The fifth session looked at the critical transformation, acquisition and technology issues that need to be addressed in order to resource the national security strategy effectively. The panel featured Mr. Terry Pudas, Deputy Director, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense; Dr. William Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board, Department of Defense; Vice Admiral John A. Lockard, USN (Ret.), Senior Vice President – Naval Systems, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems.

The following Conference Report provides a summary of the key points that emerged from the proceedings of the meeting and an analysis of panel presentations and discussions.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC



Executive Summary

The transformed security setting and the demanding challenges it presents, particularly in the wake of 9/11, have forced the United States to construct a new national security strategy and to reorganize its security structures to address the threats posed by terrorist organizations and rogue states. The new strategy represents an important framework with which to develop innovative policies and capabilities to counter existing as well as emerging threats. Given the events of September 11, defending the United States against the terrorist threat is an imperative. The war against terrorism is a unique type of conflict that requires the United States to think differently about our enemies and to harness new tools and methods to defeat them.

Changing threats mean changing our responses. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have forced a fundamental reshaping of U.S. national security strategy. Today, the threats to the United States are diffused and hidden, encompassing adversaries who, through asymmetric means including the use of WMDs, are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage. The nature of the emerging threats has led the Bush Administration to incorporate preemption as a U.S. policy option in its new national security strategy. No longer can the United States wait passively while hostile states and terrorist organizations conduct terrorist operations, obtain WMD capabilities, and promulgate hatred.

The uncertain security environment requires that the new strategy address the complexity of, and required responses to, these evolving threats, the shape of U.S. alliance and coalition-partner relationships, the need to transform the military capabilities of the armed forces and the Coast Guard, and the challenges of resourcing the emerging national security strategy. Dealing with these issues will ultimately allow the United States to have a better understanding of how to ensure the safety of the nation.



In order to examine these diverse issues and challenges and to better understand their political and military implications, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) together with The International Security Studies Program (ISSP) of The Fletcher School, Tufts University, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) convened *The 33rd IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy*. The IFPA-Fletcher conference featured presentations and discussion on such topics as asymmetric threats, transnational terrorism, and non-state enemies; the challenge of weapons of mass destruction; war in the information age; the policy of anticipatory self-defense or preemption; approaches to military transformation; reorganizing the U.S. intelligence structure; essential military capabilities to support the new national security strategy; options for acquisition reform; and coalition planning and collaboration.

Security Challenges in the New Reality

It is widely acknowledged that the United States faces a spectrum of security challenges from enemies who will use asymmetrical means to achieve their political goals. Such adversaries have assessed U.S. strengths and vulnerabilities. Because they cannot confront the United States on their own terms, they will strike at what they perceive to be the points of American weakness. Such asymmetrical strategies pose numerous challenges for the United States. Spanning threats from bioterrorism and possible nuclear use to the employment of conventional and cyber attacks, the weapons available to such actors are plentiful. They encompass the possible use of short-range missiles deployed aboard surface ships that might be launched with conventional or WMD warheads against our cities. Such means extend to aircraft or other vehicles that could be used to dispense biological or chemical weapons.

In the years ahead longer-range missiles will increasingly be available to a wider range of states and actors. This new security setting poses a series of key issues and questions that must be addressed as the United States implements its new national security strategy.

- A diverse set of weapon types are available to terrorists encompassing conventional weaponry, cyber warfare tactics, and the possible use of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. WMD use is considered almost inevitable given their growing availability and the fact that U.S. intelligence indicates that WMDs are increasingly becoming integrated into the plans of various terrorist organizations.
- The Al Qaeda network remains a threat despite the loss of its sanctuary in Afghanistan. Besides Al Qaeda, the terrorist organizations

Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad represent significant potential threats to the Western world.

- In the post-9/11 environment a growing number of terrorist groups do not depend on state sponsorship but rather rely on external and internal financial sources.
- Before September 11, terrorism was on the periphery of U.S. security concerns because it did not fit the standard definitions of warfare. Terrorism was not deemed a viable form of warfare that could seriously impact the vital interests of the United States. Al Qaeda dramatically altered this common wisdom on 9/11. Al Qaeda utilizes fourth generation warfare which is marked by unconventional and decentralized low-intensity conflict. Practitioners of fourth generation warfare seek to offset the superior military power of nation-states as well as to attack and exploit political, economic, population, and symbolic targets.
- A multifaceted approach to terrorism and possible WMD use is required. Fundamental to this approach is access to accurate and timely intelligence which requires, among other things, infiltrating terrorist organizations with U.S. agents. It also requires that all relevant intelligence is shared so that actionable plans can be formulated and rapidly implemented. This is particularly important if the United States is to take effective preemptive actions against its adversaries.
- Much of the U.S. cyber infrastructure has vulnerabilities that can be attacked with tools easily downloadable from the internet. Concerted efforts by U.S. adversaries to disrupt portions of our cyber infrastructure could have severe economic and security impacts.
- Apart from the prevention side of the equation, detailed preparations are necessary to mitigate the impacts of possible terrorist attacks should they occur. This means bolstering U.S. consequence management capabilities and augmenting the diverse range of response assets that would be required in the aftermath of any terrorist act.

Strategic Responses to New Security Challenges

Since September 11, numerous organizational and policy changes have been proposed to help deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks. Many such changes are still either under debate or just beginning to be implemented. An examination of progress thus far, and of ongoing vulnerabilities and requirements, will help focus attention on critical next steps in strategic responses to new security challenges. A multifaceted approach is needed to counter the current and emerging

threats to national security, including terrorism and other asymmetric threats; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; ethno-religious extremism; and information warfare. This approach must include a redefinition of intelligence requirements and the role of the military, especially Special Operations Forces, as part of the new national security strategy.

- The United States must develop the requisite resources and capabilities to plan and implement the policy of preemption as outlined in the new national security strategy. Preemption, or anticipatory self-defense, is a critical strategic response to the present and future security challenges confronting the United States.
- The myriad security challenges confronting the United States requires that we undertake several important initiatives. First, the United States needs to develop enhanced intelligence collection and information sharing among intelligence agencies and key decision-makers. Given the central role accurate, timely intelligence plays in the fight against terrorism, rectifying these problems should be given top priority.
- The United States needs to reorganize several agencies responsible for national security. The lessons learned from 9/11 underscored the fact that individual federal organizations must be restructured to meet the threat posed by terrorism and the security environment of the twenty-first Century.
- Because of their unique capabilities to conduct unconventional, irregular warfare, to work with indigenous forces/populace prior to, during, and after hostilities, as well as to play a central role in preemptive actions, resources for U.S. Special Operations Forces need to be augmented.

Allies and Coalition Partners

Although the alliances of the Cold War era have been transformed to meet new security challenges, the question remains how relevant such arrangements will prove to be for twenty-first-century conflicts. With regard to the war on terrorism, the United States relies on collaboration with allies and coalition partners in conducting a wide range of counterterrorist activities. As we have seen since 9/11, they are providing access to intelligence and overseas facilities and offering valuable assistance in investigations, extraditions, and operations designed to locate, apprehend, and destroy terrorist cells. It will be necessary to sustain the momentum of the antiterrorism coalition created by September 11 as the United States and its allies strive to find common ground based on their respective interests, priorities, and capabilities.

However, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has noted, the mission will determine the coalition, rather than the coalition shap-

ing the mission. This means that as in the war to liberate Iraq, it will be necessary to put together coalitions of the willing, while the United States works also to build support within existing alliances and international organizations. Where possible, the United States will seek allies and coalition partners. Where necessary, the United States will act unilaterally to protect its most important interests.

- While the United States currently possesses unparalleled military muscle, where appropriate it should attempt to build alliances and coalitions in responding to crises.
- Alliances and coalitions of the willing remain vitally important in today's security environment as made clear in U.S.-allied military action in Kosovo, the conflict in Iraq, and of course, in the war against terrorism where the United States counts on its partnership with allies for counterterrorist activities.
- The United States must think more creatively about how alliances and coalition-partner relationships will operate in the future. Washington should consult as often as possible with allies on regional issues that directly affect their interests.
- The United States should work closely with allies and friends to address problems of disease, poverty, and lack of economic progress. Such efforts can help reduce animosity among disenfranchised people.

Transformation for a Changing World

The U.S. armed forces are undergoing a massive transformation designed to prepare them for the conduct of a broad spectrum of twenty-first-century operations. Such transformation takes place in the midst of a dynamic global security setting, together with rapidly unfolding innovations in advanced technology and military strategy. Transformation encompasses both know-how and hardware, people and weapons systems.

New-generation systems based on information-age technologies provide the basis for unprecedented accuracy and lethality. As such change unfolds, the United States must also be prepared to respond to threats and challenges across a broad spectrum. In other words, we must maintain forces to fight and win the nation's wars today while investing in capabilities for the future.

How each of the services addresses such issues individually and jointly is crucially important to a broader understanding of U.S. military capabilities for the twenty-first century. It is critical that the United States maintain strong, flexible, and full-spectrum military capabilities. Currently, U.S. military power is globally preeminent, but the United States faces important military readiness and transformation needs if it is to maintain adequate military capabilities for the future.

- One of the greatest challenges facing the military is transforming the force while remaining ready today to fight and win wars and execute other required missions.
- The United States needs forces that are flexible, mobile, and able to strike quickly and precisely anywhere on the globe. We need both to enhance current capabilities and to foster new and innovative ones.
- To implement transformation, the Marine Corps is reinvigorating its partnership with the Navy to address power projection capabilities; integrating tactical aviation with the Navy; and exploring ways for the Marine Corps to work more closely with the Special Operations community.
- Air Force transformation efforts are focusing on several areas including the capacity: to deploy rapidly in support of ground forces; to transport ground forces quickly and efficiently; and to accelerate the decision-making cycle. Restructuring its acquisition process and integrating with the other services are also key elements of Air Force transformation plans.
- The Army's vision for transformation includes the objective of coupling the lethality of mechanized forces with the responsiveness/mobility of light forces, and emphasizing the need for improved joint integration of forces and augmented situational awareness to increase interdiction capabilities.
- The Navy's blueprint for transformation is *Sea Power 21*, a roadmap that describes organizational processes that will foster the rapid development and incorporation of new operational concepts and technologies, help define and establish the future Navy workforce, and provide significant cost savings.
- Finally, the Coast Guard's design for transformation, referred to as the *Deep Water Approach*, encompasses a network-centered and integrated system of resources designed to meet specific capabilities rather than a one-for-one replacement of existing systems, an across-the-board change to its integrated logistics support system, and a new approach to human resources and human resource management. These efforts have been accelerated in the wake of September 11.

Resourcing a National Security Strategy

As the United States implements the new national security strategy and transforms its military forces, important resource issues must be addressed. They include not only the establishment of resourcing priorities for military forces and timelines for achieving necessary change, but also the formulation of innovative strategies to develop needed capabilities. Building future force structure poses numerous

challenges and opportunities for the United States. Challenges encompass the levels of resources, funding timelines, and efforts to shorten the lead time from system design phase to the deployment stage. The war against terrorism, together with responses to the security threats, will provide important opportunities for innovation, agility, and the development and deployment of new military systems. How well such issues are addressed will decisively shape the outcome of transformation efforts within the new national security strategy.

As we transform our military forces to support the new national security strategy, major investment will need to be made in personnel and equipment – training and hardware. There will be new requirements for the development of human resources and technologies based on continuing innovation. Resourcing a new national security strategy will require changes not only in training but also in how we develop new leaders. The success of such efforts will depend on numerous factors, not the least of which is the ability of the public and private sectors – government and industry – to forge a creative and sustained partnership. Throughout our history, but especially in the past century, the ability of the defense industry to develop and produce new capabilities in a timely fashion has been indispensable to the success of U.S. military forces in the field.

- Military officials must identify specific technologies/capabilities that hold the promise of actually shaping the coming security environment. However, transformation encompasses more than just technology and capabilities. It also needs to address the closely connected issues of concepts of operations, processes, and organizations. Moreover, to be successful, transformation should be elevated to the level of strategy which includes the development of a comprehensive plan and implementation milestones.
- Central to a successful transformation process is the need to identify and understand the capabilities and technologies that will allow for development of new concepts of operations leading to fundamental, transformational change. The results of such change will be realized in particular in the areas of information superiority, reduced decision-making cycles, and greatly enhanced precision strikes.
- Three critical factors for consideration to help curtail built in technology lag during the acquisition process are: design for change; selective targeting of technology; and, adaptive acquisition. Design for change refers to the inclusion of a specific requirement upfront, in the design and initial stages of a system's development, for the ability to incorporate modification/change readily into a weapon system if needed. The design for change requirement would ensure that as complex weapon systems and the associated technologies evolve we will be better able to accommodate modifications/changes without significantly adding to cost and



time. A key element in design for change is the idea of an open architecture based on a widely disseminated, known standard which would allow the best innovations and technologies to be incorporated more easily into the system.

- Selective targeting of technology relates to the notion that examining a system during a complex simulation or set of experiments will allow planners to measure technologies quantifiably helping them identify the most effective areas to target for change and for specific requirements of the system under development. Such a process would result in significant reduction of the cycle time for system development and help curb unwanted acquisition lag.
- Modifying the culture and ethos of an organization is also a crucial component for enacting a successful transformation strategy. This requires establishing clear incentives for changed behavior such as prudent risk taking and innovation.







General James L. Jones, USMC and Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Introduction

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

As we mark the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the United States has begun to implement a new national security strategy and to reorganize its national security structures to meet the challenges posed by global terrorist networks and other threats.

- The IFPA-Fletcher Conference comes at a time when the United States is pursuing a broad range of political, diplomatic, and military strategies against Saddam Hussein's regime together with operations against terrorism that continue more than a year after 9/11.

We seek not only to assess the responses to 9/11, but also to understand more fully the challenges of the future. We will address both the key national security concerns facing the United States as well as the implementation of the new national security strategy. We will focus on a variety of issues with special attention towards:

- Identifying the emerging security setting encompassing asymmetrical threats, transnational terrorism and non-state enemies, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Understanding the various tenets, including the policy of preemption, contained in the new national security strategy.

- Assessing the part to be played by allies and coalition partners in shaping the new security environment.
- Building new capabilities and organizations for homeland security.
- Understanding U.S. intelligence requirements and organizing the intelligence community more effectively to meet the goals of the national security strategy.
- Evaluating transformation strategies to create essential military capabilities.
- Identifying the resources needed to implement the national security strategy.

Summary

Remarks by **General James Jones, USMC**, Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Since 9/11, there is no longer a dividing line between foreign and domestic threats. The current security environment presents daunting challenges because of its complexity and the variety of potential threats that may emerge here at home as well as overseas.

- Terrorism straddles the institutional divisions in America's national security structure, between defense and law enforcement, between foreign and domestic affairs, and between federal, state, and local levels.
- Therefore, it is necessary to balance the nation's security strategy to defend against all threats, both external and internal.

The uncertainties and challenges of today's security setting compel the United States to pursue a new approach to national security. Changing threats mean changing U.S. responses.

- In today's security setting, the United States faces unprecedented threats that include attacks on its allies and population.
- The national security strategy recently released provides the needed framework to develop new strategies and capabilities to counter existing as well as emerging threats.

The United States is no longer immune from attack. As proven by 9/11, our adversaries will increasingly strike from within our own borders.

- We can no longer afford to focus entirely on external threats. We must also remain vigilant against internal threats within the United States.
- Potential adversaries ranging from rogue states to terrorist organizations will increasingly rely on asymmetric responses to counter the conventional superiority of the United States.
- Such asymmetrical strategies pose numerous challenges.

The IFPA-Fletcher Conference provides a unique opportunity to explore and discuss a range of difficult issues and concerns confronting the United States. Several topics identified for discussion include:

- Exploring the fundamental changes that have occurred in the United States since September 11.
- Evaluating the measures needed to be taken by the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies involved in national security to address the current and future security environment.
- Working to ensure that U.S. military capabilities remain connected with those of its allies and coalition partners.
- Revisiting existing U.S. transformation efforts to ensure that they track with current security concerns and future challenges.

Analysis

General Jones set the stage for the two-day conference outlining several long-standing challenges for U.S. national security as well as new challenges that have arisen since September 11. Given the increasingly complex post-9/11 security environment, General Jones stated that it is both an appropriate and opportune time to address these issues.

The traditional division of labor in the national security environment has been blurred since 9/11. Consequently, General Jones asserted that the United States must have a national security strategy that balances protection against both internal and external threats.

Finally, General Jones noted that current national security paradigms and structures with their near exclusive focus on external threats are now undergoing major revision. In doing so, the United States must ensure that strategy and organizational changes strike the appropriate balance between structures designed to address more traditional threats and those focused on the threats manifested since 9/11.



Mr. Richard Marshall, Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Professor Paul Wilkinson, and Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Security Challenges in the New Reality

Panelists

Moderator: **Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.**, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

The Global and Regional Challenge of Islamic Extremism

Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director, the Investigative Project, and author *Jihad America*

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction in a New national security strategy

Dr. Robert G. Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council

Asymmetrical Threats and the Changing Face of Warfare

Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Director, International Security Studies Program, and Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Transnational Terrorism and Non-State Enemies

Dr. Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, and Chairman, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews



*Anthrax, Dirty Bombs and Loose Nukes:
The Face of the WMD Challenge*

Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Information Warfare: Challenge to Critical Infrastructure

Mr. Richard Marshall, Principal Deputy Director, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce

Panel Charter

The focus of this opening session is the transformed security setting and the challenges that are posed for U.S. national security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11. The essential contours of this landscape were already apparent in such events as the Khobar Towers U.S. military facility bombing in 1996 in Saudi Arabia, the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the terrorist strike against the USS *Cole* in 2000. In retrospect, each represents part of a broader pattern of escalating attacks against U.S. targets intended to create major disruption and casualties. Nevertheless, these tragic events were eclipsed by the destruction of the World Trade Center and the devastation inflicted on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It is now abundantly apparent that the new security setting includes terrorist operations designed to produce mass casualties and to destroy critical infrastructures. Larger numbers of states and actors other than states are acquiring capabilities that contain unprecedented destructive potential. In this new setting the United States faces unparalleled threats to its national security that include attacks on its allies and population. Although 9/11 has been likened to the December 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, that event stands out by itself as a singular occurrence. Whether the same can be said for 9/11 remains to be seen.

Although the 9/11 operations were carried out with hijacked civilian airliners used as weapons with jet fuel as the explosive, the prospect looms that biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons could be employed against the United States or its allies in the not so distant future. The anthrax attacks following 9/11 may be harbingers of events to come. Therefore, attention has increasingly been focused on bioterrorism as well as nuclear, radiological, or chemical weapons as a priority issue for national security planning.

It is widely acknowledged that the United States faces a spectrum of security challenges from enemies who will use asymmetrical means to achieve their political goals. Such adversaries have assessed U.S. strengths and vulnerabilities. Because they cannot confront the United States on its own terms, they will strike at what they perceive to be the points of American weakness. Such asymmetrical strategies pose numerous challenges for the United States that are being addressed especially in light of 9/11. Spanning threats from bioterrorism and possible nuclear use to the employment of conventional and cyber attacks,

the weapons available to such actors are abundant. They encompass the possible use of short-range missiles deployed aboard surface ships that might be launched with conventional or WMD warheads against our cities. Such means extend to aircraft or other vehicles that could be used to dispense biological or chemical weapons. In the years ahead longer-range missiles will increasingly be available to a wider range of states. This new setting poses a series of key issues and questions that must be addressed as the United States implements the new national security strategy.

