Organized and Co-sponsored by:
The Defence Analyses Institute of the
Hellenic Ministry of National Defense
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
The Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
A New NATO, Euro-Atlantic Security, and the Greek-American Partnership

As NATO marks its sixtieth anniversary, it faces enduring questions about strategic focus, operational priorities, military requirements, and collaborative ties with partner nations and other international institutions. Some of these questions were addressed at the NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl. However, a broader and ongoing dialogue will be essential as the Alliance moves forward in the years ahead. As a contribution to that process, the Defense Analysis Institute of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, the Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) with official NATO sponsorship convened a high-level conference in Washington, D.C. on April 28-29, 2009, on the topic A New NATO, Euro-Atlantic Security, and the Greek-American Partnership. Coming just after the Strasbourg-Kehl summit and during the first 100 days of the Obama administration, this meeting provided a unique and timely opportunity to take stock of what was achieved at the summit, what needs to be done going forward, and what the implications are for transatlantic security. Within this broader context, the meeting also focused on strategic developments in and beyond Southeastern Europe and on the key roles that Greece and the Greek-American partnership can play to help ensure stability and prosperity in this critical region. Such a focus was both warranted and necessary as NATO and its members ponder how best to dampen ongoing regional tensions and the Alliance envisions further enlargement.

As NATO charts a path ahead on these fronts, there is much that Greece can contribute to the process, based on lessons learned from its own return to democracy in 1974 under the leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis and its reintegration into the Alliance’s military command in 1980 and entry into the European Union in 1981.

Participants in the conference included senior policymakers and experts from both sides of the Atlantic, and from NATO. The conference helped us identify ways to build wider Alliance consensus on the strategic objectives, operational focus, and potential organizational adjustment of the “new NATO” now taking shape.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.  Dr. Dimitris Keridis
President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis  The Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation
Welcoming Remarks

It gives me particular pleasure to welcome you to the international conference convened by the Institute of Defense Analysis of Greece and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, under the joint auspices of the Ministry of National Defense of Greece and NATO, with the help of the Karamanlis Foundation. This is primarily because of the scope and ambition of the whole project that, while it was long in the making, it takes place today at a crucial moment for the Atlantic community and the Greek-American partnership.

The successful visit of President Obama to Europe holds the promise of renewal for our trans-Atlantic bonds, as both Europe and the United States are faced with common challenges that require coordination and cooperation at many fronts.

I am one of those who believe strongly that no other relationship matters more for world stability and prosperity than ours. This relationship has been successfully institutionalized through NATO but needs expanding beyond the realm of security to incorporate all the issues of significance our societies are concerned with.

Within this larger framework my country, Greece, by virtue of its geographical position and history, finds itself at the center of all major debates of our day, including enlarging, deepening and adapting our institutions to the changing times while confronting new threats coming from terrorism, ethno-religious extremism, organized crime, the proliferation of WMD and environmental degradation to name just a few.

The United States and Greece share a strong commonality of values and interests. As the “strongest” and the “oldest” democracy in the world, we are both freedom-loving, independent-minded, entrepreneurial and mercantile peoples. It is no coincidence that your founding fathers were inspired by classical Hellas and ours by your revolution. The United States was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Greece after the breaking of our national revolution in 1821. Our two nations have fought side by side in all major conflicts that have shook and shaped the 20th century, including the First and Second World War, the Korean War, the Cold War and, today, our forces work together in fronts as far apart as those in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Some cynics might be quick to point to what is often perceived as the anti-Americanism of many Greeks. I beg to differ: my view is that the strong feelings many of my compatriots feel about the United States prove the important role that the Greek-American relationship has played in shaping post-war Greece and its region and the continued strength of the bonds between our two nations.

Indeed, the United States provided both the security and the much needed financial and technological resources for Greece’s postwar spectacular development through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Obviously, one can point to unhappy episodes in this long history, but what counts and should not be underestimated is the fundamental strategic choice involved: if Greece is today a leader in Southeastern Europe thanks to its well-established democracy, prosperous economy and place at the center of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, it is, to a large extent, because of the Greek-American partnership.

This is a partnership that has evolved over time as Greece is no longer dependent on U.S. aid but has become a donor country itself while welcoming hundreds of thousands of foreign immigrants and investing heavily abroad. It is the responsibility of today’s leaders on both sides to cultivate, adapt and expand this partnership in the new times. For this reason, initiatives such as this conference are essential.
and much needed. It is here today where politicians and thinkers are brought together in a constructive trans-atlantic dialogue to expand what unites us and confront, in order to bridge, what divides us.

I represent the foundation that is committed to the preservation and promotion of the legacy of Greece’s leading statesman, my uncle, Konstantinos Karamanlis. In his long political career Karamanlis had a chance to meet and build strong relations with many U.S. Presidents. He firmly believed in the Western orientation of Greece and defended his policy even when many of his countrymen felt betrayed by the absence of Western solidarity against Turkish aggression.

He was, as we ourselves continue to be, enchanted by the dynamism and creativity of the American society. Nowhere is this creativity more pronounced than in America’s leading universities. I happen to know, because I, like so many of my fellow Greeks, studied here. And it is here, at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, that our foundation established a chair, where five eminent Greek scholars have so far taught, in memory of Karamanlis and for the promotion of the Greek-American partnership in higher education.

Thus, we at the Karamanlis Foundation remain committed to the deepening of the Greek-U.S. relations and we lend our full support for initiatives such as this meeting today that promise to further enhance them.

I take this opportunity to thank all the co-organizers for their superb work and for bringing all of us here today. I would like in particular to thank all the speakers who agreed to share their experience and wisdom with us. In particular, I thank the minister of national defense of Greece, Mr. Evangelos Meimarakis, for honoring us by offering the key-note address last night. I conclude by wishing you a very productive meeting.

Kostas Karamanlis
Member of the Board of the Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation,
Member of the Board of International Overseers of The Fletcher School, Tufts University
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NATO after Strasbourg-Kehl

The April 3-4, 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl 60th Anniversary Summit constituted more than a celebration of NATO’s past successes. Several events preceded the summit that helped shape the agenda. Estonia, a NATO member, had fallen victim to a barrage of cyber attacks in 2007 which led to the creation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in May 2008. Russia invaded Georgia, a nation then implementing NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), later that same year. In early 2009, President Nikolas Sarkozy declared that France would rejoin NATO’s military command and full reintegration into the organization. With its reintegration into NATO’s command structure at the Summit, France ended more than four decades of self-exclusion. Finally, just days before the Summit, NATO welcomed two new members, Albania and Croatia.

