Study
monograph released
Alliance
Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship By
Charles M. Perry, Jecquelyn K. Davis, James L. Schoff, and Toshi
Yoshihara 2004
Cover & Table of Contents
Chapter
One of Alliance
Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship
The Smith Richardson Foundation has recently funded a study of Korean reconciliation and its implications for U.S. security policy in Asia. IFPA believes that this study will make a truly unique contribution both to the broad policy debate on the U.S. response to Korean reconciliation and to the articulation of a restructured military posture better suited to the geopolitical conditions of a reconciled (if not reunified) Korea. While, to some extent, the U.S. response to the Korean reconciliation process is almost certainly being examined within different elements of the U.S. government, IFPA can contribute substantially to the development of U.S. policy by providing the type of holistic study that may not be possible across various agencies and divisions of the U.S. Departments of Defense and State.
As recent press reports outlining the Bush administration's new military strategy suggest, it appears likely that U.S. defense planning will be far more Asia-centric in the future than it has been in the recent past. Given the rising power of China, the potential for broader instability in South and Southeast Asia, and ongoing worries over North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this shift is both understandable and warranted. However, implementing an Asia-focused defense will require navigating a number of major diplomatic challenges, not the least of which will be the inter-Korean reconciliation process. This will be especially true as Seoul and Pyongyang move beyond family exchanges and economic cooperation, and begin to consider more seriously a wider range of defense-minded confidence building measures (CBMs) and conventional force adjustments, perhaps as part of a peace treaty regime between the two Koreas. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that such developments could confront U.S. officials with an earlier-than-expected need to consider rather substantial and definitive changes in the American military presence on the peninsula, changes that could affect not only its Korea-focused missions but its regional security roles as well.
Fundamental shifts in the posture of U.S. forces in Korea could also have a very significant spillover effect on U.S. forces elsewhere in the region, especially in Japan.
Once the two Koreas move from what are commonly known as "soft CBMs" (e.g., hotlines, advance notification of exercises, information exchanges, doctrine seminars, etc.) to a closer consideration of "hard CBMs" (e.g., pull-backs from the DMZ, specified deployment zones, numerical troop ceilings, limitations or bans on specific weapons categories, etc.), questions with regard to the future status and configuration of U.S. forces on the peninsula will come increasingly to the foreground. The United States will need to develop a much better appreciation for the implications of any hard CBM proposals that Seoul and Pyongyang may agree to. That is to say, it will be incumbent on Washington to consider how and when various hard CBMs could constrain and perhaps foreclose certain U.S. force mix and force deployment options, and then to develop a strategy to work around such predicaments and/or minimize any potentially destabilizing consequences. Washington will also need to anticipate any new requirements that such CBMs-and reconciliation as whole-may impose on U.S. forces in Korea, so that the United States will be ready and able to assist as effectively and comprehensively as possible in maintaining stability in a reconciling and ultimately reconciled Korea. To our knowledge, neither of these requirements has yet been the subject of much concerted study. It was to fill this void that IFPA sought and received support from the Smith Richardson Foundation.
continued...
In undertaking the proposed study, IFPA will take a front-to-back approach, laying out what U.S. long-term strategic objectives and operational concerns are likely to be, and how they might be affected by hard CBMs, conventional force adjustments, and other tension-reducing measures that may be proposed as a result of North-South dialogue and reconciliation. From that, we plan to highlight particular pitfalls and/or areas of concern in the bilateral dialogue as it affects the status of U.S. forces in Korea, and to identify areas where the United States will need to be particularly vigilant in protecting its interests. The ultimate aim is to craft a roadmap for sustaining an American forward presence in a reconciling Korea that is both politically acceptable and operationally sound. This study effort will have nine main program activities:
1. Detailed discussions with representatives of the U.S. national security policymaking community in order to gain greater clarity on how the official U.S. community would like to see U.S. forces postured in Northeast Asia over the long term.
2. Interviews with U.S. defense planners and senior military commanders to gain better insight into their unique perspective on the military operational challenges associated with the potential implementation of conventional force realignments on the Korean peninsula.
3. Meetings with senior MND, Blue House, MOFAT, and other officials in the ROK government in Seoul. We expect these discussions to provide up-to-date insights into South Korean priorities and expectations with regard to reconciliation in general and to potential CBM/conventional force adjustment initiatives in particular, both in the run-up to the December 2002 elections and over the longer haul.
4. A small working group to be convened in Seoul and designed to flesh out the views of a wider range of ROK elites and civic leaders on issues related to reconciliation and an American military presence in a reconciled Korea.
5. A brief research visit to Beijing. Apart from shedding light on Chinese perspectives on Korean reconciliation and its impact on U.S. presence in the region, we also believe that discussions in Beijing would be useful in bolstering our reading of North Korean intentions and priorities.
6. A small working group meeting to be held in Washington, D.C., and designed to gain greater clarity on the attitudes of key regional states other than the ROK (i.e., China, Japan, North Korea, and Russia) towards the reconciliation process and U.S. force deployment issues.
7. An interim white paper to be circulated within the Washington policy community, providing a preliminary assessment of the reconciliation process and its potential impact on U.S. forces as the South heads into the final leg of the ROK presidential campaign. To help prepare for the post-election setting, its will also provide an initial projection of likely policy lines and nuances of a new ROK administration, be it MDP or GNP led.
8. Post-election IFPA interviews in Seoul with key ROK officials, policy experts, and opinion-makers in order to update and refine our understanding of official ROK policy perspectives on the issues under study. This second visit will also provide opportunities to float preliminary ideas on possible U.S. responses to specific elements of the reconciliation process, and to test ROK reactions-especially those of the new leadership-to alternative U.S. force postures and deployment modalities.
9. Finally, the writing and publication of a monograph-length study.