Discussion Points

- What is new about the post-9/11 security landscape?
- Since 9/11, what have we learned about terrorist groups, their strategies, and their operations?
- How extensive is the web or network of transnational terrorist groups?
- What are the terrorist threats and challenges facing the United States as we move beyond 9/11?
- What is the nature and magnitude of threats posed by biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological weapons?
- What are the threats to critical infrastructure, including the challenge of cyberwar?
- What are the key issues and challenges for the new national security strategy?

Summary

Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director, the Investigative Project, and author of *Jihad America*.

As we examine the various networks of militant Islam, particularly those groups that have carried out violent attacks, it is possible to segregate the different challenges that we face on a regional and global basis.

- Regionally, the United States confronts challenges such as those posed by Jemaah Islamiyah, a pan-Islamic group based in Indonesia which aspires to create some type of Islamic state or caliphate in Southeast Asia. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be responsible for the October 2002 nightclub bombing in Bali that killed nearly 200 people and is purported to have direct links to Al Qaeda.
- Regional terrorist networks also exist in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and even in Australia where Jemaah Islamiyah has training camps and many supporters. Malaysia was the site of a key meeting of two individuals linked to both the 9/11 attacks and to the bombing of the USS *Cole*.

- On a global level, Al Qaeda continues to exist even though largely displaced from Afghanistan by U.S. forces. It still retains operational cells in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and reportedly in as many as sixty nations throughout the world.
- A key problem in the Persian Gulf area is the ability of Al Qaeda and its like-minded support groups to carry out attacks in Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

In the Middle East, the Hezbollah terrorist organization represents another significant threat. Hezbollah's actions not only affect Israel but also the security of the United States.

- Prior to 9/11, Hezbollah was responsible for more attacks against American troops (e.g., the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia) and citizens than any other terrorist organization. Hezbollah operatives have extensive, far-flung networks in the Middle East with the capability to inflict considerable damage.
- The group has a vast intelligence network that responds directly to instructions from Iran. Hezbollah operatives, together with Iranian intelligence agents, have collected video and other types of human intelligence on potential targets not only in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, but also in Southeast Asia, Europe, the United States, South America, and Canada.
- Hezbollah is well positioned to step into any operational vacuum created by Al Qaeda setbacks resulting from U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism.

Apart from Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are also dangerous terrorist groups that must be addressed by the Western world.

- To date, while Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have focused primarily on attacking Israelis not Americans, they have established linkages with larger fundamentalist terrorist networks.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Mr. Steven Emerson



- They have also demonstrated the capability, particularly in the United States and in Europe, to commingle financing and operational linkages at the commander level, providing support to other terrorist organizations while at the same time claiming they have no “official” ties.
- If the trend of increased cooperation among these organizations continues it will make it more difficult for the United States to compartmentalize each group and to track their activities.

Saudi Arabia’s role in promoting terrorism needs to be addressed. The situation is complex, replete with self-contradictions.

- Due to the authoritarian nature of its regime, Saudi Arabia has much more control over the level of insurrection undertaken by Al Qaeda terrorists.
- However, because it continues to sponsor financially, directly and indirectly, Al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, that have promoted, championed, or carried out acts of terrorism, it is all but certain that the nexus between funding and operational linkages is present in Saudi Arabia.

It remains to be seen how effectively militant Islamic organizations will be able to reconstitute following the loss of Al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan together with America’s ongoing war on terrorism. Moreover, there is the question concerning whether these Islamic networks will acquire and employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

- Al Qaeda normally takes from one to two years between major terrorist acts. Each ensuing attack attempts to surpass the scope and damage of the previous one.
- Its decentralized operating procedures means that individual Al Qaeda cells are not tethered to a command-and-control system in a traditional linear manner and are thus able to plan and carry out attacks with minimal or even no instructions originating from further-up their chain of command.
- Intelligence gathered in Afghanistan and from prisoners in Guantanamo Bay clearly indicate that Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas have been experimenting with biological or chemical weapons with the intent to use them against the United States.
- To date, the United States has not discovered any terrorist organization with large stores of chemical or biological toxins, nor do we know the extent of these groups’ capabilities to develop such weapons. Nonetheless, given the intelligence we have gleaned, it is imperative that the United States prepares for the possible use of WMDs by terrorist groups.

Following 9/11, the United States has tried to eliminate Al Qaeda and constrain its activities by:

- Preemptively attacking Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban government. This effort was extremely successful.
- Financially disrupting Al Qaeda by seizing their assets in the United States and encouraging our European and Middle Eastern partners to do the same. Our Treasury Department has seized \$34 million in assets in the United States and, working closely with our European and Middle Eastern partners, \$112 million worldwide.
- Identifying and ferreting out Al Qaeda terrorist cells on a global basis.

Some U.S. actions will be effective while others will be less so. For example, asset seizures will produce mixed results because Al Qaeda operations normally do not require large sums of money to conduct.

- Al Qaeda does not depend upon expensive equipment or major funding to conduct its operations. Rather Al Qaeda's success emerges from highly motivated operational leaders at the local level who are both eager and able to carry out command instructions.
- These local leaders provide instructions to dedicated low-level operatives who are both prepared to carry out a jihad/martyrdom and able to induce their colleagues to do so as well.

The United States must take a proactive role in apprehending these militant Islamic groups to prevent future acts of terrorism. The key element to meet this objective is conducting aggressive, offensive intelligence acquisition.

- Offensive intelligence acquisition encompasses “connecting the dots” in a much more concerted, integrated, logical, and comprehensive way. Once intelligence is gathered it must be disseminated throughout the intelligence community in an rapid, effective, and logical manner. However, unless we are willing to utilize the intelligence operationally, not simply to collect it, the United States will always be in a defensive mode.
- Therefore, after an operational plan is developed, the United States must be able to implement the plan in a timely and decisive manner.

Dr. Robert G. Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council

President Bush recently released the first national security strategy of his administration. It differs substantially from those of his predecessors.

- The new strategy rejects the long-standing and false dichotomy between power and values. It emphasizes the goals of universal human rights and President Bush's personal commitment to promoting political and economic freedom as the appropriate model for national success.
- The strategy acknowledges the unparalleled political and military strength of the United States and emphasizes the need to use this power, not to create unilateral advantage but to promote peace and security that can improve the conditions of all societies around the globe.

The war against terrorism is a new type of war that requires the United States to think differently about our enemies, who include rogue states and terrorists, and to harness new tools and methods to defeat them. The origins of the administration's strategy for dealing with contemporary threats and especially weapons of mass destruction in the hands of both rogue states and terrorists pre-date the events of September 11.

- In his first major address on security policy in May 2001, President Bush outlined the need to move beyond Cold War/old Soviet model approaches to security, both to defend against new threats and to seize new opportunities for peace.
- For example, rogue states represent qualitatively different types of threats. Compared to the Soviet Union, the leaders of rogue states are much more prone to risk taking.

Dr. Robert G. Joseph



- Unlike the Soviet Union, rogue states view WMDs as weapons of choice, not as weapons of last resort. Consequently, deterring and defending against these threats will be more difficult than it was with the Soviet Union because no mutual understandings nor effective lines of communications exist with rogue states.
- Rogue states want to prevent the United States from intervening in their regions, to deny us the ability to assist our friends and allies if attacked. The leaders of rogue states believe they can accomplish this goal by holding a few of our cities hostage to attack by WMDs.

From its outset, the war on terrorism contained an important WMD element, i.e., whether or not terrorists would launch an attack using such weapons. This concern has only increased given what we have since learned about Al Qaeda's keen interest in acquiring chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. The threat posed by terrorists in possession of weapons of mass destruction becomes even more stark when one compares the list of states seeking WMD with the list of states that sponsor terrorists: the states sponsoring terrorists are also aggressively seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Consequently, it has become necessary to deny the most dangerous regimes and terrorists the ability to acquire the world's most dangerous weapons. The new national security strategy includes a comprehensive approach to combat weapons of mass destruction encompassing three principal pillars.

- The first pillar is counterproliferation. The United States must develop and deploy the requisite capabilities to deter and defend against the full spectrum of WMD threats. We must ensure that detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities are integrated into our overall defense and homeland security posture. Counterproliferation can no longer be a specialty or an afterthought: it must form an integral part of the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces, as well as those of our allies, to make certain that the United States can operate and prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
- The second is strengthened nonproliferation against the spread of WMD to rogue states and terrorists. While the national security strategy puts the appropriate emphasis on counterproliferation, this does not mean that the United States will reduce its effort to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring WMD materials, technology or expertise in the first place. In this regard, the Bush administration has expanded nonproliferation and weapons reduction assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union and has proposed to the members of the G-8 a global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction

to which the United States has pledged \$10 billion for nonproliferation assistance over the next 10 years.

- U.S. nonproliferation efforts also require enhancing in meaningful ways multilateral, nonproliferation treaties and regimes. This includes strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation treaty by increased funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency and promotion of the Additional Protocol designed to strengthen nuclear safeguards. However, the enhancement of multilateral treaties does not include undertaking arms control simply for the sake of concluding agreements. In such a situation, arms control would represent a needless diversion in the war on terrorism.
- The third pillar is effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use by either terrorists or hostile states. The United States must develop and maintain the ability to reduce, to the extent possible, the potentially horrific effects of WMD attacks at home or abroad.

Finally, the national security strategy is clear about what the WMD threat may require the United States to do militarily.

- Given the immediacy and potential magnitude of the threats, and the value our enemies place on WMDs as weapons of choice, we can no longer rely on a reactive posture.
- The United States must, if necessary, act preemptively. Our use of force will be deliberate and measured to eliminate specific threats to the United States, our friends or allies.

Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Director, International Security Studies Program, and Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Prior to September 11, the majority of U.S. defense planners did not consider terrorism a category one national security issue for the United States. It was not judged a form of warfare and hence not deemed a major security concern because terrorism did not resemble war as we knew it, studied it, and had practiced it. Terrorism did not fit a war paradigm but rather a judicial, criminal, legal paradigm.

- Given the limited war fighting capabilities that terrorist groups possessed, U.S. planners dismissed terrorism as a viable form of warfare that could seriously hurt the United States.
- Prior to 9/11, terrorist use of WMDs was believed unlikely, not to be taken seriously. In addition, the United States regarded terrorists, particularly given that they were increasingly organizing themselves into diffuse cells not in regular contact with a centralized power structure, as far less professional and effective, who possessed insignificant war fighting capabilities.

- Further strengthening the belief that terrorism did not pose a serious threat was the fact that state-supported terrorism appeared to be waning.

However, following the fall of the Soviet Union, a small group of U.S. specialists and analysts believed that the future of warfare would increasingly be characterized by highly irregular, unconventional, and decentralized low intensity conflict or what became known as fourth generation warfare.[†] Unconventional, or asymmetrical, operations would be used to bypass the superior military power of nation-states like the United States as well as to attack and exploit political, economic, population, and symbolic targets. Both the organization and the operations of fourth generation warfare would be characterized by religious fervor and the use of deception, denial, stealth, and related techniques. Key components of fourth generation warfare include:

- The use of information age technologies, including modern communications and transportation technologies, will provide terrorist organizations with global reach and have a profound impact on this new form of warfare. Information technology enables terrorist organizations to promulgate their message to the public, to communicate with other terrorists, and to plan their operations trans-nationally.
- Laws and conventions of war will not constrain terrorists and their state sponsors from seeking innovative means, including the use of WMDs, to attack non-military targets and inflict tremendous damage, unconstrained by borders.
- Terrorist groups will normally forego the use of traditional conventional military power. They will attack political, economic, and symbolic targets utilizing asymmetrical means and make no distinction between civilian and military targets. Their operations, frequently undertaken in the name of religion, will be marked by high-levels of violence unencumbered by compassion.
- Al Qaeda represents the textbook practitioner of fourth generation warfare.

To counter the threat posed by terrorism and fourth generation warfare, the U.S. national security strategy sets forth what has become known as the Bush Doctrine. One of its principle tenets is preemption or anticipatory self-defense: that in certain circumstances the United States will initiate military action prior to an actual attack by an adversary or

[†] *First generation warfare, or classical nation-state war, was perfected by Napoleon. Second generation warfare is defined as industrial age war of attritions based on massive firepower which reached its apogee in World War I. Maneuver warfare, introduced by the Germans in WWII and refined by the U.S. in the 1980s, characterizes third generation warfare.*

terrorist group. However, several conditions should exist before preemptive military actions are taken:

- The adversary has attacked the United States in the past and/or has declared its intention to do so in the future.
- We have specific knowledge that an adversary is actively planning to attack the United States, its forces, citizens, or interests.
- An adversary known to possess WMDs openly states that it is willing to carry out a WMD attack upon the United States.

Given the threat of terrorism and fourth generation warfare and the asymmetrical methodology that underpin them, the United States must carefully assess its conventional force structure to ensure that it possesses the requisite capabilities to combat this threat.

- A particular area of emphasis should be augmented intelligence capabilities and the ability to project forces overseas.

Dr. Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, and Chairman, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews

Several key elements of terrorism apply to both the pre- and post-9/11 world:

- Terrorists use either violence or the threat of violence to create or instill fear in the attacked/threatened group but also in society as a whole.
- Violent terrorist attacks have always involved indiscriminate attacks on important economic, political, and symbolic targets which can include both non-civilian and civilian targets.
- Terrorist activities have always encompassed a political rationale especially in long-term campaigns in which terror is utilized as a weapon to achieve certain objectives.

The use of significant levels of violence is not the sole domain of terrorists, however. There have been numerous instances of organized crime syndicates borrowing the methodology of terrorism to achieve their own goals. Moreover, terrorists have increasingly used organized crime to fund their activities. This inter-meshing of terrorist groups and their tactics with international organized crime has complicated the task of fighting both.

- Inter-meshing creates a serious problem not only in the countries where organized criminals and terrorists operate, but also internationally as is evident in the case of Colombia. For example, the symbiotic relationship between the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the Columbian drug barons has produced a deleterious impact on both crime and drug use, not only in America but globally as well.

It is important to understand the map of modern terrorism. While the large and diverse list of terrorist groups can be defined by their political motivations, by their ethno-nationalist or ethno-religious roots, or by the states that sponsor them, a more useful approach may be to make a distinction between corrigible and incorrigible forms of terrorism.

- Terrorist groups can be termed corrigible if their campaigns can be settled by a peace process centered on access to political processes and institutions through diplomatic channels. Conversely, groups can be considered incorrigible if their terror campaigns cannot be resolved or deterred through negotiations and access to political processes.
- There has been a dramatic increase in the number of terrorist groups whose ability to survive does not depend on a state sponsor but rather rely on external and internal financial sources. Such terrorists principally fall into the incorrigible category.

Al Qaeda represents the modern-day terrorist organization.

- Al Qaeda's modus operandi makes it particularly dangerous. Al Qaeda: has the ability to survive without a state sponsor; apparently still possesses adequate financial resources to conduct its operations, even after U.S. and global efforts to shut down their monetary supply; is willing to carry out suicide attacks; and, conducts meticulous planning and trade craft in preparation of terrorist attacks. All these capabilities represent a new form of terrorism.
- Although this brand of terrorism has not entirely replaced the old terrorism as a challenge for the international community, it is crucial that the United States develop the appropriate strategy to deal with it.

Terrorist organizations have the ability to take advantage of the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in existing U.S. plans, operations, and procedures. U.S. policy makers must take concerted steps to correct these shortcomings.

- Significant deficiencies continue to exist in our ability to collect exploitable intelligence on terrorist organizations. These gaps can be narrowed by making determined efforts to infiltrate terrorist organizations with U.S. covert agents.
- The United States must identify and prioritize the most critical assets within the U.S. infrastructure encompassing civil aviation and maritime systems, bridges, highways, the cyber network and telecommunications, energy resources, water and food systems, private industry, etc. Next, their vulnerabilities must be identified and measures implemented to protect them.

Unlike nations, terrorist organizations do not have a state with defined territories and borders. Normally, terrorist organizations operate clandestinely out of various countries around the globe.

- Consequently, it is much more difficult for the United States to use technical surveillance to pinpoint the terrorist organization's cells, military bases, training facilities, airfields, etc. For example, Al Qaeda is reportedly operating in approximately sixty countries.
- Moreover, since terrorist groups are, in most cases, operating secretly within a nation that does not support their activities, we cannot impose sanctions to limit their terrorist capabilities.

U.S. efforts to fight global terrorism must also include enhancing our ability to wage political warfare. The United States must counter the vitriolic propaganda promulgated by Islamic terrorist organizations that spawn hatred against America and the West.

- It is necessary for the United States to win the battle of ideas because Al Qaeda is attempting to use Islam to justify terrorism as a weapon against both the United States and the Western world.
- If we do not answer the ideological arguments advanced in Muslim nations and if we fail to address the legitimate grievances of significant numbers of Muslims, then we will not succeed in winning the necessary support and cooperation from Muslim societies, as well as from the Muslim communities within the United States, to combat terrorism.

Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Weapons of mass destruction constitute the most dangerous threat to U.S. national security. There are three dominant categories of WMDs based on their destructive potential that are of most concern: nuclear, chemical, and biological, and a fourth lesser category called radiological weapons.

- Nuclear weapons possess the greatest potential for devastation. In most cases, they are not easy to acquire due to high development costs, the technical skills needed, and delivery requirements. However, a terrorist organization could circumvent these difficulties by purchasing (from willing rogue states and/or on the black market) nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems.
- Biological weapons such as anthrax and small pox also have the ability to cause considerable harm. Casualties can be minimized, however, if the biological agent used in the attack is ascertained quickly and an adequate response is undertaken rapidly.
- Chemical weapons are also a concern. They are considered the least difficult WMD to produce or obtain, particularly since a number of the chemical agents utilized in weapons have legitimate non-weapon uses. However, even if a terrorist organization could not

manufacture or purchase a chemical weapon, it has the option to attack facilities containing highly toxic chemicals stored in facilities and transported daily throughout the United States. The release of such chemicals could cause considerable loss of life.

- A fourth category of WMD, considered the least dangerous, is radiological weapons. Often referred to as “dirty bombs,” radiological weapons are a combination of radioactive material and conventional explosives. These weapons have the capability of spreading radioactive material over the immediate area causing disruption and public hysteria, most notably within densely populated metropolitan areas.
 - The destruction caused by such a weapon would be limited to the immediate vicinity of the blast so the loss of life would likely be relatively small unless large quantities of radioactive material were used. In this case it would be more complicated for the terrorists to transport and emplace such a weapon because of the extreme difficulty of working with, nuclear materials. Recent unclassified intelligence reports, however, indicate that Al Qaeda is actively pursuing information on radiological weapons including their possible acquisition.

Our adversaries, including terrorist groups, are increasingly seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction for possible use against the United States.