The above list represents only a sampling of the complex issues and new strategic realities that NATO must address as it defines its 21st century role. The Summit produced several accomplishments that will help shape NATO’s future.

- NATO adopted the Declaration on Alliance Security, which will serve as the foundation for the new Strategic Concept.
- NATO also addressed concerns expressed by the United States regarding the ongoing multinational operation in Afghanistan.
  - The United States requested NATO member support for Afghan elections.
  - The expansion and increase in the trust fund established for the Afghan army.
  - Enhancing NATO contributions to Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT).
  - NATO members agreed, in principle, to establish a NATO training mission in Afghanistan focusing on the Afghan police force.

A New Strategic Concept for NATO

With NATO having called for a new Strategic Concept at Strasbourg-Kehl, the Concept was a core issue discussed at the April 28-29, 2009 Conference. The present strategic concept was adopted in 1999. Understandably, it fails to account for the new 21st century realities facing NATO. For example, the 1999 Strategic Concept was based on an alliance that included sixteen members. However, even before the 1999 Strategic Concept was officially adopted, three additional members, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, had been admitted in early 1999. Since the concept’s adoption, NATO has increased its membership to twenty-eight states. Also, the 1999 Strategic Concept focused on Europe and a Euro-centric alliance. Thus, NATO did not adequately account for the new conflict centers outside Europe or the Alliance’s increased involvement in out of area operations.

Several participants noted that NATO has always adapted to new security considerations and strategic realities. For example, in 1991 NATO produced a strategic concept that targeted democratic reform and peaceful relations with former Warsaw Pact countries following the collapse of communist governments. NATO’s operations in Afghanistan offer another example. Immediately after the attacks on September 11th, NATO for the first time invoked Article 5 in support of the United States. NATO engaged militarily for the first time in the 1990s with the breakup of Yugoslavia. Thus NATO has already shown flexibility to adapt to the transformed post Cold War security setting.

In an attempt to identify the key points that a new Strategic Concept must address, participants discussed a range of issues and security threats that NATO members will likely face as the century progresses and that NATO as an institution, under its current operational doctrine and capabilities, remains ill equipped to meet. Participants agreed on several general subject areas and critical questions that should guide the authors of the new Strategic Concept and frame NATO’s mandate in the years ahead.
• NATO must accurately identify the range of issues that threaten security and stability if it is to be seen as relevant today.
  › In order for NATO to move forward with a new Strategic Concept, its members must have a common understanding of threats.
  › NATO must also examine its place in the new geopolitical structure, which contains a growing number of states and non-state actors capable of influencing global security conditions.

• In light of the new strategic environment, Conference participants agreed that NATO must consider the meaning of Article 5 when structuring the new Strategic Concept. How should NATO address new threats such as cyber security and energy security? What does Article 5 mean in an era of terrorist threats?
  › Participants agreed that Article 5 remains NATO’s foundation as the basis for collective defense and Alliance cohesion.
  › As threats to member security and stability drift further from NATO territorial defense, the new Strategic Concept needs to define the extent to which NATO is willing to engage in out of area operations and the scope of such engagements.
    » The new Strategic Concept needs to strike a balance between the institution’s core missions and the increase in demand for expeditionary operations. In the current environment, adequate territorial defense requires a greater expeditionary component.
    » Performing out of area operations will require NATO to accelerate its military transformation so that capabilities will match requirements. European forces must bridge the technological and operational gap with their American counterparts.
      » If they are to enhance military capabilities, NATO members will have to come to grips with the implications of decreases in defense spending.
  › Greece remains committed to the principles of Article 5 and supports the reaffirmation of its core missions in the new Strategic Concept.
  › NATO needs to establish a clear doctrine detailing its nuclear deterrence strategy as it relates to overall strategy and the Article 5 commitment.
  › Similarly, NATO must chart a clear course regarding its missile defense strategy. What will NATO’s missile defense role be in protection of population and territories as well as deployed military forces?

• A new Strategic Concept must demonstrate how NATO will employ a comprehensive approach that utilizes but goes beyond military force to address complex conflicts and security issues. Solutions increasingly require a broad range of instruments, including economic development and diplomatic initiatives.
  › Afghanistan offers one example where the mission requires a synchronization of military, political, economic, and diplomatic tools.
  › The new Strategic Concept will need to describe NATO’s function within a comprehensive approach that includes institutional cooperation with the EU.

• Conference participants agreed that NATO enlargement has emerged as an instrument that encourages democratic reform and political stabilization. Like the representatives at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, participants emphasized the importance of NATO expansion because of its ability to reduce the possibility of large-scale war on the European continent.
Increasing NATO membership represents only one area of institutional expansion discussed during the Conference. NATO maintains several programs that promote relationships with at least 40 nations and multinational organizations. Additionally, other multinational organizations, such as the African Union (AU), have approached NATO in hopes of establishing a more structured relationship. Several participants recommended that NATO further cultivate these relationships.

The issue of enlargement brings Russia’s security perceptions into focus. Russia opposes NATO’s eastward expansion. When addressing enlargement in the new Strategic Concept, the Alliance needs to formulate a clear and unified policy of engagement towards Russia without compromising the interests of NATO members and states that seek eventual NATO membership or looser associations.

- Enlargement has added to already cumbersome decision-making processes. Administratively, NATO Headquarters is in need of reform. The new Strategic Concept must strike a balance between the merits of consensus and the need for efficiency and greater transparency.
  - Several participants proposed eliminating the need for consensus in the decision-making process. However, other conference participants rejected this suggestion, making the case that the elimination of consensus-driven decisions would reduce the sense of ownership.
  - Without a sense of ownership, NATO cannot assume that its members will appropriately share the burdens and risks. Politicians in many Allied nations are finding it harder to convince public opinion and each respective parliament to approve higher defense spending, costly and dangerous out of area operations, and defense transformation.
  - One participant pointed out that NATO must remain an alliance of sovereign nations and not merely a corporate entity that requires more efficient management practices.

- Participants also considered the process of creating and implementing the new Strategic Concept. Should the process involve a fairly small, elite group or should the process be open to many participants? The successful integration of a new Strategic Concept will require substantial public support leading several participants to recommend the adoption of a public process.

