MITI 09/1999

Security Issues in the Middle East
September 1999

Implications of Kosovo for the Gulf Region

What lessons did friends and foes of the United States in the Middle East draw from the air campaign over Kosovo? What are the long-term security implications of Operation Allied Force for American forward presence in the Persian Gulf? These critical questions are the focus of the opening chapter for the September issue. The report notes that the high-tech weaponry and tactics showcased during the conflict reaffirmed America's unrivaled military superiority since Desert Storm. Allies in the Gulf region drew comfort from America's demonstrated ability to deter Iraqi or Iranian adventurism. Yet, the political decisions leading up to the conflict, the air campaign that unfolded, and the aftermath of the operation all point to sobering and unsettling conclusions. First, President Clinton's decision to rule out ground forces at the outset, due in large part to the apparent public aversion to casualties, severely limited the effectiveness of the campaign to destroy Serbian forces. Second, the gradual escalation of the bombings allowed the Serbs to prepare their defenses. Moreover, the ineffectual air campaign against ground forces allowed unopposed Serb troops to systematically accelerate the mass killings and exodus of Kosovars. Subsequently, Serbian president Milosevic was able to present the West with a fait accompli. Third, the shortages in munitions during the operation demonstrated the severe strains that resulted from America's myriad military commitments worldwide. Fourth, Washington seemed overly eager to hand over the longer-term commitments of post-conflict peacekeeping to its NATO-European allies. Iraq, Iran, and other rogue nations opposed to the United States have undoubtedly noted these factors and will likely focus on such perceived American weaknesses in their deliberations on future defense planning.

From the factors above, the report infers several potential lessons learned:

America's ability to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars posited in its national security strategy-one of which is a reprise of the Gulf War-is in doubt.
As a result of "imperial overstretch," Washington's staying power in the Middle East will erode over time.
The perceived public aversion to casualties among Americans will encourage future adversaries in the region to deter intervention by preemptively inflicting unacceptable losses on U.S. troops in future military confrontations.

Questions regarding this report, the reports in general, or the Institute's work on energy security programs, can be directed to Andrew C. Winner or Toshi Yoshihara.