- U.S. conventional military strength is currently unparalleled. No opponent can realistically hope to defeat the United States in a confrontation using traditional, conventional military means. As a result, U.S. enemies are adopting asymmetrical measures – including the acquisition of WMDs – to counter our conventional military dominance.
- A key objective of many terrorist organizations is to call world-wide attention to their cause through a violent event. Unleashing a WMD, particularly the detonation of a nuclear device, would unmistakably meet that goal.

To date, terrorist organizations have principally utilized conventional weapons such as high explosives and guns in terrorist attacks. The use of weapon of mass destruction by terrorist groups has been extremely limited. The reasons for their limited use are thought to include:

- Islamic terrorist organizations are fearful that WMD attacks and the subsequent unprecedented loss of life and physical destruction would alienate parts of the Islamic/Muslim worldwide community upon which the terrorist groups depend for critical popular, political, and financial support.

- The U.S. war on terrorism has disrupted the ability of terrorist groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction as well as to plan and execute such attacks.

In the context of homeland security, the United States must ensure that crisis management programs are adequate to protect its populace against potential WMD attacks.

- Domestic crisis management programs need to be constantly assessed through the use of simulations and exercises to monitor and evaluate progress made in preparing for a WMD attack. Consequence management planning and coordination among the various government agencies also needs to be improved.
- In addition, we must develop a better understanding of the ideology, motivations, cultural norms, and methodology of those terrorist organizations that threaten the United States.

Mr. Richard Marshall, Principal Deputy Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce

Information warfare is defined as the managed application of technology to bring about a controlled, disruptive impact on the ability of an adversary to use technology. Critical infrastructure is defined as the vital systems and assets such as planes, trains, banks, medical facilities, the food supply, and telecommunications, that a nation relies upon on a daily basis. The challenge is to prevent the destruction or incapacity of our critical infrastructure, to ensure that these assets are available when needed, are reliable, and provide continuity of services. Complicating this challenge is the fact that each of these critical infrastructures are increasingly inter-dependent, connected together by a cyber network.

- It is necessary for the United States to prepare for any contingency that threatens our critical infrastructure. Such preparations will help ensure that if an attack occurs, the damage against our critical infrastructure will be limited in scope and recovery time will be short.
- We need to identify and prioritize our most important critical infrastructure assets, to ascertain their specific vulnerabilities, and finally to minimize their susceptibility to attack and disruption.
- Vulnerabilities are often at the connection points to other places, people, and networks on the internet. Their disruption could result in a telecommunication failure in the United States as well as system breakdowns in other parts of the world.
- Eligible Receiver 97, an exercise sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clearly demonstrated the feasibility of information warfare when a group of U.S. experts, utilizing programs and information readily available on the internet, were able to take over and

disrupt the communications systems of a major U.S. combatant command.

A person does not require a great deal of technical knowledge or expertise to attack the cyber infrastructure. As Eligible Receiver 97 illustrated, packets and software programs for use in such attacks can easily be downloaded from the internet. Concerted efforts by U.S. adversaries to disrupt and/or bring down parts of the cyber infrastructure could cause a severe blow to the national security and economy of the United States.

- The impetus for these efforts is the growing dependence of both the civilian and military sectors on information technologies and the internet as well as the heightened vulnerability of critical U.S. infrastructure nodes to attack and disruption.
- For example, cyber attacks could come from a diverse set of actors with varying motivations located anywhere in the world ranging from a teenage hacker playing pranks on his computer, to terrorist groups attempting to shut down a segment of the U.S. air traffic control system, to a nation like Iraq coupling cyber attacks on U.S. military satellite systems with actual military actions on the ground near the Kuwait border.

A key consideration in the U.S. approach to cyber security is that while the government must be the model for coordinating the defense of the critical infrastructure it should act as a facilitator not as a regulator because the majority of the information infrastructure is privately owned.

- In the United States in particular, the military is increasingly dependent on data/communications supplied by the private sector. As a result, the government must reach out to the private sector to create incentives for their involvement and to foster a public-private partnership to help safeguard our information infrastructure.

Analysis

Session One examined the issue of security challenges in the new reality. Panelists provided insights on critical security challenges including: the status of Al Qaeda and other militant Islamic terrorist groups; the necessity to embrace the new national security strategy of preemption or anticipatory self-defense; the evolution of terrorism; and the importance of protecting the nation's critical infrastructure.

Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director, the Investigative Project, and author of *Jihad America*, argued that despite the successes of the U.S. war on terrorism militant Islamic terrorist organizations throughout the world continue to carrying out attacks. To illustrate this point, Mr. Emerson described how the Al Qaeda network is still operation-

al despite loosing its sanctuary in Afghanistan. Besides Al Qaeda, he also described the threat posed by Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. A major issue addressed by Mr. Emerson, and subsequently by all speakers, was the likelihood that such militant Islamic networks would acquire weapons of mass destruction. A key approach to combating their acquisition and use is to conduct proactive aggressive, offensive intelligence operations which encompass intelligence collection, its rapid dissemination to appropriate officials followed by development of a plan and its timely implementation.

Dr. Robert G. Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council, spoke about the new national security strategy which states that the United States should use its unparalleled political and military power to promote peace and security in the world. Dr. Joseph also noted that the origins of the administration's strategy for dealing with contemporary threats and especially weapons of mass destruction pre-date September 11. Lastly, given the potential magnitude of the threats we face and the value our enemies place on WMDs, the United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture. The nation must, if necessary, act preemptively. The preemptive use of force will be applied in measured fashion to eliminate a specific threat to the United States, our allies, and friends.

Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Director, International Security Studies Program, and Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, stated that before September 11 terrorism was on the periphery of U.S. security concerns because it did not fit the standard definitions of warfare set forth by the experts. Terrorism was not deemed a viable form of warfare that could seriously impact the vital interests of the United States. Al Qaeda dramatically altered this common wisdom on 9/11. Al Qaeda utilizes fourth generation warfare which is marked by unconventional and decentralized low intensity conflict. Practitioners of fourth generation warfare seek to offset the superior military power of nation-states as well as to attack and exploit political, economic, population and symbolic targets. A key approach to combating this new form of warfare is to utilize preemption as outlined in the Bush administration's new national security strategy.

Dr. Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, and Chairman, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, noted that several generic characteristics apply to terrorism as practiced in both the pre- and post-9/11 world: terrorists use either violence or the threat of violence to create or instill fear in the attacked/threatened group and in society as a whole; violent terrorist attacks involve indiscriminate attacks on important economic, political, and symbolic targets; and terrorist activities encompass a political rationale. However, in the post-9/11 environment,

there is a proliferation of terrorist groups who are non-state actors, whose ability to survive does not depend on a state sponsor but rather rely on external and internal financial sources. If we fail to answer the anti-U.S./West propaganda spread in Muslim countries by the Islamic terrorist groups we will not be able to win the support and cooperation from the Muslim community throughout the world.

Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, outlined the characteristics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. He stated that various U.S. adversaries, including terrorist groups, are increasingly seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction for possible use against the United States. To counter this threat, we must focus our efforts to deter WMD use and to mitigate the consequences if employed. Dr. Younger believes that the reasons WMDs have not been used in the majority of terrorist acts include the fact that U.S. efforts have disrupted the effectiveness of terrorist groups and that terrorist organizations fear that a WMD attack would alienate both the constituencies that directly support the terrorist groups as well as the broader Muslim public.

Mr. Richard Marshall, Principal Deputy Director, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce, focused his presentation on information warfare and the necessity to protect the critical infrastructure of the country against cyber attacks. Much of the U.S. cyber infrastructure has vulnerabilities that can be attacked with tools easily downloadable from the internet. Concerted efforts by U.S. adversaries to disrupt/bring down portions of our cyber infrastructure could have severe economic and security impacts. Given this reality and the fact that the private sector owns approximately 80% – 90% of the U.S. critical infrastructure, the government must work in tandem with the private sector to safeguard our critical cyber assets.

A consensus emerged among all panel members concerning the spectrum of threats facing the United States. A diverse set of weapon types are available to terrorists encompassing conventional weaponry, cyber warfare tactics, and the possible use of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. In this regard, each panelist expressed grave concern regarding the potential acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists. WMD use was considered almost inevitable given their growing availability and the fact that our intelligence clearly indicates that WMDs are increasingly becoming integrated into the plans of various terrorist organizations.

Consequently, panelists agreed that a multifaceted approach to terrorism and possible WMD use is required. Fundamental to this approach is access to accurate and timely intelligence which requires, among other things, infiltrating terrorist organizations with U.S. agents. It also requires that all relevant intelligence is shared, that the “dots are connected” so that actionable plans can be formulated



and rapidly implemented. This is particularly important if we are to take effective preemption actions against our adversaries.

Apart from the prevention side of the equation, panelists also concurred that detailed preparations are necessary to mitigate the possible impacts of terrorist attacks should they occur. This means bolstering U.S. consequence management capabilities and augmenting the diverse range of response assets that would be required in the aftermath of any terrorist act.





Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz

Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Summary

How the United States weighed the risks of a possible use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq was a difficult one. Before making any decision to use force, President Bush exercised strenuous efforts to try to find a peaceful resolution to this serious threat.

Since September 11, we have faced a grim reality. As Secretary of State Powell has stated, "The world has to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moves terrorism to a new level of threat, a threat that could not be deterred because of this connection between states developing weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organizations willing to use them without any compunction and in an undeterrable fashion."

It is precisely that concern which now calls our attention to Iraq. U.S. concerns regarding Iraq include:

- The Iraqi regime's support for terrorism, within and outside its borders, its appetite for the world's most dangerous weapons, and its





openly declared hostility to the United States form a combination that needs to be understood in a new light since September 11.

- We cannot continue living safely with a regime which as the President said, “gathers the most serious dangers of our age in a single place.”
- President Bush has detailed Iraq’s link to international terrorists and its training of Al Qaeda members in bomb-making, poisons, and deadly gases.
- The President has also spoken about Iraq’s growing fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles that could dispense its arsenal of biological and chemical weapons.
- Iraq, while agreeing to the United Nations conditions of allowing the return of UN weapons inspectors without conditions, continues to shoot at and tries to kill coalition pilots.
- During the eleven years since the end of the Gulf war, the state-controlled Iraqi media has been full of glorification for terrorists and threats of terrorism. Some of this rhetoric has come from the mouth of Saddam Hussein himself. He has been the only world leader who openly praised and justified the attacks of September 11.

In judging the nature of the threats the United States confronts, it is a classic historic mistake to ignore what our enemies say as mere rhetoric. It therefore becomes a mistake that we make at our own peril.

- We make a mistake if we deprecate the value of intelligence from open sources, because those sources can be a useful indicator of intentions.
- It is not merely the rhetoric of the Iraqi regime that concerns the United States, it also encompasses its actions.

Few in this country would deny that the present Iraqi regime is evil and dangerous. It would be difficult to find Americans who would not agree that the world would be safer and the Iraqi people would be vastly better off if this regime no longer ruled.

- Where Americans differ is over the issue of what means are necessary and appropriate to affect that kind of change.
- The central issue is how the United States weighs the risks and costs of using force.
- Those risks are very real, and no sensible person would lightly undertake an operation that risks the lives of our military.
- The president has made it clear that he will do everything possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that resolves this danger to our country and to the world.

The debate in the United States is not between those who desire peace and those who desire war. The issue is how we can best achieve a



peaceful outcome that resolves the danger we face. There is a seeming paradox at work here that takes some effort to grasp. The only hope of achieving the peaceful disarmament of Iraq is by having a credible threat of force behind our diplomacy. To be effective, the two must be part of a single policy.

- Saddam Hussein will not easily give up his weapons of mass destruction that he has worked hard to develop and retain.
- Eleven years of such defiance has cost his country and his regime quite a bit. He has subjected his country to regular bombing by coalition aircraft and lost vast oil revenues.
- No one should be under any illusions that Saddam Hussein will give up the weapons he is not supposed to have simply because the United Nations passes another resolution. Saddam Hussein will only do so if he believes their forfeiture is the necessary price for his survival and the survival of his regime.

Over the last twelve months, the President and his advisors have been weighing very carefully the risks of various courses of action. While everything possible is being done to reduce risks, no one is discounting them. The fundamental questions are how to weigh the risks of action against the risks of inaction, and to weigh the risks of acting now against the risks of acting much later.

- It is necessary for the United States to balance the risks of action against the risks of inaction, and, in doing so, we need to work hard to comprehend the fundamental uncertainty that underlies the most important judgments that we have to make.
- It is dangerous to predict the future actions of terrorists or terrorist regimes where we frequently have difficulty knowing the past, much less predicting the future. The United States is still analyzing the attacks of September 11.
- The combination of weapons of mass destruction capabilities, declared hostility to the United States, and close ties to terrorists allow for the possibility that the Iraqi regime will use its arsenal against the United States.

An attack on Iraq will not disrupt or distract the United States from the global war on terror. Iraq is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war.

- The demand on our military resources will be significant if it becomes necessary to use force against Iraq. However, we have a military that is strong enough to take on that task.
- The war on terrorism is a global war and one that must be pursued everywhere using all the instruments of national power and every resource at our command.

- Saddam Hussein supports and conspires with our terrorist enemies. He lends them both moral and material support. Disarming Saddam Hussein and fighting the war on terror are not merely related, they are one and the same.
- Iraq is part of the global war on terrorism because Iraq represents one of the first and best opportunities to begin building what President Bush has referred to as a better world beyond the war on terrorism. If the United States can defeat a terrorist regime in Iraq it will be a defeat for terrorists globally.
- Saddam Hussein's demise will open opportunities for governments and institutions to emerge in the Muslim world that are respectful of fundamental human dignity and freedom and that abhor the killing of innocents as an instrument of national policy.

It would be bad policy for the United States to wait until the threat from Iraq is imminent. The longer the world waits, the more time Saddam Hussein has to develop his deadly weapons and to acquire more.

- The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that we will know when it is imminent. This is bad judgment. The United States was not aware of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
- The United States cannot afford to wait until Saddam Hussein or some terrorist supplied by him attacks us with a chemical or biological or, worst of all, a nuclear weapon, to recognize the danger that we face.

The United States must plan on the assumption that a great moment of danger will come if Saddam Hussein believes that his survival and power are at risk and that he has little to lose by using his most terrible weapons.

- In addition, the United States must keep in mind that Saddam Hussein has a thirst for revenge. For example, Iraq's attempted assassination of former President Bush in 1993 proves this point.
- The most dangerous assumption of all, however, is that Saddam would not use terrorists as an instrument of revenge.

The time to act is now. There will always be problems with acting at any time. However, the danger of not acting grows with time.

- Unless the United States means to defer action forever and effectively acknowledge that the Iraqi regime can successfully deter us, the longer we wait to act the more dangerous it will be if we finally have to do so.

President Bush has made it clear that we do not plan to act unilaterally. Indeed, we have already begun to assemble an impressive coalition.

- Some countries have indicated they will be with us, with or without a UN resolution, and many others will surely join once there is one.
- If a moment of liberation comes, many countries and many individuals, including some who now criticize us, will want to be part of that very positive opportunity to build a more peaceful, just, and representative nation in this critically important Arab and Muslim country.

While there are many risks that would be associated with a decision to use force to resolve this threat, the one risk that seems frequently exaggerated is the risk that the removal of a Saddam Hussein regime will be a cause of instability in the region. Sooner or later the Middle East and the world will have to cope with the reality of the demise of the Iraqi regime.

- In the interest of minimizing whatever risks there are to larger regional stability, it would be far better for this admittedly enormous change to take place when the eyes of the world are upon Iraq and when the United States and a strong coalition are committed to seeing it through to a successful conclusion.
- Success in Iraq would demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred, oppression, and subjugation. It would encourage those who dream of freedom.

The future does not belong to terrorists. The future belongs to all those who dream the oldest and noblest dream of all—the dream of peace and freedom.

Analysis

Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz focused his remarks on the need for the possible use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. While stressing that President Bush has made no decision about going to war with Iraq, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz asserted that the world cannot afford to wait until Saddam or a terrorist supplied by him attacks the West with weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Wolfowitz stated that sooner or later the international community will have to cope with Saddam. Therefore, it is preferable to deal with Saddam on our terms rather than on his.

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz outlined several examples of Saddam Hussein's evil and dangerous regime. These included supporting and training terrorists, developing a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles that could dispense its arsenal of biological and chemical weapons, and Iraq's open hostility towards the United States. It would be a serious mistake to ignore these growing threats from Iraq. The debate



on Iraq is not between those who desire peace and those who desire war. The issue is how the world can best achieve a peaceful outcome that resolves the danger that the world faces.

Dr. Wolfowitz argued that the fundamental question is how to weigh the risk of action versus the risk of inaction. He acknowledged that there are many risks associated with the use of force against Iraq but said the longer the world waits to confront Iraq, the more time Iraq has to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction. The threat is imminent and therefore the world needs to act now rather than later. Saddam Hussein will not easily give up weapons of mass destruction that he has worked hard to develop and retain. He will not hand these weapons over to the United Nations simply because the UN has passed another resolution against Iraq.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense concluded that an attack on Iraq will not interfere with the U.S. war on terrorism. Indeed, it would represent a significant element in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Because Iraq is a sanctuary for terrorists, the ouster of the current Iraqi regime would be a defeat for terrorists globally.





Session Two



Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Mr. James Locher III, Mr. Bill Gertz, Dr. William J. Luti, Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, and Dr. Christopher C. Harmon

Strategic Responses to New Security Challenges

Panelists

Moderator: **Dr. Christopher C. Harmon**, Professor of International Relations, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University

An Emerging Bush Doctrine: Preemption to the Forefront

Dr. William J. Luti, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Reorganizing for Security of the Homeland and the Americas

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Intelligence Requirements to Support National Security in Light of 9/11

Mr. Bill Gertz, the *Washington Times* and author of *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11*

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Legislation in Response to National Security Requirements

Mr. James Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and author of *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*

The Role of Special Operations Forces in a New national security strategy

Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict

Panel Charter

Since September 11, numerous organizational and policy changes have been proposed to help deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks. Many such changes are still either under debate or just beginning to be implemented. An examination of progress thus far and of ongoing vulnerabilities and requirements will help focus attention on critical next steps in strategic responses to new security challenges. A multifaceted approach is needed to counter the current and emerging threats to national security, including terrorism and other asymmetric threats; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; ethno-religious extremism; and information warfare. This approach must include a redefinition of intelligence requirements and the role of the military, especially Special Operations Forces, as part of the new national security strategy.

In his June 1, 2002 speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Bush declared that the terrorist threat requires approaches beyond Cold War concepts of containment and deterrence, and that the United States should not wait for threats to fully materialize before acting. Rather, “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” Thus the Bush Doctrine will be a vital element of the overall strategic response to the new security challenges. Another critical aspect of this response is defining the intelligence requirements needed to combat terrorism and other threats. There will need to be increased collaboration and information sharing at the federal, state, and local levels of government and across and between agencies and jurisdictions. Given the new missions and targets for future security-related operations, an assessment of the military’s role in executing the new national security strategy is also needed. This includes a spectrum of military capabilities organized and tasked to address the multifaceted challenges of twenty-first-century conflict.