The 21st Century Security Landscape
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the question of NATO’s relevancy has repeatedly surfaced. Although policymakers have been discussing this issue for nearly two decades, the question is unresolved.

- In order for NATO to remain relevant in the years ahead, it is obvious that NATO must account for the changing nature of security threats. NATO members face a diverse set of threats, such as international terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, organized criminal networks, systemic corruption, the collapse of the state system in certain regions of the world, illegal immigration and the radicalization of immigrant populations, cyber warfare, and energy security.
  - Illegal immigration and the radicalization of immigrant populations illustrate the complex realities of the new security environment that are often described as unconventional.
According to one participant, immigrants arriving after the Cold War now compose at least 10% of the Greek population. Many of the immigrants have come from the Balkans, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Other European countries have already experienced the consequences resulting from unchecked immigration, notably high crime and Islamic radicalization.

There was general agreement amongst participants that illegal immigration and the radicalization of marginalized groups have serious security implications for NATO members and Europe.

- Although NATO’s original mission focused on external physical threats to its members, the growing interdependence that characterizes the international environment forces NATO to reexamine the scope of its mission.
- As NATO’s portfolio expands to accommodate 21st century security challenges, the Alliance must also come to terms with emerging power centers such as China and India, as well as Russia, and develop a strategy for dealing with them as they become more assertive.

There was general agreement amongst conference participants that NATO can serve an important role in meeting these new security challenges. One participant stated that cooperation remains as crucial for future success as it had proved to be for NATO’s territorial defense.

- For Europe, that means a strong EU with a common defense policy. NATO must increase its cooperation with the EU and other institutions, such as the OSCE, and fully embrace and institutionalize the comprehensive approach.
- Greece is uniquely positioned to assume a leadership role in addressing many of the challenges the Alliance faces.
  - Due to its unique historical and geographical position, Greece maintains close links with its immediate neighbors as well as the greater Mediterranean and Middle East regions.
  - Greece already participates in many international security efforts from Kosovo to Bosnia, from combating international terrorism in the Persian Gulf to taking part in the international mission against piracy off the coast of Somalia. Through its membership in NATO and OSCE chairmanship, both Greek and American participants asserted that Greece is ready to promote the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and its role in enhancing security not only in Europe, but also worldwide.
  - Greece can also play a critical role in fulfilling Europe’s energy security needs. Greece, through the Brugas-Alexandroupoli pipeline and other energy projects such as the South Stream gas pipeline, will play a major role in solving future energy security dilemmas.

Managing Relations with Russia

As NATO looks to respond to the 21st century security landscape by developing and adopting a new Strategic Concept, managing Russian relations emerges as a critical piece of future strategic planning. Europe felt the consequences of a more assertive Russia during the series of energy disputes between Russia and the Ukraine. As Russia withheld energy supplies from an energy-dependent continent, Europe realized the power Russia possessed as long as Moscow maintained its position as Europe’s dominant energy supplier. The energy crisis as well as Russia’s incursion into Georgia also exposed Europe’s lack of preparedness to deal with Moscow’s growing ambitions.

The theme of NATO-Russia relations recurred throughout the conference, as participants examined Russia’s political and military resurgence as well as its opposition to NATO expansion.
A participant experienced in Russian relations offered a candid overview of the state of Euro-Atlantic-Russia relations and the prospects for future cooperation. Despite substantial efforts both the United States and Russia have failed to achieve what they publicly profess as their goals. In a speech delivered at the National Defense University, President George W. Bush called for a new strategic relationship, exploiting the historic opportunities that surfaced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite such a declaration, the Bush administration failed to build a constructive strategic partnership.

During the April 2009 meeting between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev in London, President Obama reaffirmed the principles laid forth by President Bush eight years before. The joint statement calls for cooperation in the areas of strategic offensive arms, missile defense, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, securing nuclear materials, facilitating and managing the expansion of nuclear energy, as well as addressing other areas of cooperation.

The prospect of constructing a positive framework for strategic cooperation relies on the state of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. Although we have seen some progress on important issues, such as combating nuclear terrorism, the U.S. and Russia hold diverging views on other strategic concerns.

- Russia opposes U.S. expansion of missile defenses, especially the deployment of interceptors and/or radar in Eastern Europe.
- From one U.S. perspective, the downward trend of U.S.-Russia relations in the past decade can be attributed largely to Russia’s actions, although the Obama administration is attempting to “reset” the relationship with Moscow.
  - Russia has directly threatened its neighbors in response to emerging realities in the 21st century European security landscape.
  - Maintaining a dominant position in Europe’s energy market has enabled Russia to use energy as leverage during negotiations with European countries.
  - Russia continues to supply states hostile to U.S. and NATO interests, such as Iran, with advanced conventional weapons.
  - Russia continues to play a critical role in Iran’s nuclear development program.
- Emphasizing arms control negotiation as a basis for bilateral relations also remains a point of concern and potential pitfall. Russia pursues such negotiations for the benefit of the political prestige that arms control negotiations confer on a country negotiating as an equal with the United States. Russia is not entering into arms control negotiations, particularly negotiations on nuclear weapons, to lead us to a world free of nuclear weapons. Russia very much values its nuclear weapons.

Despite the challenges, the United States, NATO, and Russia can further cooperation on a number of issues. The United States, NATO and Russia can work together in the context of the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism, which is a U.S./Russian-led effort, to improve information sharing, law enforcement, forensics, and other issues one needs to deal with concerning nuclear terrorism. The United States can also partner with Russia in a way that demonstrates to others that the expansion of nuclear energy should be done in such a way that does not lead to the further spread of the sensitive technologies associated with enrichment and reprocessing.

Another participant surveyed the differences between the Obama administration and that of President Bush. Every American president has always thought that he had the potential for sustaining a good
personal relationship with the Russians, and that somehow the existence of such a connection will make
a difference. According to the participant, President Obama does not subscribe to that notion and will
instead rely more heavily upon benchmarks.

