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Iran: Headed for a National Deterrent?

Iran is an ancient civilization, proud of its Persian heritage and steeped in Shia Islam (less than 10 percent of the population are non-Shiites). In assessing this proud state, Iran's size and population potential must be understood. First, Iran is the most highly populated country in the Middle East; nearly one-third of the region's population is Iranian (Egypt through Iran). Second, of its 66 million people, about half are under 18 years old. As this population moves toward adulthood, Iran is beginning to experience a lot of domestic pressure as these young adults seek higher education and economic opportunity. Third, with a population growth rate of 2.3 percent a year — down from almost 4 percent in the late 1980s — Iran's population is still expanding, adding about one-million people a year to the country.

Consequently, Iran has a significant future military potential as it will have a large number of military-aged citizens for the foreseeable future. This is a potential that other states in the region cannot ignore. However, Iran's population structure is also adding to the strains that are pressuring its overburdened economy. Many analysts expect that Iran's economic difficulties will force that country to limit its future military expenditures. However, Iran's military spending reportedly absorbs only 2 percent of its GDP, compared with 17 percent in the last days of the Shah. Iran's military expenditures are also considerably less than those of Saudi Arabia and Israel. According to a recent survey by The Economist, Iran's citizens, which are disenchanted with their government and "criticize their government on almost every score, do not berate it for wasting its wealth on military toys."1 Some of this silence may be attributed to the freshness of the memory of the one-million Iranians who were killed in the Iran-Iraq war.2 In short, Western hopes that economic pressures will prevent Iran from pursuing long-range ballistic missiles and WMD systems may be wishful thinking.

Much of the tensions pulling at Iran are a result of a foreign policy that is at odds with itself. On the one hand, Iran provokes some states by sponsoring terrorist groups and engaging in hostile activities.3 Contributing to this unfortunate state of affairs is the fact that the Shia sect follows two additional pillars of faith (above the five it shares with the Sunni branch) deemed necessary for Shiites to demonstrate and reinforce their Islamic faith. One of these additional pillars is jihad or crusade to protect Islamic lands, beliefs, and institutions.4 Thus, Shia faith contains a predisposition for conducting holy war against the infidels. On the other hand, Iran remains fretful over its national security, concerned about the possible aggressive intentions of other states. Its experiences in the Iran-Iraq War, which included extensive Iraqi use of chemical weapon and ballistic missile attacks against Iranian targets, graphically demonstrated the vulnerabilities Iran faces from adversaries armed with missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

It is instructive to review the Iranian experience of modern warfare. For example, during 1983, Iraq fired at least 33 Scud missiles at Iranian targets and is also believed to have used mustard gas against Iranian forces in November of that year.5 During the subsequent years of the war, the use of CW and ballistic missiles grew so that by the time the fifth and last war of the cities occurred during March-April 1988, Iraq fired about 200 Scud missiles at Iran during that two-month period;6 one-quarter to one-half of the residents of Tehran fled the city fearing that some of the missiles might carry poison gas. To counter the overwhelming Iraqi advantage in these areas, Iran acquired and began using ballistic missiles and a limited array of chemical weapons (the first planned Iranian use of CW may not have occurred until 1988).7

The Iran-Iraq War made a deep impression on Iranian policymakers. First, the effect of an international embargo demonstrated the importance of becoming militarily self-sufficient to the extent possible. For example, after the first year of war, Iran only had a few operational aircraft. Most of its aircraft were of U.S. origin and the United States was not providing repair parts. In addition, the war established Iran's outlook toward the development of WMD systems. Although the actual damage inflicted on Iran by those types of systems was relatively low in comparison to the entire scope of the conflict,8 its psychological impact and ability to disrupt operations colored the Iranian outlook toward its significance. A statement made by President Rafsanjani in 1988, while he was still the speaker of the Iranian parliament, well outlines Iranian thinking on the issue. In his address to some soldiers he stated:

With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed in the battle field.

We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.9

Iran's orientation toward the development of a WMD deterrent capability was further strengthened in 1991 when U.S.-led forces easily destroyed the Iraqi military machine that had stymied Iran for so long. Apparently, Iranian policymakers determined that conventional military forces would not be able to stand against a determined assault by U.S. forces. In short, the problem for Iran was how to develop a defense capability that would deter the United States from doing to Iran what it had done to Iraq. Consequently, Iranian efforts to develop WMD and ballistic and cruise missile capabilities are believed to have increased.