The strategic response will also require new legislation, governmental reorganization for homeland security, and enhanced protection of forward deployed troops as well as the United States itself from the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. This will include a variety of capabilities encompassing defense against missiles and additional means to detect weapons of mass destruction that could be brought clandestinely into the United States and into the territories of its allies. Changes or additions to national security policies and/or counterterrorism legislation are needed to address issues such as military support to domestic consequence management response efforts, recruiting intelligence capabilities to penetrate terrorist organizations, detaining terrorist suspects, and surveillance of potential terrorists.

Discussion of proposed organizational changes in departments and agencies will help highlight potential problems in blending various or-

ganizational cultures together. The missions of agencies which will be merged into a new Department of Homeland Security range from public health to law enforcement. Likewise, an assessment of the requirements and shortfalls in safeguarding U.S. territory and troops deployed abroad from potential WMD attacks will highlight areas for improvement. It is important to consider preventative measures such as counterterrorism as well as consequence management and first responder preparedness which would help mitigate the damage and loss of life resulting from a terrorist attack.

Discussion Points

- What are the new military requirements for preemption in the national security strategy?
- What are the intelligence requirements, in terms of resources, collection, analysis, and distribution, to support new national security requirements?
- What additional legislation is needed to address national security requirements?
- What is the role of Special Operations Forces in the new national security strategy? What lessons learned can be applied from the unprecedented use of such forces in Operation Enduring Freedom?
- What will be the greatest challenges of streamlining national security and national defense agencies and organizations into a Department of Homeland Security?
- How can we most effectively protect the U.S. homeland and forward deployed forces from weapons of mass destruction?
- Do we have the necessary protective equipment, training, disease surveillance, pharmaceutical stockpiles, and communications equipment?

Summary

Dr. William J. Luti, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

In September of 2002, President Bush unveiled a new national security strategy. The three most important elements of the strategy are:

- The United States will defend the peace by:
 - Opposing and preventing violence by terrorist and outlaw regimes;
 - Fostering an era of good relations among the world's great powers; and,
 - Seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe.

The vision of the national security strategy is to create conditions that favor freedom.

- The United States seeks to create conditions in which all nations and societies can choose for themselves the rewards of political and economic liberty.
- It combines moral clarity with extreme vigilance. The United States wants peace with freedom-loving countries and will hold tyrannical regimes accountable for their actions as well as those of any proxy terrorist groups that they host or support.

The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or preemption is set forth in the new national security strategy. In a new and dangerous world, where enemies grant safe haven to terrorists and where terrorists aim to kill many Americans, the United States can no longer adhere to a policy based solely on reacting to aggression after it has transpired.

- The United States will take preemptive action against known threats as appropriate.
- Anticipatory self-defense is not about the unrestrained use of unilateral preemptive action but rather it involves heading off threats to liberty and freedom before they emerge. Anticipatory self-defense is consistent with the U.S. goal of making the world more secure.
- With sufficient warning of 9/11 or any other recent terrorist attacks, is there any doubt that the United States should have the right to act first in the defense of thousands of Americans? Anticipatory self-defense allows the United States to reserve the right to dismember terror networks as well as to hold accountable those states that harbor terrorists and those tyrants who provide them succor.

However, preemptive action will not be the initial response of the United States. Rather, it will be employed judiciously as a last resort. The threat must be extremely grave and the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action. The policy does not provide a green light to act without first exhausting other means including diplomacy.

- Before the U.S. military engages in an act of anticipatory self-defense, the United States will seek to solve the problem through peaceful means and consult with our allies and the United Nations.
- We will monitor the rhetoric of opponents and take their threats seriously. We will focus on any statements which indicate that a country or terrorist group considers itself at war with the United States.
- We will also look at the historical record of a country's development, whether they possess weapons of mass destruction and whether they have used WMDs in the past. We will also assess the country's motives for threatening the United States and/or its allies.

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- We will not settle for deals based on promises alone but will judge our adversaries on the reality of their actions.
 - Any country suspected of providing safe haven, financing or facilities to terrorists who kill Americans will come under extremely close scrutiny. For example, Iraq is one case where the United States is making these judgments.

The intelligence agencies of the United States play a very important role in warning about potential threats. Intelligence alone, however, is not enough to protect the country.

- The United States must think of ways in which terrorist organizations might strike next. Such thinking will ultimately allow the United States to begin preparing defenses against future potential strikes. Oftentimes the United States has suffered from what might be called failure of imagination.

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the newest of the nine combatant commands, was established in 2002 to protect the interests of the United States. NORTHCOM takes the homeland defense missions being performed by other Department of Defense organizations and puts them under a single command. The creation of NORTHCOM represents a needed response to the new security challenges confronting the United States.

- The United States divides the entire globe into military commands, a practice known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
- The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a biennial review of the UCP to examine the force structure, missions, and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries of each unified combatant command. The latest review was held in October of 2002.
- Given the homeland security requirements that arose following 9/11, the 2002 review recommended the creation of NORTHCOM to defend the United States.

Geographic location and friendly neighbors no longer provide the United States with the protection we once took for granted.

- We live in a more dangerous and complex environment which requires an expanded effort within NORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR). The United States must be prepared to meet all potential threats.
- Although the U.S. military is second to none, the threat to the United States has changed as demonstrated by the events of September 11 and the asymmetrical terrorist attacks perpetrated on New York City and Washington, D.C.

- NORTHCOM is charged with protecting against those types of asymmetrical threats.

NORTHCOM conducts operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and its interests within NORTHCOM's assigned AOR.

- The continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and portions of the Caribbean region are designated as Northern Command's AOR.
- The commander of NORTHCOM is also responsible for security cooperation and military coordination with both Canada and Mexico.
- Since the vast majority of threats to the United States originate outside its AOR, it is imperative that NORTHCOM coordinate its activities with the other regional combatant commanders.
- Apart from its mission to defend the United States, NORTHCOM will also provide military support to civil authorities in the case of terrorist or related incidents as directed by the president or secretary of defense.

Mr. Bill Gertz, the *Washington Times* and author of *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11*.

For the U.S. intelligence community, the September 11 attacks represent a series of critical mistakes that involve failures of analysis, institutional obstacles, and structural breakdowns.

- Today, the intelligence system is broken: it is a huge bureaucracy that has turned inward to focus more on itself than on the achievement of its mission.

The intelligence community has become too reliant on the provision of information by a few of its key segments rather than utilizing all con-

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA



stituent agencies/elements effectively and following a coherent strategy to gather and disseminate information.

- The United States places too great an emphasis on diplomatic posts and their liaisons for gathering and providing intelligence.
- The intelligence community lacks the capability to garner critical internal operational intelligence on foreign governments and terrorist organizations and the threat they pose to the United States.
- There is an over reliance on U.S. technical intelligence capabilities such as satellite imagery and eavesdropping techniques which infrequently provide an adequate overall intelligence picture, particularly when dealing with terrorist groups. Moreover, such intelligence normally does not provide the type of information necessary to plan and execute a preemptive attack.
- Consequently, the United States must augment its human intelligence capabilities substantially in order to penetrate terrorist organizations.

Reorganization within the intelligence community, particularly at the Central Intelligence Agency, will help rectify some of the problems that became starkly obvious following September 11.

- Both officials and operatives in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) are not properly trained nor does DO employ the appropriate personnel to deal effectively with the terrorist threat. To illustrate, the prevailing view found within DO is that it is nearly impossible to penetrate a terrorist group like Al Qaeda. The best opportunity for garnering intelligence is through the serendipitous defection of an Al Qaeda member.
- A new service should be created that melds together the best elements of the DO with other intelligence components. The new intelligence entity would be staffed with more effectively trained personnel who have more diverse backgrounds together with greatly improved language skills.
- In addition, the new staff should possess strong credentials in the regions that the United States is targeting for intelligence collection. For example, to combat Iraq, Al Qaeda, and other Arab terrorist organizations, we need to employ Arab-Americans with Arabic language skills and to provide them with extensive operational training to work undercover in the countries of their ancestry.

Additional recommendations for restructuring the intelligence community include:

- A new Central Analysis Agency should be created to increase our analytical and information sharing capabilities which were shown to be so inadequate following the events of 9/11. For example, one

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent testified recently that the CIA failed to inform the FBI when two September 11 hijackers first entered the United States.

- To improve this situation, bureaucratic and legal impediments that constrain information sharing among various intelligence agencies must be eliminated.
- The Defense Intelligence Agency should be disbanded because it has outlived its usefulness. However, its functions of coordinating and providing intelligence for the Joint Staff and supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be enhanced but moved to the Joint Staff and to the individual military services and/or the combatant commanders.
- Finally, a new Special Operations intelligence capability should be created to support U.S. Special Operations Forces in conflicts such as Afghanistan.

Mr. James Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and author of *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*

Today, the National Security Council (NSC) membership is still defined by a post-World War II concept of national security focusing on diplomacy, military power, and intelligence. Current NSC membership consists of four statutory members: the president, the vice-president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense. Given the requirements set forth in the new national security strategy, the NSC must be restructured to accommodate the demands of the changed security setting.

- The NSC should be expanded to include the secretary of the treasury, the attorney general, and the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security because they will assume an increasingly important role in national security affairs and our fight against terrorism.
- The addition of these new members will highlight the important national security role of their departments as well as begin the necessary cultural changes that will enable these departments to carry out their augmented security responsibilities.

With the creation of both the Office of Homeland Security and of the Homeland Security Council, the United States has bifurcated the mission of combating terrorism. The NSC previously had the sole responsibility for the homeland security mission. However, the United States has now divided homeland security between the NSC and the Homeland Security Council. This is an inefficient division of responsibility for combating terrorism.

- The NSC has the responsibility for overseas and domestic counterterrorism, intelligence support for counterterrorism, overseas antiterrorism, and overseas consequence management. The new

Homeland Security Council has responsibility for domestic antiterrorism and domestic consequence management.

- Since this situation represents an unnecessary duplication of resources and efforts, the Homeland Security Council should be eliminated. The Office of Homeland Security should continue in existence only as long as it is needed to help establish the new Department of Homeland Security.

For many years interagency planning and reform has been a problem. However, in the wake of 9/11 it has become blatantly clear that urgent change is needed.

- One of the main problems is the imbalance between departmental interests and national interests. Departments and agencies too often engage in turf wars to protect their own interests and funding. Further complicating matters is the fact that a common vision, culture, doctrine, and terminology frequently do not exist among departments/agencies. These problems have become particularly apparent within the various segments of the intelligence community following 9/11.
- The executive branch, not Congress, should initiate interagency reform because the overlapping committee jurisdictions on Capitol Hill present a major obstacle to needed change. The president should charter an in-depth study to examine organizational reform and to develop an actionable plan to implement it.


The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must guard against fruitless turf battles as it attempts to amalgamate the approximately twenty-two diverse federal agencies encompassing over 170,000 employees that comprise the new department.

- To be effective, DHS must create an organization with a coherent, relevant vision that will help bring these diverse agencies together around a unified approach to the homeland security mission.

Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will play an increasingly important role in the new national security strategy. The war on terrorism requires heightened use of SOF to conduct unconventional, irregular warfare. This capability was clearly demonstrated in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where SOF assets were a major contributor to the toppling of the Taliban government and the safe haven it provided to Al Qaeda.

- U.S. Special Operations Forces were able to coordinate operations in Afghanistan not only between/among U.S. military services but also among different nations and various Afghani ethnic and linguistic groups.

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- The war in Afghanistan was not a “general’s war.” Rather, it was a war waged primarily by SOF colonels and lieutenant colonels and won by small units that operated with autonomy in a highly fluid environment.
 - SOF soldiers possess capabilities distinct from other military personnel encompassing: language skills, extensive overseas experience, ability to work closely with foreigners and to provide training, ability to blend into the society in which they operate, independence, and an unparalleled degree of training.

SOF demonstrated numerous capabilities during Operation Enduring Freedom and simultaneously where needed throughout the rest of the world.

- While Army SOF conducted unconventional warfare, other Army and Navy SOF were carrying out special reconnaissance and direct action to destroy Al Qaeda. Army SOF demonstrated strategic reach along with significant capabilities to conduct successful night operations.
- Air Force and Army SOF aviators performed under conditions where their specialized training and equipment produced results unique to SOF. For example, Air Force Special Tactics Airmen transformed the role of SOF by integrating the air power of each military service into the overall operation.
- Other less touted, but nonetheless significant, SOF capabilities are those provided by Civil Affairs. Deployed worldwide before hostilities begin and remaining long after they have ended, Civil Affairs SOF work to assist in rebuilding the instruments of local governance that foster stability. They act in coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State to rebuild societies torn apart by war. They also communicate the message that America’s quarrel is not with the population of a particular country but rather with the terrorists and the leaders of the regimes who suppress them.
- Another critical SOF capability is psychological operations. On a strategic level, SOF psychological operations offset the distorted anti-U.S. propaganda advanced by adversaries by offering alternative sources of data to those who are denied freedom of speech and access to unbiased information.

A key tenet of the new national security strategy is the concept of pre-emption wherein the United States would, under certain conditions, initiate military action prior to an actual attack by an adversary or terrorist group. A preemptive posture imposes two important requirements on the SOF: finding the adversary and responding in a timely fashion.

- The deployment of SOF across multiple theaters where terrorist groups operate will stretch the limits of its current force structure. Consequently, the United States will have to become more selective about when, where, and how it utilizes SOF around the globe.
- This problem can be solved in part by augmenting SOF resources in several areas to include: additional capabilities to conduct special reconnaissance; enhanced capacity for rapid response including improved mobility platforms to respond once an adversary is found; and expanded and improved logistic assets.

Analysis

Session Two examined U.S. strategic responses to new security challenges. Panelists addressed such challenges as terrorism and asymmetric threats; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; intelligence requirements and the need for fundamental reform within the intelligence community following 9/11; and the role of Special Operations Forces.

Dr. William Luti, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, argued that the United States is still quite vulnerable to outlaw regimes and terrorist groups that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction. To combat this vulnerability, the United States must, among other things, implement the concept of anticipatory self-defense as outlined in the new national security strategy. In a world where enemies may grant safe haven to terrorists and where terrorists seek to kill Americans, the United States cannot continue to follow a reactive policy against aggression.

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command, opened his presentation by describing the mission of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the new combatant command established in the aftermath of September 11. NORTHCOM has been assigned the mission of defending the United States and providing support to civil authorities. General Anderson noted that two vast oceans and friendly neighbors do not provide the protection that Americans once took for granted.

Mr. Bill Gertz, the Washington Times and author of *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11*, believes that the U.S. intelligence system needs to be dramatically revamped to address the requirements of the post-9/11 security setting. On the clandestine side, the United States must devote far greater attention to the development of human intelligence assets with Arab language skills in order to increase the chances of infiltrating Al Qaeda and other Arab terrorist organizations. Technical intelligence alone cannot provide the requisite information to combat the terrorist challenge.

With regard to intelligence analysis, perhaps the most critical flaw exposed in the aftermath of September 11 was the failure of various

U.S. agencies such as the FBI and CIA to share key pieces of information. To be effective in the war on terrorism, bureaucratic barriers, legal restrictions, and other institutional impediments that obstruct the timely exchange of intelligence must be removed.

Mr. James Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and author of *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, focused his remarks on the need to reorganize the National Security Council to make it more effective in meeting the challenges facing the United States today. Reflecting their departments' heightened role in national security matters, the Attorney General and the secretaries of Treasury and Homeland Security should become statutory members of the NSC. In addition, as it attempts to merge over twenty existing federal agencies into a single well-managed organization, the new Department of Homeland Security must avoid falling prey to the stagnating turf wars that so often plague departments and agencies in the U.S. government.

Lastly, Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, described the unique capabilities resident in Special Operations Forces that were so effective in dislodging the Taliban government and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan and that continue to help reconstitute local Afghani institutions and governance. Given the nature of twenty-first-century warfare, the ongoing war on terrorism, and the exigencies of the policy of preemption, growing emphasis will be placed on the type of capabilities, such as the ability to conduct a range of unconventional and irregular warfare operations, possessed by U.S. Special Operations Forces.

There was broad agreement among the panel members that the myriad security challenges confronting the United States require several important initiatives. First, the United States needs to develop enhanced intelligence collection and information sharing among intelligence agencies and key decision-makers. Given the central role accurate, timely intelligence plays in the fight against terrorism, many panelists believe that rectifying these problems should be given top priority.

Second, we must develop the requisite resources and capabilities to plan and implement the policy of anticipatory self defense or preemption as outlined in the new national security strategy. Panelists concurred that preemption is as a critical strategic response to the present and future security challenges confronting the United States.

Third, the United States needs to reorganize several U.S. agencies responsible for national security. The lessons learned from 9/11 presented a loud "wake-up call" that individual federal organizations must be restructured to meet the threat posed by terrorism and the



security environment of the twenty-first century. These entities include the CIA, the FBI, and the NSC.

Finally, because of their unique capabilities to conduct unconventional, irregular warfare, to work with indigenous forces/populace prior to, during, and after hostilities, and to play a central role in pre-emption actions, resources for U.S. Special Operations Forces need to be augmented. These would encompass: additional capabilities to conduct special reconnaissance; enhanced capacity for rapid response; and improved logistics.





Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret.), General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis

Allies and Coalition Partners

Panelists

Moderator: **Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis**, Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Coalition Opportunities and Challenges in Central and Southwest Asia

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, and former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

Coalition Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and Europe

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

Implications of the Broader Asia-Pacific Area for U.S. national security strategy

Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret.), President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Panel Charter

Especially since World War II the United States has taken the lead in developing alliances and coalitions in support of shared interests, values, and goals. Such arrangements have created unprecedented levels of cooperation, including agreed strategies, contingency planning, training of military forces, integration of command structures, building infrastructures for supplying military forces, and actually deploying forces for operations as in Southeastern Europe in the last



decade. Although the alliances of the Cold War era have been transformed to meet new security challenges, the question remains how relevant such arrangements will prove to be for twenty-first-century conflicts, including the war against terrorism. The United States relies on collaboration with allies and coalition partners in conducting a wide range of counterterrorist activities. As we have seen since 9/11, they are providing access to intelligence and overseas facilities and offering valuable assistance in investigations, extraditions, and operations designed to locate, apprehend, and destroy terrorist cells. As many as ninety other countries have cooperated with the United States in the war against terrorism since September 11, 2001.

The war against terrorism heightens the need for the United States to forge and maintain cooperative arrangements with a large number of states. It will be necessary to sustain the momentum of the antiterrorism coalition created by September 11, as the United States and its allies strive to find common ground based on their respective interests, priorities, and capabilities. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has pointed out, for the United States it is the mission that will determine the coalition, rather than the coalition shaping the mission. This means that it will be necessary to put together coalitions of the willing, while the United States works also to build support within existing alliances and international organizations. Where possible, the United States will seek allies and coalition partners. Where necessary, the United States will act unilaterally to protect its most important interests.

Among the lessons of the past, alliance/coalition cooperation in military operations requires a high level of synchronization among the forces of contributing partners, as well as unity of effort within and among the various U.S. military services. The transformation of the U.S. military to meet the changing face of twenty-first-century warfare, and the resulting gap in military technology investment and capabilities between the United States and its allies, poses an obstacle for future alliance/coalition operations. If allies and coalition partners lack the advanced military technologies required to make them useful coalition partners in military operations, their ability to act with the United States will be diminished, and the overall collective effort will be weakened. Here it is useful to point out that since 9/11 the United States has added to its existing defense budget a larger amount of money (\$45 billion) than the total of any of the NATO-European defense budgets. The extent to which the United States and its allies can reach consensus on their respective contributions to the war against terrorism and the other security issues of the twenty-first century will have obvious implications for the future of alliances as a part of U.S. national security strategy.