- Contextually, the Obama administration finds itself in a very different operating environ-
ment.
  - Oil prices, the source of Russia’s economic and political resurgence, have dropped
precipitously over the past year.
  - The global financial crisis accompanied the decrease in energy prices. Russia, having
once felt immune to the shocks in the global markets, realizes that it too has to deal
with difficult economic issues both nationally and internationally.
    - Russia’s new economic awakening and the possibility of reducing Europe’s
dependence on Russian energy supplies may open a door for future NATO
and U.S.-Russia dialogues.
    - The participant stated that even though the previous administration pur-
sued a two plus two (secretaries of defense and state) diplomatic strategy,
there was little high-level economic discussion.
NATO and the EU as Actors of Stability and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe and the Wider Region

Prospects for closer NATO-EU cooperation and a broader comprehensive approach-strategy

To meet the challenges of the transformed security setting in the 21st century, conference participants agreed that NATO and the EU must improve their capacity for cooperation. Participants were quick to highlight that NATO’s actions in Southeastern Europe, while working jointly with partner nations and institutions, helped bring stability to a troubled region, NATO membership to some of the countries, NATO partnership ties with all of them, and prospective EU membership for most of the countries.

- In order to facilitate NATO-EU cooperation, NATO convenes select committees with EU participation. However, these committees remain largely ineffectual. One participant suggested that both NATO and the EU must transcend the institutional boundaries that continue to impede effective collaboration.
- Much of EU military planning for European security and defense policy occurs in NATO Headquarters where a great deal of interaction between low level military commanders already exists. However, political considerations often stifle any chance for real cooperation and dialogue.
- Participants agreed that NATO and the EU must streamline decision making processes, improve military coordination, and achieve greater transparency.
  - Maritime security operations serve as examples of poor resource allocation, a by-product of encumbered decision making and a lack of effective communication. More often than not, the same nations that provide ships for EU anti-piracy missions also provide assets for NATO anti-piracy operations in the same region, thereby generating a costly overlap of forces.
  - A defense official representing a NATO member state explained that ships belonging to NATO or EU members often find themselves operating under different commands and differing rules of engagement.
  - Many participants, frustrated with low levels of NATO-EU communication and coordination, placed the blame primarily on the EU and its lack of transparency. One participant attempted to balance the criticism by reminding his colleagues of the following:
    - EU’s counter-piracy operations preceded such NATO operations. The rules of engagement adopted by the EU for Operation Atalanta are more robust than the rules of engagement used by NATO SNMG (Standing NATO Maritime Group).
    - The EU remains actively involved in the Middle East and Iran. The EU is also much more operationally engaged in Africa than NATO.
- The United States and NATO are quite responsive to furthering cooperation with the European Union.
  - According to one participant, no institution, however cohesive and powerful, can attend to the many missions that lie ahead on its own without contributions by other institutions with the many tools that are needed to fulfill the tasks of stabilization, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation.
- In recent months, new circumstances have arisen that may present opportunities for increased NATO-EU cooperation.
Increasingly, key states within the EU and NATO show signs of strategic convergence. White Papers published by the French, the Germans, and the British cover similar themes and show a similarity to the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Defense Strategy released in June 2008 by the U.S. Department of Defense.

The reintegration of France comes at a time of improved U.S.-France bilateral relations. This new U.S.-French intimacy can be harnessed to improve NATO-EU cooperation.

The EU and NATO complement each other well on matters related to energy security. The EU focuses more generally on the economic and political aspects while NATO concentrates on security and infrastructure.

- Improved NATO and EU cooperation would also yield positive results in Afghanistan.
  - One participant lamented the current lack of attention given to NATO-EU cooperation. The participant declared that, on a broader scale, we need to focus our cooperation not just on military affairs but also on governance, health, education, job creation, and other issues that surface in Afghanistan reconstruction efforts.
  - The participant stated that the EU should appoint a ministerial-level representative to Afghanistan.

There was general agreement amongst participants that the adoption of the comprehensive approach, which relies on greater NATO and EU cooperation, offers NATO the greatest flexibility and the highest probability for success when responding to 21st century security challenges. The root causes of instability and the effects that instability and insecurity produce are so broad that we need to bring to bear an extensive combination of different instruments and measures which cannot be found or generated in a single organization. Moreover, these instruments would need to be coordinated in a war that would maximize their impact so as to have the desired effect.

- NATO has experienced only limited success in Afghanistan due to its inability to implement a comprehensive approach. The situation in Afghanistan calls for more than the application of military force.
  - The EU’s larger toolkit which includes the area of civil affairs, strengthening governance and the rule of law, and other capabilities, is sorely lacking in Afghanistan.

Regional Cooperation in Southeastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Challenges and Prospects

Conference participants closely examined developments in Southeastern Europe, which reflected NATO’s overall shift in focus from Central Europe. As NATO’s attention increasingly turns to Southeastern Europe due to basing realignment and involvement in extended out of area operations, regional cooperation becomes a necessary ingredient for success. There was general agreement amongst participants that although NATO and EU work in the region remains unfinished, the efforts pursued by NATO and the EU during post-war reconstruction and stabilization operations in Southeastern Europe offer good lessons and to a certain degree a model of success for future regional efforts and effective out of area operations. For instance, a participant commented that due to NATO and EU military and political involvement Serbia no longer poses a threat to regional security and the prospect for large scale military confrontation is virtually non-existent.

- NATO enlargement remains a central pillar of the Alliance’s engagement strategy in the Balkans. The prospect of gaining NATO, and EU, membership provides states with baselines for democratic and economic reform. One participant also noted that NATO helps countries with defense modernization.
In the eyes of Balkan states, NATO encourages internal cohesion and stability. This stands in sharp contrast to Baltic states which view NATO as a means of defending against external territorial aggression.

- Bosnia signed a stabilization and association agreement in June 2008 and maintains an individual partnership action plan with NATO.
- Albania and Croatia joined NATO and Albania recently applied for EU membership. Croatia is a candidate for EU accession as well.
- Serbia, a country once bombed by NATO, and Montenegro also signed stabilization and association agreements.
- The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has been an EU candidate since December 2005, and pending the resolution of the name dispute will join NATO.

Greece strongly supports NATO’s open door policy and the integration of Southeast European countries.

- Greece has supported both NATO and EU enlargement since the mid-1990s.
- Greek support for Southeast European states’ admission into NATO includes FYROM. Several participants noted the shift in Athens’ position on this issue.

- Without minimizing the historical, symbolic, and cultural significance of the issue, the current Greek government, contrary to the desires of the Greek public, understands that the conflict requires a compromise.

Conference participants also identified challenges with respect to NATO enlargement.

- One participant urged NATO to accelerate Bosnia’s path to full membership. According to the participant, only full integration will induce change in that still fractured country.
- NATO should also prepare itself for the consequences of continued engagement in Southeastern Europe, which will invariably involve stabilization tasks.

- In addition to institutional enlargement, participants highlighted several multinational frameworks that continue to guide regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe.

