TCOG2

Close Window

Security Polcy Reforms in East Asia and a Trilateral Crisis Response Planning Opportunity
Second Interim TCOG Report

As noted in our first interim project report, one of the more successful innovations of the last six years in the area of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliance management has been the establishment and use of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) for developing common policies toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). This series of regular meetings of high-level diplomats from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) has allowed the three governments to discuss together a range of options for dealing more effectively with North Korea, and it has provided a hitherto absent forum for coordinating policies on a regular basis. The results have included a better understanding among the three of each other’s policy objectives and methods for achieving them, a lessening of concern if ends or means do not exactly correspond, a coordination of policies toward the North, and a more unified voice in dealing with the ruling regime in Pyongyang.

Since its formal introduction in 1999, however, the TCOG has changed a great deal, both in terms of how it functions and in terms of its role within a broader negotiating framework. Some have argued that the TCOG process has weakened over time, and that it has been strained under the weight of conflicting views regarding appropriate North Korea policy. Others have countered that although the TCOG now meets less formally and less frequently, this has more to do with the increased strength of trilateral relations, and the group simply requires less of the ceremonial trappings of trilateral diplomacy. The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between, and understanding that truth (as much as possible) is important if these countries are to become a stronger collective force for peace and prosperity in the region and beyond.

The first interim report described the history and evolution of the TCOG as a diplomatic tool, based on dozens of interviews with past and current participants from all three countries. An understanding of the history of the TCOG, including its relative strengths and weaknesses, was essential in order to evaluate constructively the best ways to enhance trilateral policy coordination and cooperation, either as a potential model or a lesson from which to learn. In the second interim report, we wanted to explore to what extent the TCOG model can be used to encourage trilateral cooperation on important security issues beyond those directly linked to the DPRK.

These other issue areas of trilateral coordination might include 1) crisis contingency planning, such as planning a response to the collapse of government control in North Korea, regional natural disasters, or terrorist incidents; 2) longer-term policy planning, such as the impact on alliance relations and associated security postures of changes being triggered by the much-discussed “transformation” of the U.S. military, especially with respect to alternative basing options and force structure requirements in the region; and 3) institution building, such as the prospects for closer coordination on regional and global arms control, including broader bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Asia.

It is on these issues that this second interim report is focused, with a particular emphasis on the opportunities to improve crisis contingency planning and response cooperation. The massive December 2004 earthquake and tsunami that devastated parts of South and Southeast Asia present a vivid reminder of both the value of recent efforts to facilitate multilateral relief coordination, as well as how much room remains for improvement in this area. Knowing what we know from the TCOG experience, how could a trilateral dialogue on this topic be structured? What are the opportunities, and what should be the priorities? What are the potential implications for changing political and foreign/security policy dynamics within each country and around the East Asian region more broadly? These are some of the questions that this report addresses.