Discussion Points

- How important are allies and coalition partners in the new U.S. national security strategy?
- Moving forward in the global war on terrorism, what is the likely extent of support and the potential for discord between the United States and its allies and coalition partners?
- How does the proliferation of asymmetric warfare capabilities affect alliance/coalition operations and cohesion? Does a higher WMD threat encourage caution from alliance members fearing an attack on their territory, or does it foster a sense of urgency of action?
- What are the most serious challenges for alliance/coalition operations in Central and Southwest Asia?
- What are the key strategic issues confronting the United States, respectively, in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific area?
- What are the lessons learned thus far from the war against terrorism for alliance and coalition operations?
- How serious is the emerging technology gap between the United States and its alliance and coalition partners? How will this gap affect cooperative efforts in the war against terrorism?

Summary

Moderator: **Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis**, Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

The face of warfare has changed due to the prospect of cyber attacks, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the transformation of military-relevant technologies. Therefore, the conventional wisdom about warfare planning is evolving, and with it the notion of “alliances” and operational planning.

- It must be remembered that the policy of preemption is only one of the many concepts contained within the new national security strategy. One concept in particular that is often forgotten or overlooked is multilateralism. Allies and coalition partners are indeed a critical element for the Bush administration.

Robert Osgood, who in 1968 published a definitive study of alliances in U.S. foreign policy, observed that alliances in the context of America’s post-World War II containment strategy are the closest we have come to collective security in a world of power politics.

- Indeed for the United States, U.S. alliance commitments have formed an interlinking network of relationships designed to deter, protect, at times to compel, and even, especially in the case of NATO, to promote values, ideas, and freedoms commonly associated with the Western world.

Alliances evolve over time. During the past fifty years, alliances have changed as problems and limitations became apparent between and among alliance members.

- With the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded and NATO underwent a major transformation of its internal organization and enlargement of its membership.
- Although there was alliance unity immediately after 9/11, NATO has faced fundamental questions about its future status, its role in the war against terrorism, and the use of military force against Iraq.

After 9/11, there is an expanding capabilities gap between U.S. and other NATO military forces. Moreover, there is no shared consensus on how to deal with emerging threats posed by terrorism and WMD.

- In the 1990s, crisis management, peace support operations, and peacetime engagement were emphasized as NATO focused on Southeastern Europe.
- The events of 9/11 clearly demonstrated that NATO must also address international terrorism and WMD proliferation.

The United States will continue to need allies to accomplish its military and political objectives.

- Politically, alliances or coalitions are important because they can lend international support to a common cause. They can buttress resolve, and contribute to burden-sharing, and thereby enhance public support.
- Militarily, there may be instances when the United States can operate without its allies. New technologies for power projection and offshore basing under development in the United States, for example, may accelerate that trend. Nevertheless, the United States has still had to rely on access to allied or coalition partner facilities to launch strikes, recover aircraft, or to utilize pre-positioned materials or to attain facilities for forces.
- Even though the United States possesses unequalled military power, it faces vulnerabilities from asymmetrical threats.

Alliances as we have known them in the past no longer exist. During the Cold War there was a readily perceived threat and a shared vision that military power played an important role in meeting that threat.

- Although the alliances of the Cold War era have either been disbanded or transformed, no shared vision exists regarding the appropriate response to the security threats and challenges we currently confront.

It is important not to confuse U.S. unilateral action with American rejection of all multilateral frameworks or policy approaches.

- Explicit in the new national security strategy is the understanding that when vital U.S. interests are threatened, America will act with or without its allies or friends.
- New operational strategies together with relationships with new partners, former adversaries, and/or established allies may allow the United States the luxury of operating in a coalition of the willing outside of established multilateral alliance frameworks. If, however, the United States should find itself in the position of needing to act on its own, it will do so.

The new national security strategy's delineation of preemption as a means of dealing with future threats poses demanding issues for the United States in its relations with allies.

- There is concern among many allies about the nature and level of evidence that could be used to justify preemptive action.
- As a result there is a potential for prolonged allied debate and/or attempts to constrain the United States from acting to the effect that timely action is not possible or the element of surprise is lost.

U.S. alliance relationships have a fundamental role in the political strategy of the United States.

- The United States needs to think more creatively about how U.S. alliances and coalition-partner relationships operate in the new era.
- Moreover, greater thought must also be placed upon how regional alliance frameworks could interface more effectively to meet the challenges of the current and projected security environment.

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, and former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

The threat of terrorism can only be stopped at its roots. Therefore, we must reach out to those groups in regions that want to harm the United States. This requires a new approach that addresses the problems of regions that include Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. It is necessary to influence in a positive manner the populations of these regions who form the basis of the current and future terrorist threat to the United States. The United States needs to help bring these regions into the twenty-first century.

- Improving the lives of the population will favorably mold the public's perception of the United States.

- It is important for the United States to help build viable infrastructures within these regions.

Two important ways for the United States to reach out to these regions are:

- In conducting the war on terrorism, the United States must identify the causes as well as the symptoms for terrorism and address the reasons for extremism. Military operations against terrorism are necessary, but not in themselves sufficient. It is crucial to hit terrorism at its center of gravity: the millions of disenfranchised, angry young men of the Arab world. They join terrorist organizations in large part because there is limited or no political, social, and economic opportunities, conditions which are at the root of Islamic extremism. The United States must address this problem.
- Strengthening U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Middle East peace process is also necessary. An invigorated peace process would produce positive effects throughout the Middle East and the Arab/Muslim world. In addition, a revitalized peace initiative would make it more difficult for Islamic extremists to recruit followers.

The United States must remain fully engaged in the Middle East and Southwest and Central Asia.

- It is necessary for the United States to pay close attention to such countries as Afghanistan. During the Cold War, the United States aided the Afghans in expelling the Soviet Union. However, once the Soviet army left Afghanistan, so did the United States. If the United States remained in Afghanistan and helped the Afghans rebuild their country, it is unlikely that the Taliban and Al Qaeda would have gained sufficient strength to pose a threat.
- Afghanistan is currently the U.S. model of reconstruction. The U.S. should place emphasis on making this model work efficiently. Economic and humanitarian aid as well as funding to help to reconstruct the country should be provided quickly.
- Providing such assistance will help dispel doubt within the international community, in Afghanistan, and within the region about U.S. commitment to this vital area.

The United States has spent considerable time and effort in creating and sustaining relationships in the Middle East. These relationships are both delicate and fragile and require full-time attention. It is very easy to destroy these relationships.

- Currently, Iran is undergoing a fundamental change with the youth of the country supporting democratic reform. The United States should utilize its resources to encourage such change within the country. Promoting democratic change within Iran, where Islamic extremism has been a dominant influence, has the potential to



alter the political landscape of the Middle East dramatically. Such a positive change would send a powerful message to Islamic terrorists throughout the world that democracy, not extremism, is the appropriate path to follow.

The United States must deal with Iraq carefully.

- As it confronts Iraq, the United States must be sure to continue to build and foster mutually beneficial relationships with other countries in the region.
- Building closer, more positive ties with other nations will help prevent additional turmoil in the region when the United States takes military action against Iraq.

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

Much of the contemporary debate in the United States is about multilateralism versus unilateralism. This debate has been ongoing for numerous years and has hampered the diplomatic abilities of the United States by confusing allies of our true intentions.

- It is necessary to engage our allies and friends in a dialogue because coalitions are important. Coalitions with allies that share common goals and values have the potential to give much needed support during times of crisis.
- The United States needs to undertake a more consultative process with its allies to produce agreed upon decisions. Such decision making will prevent unconstrained and uncoordinated activity from producing regrettable consequences.
- A consultative process with allies will also make them feel that they are a part of the U.S. decision making process. Moreover, such inclusion will ultimately allow them to more easily assist the United States in taking any prescribed action.

Weapons of mass destruction remain a significant threat today. However, it should also be noted that the United States and its allies have had over fifty years of experience in dealing effectively with the WMD threat.

- For more than fifty years the United States devoted considerable effort to create a successful strategy of deterrence that helped maintain the peace.
- The United States must apply similar energies to the development of a new deterrent strategy that addresses current security realities including the proliferation of WMD and their possible use by rogue states and terrorists. Regrettably, deterrence theory today does not generally garner the same priority in U.S. policy circles or in academia as it did during the Cold War.



Advanced technology developed over the past decade has enabled far greater precision and lethality in battle. There are, however, a number of flawed conclusions that can be drawn from the capabilities such technologies afford.

- For example, in some cases advanced technology has minimized the horror of warfare for politicians and decision makers by making conflict appear bloodless and pristine. The precision of smart weapons such as cruise missiles that can speed through a window to hit a designated target without causing collateral damage has left the impression on some leaders that making the decision to take military action is simple and innocuous.
- The apparent ease of waging a “bloodless” war does not mean the United States no longer requires a strategy where the means and the ends are closely related. Strategy is necessary to win any war. Warfare is a deliberate activity that requires deliberate planning.
- Moreover, the possession of advanced technologies and capabilities does not mean that the United States can or should always act unilaterally. It must continue to plan, consult, and work with its allies in order to make successful engagements easier to achieve.

It is imperative that the United States does not become unilateralist or isolationist. We cannot ignore our traditional allies with whom we share common goals and values as we attempt to implement various international policy initiatives.

- The United States cannot disregard its allies particularly when making decisions that will affect their interests. If we follow such a path, our allies will increasingly ignore us when their support is needed.

Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret.), President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

The new U.S. national security strategy discusses the desirability of expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building an infrastructure of democracy. This approach is based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The goal is to make the world a safer place by fostering political and economic freedom and peaceful relations with other states. This strategy is particularly relevant for the Asia-Pacific area.

- The Asia-Pacific region is a vast area comprising a diversity of peoples and cultures. The gap between the rich and the poor must be overcome to prevent the region from developing into a breeding ground for Islamic extremism.
- To forestall such an eventuality, the United States must provide aid to help sustain economic growth and reduce poverty in the region.

As a Pacific power, America cannot yield its strategic position in Asia.

- America's commitment to Asian security and stability is an enduring one. Though we will constantly review our posture and consider sensible adjustments, the United States will maintain forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future.
- However, the density of U.S. basing and enroute infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions to the United States. This places a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and on developing systems capable of sustained operations at great distances with minimal theater-based support.

Currently, Asia is wrestling with the possible implications of globalization for the region. Therefore, it is necessary for the United States both to understand that Asia is going through a period of great change and to understand how this change may influence U.S. security and operational requirements in the area. There are five elements of globalization that not only impact directly on Asia but also on the rest of the world:

- Unprecedented economic interdependence driven by cross-border capital movements, rapid technology transfers, and real time communication and information flows;
- The rise of new actors that challenge state authority, in particular non-governmental organizations or NGOs, civic groups, multinational corporations, global production networks, and financial markets;
- Growing pressure on states to conform to new international standards of governance particularly in the areas of transparency and accountability;
- The emerging of an increasingly Western-dominated international culture, a trend which in many countries has raised the concern about the erosion of national identity and traditional values. This element of globalization has a largely negative impact upon many in the Islamic world; and,
- Finally, severe transnational problems have arisen that can only be resolved by multilateral action encompassing water-borne diseases and AIDS, slavery and human smuggling, production and smuggling of unlawful drugs, and illegal immigration.

It is important for the United States to take a multilateral approach to security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. A multilateral approach in time of crisis is the key to enhanced regional security cooperation.

- Cooperation and integration of capabilities among states has become a necessity in the interest of security. This is particularly relevant in the area of peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief where the United States is constantly bringing Asian nations together to train for these missions.

Analysis

Session Three facilitated a broad discussion on the issue of allies and coalition partners. Panel members made presentations and fielded questions on various aspects of coalition building and U.S. efforts on the war on terrorism.

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, underscored the fact that alliance relationships remain a central ingredient of U.S. plans to carry out its military and political objectives. However, the United States should devote greater attention to how U.S. alliances and coalition-partner relationships should function in today's security setting. In addition, Dr. Davis noted that in the future we may see greater multilateral actions taken by U.S.-led coalitions of the willing outside of an existing and more established alliance framework.

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, and former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, stated that the United States needs to take a multifaceted approach to address the threat of terrorism. In particular, General Zinni believes that we must shape in a positive manner the thinking of peoples in these regions who represent both the current and future terrorist threat to the United States.

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, stated that the United States must consult more closely with allies so that they feel a part of the decision-making process. Including allies in this process will facilitate their participation in any U.S.-led military action. General Sheehan's comments underpinned his belief that the United States should not become a unilateralist or isolationist power.

Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret.), President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, noted that the goal of opening societies and expanding democracy, as outlined in the national security strategy, is particularly relevant for the Asia-Pacific area. To prevent this region from developing into a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and a fertile ground for terrorists, the United States must help promote economic growth and decrease poverty levels in the region.

Several consistent themes arose from the presentations and discussions. Panelists concurred that fostering existing or potential alliances and coalitions based upon common interests, values, and goals provide several important benefits to the United States. These can include shared planning, use of common strategies/doctrine, joint training, and integrated command structures as well as the ability to generate heightened political and public support for possible military actions. Moreover, as noted by Dr. Davis, although the Bush administration is frequently accused of abandoning a multilateral approach to its foreign policy efforts, it often goes unnoticed that alliance and coalition



planning is indeed a critical component of the new national security strategy.

Alliances and coalitions of the willing remain vitally important in today's security environment as made clear in U.S.-allied military action in Kosovo, the potential conflict in Iraq, and of course, in the war against terrorism where the United States counts on its partnership with allies for a diverse set of counterterrorist activities. Lacking this collaboration, panelists agreed, the United States would not have enjoyed the same level of success, e.g., the recent capture in Pakistan of top Al Qaeda operative Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, as it has in the war against terrorism.

However, several panelists noted that the United States needs to think more creatively about how alliances and coalition-partner relationships will operate in the future. Washington should consult more often with allies on regional issues that directly impact their interests. If we ignore our allies, our allies will ignore us when the need for help arises.

Finally, in order to promote stability and peace throughout the globe, the United States should work more closely with allies and friends to help regions address the problems of disease, poverty, and lack of economic opportunity. Panelists concurred that aiding these regions will help reduce a growing animosity towards the United States/West among its disenfranchised people.





Evening Keynote Address

General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.)

General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.), President and Chief Executive Officer of Business Executives for National Security (BENS), and Executive Director, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission)

Summary

The Hart-Rudman Commission was chartered under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Commission Act and funded by the Department of Defense. However, to insure an unbiased report the Commission established several conditions.

- It would be bipartisan.
- It would be independent and not beholden to any institution that might be affected by its findings.
- The timing of its product would be such that it would be turned over to a new administration.

The Commission was adequately funded and assembled a capable staff. The members ranged from Gary Hart to Newt Gingrich. The Commission set about to do essentially three things:

- Understand what kind of a world Americans were going to live in over the next quarter of a century and its implications for national security. The product of this effort is the publication called *New World Coming*.
- Develop a U.S. national security strategy appropriate for this time frame.
- Examine the structures and the processes by which the United States provides for its security, and make appropriate recommendations.

The Commission held thirty-three conferences and met with a broad range of experts to understand the world of the future. In addition, the Commission also sought to identify future threats.

- The Commission brought together cultural anthropologists, demographers, emigration specialists, and philosophers, to discuss future demographic trends. Much was learned about the likely composition of the diverse U.S. population of the future.
- The conferences and interviews led the Commission to conclude that interstate conflict will continue to decline while intrastate conflict will rise.

The Commission concluded that no other nation will pose, in the time frame of a quarter of a century, a significant symmetrical threat to the United States. The United States will remain a political, economic, military, and cultural force. Such strength will allow the United States to continue to shape the international environment. However, the United States will continue to face various threats.

- Other nations will use asymmetric attacks, such as terrorism, to challenge the United States.
- The Commission also believed that Americans will be attacked on their own soil.
- The United States will also be threatened by the proliferation of weapons technology. Science and information-, bio-, nano-, and WMD technology will continue to advance and will inevitably fall into the hands of people who seek to cause great harm.

To combat these threats, a national security strategy was developed based on a possible future security environment set forth by the Commission. In developing the strategy it was necessary to determine what made the United States strong, what was at risk, and why it was at risk.

- While creating the strategy, the Commission reviewed areas other than those that are normally considered a part of the national security mix such as social cohesion and education.
- The Commission concluded that the United States will remain the principal military power in the world. Moreover, the Commission argued that the United States will not face threats from great powers that have nuclear weapons such as Russia, China, or India, but rather from other threats that flow from failed states and actors other than states.
- In addition, the Commission stated that a direct attack against the United States is likely over the next quarter century. The report stated: “The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. The

risk is not only death and destruction, but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership.”

The Commission concluded that the United States is moving into an era of global cultural conflict where globalization will spark conflict between the First and Third Worlds. Disparities in wealth will increase and widespread poverty will persist.

- There will be an intense rejection of Western culture and a backlash to globalization in parts of the Third World. This will be seen in attacks on the United States or other Western countries.

The promotion and expansion of American values will be increasingly important for the advancement of U.S. interests of preserving security and promoting freedom. Therefore, the United States must work to lessen the disparities or potential causes of instability worldwide. In addressing this threat the United States should place emphasis on:

- Helping impoverished peoples, thus far excluded, experience the economic benefits of globalization.
- Contributing to the extension of freedom and democratization.

In developing the national security strategy, the Commission analyzed what particular types of military capabilities the nation will need for the future.

- Conventional military forces will have to be much lighter, more agile, more responsive, and more network-centric to be able to operate effectively in the future.
- The Commission called for a new top-down planning process that would accelerate efforts to transform the military’s capabilities as recommended, with the highest priority reserved for developing expeditionary forces.

The Commission introduced the notion that the United States will have to devote resources and capabilities to homeland security.

- The Commission recommended folding the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard into a new “Homeland Security Agency.”
- The new agency would be chartered into law to provide a focal point for government response in “all natural and man-made crisis and emergency planning scenarios.”
- The Hart-Rudman Commission placed heavy emphasis on the role the National Guard can play in homeland security missions. The National Guard should be given homeland security as its primary mission.
- The Commission stated that the National Guard should be relieved of the responsibility of participating in overseas deployments in order to concentrate on homeland security. Therefore, the Guard

needs to be “reorganized, properly trained and adequately equipped.”

The Commission placed emphasis on recapitalizing America’s strengths in science and education.

- The Commission came to the conclusion that our systems of basic scientific research and education are in serious trouble. At a time when other countries are strengthening their efforts in scientific research and education, the United States is falling behind. “The harsh fact is that the U.S. need for the highest quality of human capital in science, mathematics, and engineering is not being met.”
- The Commission report points to a need for producing more scientists and engineers and, to do this, the need exists for more and better qualified science and math teachers.
- Currently, 40 percent of the nation’s science teachers have neither a major nor a minor in science, and a third of the nation’s public school teachers in mathematics have neither a major nor a minor in math.
- It is the Commission’s view that the inadequacies in research and education pose more of a U.S. security threat than any potential conventional war.