- The SECI, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, helps countries improve cross-border trade and customs regulations in order to advance economic cooperation and institutional developments.
- Under the Clinton administration, the United States spearheaded the effort to create the Southeast European Defense Ministerial in 1997 in order to address regional security concerns, to develop the capacity for peacekeeping operations, and to deal with emerging transnational threats such as drug smuggling and human trafficking.

Conference participants concentrated most of their criticism concerning insufficient levels of NATO-EU cooperation in the Balkans on the EU.

- Despite the June 2003 Thessaloniki agenda, the EU has shown little movement with respect to implementing the agenda which declared all Balkan states as potential candidates for EU membership.

- One participant claimed that Bosnia’s future rests with the EU and not necessarily with NATO, and that the EU should move quickly to bring Bosnia into the European fold.
Bosnian membership requires a regional context, involving Croatia’s attainment of full EU membership and placing Serbia on a fast track to membership.

One participant argued that the region should concern the EU more than NATO yet NATO appears more proactive with respect to regional engagement.

Another participant responded by asserting that some issues are shared unevenly and in some cases, therefore, may call upon uneven investment of capabilities. But in the end, the problems are indeed shared.

- Conference participants also expressed concern over the dark cloud of the global financial crisis that hangs over the region. Worried participants explained that the full effect of the crisis has not yet reached Southeastern Europe. Due to the region’s already troubling socio-economic situation, the consequences of the crisis may prove severe.
  - The region struggles with high unemployment. Montenegro’s unemployment rate is 12%, Serbia’s is 50%, 45% in Bosnia, and Albania maintains a 13% unemployment rate.
  - Additionally, economic growth is receding. Southeastern Europe is expected to grow 1.5% in 2009 as compared to 7.3% in 2008.

**Opportunities for cooperation in the broader Mediterranean region**

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and the EU have focused on unifying Europe around a Euro-Atlantic orientation by pursuing enlargement and promoting partnerships. As both organizations continue to expand, NATO and EU interests naturally extend beyond the continent’s territorial borders.

- The stability of the Mediterranean region, a major intersection of energy interests and trade routes, is of tremendous importance to the EU and the United States. The Mediterranean links European security to the security environment of the Middle East and Asia.
  - The Suez Canal connects Europe to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, major trade routes for commercial shipping, including energy resources. As a result, NATO interests now include piracy off the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as well as the political stability of Mediterranean states, such as Egypt which operates the Suez Canal.
  - Russia maintains a naval presence through its basing agreements with Syria and relationships with Egypt, Libya and Algeria, amongst others. A more assertive Russia in the Mediterranean region could threaten NATO and EU security interests if efforts to engage Russia fail.

- A conference participant noted that Europe is increasing its level of engagement. In 2008, following President Sarkozy’s recommendation, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership relaunched the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. France’s reintegration into NATO’s military command will prove significant with respect to NATO/EU involvement in the Mediterranean in the years ahead.

- The participant also suggested that perhaps due to Europe’s heightened awareness of the Mediterranean the time has come for the United States to change the manner in which it pursues regional policies by formulating a specific Mediterranean strategy. In the past, the United States did not differentiate the Mediterranean from other geographical divisions, such as Europe, and instead pursued Mediterranean-focused policies from within the NATO structure.
Turkey’s position as a NATO member, an aspiring EU member, and a Mediterranean country places it in a unique position to help safeguard European security and commercial interests in the Mediterranean.

- Turkey shows signs of support for European regional initiatives by contributing military forces to operations in Kosovo and Bosnia as well as participating in battle groups and supporting further development of European military capabilities.

Greece as a key contributor to economic stability, prosperity, and growth in and beyond Southeastern Europe

Since Konstantinos Karamanlis initiated the 1976 Balkan Summit, Greece has sought to play a stabilizing role in Southeastern Europe. The end of the Cold War briefly interrupted Greece’s positive regional engagement as a new set of regional dynamics shattered the foundation of Greece’s Balkan and Southeast European policy. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, for example, rekindled the fear of Macedonian irredentism as well as fears over the state of the Greek minority residing in Albania. As a result, during the early 1990s Greece maintained tense relations with nearly all of its neighbors. However, Greece has emerged since that time as a constructive regional player.

- Greece plays a key role in the post-conflict reconstruction of the Balkans by investing more than €16 billion in the Balkans, which in turn helps to create more than 200,000 new jobs.
  - Greek-owned banks operate extensively in the region with control over 3,200 branches, which accounts for approximately 20% of the local market.
  - Greece heavily invests in Serbia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, FYROM, and possibly Kosovo in the future.
  - In 2007, trade between Greece and states in the Balkans rose 16% from 2006.
- Greece can play an important role in promoting Southeastern Europe as a future energy hub for European energy demands.
  - One participant advanced the notion that a lack of control over the transit countries and infrastructure caused the European energy crisis, not a lack of Russian supplies. Europe must work together to deal with this problem. One example of such a collective effort is the Energy Community of Southeastern Europe which deals with energy sufficiency issues.
    - Greece is considering the option of building liquefied gas storage facilities in its northern region, which will help transfer Azeri gas to Europe.
    - Turkey and Greece already jointly operate the Interconnector, a pipeline that transfers Azeri gas to Europe.
- The thawing of tension between Greece and Turkey has proven critical to improving the stability of Southeastern Europe and the greater Mediterranean region. Since 1999, Greece has engaged in the process of détente with Turkey by improving bilateral relations. Better relations have reduced the danger of military confrontation between the two states.
  - The détente has also reduced the saliency of the Cyprus issue. There was general agreement amongst participants that Cyprus is still a problem for Greece and Turkey, but the disagreement seems unlikely to devolve into a military confrontation in the near future.
The Future of the Greek-American Partnership

U.S. and Greece: Sharing Strategic Interests
The foundation of U.S.-Greece relations rests on a shared history, values and strategic interests, together with a commitment to NATO, participation in multinational operations, and support for policies based on shared interests. Furthermore, the U.S. appreciates Greece’s role from a broader strategic perspective that extends beyond the Euro-Atlantic relationship.