Iran's Security Policy Objectives

Iran appears to have three security objectives of particular interest to the United States:

Ally with the key Asian powers. It is Iran's policy to form an alliance that includes India, China, Russia, and Iran to coordinate regional policy and create a strong alliance against the United States.10 From the Iranian perspective this alliance would create a fourth pole in international affairs, in addition to the United States, Europe, and Japan.11 Iran also sees this policy as a means of countering U.S. attempts to isolate Iran in the international community.

Deter foreign powers with WMD systems. As discussed in the introduction, Iran wants to be able to deter other powers, to include Iraq and the United States, from threatening the country. Moreover, the Sunni-Shia division in Islam predisposes other Islamic states to view Iran with suspicion, thus creating additional tensions. Since, in terms of conventional forces, Iran is not a particularly strong country (Iraq is still the area's strongman), Iranian leaders view WMD and missile delivery systems as being essential to Iran's security.

Dominate the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is working to establish a military capability to deny transit through the Strait of Hormuz. This effort includes the layered deployment of cruise missile-equipped patrol boats, submarines, underground shore-based missile sites, long-range anti-ship ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, and a manufacturing base with the resulting stockpile of anti-ship mines.12 A military capability to disrupt shipping through the strait, which carries 20 percent of the world's oil, could provide Iran with a powerful tool with which to intimidate other Gulf oil producers. In addition, this capability could also make it difficult for the United States and its allies to ship military equipment into the vital Persian Gulf ports during a crisis if Iran should oppose that action.13 Moreover, if the West should in the future contemplate a land-based military intervention in Iran, such an operation would be difficult to conduct if the Persian Gulf ports were inaccessible to military cargo ships. Essentially, the potential ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran with both regional political leverage with OPEC members and a logical strongpoint for national defense against outside intervention.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

As signaled by Rafsanjani's 1988 statement, Iran's WMD aspirations include all three categories of weapon systems that are grouped under the term WMD: chemical, biological, and nuclear. In the first two categories, Iran already has some capability; for the last category, it is still working to develop indigenous nuclear weapons.

Chemical Weapons. Iran's stockpile of chemical weapons developed out of its experience as a CW victim during the Iran-Iraq War. Currently, Iran is believed to have a large stockpile of chemical weapons on hand, including nerve and blister agents.14 A CIA statement claims that Iran has several thousand tons of agents including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents. Its production capacity is estimated at 1000 tons a year,15 with its major production facilities located at Damghan, 300 kms east of Tehran.16 The CIA claims that Iran is working on developing a self-sufficient CW production capacity that includes more effective nerve agents. Along with shell and bomb delivery systems, Iran may also be producing CW warheads for its Scud missile systems.17

Biological Weapons. Based on various U.S. government reports, Iran has most likely investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents, produced some agents, and probably weaponized a small quantity of its production.18 In this technology, Iran is judged to be able to support an independent BW program, which is now in the late stages of research and development, with little foreign assistance (although some foreign BW expertise, especially from Russia, is flowing to Iran).19 It is reported that the country has collocated a BW lab near its CW production facilities at Damghan. Unfortunately, the dual nature of biomedical technology, which can also be used to produce BW agents, provides Iran with an in-house capacity for large-scale agent production.20 An Iranian-developed BW warhead for ballistic missile use could be available around the year 2000.21 Based on the discussion in Chapter 1, it should be expected that Iran's BW warheads will be configured to package the agent in submunitions which will deploy out of the warhead during the ascent phase of a ballistic missile's trajectory at about 60 kms altitude. It is expected that the agent will also be packaged for future delivery by cruise missiles and other means.