The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the Cold War have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the United States government. While devising its proposed national security strategy, the Commission recommended major organizational changes in the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the intelligence community, and Congress.

- The Department of State is no longer an effective institution. “The department suffers in particular from an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.” It is therefore necessary to solve these internal weaknesses. For example, the Commission recommended the creation of five regional Under Secretaries for Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia within the State Department to enhance the organizational structure in which regional and functional policies are made.
- The Department of Defense has too many staff members and staff activities that create confusion and delay. Therefore, the Department of Defense must reduce its personnel. Moreover, money is also wasted or ill-used. More needs to be done to create an effective strategic plan to guide the programming and budgeting process.

- The intelligence community has yet to adjust to the post-Cold war era. It is necessary for the intelligence community to enhance its intelligence analysis to detect all threats. For example, the Commission emphasizes the recruitment of human intelligence assets to enhance the process of collecting intelligence.
- Congress' role in the formulation and execution of security policy must also be reformed. At present, for example, every major defense program must be voted upon no fewer than eighteen times each year by an array of committees and subcommittees. This represents a very poor use of time for busy members of the executive and legislative branches.
 - To address these deficiencies, it is suggested that Congress reconsider its role in national security policy via a review of the legislative branch's security policy function. The review would be conducted in both the House and Senate and should be bipartisan. Following this assessment, the leadership of Congress and the executive branch would build programs to encourage members to gain knowledge and experience in national security matters. This would in turn be followed by structural reforms, such as merging appropriations and authorizing subcommittees to make the legislative process more efficient.
- In addition, the Federal government's personnel system also requires reform. An outdated personnel system and inadequate incentives or compensation have created a crisis in recruitment and retention throughout the government.

Analysis

General Charles Boyd pointed out that the Hart-Rudman Commission held a multitude of conferences and private interviews with a broad range of experts to understand the world of the future and identify future threats to the United States. The conferences and interviews led the Commission to an assessment of the world in the next quarter of a century. The Commission also developed a U.S. national security strategy appropriate for this time frame. The Commission examined the structures and the processes by which the United States provides for its security, and made numerous recommendations to enhance it.

The Commission's national security strategy is intended to prepare the United States for starkly different threats in a new century. Threats to United States security will be more diffuse, harder to anticipate, and more difficult to neutralize than ever before. While the likelihood of major conflicts between states will decrease, intrastate conflict will likely increase.

Despite the rise of intrastate conflict, the United States will remain a major political, economic, military, and cultural force. No other na-



tion will pose, in the time frame of a quarter of a century, a significant symmetrical threat to the United States. Nevertheless, it is certain that other nations will use asymmetrical attacks, such as terrorism, to challenge the United States.

General Boyd emphasized that the Commission concluded that the United States is moving into an era of worldwide cultural conflict where globalization will spark conflict between the First and Third Worlds. There will be an intense rejection of Western culture and a backlash to globalization in parts of the Third World. This will inevitably be seen in attacks on the United States and/or other Western countries. Therefore, the promotion and expansion of American values will be increasingly important for the advancement of U.S. interests of preserving security and promoting freedom. General Boyd suggested that to address this threat the United States should place emphasis on helping impoverished peoples experience the economic benefits of globalization and also contributing to the extension of freedom and democratization.

Finally, General Boyd outlined several areas of reform needed to enhance the national military and decision making capabilities in the next quarter century. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy. General Boyd stated that there is no overarching strategic framework to guide U.S. national security policy making and resource allocation. Therefore, the Commission deemed it necessary to reform the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the intelligence community, and Congress. General Boyd remarked that, at present, clear goals and priorities are rarely set within these institutions.





Morning Keynote Address

Military Requirements for a New National Security Environment

General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Summary

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), established after the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), has developed over time. However, the JROC must continue to evolve.

- Currently, each service presents to the JROC its new weapon system development plans for review and approval. It is JROC's responsibility to assure that the program is interoperable with those of the other services, meets all the criteria for the program as designed by the service, and the weapon system fits a defined need.
- JROC must take additional steps to help the services understand the kinds of future capabilities they will need.

It is necessary to transform JROC into a mechanism that helps the services plan their respective capabilities for a fifteen- to twenty-year period. JROC should be utilized to shape the joint forces that each service will need to fight and win the nation's wars.

- This would allow JROC to set forth capstone requirements, capabilities, and operational concepts.
- Such action would then assist the armed services in seeing the types of future missions the United States may be required to undertake. In addition, it would also help in understanding the gaps in the service's capabilities to perform those missions.

- Understanding potential shortfalls would allow the services to design programs that would fill known or presumed capability gaps.
- Currently, JROC is drawing on the national military strategy and existing war-fighting concepts such as *Joint Vision 2010* to describe the broad capabilities that will be needed.

The secretary of defense has recently distributed his contingency planning guidelines to the combatant commanders. In doing so, the secretary has begun to change military planning.

- Instead of creating a two-year cycle on war plans, the secretary has directed his commanders to create a revision cycle of six months.
- This will take battle plans that have been “on the shelf” for the past few years and bring them up to date.
- Through an interactive process with the combatant commander, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense, the battle plans will provide a basis for determining the appropriate assets needed.

This year, the armed forces have conducted an operational availability study to give necessary recommendations to the secretary of defense to formulate various guidelines on how each service should improve and how time and capital should be invested to prepare for the conflicts of tomorrow.

- An operational availability study determines how much of the nation’s combat capability can be delivered anywhere in the world at any particular time. The study investigates further requirements for future deployment and if they are being met. In addition, the study addresses the time frame needed to deploy a

General Peter Pace, USMC



certain military asset and if that time frame is satisfactory to a combatant commander controlling the asset.

- The objective of this analysis is to enable the Department of Defense to develop contingency plans for the future. Such recommendations will then be used to give guidance to the service secretaries and service chiefs to allocate resources in transforming the services.
- In the past three months, the military has analyzed current war plans and asked commanders whether the plans meet their requirements. The responses have been positive.

Access and deployment speed are two essential prerequisites for operational readiness. In particular, speed is a tremendous force multiplier.

- The divisions of the future will be designed to be two-thirds the size of today's divisions but with the same or even greater lethality. Such divisions will be more mobile.
- Future divisions need to be more interchangeable. Interchangeability will be based on interoperability that will enhance operational flexibility.

There is nothing that the armed services can do operationally that is not supported in part, or in whole, by the Reserve and National Guard community.

- The challenge to this particular community of the armed forces is its lack of speed in deployment.
- If speed is to be maximized as a force multiplier, as we transform the active force, the reserve component must undergo comparable change.
- The timelines for Reserve and National Guard deployment will have to be revisited and revamped in order for this community to play an active part in any combat scenario.

Analysis

General Pace focused his remarks on the need to evolve the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to further aid the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs in making the critical decisions and choices in developing the armed forces of the future.

General Pace emphasized that JROC plays a crucial role in the transformation process of the armed services to become more interoperable. JROC has the influence to ensure that all major weapons systems are validated as interoperable before they are procured. However, JROC must move beyond simply reviewing and approving a service's program if it meets all of the criteria as designed by the service or if it is interoperable and fits a need. Instead, JROC must help the services understand the kinds of capabilities they will need for the future.

Therefore, JROC should play a more effective role in helping the services plan their respective capabilities for a fifteen- to twenty-year period.

General Pace plans to refocus JROC so that it issues directives for new technologies rather than relying on proposals from the individual services. This will allow JROC to set forth capstone requirements, capabilities, and operational concepts for the services. Such action would then assist the armed services in seeing the types of missions that may be required in the future and understanding the gaps in our capabilities to perform those missions.

General Pace also explained that combatant commanders play a vitally important role in the transformation process. They provide valuable information to the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs on lessons learned from exercises or operations they oversee. The information is then used in determining what military assets are needed for the future. In addition, the secretary of defense has recently developed and distributed contingency planning guidelines to the combatant commanders. The secretary has directed the commanders to revise existing war plans to become more current.

General Pace discussed the introduction of an operational availability study that will give necessary recommendations to the secretary of defense. The study will be used to formulate various guidelines on what each service should improve and how time and capital should be invested to prepare for future conflicts. An operational availability study also addresses the time frame needed to deploy a certain military asset and if it is satisfactory to a combatant commander controlling the asset. The objective of this study is to strengthen the ability of the Department of Defense to develop contingency plans.

Finally, General Pace stated that access and deployment speed are two essential prerequisites for operational readiness. To incorporate rapid deployment speed, many aspects of the military will have to change. For example, the divisions of the future will need to be designed to be two-thirds the size of today's divisions but possessing the same or greater lethality. Future divisions must become more interchangeable. Interchangeability will be based on interoperability that will enhance operational flexibility. Moreover, if speed is to be maximized as a force multiplier, as we transform the active force the reserve component must undergo comparable change.



Session Four



Admiral Thomas H. Collins, USCG, Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, General John M. Keane, USA, General John P. Jumper, USAF, and General James L. Jones, USMC

Transformation for a Changing World

Panelists

Moderator: **Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.**

General James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

General John P. Jumper, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

General John M. Keane, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Thomas H. Collins, USCG, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

Panel Charter

The purpose of this session is to set forth, from the perspective of each of the military services, the key issues and priorities for building military forces for the twenty-first century. The U.S. armed forces are undergoing a massive transformation designed to prepare them for the conduct of a broad spectrum of twenty-first-century operations. Such transformation takes place in the midst of a dynamic global security setting, together with rapidly unfolding innovations in advanced technology and military strategy. Transformation encompasses both know-how and hardware, people and weapons systems. Speaking about transformation, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has stated: "It's change in the way we fight, in the way we train, in the way we exercise, but especially it's a change in the way we think and how we approach our jobs. Changes in doctrine, in training, in organization, in the way we develop leaders and, most important, in the way all of the services work together." New-generation systems based on information-age technologies provide the basis for unprecedented accuracy and lethal-

ity. As such change unfolds, the United States must also be prepared to respond to threats and challenges across a broad spectrum. In other words, we must maintain forces to fight and win the nation's wars today while investing in capabilities for the future. In the last decade, military forces have been called upon in support of an unprecedented number of diverse tasks including operations-other-than war as in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the ongoing war on terrorism and deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its forward deployed forces, and the territory and forces of allies and coalition partners.

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, completed in late 2001, set forth six key transformation goals that shape the discussion of U.S. efforts to build a twenty-first-century military. First, the United States must be able to protect the U.S. homeland and overseas deployments and facilities, particularly against the threat of WMD, by providing passive and active defenses. Second, the United States must be able to project and sustain power by reducing the military's dependence on logistical support and by exploiting technologies such as long-range aircraft and stealthy platforms. Third, the United States must be capable of denying our enemies sanctuary, including the ability to launch attacks against the United States, such as those launched by Al Qaeda from caves in Afghanistan. For this purpose the United States can benefit from long-range precision strike capabilities, intelligence, and undersea warfare; enhancing offensive and defensive information network measures; and, leveraging information technology to enhance joint operational capabilities. Fourth, the United States must maintain unhindered access to space while protecting the infrastructure that supports critical space capabilities. Fifth, transformation should maintain and enhance agile, lethal, flexible, and survivable joint forces with long-range precision strike capabilities. Last but not least, transformation must encompass doctrine, training, and organizations, not simply technological enhancements. How each of the services is addressing such issues individually and jointly is crucially important to a broader understanding of U.S. military capabilities for the twenty-first century.

Discussion Points:

- What are the transformation priorities of each of the military services, and how do they relate to joint force requirements?
- To what extent is each of the military services approaching force transformation jointly and integrating efforts as a unified plan?
- What is the appropriate shape, extent, and pace of transformation for each of the military services?
- Do transformation requirements need to be re-prioritized as a result of the terrorist attacks and lessons learned from the war on ter-

rorism since 9/11? How can the U.S. military conduct research and development towards transformation in a way that minimizes risk and maintains a broad set of capabilities based on innovations to provide the force of the future?

- How can transformation strike the appropriate balance between modernizing for the future and maintaining current core competencies and systems to address today's challenges across that spectrum?
- What is the role of National Guard and reserve components in transformation?

Summary

General James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

The concept of transformation is a key element of the new U.S. national security strategy and is taken quite seriously by the U.S. Marine Corps.

- The Marine Corps views transformation as having two critical elements. The first is a completely new asset, or concept of operations, that enables new capabilities. An example is the Global Positioning System or GPS. The second is a change or modification to an existing asset that provides an exponentially improved capability, for example, transforming a gravity bomb into a smart bomb by the addition of guidance kits and other modifications.
- Thus, transformation is both evolutionary and revolutionary. Two fundamental components of transformation are innovation and the capability to adapt.

For the Marine Corps, transformation encompasses four distinct pillars:

- First, one must harness advanced technology. Whether it be tilt-rotor technology, the lift-fan short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) technology developed for the Marine Corps version of the Joint Strike Fighter, or a concept for a family of high-speed vessels, the utilization of technological advances will significantly facilitate the transformation of Marine Corps capabilities.
- Second, it is necessary to develop new operational concepts. Transformation is not simply about developing new assets it also encompasses how one uses those assets in an operational setting. Transformational equipment must be used by an intelligent operator. For example, using information technologies and other tools, the Marine Corps has made tremendous progress in integrated logistics which now permits the same job to be done more effectively with fewer personnel and numbers of headquarters.
- Third, it is necessary to institute organizational realignments to change the way the Marine Corps operates. The transition of the

Marine Corps to an all-volunteer force has resulted in tremendous benefits, including higher education levels among non-commissioned officers (NCOs), many of whom increasingly possess some form of college education. A more educated force allows the Marine leadership to give NCOs responsibilities traditionally performed by officers thus freeing officers to carry out higher-level tasks.

- Fourth, is the need to undertake acquisition reform and to incorporate more successful business practices, such as activity-based cost and management, so that the Corps allocates its limited resources in the most cost-effective manner.

The United States Marine Corps is engaged in three major transformation efforts:

- A reinvigorated partnership with the U.S. Navy. Both the Marine Corps and the Navy are working together to ensure that sea-basing and power projection capabilities are fully complementary.
- The integration of Naval tactical aviation. This will increase the cost effectiveness of both services' air arms in terms of resource allocations.
- Exploring with the Special Operations Command options for the Marine Corps and the Special Operations community to establish a closer working relationship. The objective is to augment the number of light Special Operation Forces available for the increased operating tempo of SOF activities.

General John P. Jumper, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

To implement transformation properly, the U.S. Air Force must initiate a new way of doing business. Previously, the Air Force acquisition process tended to focus more on the weapon systems themselves rather than on how those systems would fit together with the capabilities of the other military services on the joint battlefield. This mindset must change. Today, the Air Force believes that the most fertile ground for transformation, particularly more effective acquisition planning, revolves around the development of sound concepts of operations.

- Before making acquisition decisions, the Air Force must examine its concepts of operations to determine how the Air Force plans to fight, how it plans to integrate with the other services and with coalition and allied partners in the context of joint/coalition warfare.
- Although these adjustments are necessary to implement transformation within the Air Force, changing the old mindset and traditional ways of doing business will be a slow and painful process.

Specific Air Force transformation challenges include:

- The ability to deploy rapidly to assist/reinforce ground forces must be enhanced. Capabilities for the rapid, all-weather transport of ground forces and other needed assets also must be augmented.
- Organizational and integration improvements need to be implemented within the air operations centers that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In particular, better integration of air operations procedures need to be instituted to breakdown cultural differences and the stovepipes that exist among the various operators from different services/agencies.
- The acquisition process must be restructured to encourage innovation, ingenuity, and speedier system modifications. Currently, the process is far too risk averse, hampered by concerns over procedures and regulations that inhibit innovation. In order to acquire the necessary tools to win wars, the Air Force, and all the services, need to be able to take prudent risks unencumbered by excessive regulation as they develop or modify weapons systems.

General John M. Keane, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

In the late-1990s, the U.S. Army recognized that a mismatch existed between the requirements set forth in the national military strategy and the resources, appropriate force design, and capabilities of the Army to meet those requirements. The Army knew U.S. adversaries were changing tactics to exploit our vulnerabilities. In order to respond, the Army realized it needed to change as well.

- The Army's goal is to become a force that combines the decisive war-fighting lethality of mechanized forces with the strategic responsiveness of today's light forces.
- Moreover, the Army believes that the integration of forces on the joint battlefield and more effective use of technology to network assets will help achieve unparalleled situational awareness thus enabling the capacity to coordinate fire control and interdiction capabilities.
- Achieving the Army's vision requires the comprehensive transformation of the entire Army, from the operational force to the institutional Army. The transformation encompasses the way the Army will fight, organizational change, and its approach to acquisition planning. The resultant force structure will be responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

Since the Army is a large and complex organization that must maintain a ready posture, the implementation of significant change will require

careful planning, sustained support, and periodic reassessments and adjustments.

- The Army begins with an operational concept, or doctrine, to understand how it will wage war, and then develops the necessary weapons systems and supporting equipment to carry out its doctrine.
- The Army will explore new combinations of concepts, people, organizations, and technology in order to produce innovative and enhanced capabilities to combat the threats of the current and projected security setting.

Transformation is fundamentally about changing the way the U.S. Army deploys, fights, sustains, and uses information. Transformation will provide new capabilities for the Army enabling it to defend our allies and friends, dissuade military competition, deter aggression, and, if necessary, decisively defeat the aggressors.

- Army formations will become even more strategically responsive, modular and scalable, capable of conducting a diverse set of missions.

Past events, such as the First World War where a frontier army was transformed into a modern force, the Second World War where a foot infantry and horse drawn artillery force were transformed into a combined arms mechanized force, and finally in Vietnam where a European-based Army focused on the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact was transformed into a force capable of conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign, have all proven that the U.S. Army has the ability to change.

- The implication is obvious: there is no justification in fearing change because the U.S. Army has accomplished great feats of transformation throughout its history.

Another critical aspect of transformation is the Army's growing capability to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world. While most Army equipment will still be transported by sea, speedier, more timely deployments require robust airlift capabilities.

- To increase its deployability, the Army will utilize both strategic and tactical air assets. Strategic air assets consisting of C-17s and C-5s will deploy Army forces to the area of operations while tactical air assets encompassing C-130s and some C-17s will deploy forces/equipment to the theater of operations.
- The Army, which is attempting to reduce its logistical footprint by 50 percent, has decided that most of its military equipment must fit on C-130s. This has profound implications because it will force the Army to become more innovative regarding deployments while at the same time reducing its logistical footprint.

The 2003 budget will be the last Army budget that will fund a main battle tank program. This is quite transformational for the Army.

- The Army plans to move away from the traditional standard upon which the tank was based. No longer will a tank be built with the requirement to survive a first round hit and then proceed to overmatch its adversary without taking additional hits.
- Today, the Army believes it will fight at a time and place of its choosing and will have better technology, intelligence, and stealth to use against its adversary. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, light armor protection and wheeled mobility are better suited for envisioned missions.
- The Army will also use hybrid electric engines which could reduce fossil fuel consumption by as much as 40 percent.

When its transformation process is completed the Army expects to have established a strategically responsive force that provides decisive combat power to function successfully in the full range of military operations.