- U.S. policymakers consider Greece a critically important actor in Southeastern Europe. Greece exerts great political influence in Balkan capitals and possesses a major economic interest in the region’s future.
- Greece’s quiet logistical support during the Iraq War made a lasting positive impression on American military planners. Greece allowed the U.S. to conduct transport aircraft and refueling operations out of Souda Bay.
- Greece still suffers from domestic terrorism, which one participant described as the same old problem but a different generation. In addition, the problems associated with Islamic militancy also threaten Greece. Leading up to the 2004 Olympic Games, counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and Greece was extensive and ultimately successful.
- One point of concern from the U.S. perspective is Greece’s position towards FYROM. Resolution of the FYROM problem remains a challenge to Greece and U.S. policymakers.
  - The differences between FYROM and Greece stem from the naming of an independent and sovereign state that shares Greece’s northern border as Macedonia and fears over FYROM’s irredentist ambitions. Greece insists that the name Macedonia refers to a northern region located within Greece and not to a state which declared its independence in 1991 following the breakup of Yugoslavia. Greece also rejects the usage of the term Macedonian to refer to FYROM’s people, language or culture.
- There are several areas in which the U.S. and Greece can further cooperation based on shared strategic interests.
  - Energy security is an area of strategic convergence. The U.S. and Greece must work together to reduce Russia’s dominant position in European energy markets.
  - Greece must continue to play a leading role in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
  - The ongoing ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which includes Greece, preoccupies American security policy planning.
  - Due to the strategic significance of Southeastern Europe, addressing the impact of the financial crisis on the region is of critical importance to both the U.S. and Greece.
    - Greece is a major creditor for the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, FYROM, and other countries in the region. An abrupt withdrawal of credit from the region due to increased banking regulation would have serious economic and political consequences.
- Jihadists from Iraq and Afghanistan who once lived in Greece are now returning home because of successful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations conducted by coalition forces, a trend which increasingly concerns Greek and American security experts.
  - An American participant pointed out that many voices are competing for the ear of the new American president. In order for Greece to be heard, Greece must work closely with the United States on the substantive issues that divide the two countries, as well as those on which they have shared interests.
Greece’s contributions to NATO, EU, OSCE, and UN operations

Greece contributes to international peacekeeping operations, deploying a total of 2,231 soldiers and specialists worldwide as of April 2009. Involvement in multinational operations in often complex environments benefits not only the host nation but also Greece, as it improves its capabilities, gains valuable operational experience, and builds partnerships and working relationships with partner nations.

- As the European Union builds a more unified foreign policy structure through the eventual ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of high-level offices dedicated to formulating and advancing foreign policy, its members anticipate greater and more substantive EU involvement in foreign affairs.
  - One participant noted that the U.S. often misperceives the role of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). U.S. policymakers see a robust and coherent ESDP as part of a larger toolbox available to NATO and the United States. However, the Europeans do not view the ESDP differently. Instead, the ESDP will constitute the strategic pillar of European defense policy.

- Greece provides military and financial support to numerous multinational operations around the world.
  - Greece participates in several NATO operations.
    » Greek troops are deployed in Kosovo, a contingent which includes mechanized battalions, officers and a transport company.
    » Staff officers also serve in FYROM, Albania, and at U.S. CENTCOM Headquarters as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
    » Since 2002 Greece has allocated more than €60 million for development assistance in Afghanistan. Greece will assume responsibility for security at Kabul airport next year and plans to expand its area of operation to include Western Afghanistan.
    » Greece also contributes to Operation Active Endeavour by providing several naval assets including a special operations team, a frigate and an additional support ship.
    » Souda Bay serves as a forward logistics base for NATO forces.
    » Greece provides forces for the NATO Response Force and participates in nearly all NATO multinational exercises.
    » Greece established the Athens Multinational Strategic-Lift Coordination Center (AMSCC) in 2004 to supplement strategic lift capabilities in NATO and EU led operations.
  - As a part of ongoing EU operations, Greece maintains a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Georgia, and is an active participant in Operation Atalanta.
    » Greece is also a member of EU Battle Groups.
      » HELBROC BG includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. Greece offers the greatest number of personnel with 960 out of 1,164 wearing a Greek uniform.
      » EU SIAF-BG, a battle group focusing on amphibious operations, is the second battle group containing Greek forces.
  - Greece also participates in missions sponsored by the United Nations.
    » Greece contributes to UNIFIL in Lebanon.
    » Greece takes part in UN monitoring missions around the world. For example, Greece supplies UNMISUD in Sudan with 6 officers.
Leveraging Greece’s OSCE presidency to sustain reform, promote stability and build civil society in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and beyond

As an active member of NATO and the EU, Greece can help elevate OSCE engagement through its chairmanship and the three organizations can form a triad of complementary structures as the impediments to greater strategic convergence weaken.

- Improved cooperation between the OSCE, NATO, the EU, and even the UN, will play a big role in the successful implementation of the comprehensive approach.
  - Admiral James Stavridis, commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is the incoming NATO Supreme Allied Commander/European Command (SACEUR).
    - One participant outlined Admiral Stavridis’ accomplishments while serving in SOUTHCOM.
      - Admiral Stavridis transformed SOUTHCOM to be much more integrated with its civilian counterparts from the State Department and the Defense Department.
      - The military became more involved as a supporting actor in civil, economic, social, diplomatic and informational activities.
  - For the comprehensive approach to succeed, the EU, the OSCE, and NATO must pursue complementary roles. For instance, although Greece commits forces to Afghanistan, Greece will not likely emerge as a major player in ISAF’s operation. However, Greece can assume a greater leadership role in the Balkans and the Caucasus, thereby complementing American leadership in Central Asia.

- A participant predicted that the chasm will only grow between Eastern and Western Europe as the financial crisis slowly creeps across the continent and reaches countries like Ukraine, where credit plays a major part in economic development. Greece will have to assume a leading role in the development of strategies that deal with complex economic and security dynamics that may result from the crisis.
- The OSCE may emerge as the ideal forum to deal with Russian security perceptions.
- Although conference participants endorsed the benefits of the comprehensive approach and the need to improve regional cooperation, one participant declared that the comprehensive approach is not working because of disagreements between Turkey and Cyprus. In NATO, Turkey vetoes cooperation with the EU while the unresolved problem of Cyprus is being used by some EU members as an excuse to deny EU cooperation with Turkey. Greece can play a major part in resolving this crisis because of its leadership in the OSCE, the close relations Greece enjoys with Cyprus, and improved Greece-Turkey bilateral relations.
  - One participant firmly disagreed with the above analysis. Cyprus, according to this perspective, does not veto any move to further EU-NATO cooperation. Turkey is the only country that takes such actions. Furthermore, the participant argued against Greek involvement. The responsibility falls on NATO’s shoulders and NATO, not Greece, should persuade Turkey to change its behavior.

