Missile Defense

Missile Defense and Counterproliferation Studies

Recognizing that over the next decade or so the United States and its allies will face a proliferation of precision weapons and missiles in the hands of adversaries, IFPA has undertaken several projects to assess U.S. and Allied missile defense and counterproliferation policy and technology. The most notable among these are described below.

Allied Cooperation on Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

In its continuing investigation of the status of evolving regional missile threats and potential military counters to them, IFPA periodically organizes and hosts workshops and conferences for senior Allied officials with operational and/or policy-making responsibility for missile defense programs. Participants have the opportunity to examine technology now or soon to be available, as well as longer-term technological developments. The meetings promote discussion of ways to fund, develop, and procure these systems collaboratively, and of how best to deploy them so as to reinforce joint and combined theater missile defense in regions of shared importance.

Workshops and conferences have included the following:

Missile Defense and Counterproliferation on the Korean Peninsula: Exploring U.S.-ROK Options and Requirements.
IFPA held a workshop on October 8, 2002, in Seoul, in support of the Department of Defense's Missile Defense Agency (MDA, formerly BMDO) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Organized in association with the Center for International Studies of the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Yonsei University, Seoul,this bilateral U.S.-South Korean workshop brought together key members of the American and South Korean governments, as well as academic experts and analysts from the think-tank communities of both countries, to explore the air and missile threat environment in Northeast Asia and to discuss and identify appropriate options for responding.

Defending the Northeast, the Nation, and America's Allies from Ballistic Missile Attack. This major missile defense conference was held June 28-29, 2001, against the backdrop of a new administration, which took office at a critical point in the missile defense debate and discussion and in a changing security setting. It followed President Bush's important address on missile defense on May 1, 2001, at National Defense University. Topics addressed included proliferation and the missile threat; the ABM Treaty and missile defense; technology options and architectures for missile defense; priorities and programs, timelines, and cost; and allies and coalition partners and missile defense.

This meeting was designed to bring together expertise from the political-military and technology-industry communities, together with others having an interest in national security and missile defense. Speakers and participants will include present and former high-level policy makers, members of legislatures, and senior military leaders, members of the broader academic-policy community, and representatives from industry.
Air/Missile Defense, Counterproliferation, and Security Policy Planning: Implications for Collaboration Between the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and the GCC Countries. Cosponsored by IFPA and the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), this conference was convened in Abu Dhabi in March 1998. It was the first region-wide dialogue among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations and the United States to focus on issues related to air and missile defense and counterproliferation planning. The purpose was to assess the potential for bilateral and regional cooperation between the United States and its GCC coalition partners on countering the rising threats of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic- and cruise-missile proliferation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area. Major topics of discussion included:
- Proliferation trends and emerging threats
- Coercive deterrence and the defensive option
- Operational planning and missile defense contingencies
- U.S. TMD planning and technology options for the GCC
- Political, economic, and operational benefits of collaboration
Exercise Eagle Resolve 1999. The Institute held this workshop in cooperation with the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, in April 1999. Cosponsored by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), the meeting built on the foundation laid at the Abu Dhabi conference held in March 1998. Delegates from the GCC states met with U.S. officials to discuss the strategic environment of the Middle East with discussion focusing on proliferation threats and the diffusion of missile technology in the region.
Theater Missile Defense in Northeast Asia: Implications for Korean Security and the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Held in June 1999 at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, his conference was opened by General John Tilelli, commander in chief, UN Command/Combined Forces Command, and commander, U.S. Forces Korea. The conference explored a variety of issues related to U.S. and Korean air/missile defense requirements, including the following:
- The nature of the current and projected missile and WMD threat confronting Northeast Asia in general and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in particular
- The role of defensive options in counterproliferation planning and how they relate to other potential military responses and broader policy initiatives
- An overview of U.S. air and theater missile defense architectures and operational concepts relevant to ROK and U.S. planning, together with a review and assessment of current and projected ROK and U.S. requirements for air/missile defense
- The broader strategic and policy planning context in which U.S.-ROK collaboration on air/missile defense must evolve

Missile Defense Technology

The following projects together provide the policy community with a comprehensive examination of the factors shaping the future security setting and likely missile-threat environment, with an emphasis on the mid- and long-term implications of missile-related technology diffusion. They also recommend technological, policy, and organizational responses for U.S. defense planners to consider, focusing on the feasibility of various missile defense options now in development.

National Missile Defense: Policy Issues and Technological Capabilities. Completed in July 2000, this study examines in some detail the technology and policy options related to national missile defense (NMD) that U.S. policy makers will encounter over the next few years. The study explores the current U.S. policy dichotomy, the evolution and status of the NMD program elements, and the technology issues that are central to NMD deployment and future system evolution.

An eletronic version of this study is available.

Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010: What are the Policy and Technology Challenges? This 1997 study addresses international missile threats, missile defense countermeasures, and U.S. missile defense programs and their accompanying unresolved issues. The study found that such factors as the global economy and technology transfer (sanctioned, unintentional, and illicit) together point to a future world where the number of countries possessing long-range ballistic and cruise missiles and weapons of mass destruction will increase significantly. The study further found that as a consequence of this proliferation, the United States will be forced to deploy missile defenses, the only questions being when to deploy them and what type to deploy. IFPA concluded the study with recommendations as to the type of missiles to develop and deploy. Upon completion of this project, senior IFPA representatives testified before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee on the findings of the project, and, at the request of the committee chairman, every member of Congress received a copy of the study. Several follow-up briefings, meetings, and supplemental publications have since amplified and updated this study.

Requirements for Future Missile Defense Technology Research. Completed in July 1998, this project assesses the current state of U.S. missile defense policy and technology and determines where it is, and should be, headed. The project includes these two studies on specific missile defense issues:

A Prognosis for International Missile Developments
Completed in August 1997, this study expands on the examination of missile threats in Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010. It summarizes and updates, by region, the likely ballistic- and cruise-missile threat in the 2010 timeframe.

National Missile Defense: A Candid Examination of Political Limits and Technological Challenges
This study was completed in June 1998 and examines the technology and policy options available with existing missile defense programs and how they can be used to devise an effective national missile defense for the early twenty-first century. The study draws on the results of a June 1997 workshop with the same title, a January 1998 symposium (Exploring Future U.S. Missile Defense Requirements: Where Are We and Where Do We Need to Go?), and substantial independent research and analysis. As a follow-on to this study, the Institute held a one-day symposium, Assessing National Missile Defense: A Roundtable Review, in May 1999 in Washington, D.C. The symposium provided a balanced approach to this much-debated topic and focused on its status, integration challenges, and the need to address future technology and policy issues.

The Role of Psychological Operations in Counterproliferation Policy

Psychological operations (PSYOP) constitute a little-studied counterproliferation tool with which the United States seeks to dissuade, impede, and deter its adversaries from using WMD. In 1998 the Institute completed an examination of psychological operations and their possible effectiveness in helping to reduce the danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass estruction. IFPA provided an overview of the key policy issues associated with the use of PSYOP in counterproliferation planning. These issues include:

Identification and initial examination of political incentives or disincentives for using PSYOP

Experience with past efforts to use PSYOP

Interagency coordination as a prerequisite for successful PSYOP, particularly in making available timely, detailed, accurate, and relevant intelligence

How PSYOP should be integrated into an overall U.S. counterproliferation strategy

Two case studies, one focused on Iran and the other on a non-state actor, the Japanese cult Aum Shinri Kyo