- Ultimately, the Army anticipates this force to have the lethality, survivability, and tactical mobility of today's heavy force and the responsiveness and deployability of today's light force.

Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations

The U.S. Navy sees four clear indicators that underpin the need for transformation.

- Today, the United States, despite the various challenges it faces, continues to enjoy a window of strategic opportunity that opened with the end of the Cold War. Since the United States currently has no peer competitor, the near-term risk is more manageable than the risk that existed during the Cold War.
- The terrorist attacks of September 11 represented a clarion call for the United States, challenging long held assumptions both about its security at home and the threats it faced around the world.
- Fiscal pressures and constrained resources will also force the military services to change the way they conduct business.
- The United States must exploit the competitive edge it enjoys in technologies. However, given that many of these technologies are developed in the private sector and are dual-use, and thus increasingly obtainable on the open market, potential U.S. adversaries will have progressively more access to them. Consequently, the United States must quickly capitalize on new technologies as they become available.

To implement the transformation process, the U.S. Navy has developed a roadmap called Sea Power 21. It calls on the Navy to organize itself

around a clear, concise, and powerful vision of the capabilities it will provide in the decades ahead.

- *Sea Power 21* includes transformed organizational processes designed to: make new operational concepts and technologies available to the fleet in a more timely fashion; shape and educate the workforce needed to operate tomorrow's fleet; and reap cost savings that will allow the necessary investment in future systems.
- *Sea Power 21* will increase the deterrence, crisis control, and warfighting power of the U.S. Navy. It will also help ensure that naval forces are a fully networked, jointly integrated sea-based power projection force protecting U.S. global interests.

Three fundamental concepts lie at the heart of the Navy's continued operational effectiveness: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.

- *Sea Strike* is the projection of precise and persistent offensive power. *Sea Strike* operations are how the Navy will exert direct, decisive, and sustained influence in joint operations.
- *Sea Shield* is the projection of layered, global defensive assurance. It entails extending air breathing and ballistic missile defenses beyond U.S. naval assets to the joint force and allies as well as providing a defensive umbrella deep inland.
- *Sea Basing* is the projection of operational independence. *Sea Basing* will use the extended reach of the fleet's modern, networked weapons and sensors to maximize maneuver space in the world's oceans.

The key concept of Sea Power 21 will be to shift from a platform centered organization based on ships, airplanes, and submarines to an organization that emphasizes capabilities. In this regard, the Navy is focusing on three key areas of transformation.

- The first is personnel and training which are critical to successful transformation. The Navy has developed several new initiatives including Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through our Commitment to Education and Learning) which the Navy will use to educate and train its personnel in untraditional ways.
 - The Navy is also experimenting with swapping out crews part way through their deployments at sea. It is hoped that this technique will minimize crew fatigue and allow for a greater forward deployed capability. In addition, the Navy is designing future ships with innovative procedures and work-reducing technologies so that they can be operated and maintained with significantly smaller crews.
- The second area of naval transformation is missile defense. The Navy has a long history of defending itself while at sea which will

be incorporated into a sea-based missile defense that provides protection to all joint forces within the area of operations.

- The Navy is also actively involved in force netting, i.e., tying sensors, shooters (ships, aircraft, submarines), decision aids, and decision makers into a worldwide network. Such a network will be able to pass information rapidly among all platforms using space-based assets to enable decision makers to make timely, accurate decisions.
- The final, and perhaps key area of transformation, is organization. Training, education, advanced technologies, and new, innovative naval platforms are pointless without incorporating change into the Navy's organizational structure. The Navy must expend its resources more efficiently not only to reduce costs but also to provide its capabilities whenever and wherever needed.

Admiral Thomas H. Collins, USCG, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

Transformation represents the need for an unprecedented change in the Coast Guard, and the other services of the armed forces, in order to fulfill their responsibilities. The Coast Guard identifies three crucial aspects of transformation:

- The first is scale and dimension.
- The second is the speed by which we have to address transformation.
- The third is the relevance to critical national priorities.
- In the wake of 9/11, each of these three aspects have taken on heightened importance.

Ten years ago, the Coast Guard anticipated the changes it would confront in the new security setting. Its blueprint for transformation was published in a document entitled Coast Guard 20/20.

- *Coast Guard 20/20* called for a new groundbreaking approach to acquisition referred to as the *Deep Water Approach*. It encompassed a new network-centered and integrated system of resources designed to meet specific capabilities rather than a one for one replacement of existing systems.
- During this time the Coast Guard was creating a wholesale change to its integrated logistics support system.
- A new approach to human resources and human resource management called *Future Force 21* was also developed. *Future Force 21* was designed to restructure the service's workforce to allow for greater specialization and thus permit the Coast Guard to change the nature of its labor force.

With the implementation of Coast Guard 20/20 the Coast Guard believed it was ready for transformation. Transformation was to be

a measured, deliberate, and gradual process. However, September 11 changed everything.

- The attacks of 9/11 dramatically increased the Coast Guard's operating tempo and changed the mission profile of the service.
- The value and the vulnerability of the U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal regions became immediately apparent.
- The Coast Guard quickly reallocated resources to homeland security from approximately 1½ percent of its resources pre-9/11 to 55 percent post-9/11.

The Coast Guard responded to the attacks of 9/11 by:

- Reallocating resources to fund operations;
- Establishing new port security zones;
- Reinvigorating offshore boarding schemes;
- Launching a sea marshal concept for ships;
- Increasing Coast Guard presence in the U.S. ports and waterways; and,
- Creating new security units such as Maritime Safety and Security Teams to provide security in U.S. ports.

The president designated the United States Coast Guard as the lead federal agency for the maritime component of homeland security.

- Such a move created the need for a major change in the Coast Guard to meet the demands of the war on terrorism and provide greater security for the nation.
- The increased role will create a new paradigm for the Coast Guard that uniquely combines civil authority and military authority to achieve security.

The Coast Guard will be incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security. As a result, the Coast Guard must restructure its organization to integrate successfully into the new department.

- This presents the prospect of tremendous cultural change. The Coast Guard must change how it allocates resources and deploys assets. The 2003 Coast Guard budget has grown by an unprecedented 20 percent to help meet its expanded mission. However, a larger budget places increasing demands on good stewardship to satisfy the competing interests on service resources.
- For example, the Coast Guard will also have to develop an efficient method to balance the requirements of, and resources earmarked for, the homeland security mission with its other non-homeland security missions.
- Consequently, the Coast Guard must quicken the pace of its efforts to recapitalize its network-centric approach to ships, boats, and aircraft.

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- A critical objective is the development of a system of intelligence sharing for strategic operational and tactical advantage, both internally and externally. Reflecting the importance of this capability, the Coast Guard established a new position, the assistant commandant for intelligence.
 - Finally, the Coast Guard must also improve the way it attracts, develops, educates, trains, and retains personnel.

A key component of the new national security strategy is the doctrine of preemption. It is informed by the fact that the United States can no longer rely on reactive posture as was done in the past.

- The destruction of the World Trade Center demonstrated that preemption must be part of U.S. policy. Anticipating the threat will contribute to efforts to prevent future threats from becoming actual events.
- Awareness and prevention are also key elements of the Coast Guard's maritime security strategy.

The Coast Guard believes transformation is an evolving process with many dimensions that must be addressed on an ongoing basis.

- First, we must be cognizant that many future threats to the United States may be low-tech.
- Second, U.S. enemies will continually adapt to U.S. responses. The Coast Guard has witnessed such flexibility by adversaries in its counter-drug operations where drug runners are constantly changing their procedures in reaction to successful Coast Guard interdiction efforts.
- Third, preemption is a valid and necessary policy. For preemption to be effective, however, it is necessary to obtain the requisite intelligence and to act on it swiftly.
- Fourth, the threat is no longer limited to overseas as demonstrated by 9/11. The threat to the U.S. homeland requires coordination between both civil and military authorities.
- Finally, homeland security must be seen as an integral component of national security. It places a premium on jointness among the military services, and greater coordination within the federal interagency process as well as among federal, state, and local organizations.

Analysis

Session Four, the Chiefs Panel, examined the issue of transformation within each of the armed services and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Chiefs Panel included the Commandant of the Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, and either the Chief or Vice Chiefs of Staff from the other three military services who made presentations and fielded questions on various aspects of transformation within their respective services

including: defining transformation; highlighting past successes and challenges; and steps toward transformation presently being taken. The session facilitated a broad discussion of organizational and budgetary issues as well as challenges related to transformation within the military services.

General James Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, opened his presentation by addressing the Marine Corps approach to transformation. General Jones divided transformation into four components: harnessing advanced technology; developing new operational concepts; instituting organizational realignments; and undertaking acquisition reform and achieving better business practices. To implement transformation the Marine Corps is reinvigorating its partnership with the Navy to address power projection capabilities; integrating tactical aviation with the Navy; and exploring ways for the Marine Corps to work more closely with the Special Operations Community.

General John Jumper, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, discussed Air Force plans for transformation including concept of operations, restructuring and organizational efforts, the acquisition process, and integration and joint operations with the other services as well as with coalition and allied partners. In addition, General Jumper also addressed several specific capabilities that need to be improved including the capacity: to deploy rapidly in support of ground forces; to transport ground forces quickly and efficiently; and to quicken the decision cycle which requires enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection and its rapid dissemination to decision makers.

General John Keane, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, focused on the Army's vision for transformation. General Keane highlighted the objective of coupling the lethality of mechanized forces with the responsiveness/mobility of light forces and emphasized the need for improved joint integration of forces and augmented situational awareness to increase interdiction capabilities. Transformation embraces how the Army will fight, its approach to acquisition planning, and organizational change.

Admiral William Fallon, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, addressed Navy transformation efforts, in particular its blueprint for transformation entitled *Sea Power 21*. This roadmap describes organizational processes that will foster the rapid development and incorporation of new operational concepts and technologies, help define and establish the future Navy workforce, and provide significant cost savings.

Admiral Thomas Collins, USCG, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, discussed Coast Guard transformation objectives and how the events of 9/11 forced it to accelerate existing transformation plans and timelines dramatically. Recently incorporated into the new Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard is responsible for the maritime



component of homeland security including the protection of U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal regions.

Last but not least, the panel members agreed that the key requirement, and challenge, for transformation is to develop capabilities that can both defend the U.S. homeland while projecting force over long distances to defend U.S. interests.

At the heart of this effort is acquisition reform which takes into account doctrine and concepts of operations, i.e., how each of the services will conduct warfare in an integrated manner, jointly with the other services, and frequently as part of a coalition structure that includes the military forces of friends and allies. Before weapons systems can prudently be selected for development and production, the services, panelists agreed, must understand how they will conduct future warfare in combined, joint operations.





Luncheon Address

Mr. Gordon R. England

Challenges for National Security

Mr. Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy

Summary

Several speeches by George W. Bush served as the basis of what would become the 2002 national security strategy of the Bush administration.

In September 1999, speaking at The Citadel, then Governor Bush stated two important facts about creating a new strategic vision for our military: the United States needs to change the way it will conduct warfare and geographical distance no longer means security for the nation.

- No longer can the U.S. afford to deploy military forces overseas without clearly defining national interests. The U.S. military should no longer be utilized as a permanent peacekeeping force where uncertain missions, open-ended military deployments, and ill-defined objectives have, as a result, dangerously overstretched the U.S. military. In the future, U.S. military power must be used more selectively and have clear mission priorities.
- Moreover, countries such as Iraq and North Korea should be warned against sponsoring the use of WMD. Governor Bush stated: “Our

first line of defense is a simple message. Every group or nation must know, if they sponsor such attacks, our response will be devastating.”

- For most of our history, the United States has felt relatively secure behind two great oceans. However, with the spread of weapons technology, geographical distance no longer equates to security. For example, North Korea can reach across oceans to threaten the United States with *Taepo-Dong-2* long-range ballistic missiles.

In June of 2002, President Bush addressed the graduating class at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

- President Bush stated, “Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation for citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”

Following the terrorist attacks, President Bush in a joint session of Congress laid out our new purpose to destroy terrorism by every means necessary, to destroy terrorist networks, and to deprive them of their funding.

- He also declared that, “Every nation in every region has a decision to make: either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”

In September of 2002, the new national security strategy was published. Its three key themes are:

- We will take the fight to the enemy – preemptively if necessary;
- We will fight this war (against terrorism) with our world partners - but we will act alone if required; and,
- We will use all means diplomatic and economic to fight terror – but we will use military methods if that is the final option.

The national security strategy has an emphasis on action. Action is defined as including military, economic, and diplomatic means.

- The president in the national security strategy wrote: “In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”
- Action will be used to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or to our allies and friends. The reasons for action will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

A particularly important concept of the new national security strategy is anticipatory self-defense.

- Preemption, defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law.

- The national security strategy states: “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction, and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”
- The United States will take the appropriate steps of preemptive action by itself, if necessary, against known threats and will no longer wait as danger gathers.

The strategy of anticipatory self-defense is needed at this time in our history. The United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past through the strategies of deterrence and retaliation.

- The national security strategy states: “The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.”
- The United States has an inherent right to take preemptive action against imminent threats. It is hoped such action may be able to prevent another September 11-like attack.
- Defending against enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government.

While providing for the wellbeing of the country, it is necessary to have security for economic development. At the same time, it is also necessary to have economic development for security. They become two sides of the same coin.

- Terrorism has disrupted our way of life. For example, the pair of snipers who terrorized the Maryland and D.C. area had an adverse effect on the local economy. The snipers disrupted peoples’ way of life in such a way where the local populace was afraid to leave their homes. This inevitably harmed the local economy.
- Moreover, one of the objectives of organized terrorism is to disrupt the economic structure of the United States and other free nations around the world. The Western economy is the engine that fuels stability, freedom, and modern change.

The implications of the new national security strategy are wide ranging for both U.S. military and civilian government agencies. Protecting the United States, and all that it represents from the dangers of terrorism, will take time. It will also require commitment and focused leadership over many presidential administrations.

- Sustained, accurate, and actionable intelligence will be required.
- Moreover, it will take speed, agility, and precision of action and decision making throughout all agencies within the U.S. govern-

ment responsible for security to combat the present danger of terrorism.

- The military will need to develop a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States from existing and developing missile threats. The military will also find it necessary to have the ability to make decisions and re-supply its forces more rapidly.
- Clearly, the Department of Homeland Security is also essential in providing security for the nation.

Whether or not the United States requires another National Security Act to replace the National Security act of 1947 is a troubling question. It is my judgment that we are hobbled by a system that is not agile and is not very responsive to the threat of terrorism.

- As the most economically and militarily powerful nation on earth after World War II, the United States bore the primary responsibility of preventing another world war.
- President Truman and his civilian and military leaders were determined to create structures and programs that would guarantee our national security and promote lasting peace.
- The result of their efforts was the National Security Act of 1947.
- Today, however, we face a different threat, and this threat will require an entirely different kind of national security structure.
- If changes are deemed appropriate, then they should be made immediately to ensure the protection of the homeland.

If one looks at the past, our armed interventions in recent history – in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo – were primarily about the freedom of people. Once again, President Bush and the national security strategy have reaffirmed our willingness as a nation to fight for two things: to make Americans safe and to protect the principles we cherish.

- It is necessary to understand that the United States will not fight for land, for money, or simply to impose its will. The United States will fight, however, to keep America intact and free so that future generations of Americans can both realize their dreams and succeed in life.

Analysis

In his luncheon address, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England focused on the new national security strategy. Secretary England noted that the national security strategy has an emphasis on action. Action, defined as being broad based where it includes all means military, economic, and diplomatic, will be used to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends.

Secretary England emphasized that preemption, defined as the anticipatory use of force in self-defense, is a particularly important concept of the new national security strategy. The U.S. government



has an inherent right to take preemptive action against imminent threats. It is hoped such action may be able to prevent another September 11-like attack.

As a result of the proliferation of WMD, the strategy of anticipatory self-defense is needed. The United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have forced a fundamental reshaping of the national security strategy. Secretary England pointed out that how the United States defends the homeland has shifted from a strategy of deterrence to one of preemption.

Secretary England explained that the implications of the new national security strategy are wide ranging on both the U.S. military and civilian government agencies. Protecting the nation from the dangers of terrorism will take time to accomplish. It will take speed, agility, and precision of action and decision making throughout all agencies within the U.S. government responsible for security to combat the present danger of terrorism.

Finally, Secretary England stated that the United States might require a new National Security Act to replace the National Security Act of 1947. If the United States is to succeed in the war against terrorism, it requires a new security structure to organize the nation's various capabilities to combat terrorism effectively.





Keynote Address

Priorities for Military Transformation

Rear Admiral Stanley R. Szemborski, USN, Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Summary

The main impetus for transformation has to do with the challenges posed by today's evolving security environment. As Americans, we have the right and the obligation to protect ourselves and our interests. The events of 9/11 were but one indication of the dangers facing the United States.

To meet the challenges of the emerging security environment, the Department of Defense needs to transform its concepts, forces, processes, and organization.

- We have to do this while at the same time winning the war on terror and maintaining a quality force.
- Currently, the Department of Defense is trying to balance three key goals: winning the war on terror, taking care of its personnel, and transforming our military capabilities.

In an effort to transform the way the Defense Department does business, it has made and is making fundamental changes to its strategy, its force size and construct, the way it plans, and the way it is postured.

- The services have made great strides incorporating some of these transformational concepts, but we still have a long way to go.

There are several important themes that are ingrained within the development of strategy.

- The first theme is surprise and uncertainty. We now have a much less certain future than compared to the relatively static relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union



during the Cold War. This realization led to the conclusion that we need to explore a lighter, more flexible, and agile force with a smaller footprint.

- The second theme is the shift of emphasis to planning based on capabilities. We are making a major effort to understand what capabilities the enemies of the future might have and then to determine where we want to go with our capabilities in order to anticipate them.
- The third theme is managing risk. The goal is to face the problem of managing risk squarely, assess the risks at the strategic level, and rather than burying the assessments down at the bottom, we are consciously bringing those assessments to the top.

We have framed risk into four categories.

- The first is force management, how we recruit, train, and maintain qualified people.
- The second is operational, achieving military objectives in the near term.
- The third is future challenges, including the ability to invest in new capabilities and operational concepts to dissuade and defeat mid- and long-term military threats.
- The final category is institutional, encompassing management practices and controlling our resources effectively.
- The goal of this framework for risk management is to provide tradeoffs for the secretary of defense to consider.

With these themes in mind, a strategic framework was developed built on the following policy goals:

- First, we seek to assure allies and friends of our resolve and steadfastness of purpose to be a reliable security partner.
- The second goal is to dissuade adversaries or would be enemies. We seek to dissuade future military competitors from entering that competition. Dissuasion is part of a multifaceted approach to deterrence. The goal is a capability that is deployed forward, complemented by global intelligence and global strike.

Once the strategic framework was in place, there needed to be a change in the force sizing construct. We needed to execute this strategy.

- Previously, the U.S. sized and shaped and planned for two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.
- However, the new security environment necessitated planning for a wider range of contingencies.
- Previously, the desired end state in both major theater wars was a regime change, or to win decisively. Because of the needs for flexibility and the greater numbers of areas around the world where the United States might have to conduct those operations,



the Department of Defense decided that it must plan for a desired end state that was something less than a regime change and based instead on the need to defeat an enemy as quickly as possible.