The Legacy and Future of the Greek-American Partnership

The Greek-American partnership survived the trials of the Cold War and has entered a new phase as Greece and the United States look to meet new security challenges. The relationship between the U.S. and Greece is a success story. The U.S. invested heavily in Greece, both politically and economically, after the Second World War. Greece was the largest recipient per capita of U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan. Today, Greece is a donor country involved in regional economic development and a participant in international peacekeeping operations.
The future of the Greek-American partnership is bright. With Greece assuming the OSCE chairmanship, expanding its responsibilities in Afghanistan as part of ISAF, playing a leading role in stabilizing and developing Southeastern Europe, and actively participating in EU and NATO anti-piracy operations, Greece remains engaged and in a unique position to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

The Greek-American partnership is a critical component of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and will play a major part of the Alliance’s strategy for meeting the challenges presented by the 21st century security landscape.
Greece, NATO, and 21st Century Euro-Atlantic Security

The Honorable Evangelos Meimarakis
Minister of Defense
Hellenic Ministry of National Defense

Ten years ago in this very room, world leaders commemorated NATO’s 50th anniversary, and today we gather to mark the Alliance’s 60th year with this timely conference. I believe that opportunities such as this conference reflect the excellent bilateral relations that currently exist between Greece and the United States.

In recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of conditions that have led to an exceedingly uncertain international environment, characterized by new threats to regional and global security. Our understanding of past threats is no longer relevant to today’s challenges. Asymmetrical threats now dominate the security environment. Climate change, illegal immigration and displaced persons, cyber attacks, energy security and the return of piracy, have surfaced as major challenges to stability and security. Furthermore, our global order is increasingly interdependent, as demonstrated by the financial crisis. Given this framework, all of us are obliged to work collectively and cooperatively. Only together can we overcome this crisis.

The current international system is characterized by many uncertainties. But one thing is certain. The relationship between Europe and the United States remains the foundation for our common future; a future filled with security, democracy, freedom, and prosperity.

Greece and the U.S. will continue to cooperate bilaterally, as well as within the NATO framework to undertake coordinated and mutually supportive actions in this evolving international environment. Through this cooperation we will not only continue to defend the fundamental values of democracy and freedom, but also our common security.

President Obama and Prime Minister Karamanlis at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit recently reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship. Greece’s Foreign Minister, Dora Bakoyannis, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed similar sentiments following their meeting in Washington D.C. Prior to attending this conference, I had the privilege of meeting with my American counterpart, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, with whom I exchanged views on issues relating to the strategic management of new challenges on a regional and global level.

Now let us turn to NATO. Even sixty years after its founding, the Alliance remains the primary guarantor of peace and security not only in Europe but also around the world.

Over the course of its history, the Alliance has adapted to changing circumstances. In recent years, NATO has launched a process of transformation in order to respond to the challenges posed by a post-bipolar world and particularly the post-9/11 era. This transformation is the basis for improving the operational readiness and effectiveness of NATO forces, which are slowly evolving into a truly global force.

Greece has been a member of NATO for over half a century and over the years my country contributed greatly to various NATO missions. Greece has participated in NATO’s military and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, most notably during Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea and as a part of NATO peacekeeping forces KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan.

Allied nations agree that the ultimate goal for NATO in Afghanistan is the establishment of the conditions that permit the Afghan people to manage the affairs of their country. To this end, the Alliance’s adoption of the “Comprehensive Approach” presents the most promising strategy for success. The country faces complex challenges that require multi-layered solutions. Allied nations can no longer rely solely on the military option to resolve the problems facing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Piracy is an emerging problem that the international community must face as pirates threaten the transport routes that the world depends on for trade and freedom of movement. Greece, using its position as a dominant shipping and naval country, supports NATO and EU-led efforts to combat piracy.
In the broader region, Greece continues to play a leading role in promoting regional cooperation and development. The Balkans has always affected European security. As our security becomes more interdependent, peace in the Balkans is crucial for wider regional stability. That being said, we have made significant progress in the Balkans and one can say the region is no longer the “powder keg of Europe”, even though we must continue to focus our attention on ensuring peace and helping the Balkan nations realize the goal of a peaceful transition to democratic governance and good neighborly relations. The people of Southeastern Europe must continue to work towards transcending the nationalist ideologies that have shaped past policies, which often resulted in political deadlock.

Last October, I invited to Greece my counterparts from all of the Southeast European countries to observe a military parade commemorating Greece’s role in the resistance against the Nazi occupation during World War II. I have since been invited to similar events in Bulgaria and Serbia. Such exchanges and public displays of support advance the objective mentioned above, namely breaking down the nationalist barriers that prevent cooperation, understanding, and progress.

Greece has participated heavily in the economies of Southeast European countries by making financial contributions and providing access to vital natural resources. Greece has already invested approximately €13.25 billion in the Balkans and Turkey, while Greek banks hire 34,757 employees from the region.

Greece fully supports NATO expansion as long as candidate countries fulfill the membership requirements and embrace a Euro-Atlantic orientation. We offered our support to Croatia and Albania, two nations that recently joined our ranks as members of NATO, and we look forward to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia fulfilling their obligations so they too can join NATO.

Now, with respect to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the name issue is not simply a whim or a tantrum on the part of Greece. It is a serious problem, inextricably linked to the security and stability of the region, as well as the general principle of good neighborly relations.

Achieving a solution to the controversy surrounding FYROM’s name will lead to full normalization of our bilateral relations, facilitate our neighbor’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and will reinforce stability in the region. We truly regret that FYROM has not been able to meet Greece and find a mutually acceptable solution especially when one considers the great steps Greece has taken on the matter in spite of the significant domestic political cost.

Turning to our relationship with Turkey, Greece continues its efforts to improve bilateral relations. Although Turkey publicly committed itself to respecting the principle of good neighborly relations and working towards a peaceful resolution of our differences, the Turkish stance in the Aegean has not changed. The casus belli remains in force as Turkey continually violates territorial water and airspace. Politically, Turkey must take more definitive steps and proceed with the necessary legal reforms, mainly on the issues of human rights and religious freedom. The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek minority living in Turkey continue to face hardships, especially with respect to their property rights.