Nuclear Weapons. There is a major dichotomy in the picture that has been created of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Unclassified assessments based on Iran's known nuclear infrastructure reflect a technology and production base inadequate to the task of producing nuclear weapons for many years.22 Yet, it is also clear from various statements made by U.S. government officials that, in addition to Iran's legitimate efforts to develop its nuclear power-generation industry, it is believed to be operating a parallel clandestine nuclear weapons program, with the Isfahan Nuclear Center acting as the "nerve center" for the development.23 U.S. officials estimate that with extensive outside help, Iran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon by about the year 2000.24

Iran's nuclear weapons program is broadly based, according to former CIA Director John Deutch. During congressional testimony, Deutch stated that "Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In an attempt to shorten the timeline to a weapon, Iran has launched a parallel effort to purchase fissile material, mainly from sources in the former Soviet Union."25

Although speculative, there are a number of reports that seem to signal the type of infra-structure that Iran is establishing in support of its clandestine nuclear weapons program. Many of the facilities are being built underground.

Fig. 4-11

Going underground would be a relatively natural inclination for the Iranians who, in addition to mining, have over the centuries dug and maintained a network of perhaps 60,000 tunnels, each of which carry irrigation water for long distances from the mountains down to the fields of Eastern Iran.26 Consequently, Iran has a long-established brotherhood that does nothing but tunnel as a hereditary occupation.27

It is generally thought that Iran has at least 10 locations devoted to nuclear activities and may be developing an 11th site south of Tabriz (with Chinese assistance).28 While some of these sites contain legal activities, several are also believed to hold clandestine nuclear weapons facilities. Examples of unconfirmed reports that are believed to be related to Iran's nuclear program include the following:

Reports based on information from the Iranian exile community in Europe claim that Iran has built a secret facility for developing nuclear weapons inside of a mountain at Chalus. See Figure 4-12. Local residents inside Iran have been told by the authorities that the facility, which from the outside is seen as two large doors covering the mouth of a tunnel, is an electrical power station staffed by Canadian specialists. However, exiles claim that the specialists working at the site are actually from the FSU, China, and North Korea.29

Neka, in northeast Iran near Turkmenistan, contains a network of nuclear research establishments of which little is known. In 1995, a secret deal was reportedly signed for Russia to deliver two 400 MW reactors to an underground facility at that site.30

Uranium enrichment centrifuges are believed to be housed in facilities at Ma`allem Kelayeh under the control of the Revolutionary Guards.31 In addition, at least one report indicates that Pakistan may have supplied gas centrifuges to Iran.32 This potential raises concern that some of the uranium hexafluoride that will be produced by the hexafluoride plant being constructed by the Chinese at Esfahan (NPT compliant)33 could be diverted to a clandestine enrichment program to create weapons-grade uranium.34 (Note: Iran may also be following Iraq's pattern, enriching uranium by using two or three different technologies.)

Iran established its own uranium mines in eastern Iran during the 1980s.35 In addition, a ship carrying 200 tons of enriched Brazilian uranium disappeared while enroute to Canada in late 1994. According to a Brazilian magazine, officials apparently determined that the ship may have been diverted to Iran following their discovery that the Canadian company which was to have received the uranium did not exist.36

The Iranian journalist, Freidoun Sahebjam, claims that Iran has constructed several secret nuclear weapon facilities with North Korean assistance, to include two underground reactors and possibly an underground calutron enrichment facility. One of the reactors is said to be in the nuclear complex near Tabas.37

figure 4-12

As discussed in earlier chapters and sections, Chinese, Russian, North Korean, and Pakistani technicians all have been reported working in Iran, in addition to a healthy representation of Western specialists and non-Russian FSU citizens.38 While the national representation cited is generally accepted as fact, there is little open-source material that indicates either the quantity or the quality of the foreign personnel involved. However, the Iranians apparently were offering Soviet scientists $5000 a month in 1992 to work on special projects in Iran. Considering that the average Soviet scientist was only making $70 per month at home, it seems likely that more than a few of them may have accepted positions in Iran.39

Although the veracity of the reports cited above cannot be confirmed through open-source materials, it seems likely that at least some of them reflect fact. For Iran to be able to develop a nuclear weapon within the next few years, as the CIA claims, some clandestine operations to produce fissile materials has to be ongoing. Likewise, of particular concern are the continued rumors that Iran has acquired 2-4 nuclear weapons from the FSU. The first report to surface claimed that in 1991 Iran had acquired at least two of the warheads reported missing from Kazakhstan.40 That reported sale was later largely discredited with at least one article claiming that the pending deal had been foiled by agents of the CIA.41