The Department of Defense allocated spending in the fiscal year 2003 budget differently than past years in order to facilitate the progress of transformation.

- The war on terror received major increases in funding levels.
- We invested in personnel, putting money towards quality of life measures and a targeted pay raise. We invested in order to attract and keep good personnel. This is a vital part of transformation. The Department of Defense needs to develop a cadre of persons who comprise the information force of the future.
- The Department of Defense also budgeted around eight billion dollars to transform the business practices of the Department.
- The Department of Defense also focused on the need to see, hear, and communicate. As a result, the Department is developing joint war fighting capabilities that will enable it to move enormous quantities of information over long distances and allow for the kind of networked forces that will be the hallmark of the future.

The services have worked very hard in the area of transformation:

- The Navy is experimenting with the notion of expeditionary strike groups.
- The Army is working to develop its next generation force.
- The Air Force is putting major resources into transformational space programs.

The near term priorities of transformation are the four categories of risk previously discussed:

- The first is force management risk, including manning the force. It is necessary to maintain a quality force at a reasonable cost while assuring a sustainable military tempo. The Department of Defense also needs to continue to modernize its infrastructure and facilities, especially those which contribute directly to the readiness of our force and the quality of life for our men and women in uniform and their families.
- In the area of operational risk, homeland defense and the war on terror are clearly the priority. The Department of Defense needs to work on countering the proliferation of WMDs.
- There is also what is called future challenges risk. Investing in science and technology and investing in transformation and capabilities, fostering a spirit of innovation and risk taking and experimenting with new concepts, capabilities, and organizational designs, will yield capabilities, forces, and organizations to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, defeat potential U.S. adversaries.



The Department of Defense has already made some organizational changes to help achieve this goal. For example, the Office of Force Transformation was created in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

- Finally, there is institutional risk. This must be handled carefully because of its impact on the readiness of forces. We need to streamline the decision making process, reform how programs and budgets are prepared, and how new weapons systems are acquired.

As a Department, we need to foster and encourage this kind of thinking that leads to innovation. This encompasses both technical innovation and new thinking on how the technology can be utilized. The Department of Defense has made a good start. However, we have a long way to go.

Analysis

In his address, Rear Admiral Szemborski, USN focused on the need to transform the Department of Defense's concepts, capabilities, forces, processes, and organization. In an effort to transform the way the Department of Defense does business, it has made, and continues to make, fundamental changes to its strategy, its force size, the way it plans, and the way it is postured.

Rear Admiral Szemborski discussed a number of important themes that shape the development of strategy. Surprise and uncertainty, the need for a capabilities based strategy, and managing risk have been incorporated within the U.S. national security strategy.

Rear Admiral Szemborski pointed out that certain risks are inherent in developing and transforming the nation's strategy in an evolving security environment. To illustrate this point, he placed risk into four categories: force management, operational, future, and institutional risks. He then explained that facing the problem of managing risk allows for a proper assessment of potential risks as the essential precondition for developing military strategy. Rear Admiral Szemborski emphasized that with these themes in mind, a strategic framework can be developed.

Rear Admiral Szemborski suggested that once the framework was in place, there needed to be a change in the force sizing construct. He pointed out that previously the United States sized and shaped and planned for two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. However, the new security environment of today necessitated planning for a wider range of contingencies.





Dr. William Schneider, Mr. Terry Pudas, Vice Admiral John A. Lockard, USN (Ret.)

Resourcing a National Security Strategy

Panelists

Moderator: **Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis**

Implementing Military Transformation

Mr. Terry Pudas, Deputy Director, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense

Technology Concepts to Support Transformation

Dr. William Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board, Department of Defense

Preventing Built-in Technology Lag in Acquisition

Vice Admiral John A. Lockard, USN (Ret.), Senior Vice President - Naval Systems, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems

Panel Charter

As the United States implements the new national security strategy and transforms its military forces, important resource issues must be addressed. They include not only the establishment of resourcing priorities for military forces and timelines for achieving necessary change, but also the formulation of innovative strategies to develop needed capabilities. How to build the forces of the future poses numerous challenges and opportunities for the United States. The challenges encompass the levels of resources and funding timelines as well as efforts to shorten the lead time from design phase to the deployment stage. Given the rapid and accelerating pace of technological innova-

tion in the civilian sector, the need to move rapidly from innovation to production will pose a growing challenge for defense systems. How well such issues are addressed will decisively shape the outcome of transformation efforts within the new national security strategy. As we resource it, the new national security strategy will be tested and adapted in light of the emerging security setting and its challenges in the years ahead. The protracted war against terrorism, together with responses to the security threats, will provide important opportunities for innovation, agility, and the development and deployment of new military systems. At the same time the United States will need to train and equip a new generation of military forces to operate in the emerging security setting.

As we transform our military forces to support the new national security strategy, major investment will need to be made in personnel and equipment – training and hardware. There will be new requirements for the development of necessary human resources and technologies based on continuing innovation. Resourcing a new national security strategy will require changes not only in training but also in how we develop new leaders. The success of such efforts will depend on numerous factors, not the least of which is the ability of the public and private sectors – government and industry – to forge a creative and sustained partnership. Throughout our history, but especially in the past century, the ability of the defense industry to develop and produce new capabilities in a timely fashion has been indispensable to the success of U.S. military forces in the field. Among the issues to be addressed is how to streamline the acquisition process and alleviate problems of technology lag to support transformation. In this endeavor the experience of the private sector should be examined and assessed for its potential applicability to defense acquisition.

Discussion Points

- What are the key resources that will be needed to support the new national security strategy?
- How can military transformation most effectively be resourced? What are the funding requirements?
- What are the key technology concepts that will be needed to support military transformation and how can they best be prioritized and resourced?
- How can defense-related research, development, testing, and evaluation be conducted to maximize efficiency without compromising the exploitation of tomorrow's technologies?
- How can built-in technology lag in the defense acquisition process be shortened? How do the competing interests and approaches of the private and public sectors affect this process?

- What is the impact on overall military readiness of the ongoing war on terrorism? How will this evolve in a protracted campaign?
- What additional resources will be needed as a result of the war against terrorism?

Summary

Mr. Terry Pudas, Deputy Director, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense

Transformation is not about predicting the future, and then building toward it. To the contrary, transformation relates to creating and anticipating the future. The United States today cannot be prepared to do everything at all times around the globe. U.S. military planners must make well-considered investments in specific capabilities and technologies that will help influence and determine the shape of the future security environment. However, an effective transformation paradigm is more than selecting capabilities and technologies. It also encompasses the co-evolution of concepts of operations, processes, and organizations, together with the appropriate capabilities and technology.

- Transformation can be viewed in three separate but related categories: 1) defense and national security; 2) the management of defense, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Review (JROC) process, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the acquisition process, and personnel management; and, 3) the force structure.
- To be truly effective, transformation must be raised to the level of strategy. A comprehensive approach to transformation must be designed, implemented, tested, and refined as necessary.
- Transformation includes new competitive areas and competencies incorporating fundamental shifts in underlying principles. For example:
 - Demassification, the separation of combat power from mass, by substituting information for mass;
 - Decoupling payload fraction in ships from displacement due to the use of new, lighter, materials;
 - Better utilization of information technologies to garner a unique competitive advantage;
 - The Global Positioning System or GPS, which provides precise timing and pinpoint navigation, is an example of a truly transformational capability.
- Changing the culture/ethos of an organization is a critical element in implementing a transformation strategy
 - Create incentives for new behavior, informed risk taking, and innovation.

Even though the U.S. military is indisputably the most capable in the world, its force structure must continue to change if we are to meet the security needs of the early-twenty-first century.

- The United States faces a highly competitive environment. It has enemies who have unambiguously demonstrated their willingness to attack U.S. interests both at home and abroad.
- If the United States does not implement a cohesive, comprehensive strategy of transformation it will stagnate, becoming a strategic fixed target, increasingly at risk to emerging and existing threats.
 - The new technology context creates falling barriers and easier access to advanced technologies including high-quality information technology (IT) to a growing range of actors and states prepared to utilize them against the United States.
- The U.S. military must transform itself to the information age by developing network-centric operations.

Key components of transformation involve:

- Broadening the capabilities base which includes the operational base, the technical base, and the industrial base;
- Revaluing key attributes for the information age;
- Significantly decreasing the capabilities cycle time from initial concept to actual deployment;
- Information superiority; and,
- Speed of command and decision-making
 - Access to information and shared awareness enables dispersed forces, demassification, i.e., substituting information for mass while at the same time maintaining potent lethality.

A distinctly American way of war will emerge from this transformation process encompassing a force structure that is more expeditionary in nature, lighter, more lethal, increasingly networked and more interoperable at the Joint Task Force level. Before this becomes a reality, however, the following capabilities must come to fruition:

- Interoperability needs to extend to the tactical level.
- The range or reach of sensors must be expanded because in most cases U.S. forces can shoot farther than they can see.
 - Unmanned aerial vehicles (armed or unarmed) are one of several possible solutions to this problem.
- Modular, plug-and-play systems will provide precision effects and heightened lethality.

Transformation requires modernization but not the wholesale jettisoning of all, or even most, of the current systems in the inventory. Meaningful transformational results can be produced by changing as little as 12 percent to 15 percent of the force structure. DOD's new

Office of Force Transformation focuses on significant new capabilities and new rule sets.

- New capabilities include:
 - Speed of light weapons which would make an airplane or ballistic missile appear as a fixed target
 - Robotics
- Rule sets to help determine whether or not a particular capability is really transformational and thus should be explored or fielded include the following types of questions:
 - Do falling barriers to competition re-establish a leadership position and lock out competition? Do they dramatically increase the speed of organization, deployment, employment and help sustain it?
 - Will a particular technology/capability leverage U.S. advantages of command and control, logistics, deployment, and medical treatment? And does the acquisition strategy dramatically reduce system cycle time?
 - Is the system operating at decreasing rates of return on investment? Is this a skip-a-generation candidate or not? What risks are involved in selecting a skip-a-generation system?
 - Will the new capability be less expensive to counter the system it is designed against or is the new capability on the wrong side of the cost technology curve?

Dr. William Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board,
Department of Defense

There are numerous ideas and theories germane to the impact of technical choices on the success or failure of transformation. However, four hypotheses appear to be especially important:

- The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the liberalization of commerce and advanced technology that followed made threat-based planning impractical and necessitated transition to a capabilities-based planning model;
- Over the past decade or more, enabling technology for advanced military capabilities has emanated primarily from the private/civil sector not from the defense sector;
- The inability to have forces optimized against a specific threat that is characteristic of the twenty-first century security environment necessitates that the U.S. force structure must be extremely flexible. It also suggests that U.S. forces require reconfiguration – not recapitalization – in order to cope with the threat; and,
- The requirement for transformation is comprehensive encompassing more than weapon modernization. Perhaps as importantly, it includes new concepts of operation, greater support for forces, and



improved business practices to allow for more effective resource management by the Defense Department.

At the heart of trying to understand the circumstances that will transform military capabilities is the identification of those capabilities that enable new concepts of operations allowing for a fundamental change from the past.

- Such change will facilitate selection of technologies making possible not just information superiority, but also decision superiority.
- It will permit application of that information in abbreviated cycle times providing a decisive advantage.
- It will also allow for the ability to conduct precision strikes independent of range which are undertaken in the context of an integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system with joint networked forces.

If the United States is to understand the array of technology opportunities that will permit the development of transformed forces several techniques need to be introduced to bring the necessary technologies to bear on the problem.

- In this regard, perhaps the most important technique to decrease the cycle time in the development of a weapon system is to make focused research and development (R&D) investments directed solely to the capabilities that are considered necessary. This approach will avoid broad-based, non-specific system R&D which diverts resources and severely inhibits the ability to produce transformational capabilities.
- The Defense Department must also seek out more actively key enabling technologies and engineering/integration expertise that are increasingly located in the civil/private sector. Legal, administrative, and cultural constraints must be minimized and/or eliminated for this to occur. The critical skills required are less and less the technologies themselves, but rather the systems engineering and systems integration know-how which facilitates the incorporation of advanced technologies into top-quality military systems.
- As one part of our recapitalization efforts, U.S. defense planners should focus on weapons system upgrades and modifications that incorporate truly evolutionary, transformative technologies. Acquisition officials must be given the authority to redirect resources to support such evolutionary development.
 - The approach utilized in the U.S. missile defense program may serve as a useful model. For example, when missile defense technologies and concepts demonstrate their feasibility, they are deployed in limited numbers with operating forces to test



and confirm their potential in the field. If proven successful they advance to ensuing rounds of development.

- Escalating support costs are beginning to undermine our ability to incorporate advanced technology effectively into modern, high-performance weapon systems. Consequently, the reduction of support costs must be established as an essential – and quantifiable – criteria at the onset of the R&D process.

Vice Admiral John A. Lockard, USN (Ret.), Senior Vice President
- Naval Systems, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems

Several factors should be considered when attempting to address the daunting problem of preventing or significantly curtailing built-in technology lag during the acquisition process. First, incorporate the concept of design for change. Second, selective targeting of technology should be incorporated into a system. Third, seriously consider adopting the concept of adaptive acquisition.

- *Design for change* refers to the inclusion of a specific requirement for change in the design and initial stages of a system's development. The design for change requirement would ensure that a complex weapons system and the associated technologies and design will be better able to accommodate modifications/changes as it evolves without significantly adding to cost and time. This would entail an open architecture and modular design approach so that design/technology changes could be more readily and cost-effectively undertaken.
 - A key element in design for change is the idea of an open architecture. Because the architecture would be non-proprietary, based on a known and promulgated standard, modular design, (i.e., not unique), it would allow the best innovations and technologies from many quarters to be incorporated more readily into the system. Either industry or the government could define the actual open architecture for each system.
 - Because they would be based on standards and specifications that would be made known, open architectures would likely reduce cycle times and costs considerably.
- *Selective targeting of technology* relates to the notion that examining a system during a complex simulation or set of experiments will allow planners to assess technologies more precisely in order to identify the most effective areas to target for change and for specific technology insertion.
 - *Selective targeting of technology* has been utilized in the area of precision engagement where the effects cycle was assessed, and in the decision making process itself where simulations provided valuable data to facilitate informed choices on technology investments.

- *Adaptive acquisition* encompasses the idea that complexity and risk can be managed in the context of the current procurement process. Adaptive acquisition also suggests that a serialized approach to procurement is not necessary, that acquisition officials and industry can be much more flexible and innovative in applying procurement rules and regulations. The acquisition community can abide by the existing set of rules but still be creative enough to adjust them to the specific requirements of the system under development. Such a process would go a long way toward reducing the system development time cycle and preventing unwanted acquisition lag.
 - The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) is a good illustration of how flexible, adaptive acquisition procedures exercised in its design and procurement resulted in a quantum capability improvement over what was anticipated.
 - The private commercial sector that works outside the defense establishment is characterized by a culture that rewards flexibility, agility, and innovation in procurement. Embracing such practices would serve the defense sector well.

Analysis

This session examined the issue of resourcing military transformation. Panel members included government officials and a representative from the defense industry who made presentations and fielded questions on approaches to the implementation of transformation; technology and related concepts to support an effective transformation strategy; differences between the procurement culture in the private/commercial sector and the defense establishment and how they may affect transformation; and methods to reduce, if not fully prevent, built-in technology lag and escalating weapon procurement costs.

Mr. Terry Pudas, Deputy Director, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, argued that military officials must identify specific technologies/capabilities for resourcing that hold the promise of actually shaping the coming security environment. Transformation must encompass more than just technology and capabilities. It also needs to address the closely connected issues of concepts of operations, processes, and organizations. Moreover, to be successful transformation should be elevated to the level of strategy which includes the development of a comprehensive plan and implementation milestones.

Dr. William Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board, Department of Defense, opened his presentation by setting forth four key ideas central to the success or failure of transformation: the transition to a capabilities-based planning model following the Cold War; advanced technology which now originates primarily from the private/civil sec-

tor; a capabilities-based planning model that places a premium on a U.S. force structure configured for flexibility and agility capable of responding to a diverse set of threats; and transformation is a phenomenon that encompasses more than weapon modernization. To be truly comprehensive transformation must include new and unique concepts of operation, improved support for forces, and cutting-edge best business practices to allow for more effective Defense Department resource management.

Indeed, central to a successful transformation process is the need to identify and understand the capabilities and technologies that will allow for development of new concepts of operations leading to fundamental, transformational change from the past. The results of such change will be realized in particular in the areas of information superiority, reduced decision-making cycles, and greatly enhanced precision strikes.

In his presentation, Vice Admiral John A. Lockard, USN (Ret.), Senior Vice President - Naval Systems, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, outlined three critical factors for consideration to help curtail built-in technology lag during the acquisition process: design for change; selective targeting of technology; and, adaptive acquisition. Design for change refers to the inclusion of a specific requirement for possible changes/modifications upfront, in the design and initial stages of a system's development. The design for change requirement would ensure that as a complex weapon system (and the associated technologies) evolve it will be better able to accommodate modifications/changes without significantly adding to cost and time. A key element in design for change is the idea of an open architecture based on a widely disseminated, known standard, a modular design, (i.e., not unique), which would allow the best innovations and technologies to be incorporated more easily into the system.

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis



Selective targeting of technology relates to the notion that examining a system during a complex simulation or set of experiments will allow planners to measure technologies quantifiably helping them identify the most effective areas to target for change and for specific technology insertion. Adaptive acquisition also encompasses the idea that complexity and risk can be managed in the context of the current procurement process. For example, acquisition officials and industry can be much more flexible and innovative in applying existing procurement rules and regulations but still creative enough to adjust them to the specific requirements of the system under development. Such a process would result in significant reduction of the cycle time for system development and help curb unwanted acquisition lag.

Several consistent themes surfaced from the presentations and discussion. First, a consensus emerged among all panel members concerning the importance of instituting culture change within the defense procurement establishment. Modifying the culture and ethos of an organization is a crucial component for enacting a successful transformation strategy. This requires establishing clear incentives for changed behavior such as prudent risk taking and innovation. In addition, while statutory changes to procurement rules may be desirable in some cases, a great deal of progress in improving the acquisition process can be made under the current framework. For example, there is sufficient flexibility in the existing rules and regulations for procurement officials and industry representatives to incorporate innovative approaches. In this regard, the defense industry should look to the best practices of the private commercial sector which is characterized by a culture that rewards flexibility, agility, and innovation in procurement. Greater adoption of such traits would serve the defense sector well.

Panelists also agreed that if the United States hopes to develop the type of force structure necessary to meet the demands of the twenty-first century the time it takes to bring a weapon system from the drawing board to deployment in the field, i.e., the cycle time, must be reduced significantly. One approach proposed is to focus research and development (R&D) investments on those capabilities that are identified as crucial to the system. This approach will help minimize broad-based R&D which can produce the unwanted effect of diverting monetary resources, consuming time, and most importantly, significantly impeding the development of a transformed force structure.

Finally, panelists concurred that military planners must take concrete steps to cut the rapidly rising support costs of modern weapons systems. One proposed solution to this problem is to establish the reduction of support costs as an important and quantifiable design/production criterion at the outset of an R&D program.





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