As for broader European security initiatives, Europe is creating a regional security system in which Greece is playing an important part. European countries have come together to build effective platforms for cooperation, such as the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) and the South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). Additionally, within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a Battle Group has been established with Greece serving as the lead nation.

Europe’s security remains tied to the security and stability of the Mediterranean region. For this reason, supporting the Mediterranean Dialogue is of critical importance. The forum aims to encourage nations in the Mediterranean to contribute to regional efforts through cooperation, enhanced interoperability, a free exchange of information, defense reform, counter-terrorism cooperation, responding to natural disasters, providing humanitarian aid, as well as promoting education and science.
Over the years Greece has taken a keen interest in the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Ministry of Defense with the help of other Mediterranean Dialogue member countries, organized seminars to study the progress of various Dialogue initiatives and assembled several joint exercises covering sea and air rescue, natural disaster and humanitarian aid missions.

Greece is working to establish an environment of trust, mutual understanding and cooperation in order to build on the progress we achieved thus far, from reinforcing stability in the Balkans to further strengthening the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. My country is playing a leading role in a truly difficult but necessary undertaking: to change our broader region into one of peace, stability, and economic prosperity.

Both Greece and the United States seek to promote democracy, peace and stability in Southeastern Europe. Greece is looking to further its involvement in the region through its chairmanship of the OSCE, which it assumed on January 1, 2009.

I would like to emphasize the fact that Greece will continue to act as a helpful strategic partner in the international community. The relationship with the United States is of vital importance to Greece and the region. Shared values, history, and common visions bond Greece and the United States together. Continuing our dialogue and encouraging the free exchange of ideas will only further our bilateral cooperation and enhance our mutual understanding of the strategic priorities facing our nations.
Agenda

TUESDAY, APRIL 28

18:30-19:15  Welcoming Reception

19:15-21:00  Dinner and Keynote Speaker

The Honorable Evangelos Meimarakis, Minister of Defense, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29

8:00-9:15  Conference Registration and Breakfast

9:15-9:30  Welcome and Introduction

9:30-11:45  Session 1: NATO after Strasbourg-Kehl

● Alliance priorities: A new strategic concept for NATO?
● Maintaining NATO’s commitment in Afghanistan
● “Keeping the door open” re: membership and partnership
● Managing relations with Russia

12:00-13:00  Buffet Luncheon

13:15-14:45  Session 2: NATO and the EU as Actors of Stability and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe and the Wider Region

● Prospects for closer NATO-EU cooperation and a broader comprehensive approach-strategy
● Regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe as a model for collaboration both within and beyond NATO
● Euro-Atlantic prospects for the Western Balkans (e.g., security, stability, trafficking, human rights issues, and democratic development)
● Greece as a key contributor to economic stability, prosperity, and growth in and beyond Southeastern Europe

14:45-15:00  Break

15:00-16:45  Session 3: The Future of the Greek-American Partnership

● US and Greece: sharing strategic interests
● Opportunities for economic-industrial collaboration
● Greece’s contributions to NATO, EU, OSCE, and UN operations
● Leveraging Greece’s OSCE presidency to sustain reform, promote stability and build civil society in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and beyond

16:45-17:00  Concluding Remarks
Participant List

Sergeant Georgios Adraktas, Assistant to Defense Attaché, Embassy of Greece

Mrs. Despina-Ino Afentouli, Information Officer for Greece and Regional Coordinator for the Caucasus, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO

Ambassador Yashar Aliyev, Embassy of Azerbaijan

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy and Director for the Center of Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University

Mr. George Bistis, Chief, Greek Service, Voice of America

Air Commodore Antonie Adriaan Herman de Bok, Defense Attaché, Embassy of The Netherlands

Mr. Spencer P. Boyer, Director of International Law and Diplomacy, Department of Security and International Policy, Center for American Progress

Mr. Tobin Bradley, Director, NATO and Western Europe, National Security Council

Ambassador Peter Burian, The Embassy of the Slovak Republic

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Mr. Athanasios Ellis, Washington Bureau Chief, Kathimerini, Antenna TV, Athens News Agency

Mr. Anastasios Evangelou, Director of Communications, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Greece

Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas, former Executive Director, Commission on Preventing WMD Proliferation and Terror

Ms. Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Director, Office of Southern European Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Dr. Stephen Flanagan, Senior Vice President and Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

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Minister Karolos Gadis, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Greece

Colonel Spyridon Georgopoulos, Air Attaché, Embassy of Greece

Mr. Yanos Gramatidis, President, American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce

Lt. Col. Dimosthenis Grigoriadis, Assistant Air Attaché, Embassy of Greece

Mr. Viktor Hamotskyi, 1st Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine

Mr. Neil Holland, 1st Secretary Political in the Foreign and Security Policy Group, British Embassy

Ivona Hola, Political Secretary, Embassy of the Czech Republic

Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, Senior Advisor, RAND Washington Office

Mr. Mihalis Ignatious, Journalist, To Ethnos, MEGA TV

Mr. Edward Joseph, School of Advanced and International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Ambassador Robert Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy, and former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

Ambassador Andreas Kakouris, Ambassador, Embassy of Cyprus


Mrs. Krinio Kanellopoulou, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Defense and Foreign Affairs

Vassilis Kapetangiannis, Press Counselor, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Greece

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Mr. Mark Kronenberg, International Business Development, The Boeing Company

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The Honorable Evangelos Meimarakis, Minister of Defense, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Greece

Mrs. Ioanna Kolokota, wife of the Minister of Defense, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Greece

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Mr. Malkhaz Mikeladze, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Georgia

Mr. Nick Mitropoulos, The Monitor Group

Ms. Laura Molyviati, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Greece

Mr. Viktor Nikituik, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Ukraine

Brigadier General Joseph Njeim, Assistant Defense Attaché, Embassy of Lebanon

Mr. Lazaros Panourgias, European Investment Bank

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Ambassador Charles P. Ries, Senior Fellow, RAND, and former Ambassador to Greece

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Mr. Gene Rossides, Board of Directors, American Hellenic Institute

Mr. Emanuel L. Rouvelas, Partner, K&L Gates

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Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Mr. John Sitilides, Chairman, Board of Advisors, Southeast Europe Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Mr. James Snyder, Information Officer for the United States, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO

Mr. Thrasivoulos Stamatopoulos, Permanent Representative of Greece to NATO

Mr. Alejandro Sueldo, Office of Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The Honorable John Tanner (D-TN), U.S. Congressman, President, NATO Parliamentary Assembly