Yet, there are other recent reports that insist that Iran has, in fact, managed to acquire at least three nuclear devices of unknown utility/operational capability. These reports, pointing to the recent change in official U.S. government statements as supporting their contention, claim that various Western intelligence services now privately acknowledge that Iran does possess a few nuclear weapons. It has become fairly standard for recent U.S. official reports to be worded so as to restrict the statement to discussing Iran's indigenous nuclear weapons program.42

In reality, it is very unlikely that any source in the Western world knows for certain what nuclear materials or weapons the Iranians may have managed to acquire. However, if Iran has gained access to some number of Soviet warheads, those warheads would provide the Iranians with models of tested weapon designs that may incorporate the miniaturization and sophistication that is usually gained only after years of effort and testing. In essence, if Iran has possession of an advanced nuclear warhead, it could reverse engineer the design and arm its future missiles with light, powerful, modern warheads, thus helping to achieve longer missile ranges (due to lighter payloads) much earlier than would otherwise be expected.

On the other hand, press reports of Iran's nuclear technological backwardness and developmental difficulties also indicate that even if it has a proven nuclear weapon design, its scientists may have trouble with the applied engineering and manufacturing process, thus slowing Iran's emergence as a nuclear power. This situation is the result of a self-inflicted wound. Many of Iran's elite, to include many of its scientists, fled the country or were executed in the early 1980s. An estimated 4 million Iranians are still in exile.43 Over the last few years, Iran has been working (with limited success) to entice these exiles to return home. A key variable in this equation is how well Iran has been able to cover its internal technological weaknesses through the use of foreign talent and outside assistance.

Iranian Missiles: A Sought-After Capability

Iran views Israel and the United States as its primary enemies. Thus, its ballistic missile interests would be to hold Israel at risk, to be able to deter the "Great Satan" from intervening in the Middle East, and to discourage potential European allies of the United States from entering into U.S.-led military coalitions that are contrary to Iranian interests. In addition, Iran has a clear need to be able to deter its neighbors and prevent the recurrence of the type of situation it found itself facing during the Iran-Iraq War. Many security analysts also suspect Iran of having hegemonic aspirations with respect to the Persian Gulf region. To accomplish these goals, Iran is following an active program to develop both cruise and ballistic missile delivery systems. Its procurement program includes the outright purchase of complete systems coupled to the development of in-house production capabilities.

Ballistic Missiles. Much of Iran's ballistic missile-related issues have been covered earlier during discussions of supplier-country activities. For example, the import of Chinese M-7 (CSS-8) and the possible construction of an M-9 missile plant was discussed in Chapter 3.44 As also noted, Iran has a missile test range and missile production facilities. Its indigenous missile production efforts include the manufacturing of various short-range ballistic systems, to include a large quantity of Scud Bs and some Scud Cs.45 Some of these Scud Bs may now be undergoing upgrade to the 500-km range Scud C system.46 What is less clear is whether or not Iran is yet producing missiles with ranges beyond that of the Scud C. Currently, Iran's missile production structure includes the Chinese-built missile plant near Semnan, the larger North Korean-built plants at Isfahan and Sirjan which can produce liquid fuels and certain structural components, and missile test facilities at Shahroud in the northeastern part of the country. Iran is making progress in mastering missile production. In the past, most of Iran's indigenous missile production has been heavily dependent upon the assembly of "knock-down" kits. This lack of indigenously produced components is changing. For example, Iran's Scud B system is now produced using a significant proportion of indigenously manufactured components.47 This development is consistent with Iran's objective to move towards self-sufficient missile production. It may have some 100 facilities that produce missile components of different kinds.48

As discussed in the North Korean section of Chapter 3, Iran helped finance North Korea's missile development. Reports have claimed that Iran intends to field a 1300-km range Nodong system that will provide it with the capability of targeting Israel, and that Iran expected North Korea to provide it with the means to manufacture that missile.49 Several reports had indicated that a few Nodongs had been shipped to Iran in 1994-95, but when General Peay, USCINCCENT, claimed during a Spring 1996 interview that a recent attempt by Iran to buy Nodongs from North Korea had failed for financial reasons,50 uncertainty was cast on the earlier reports of Nodong shipments to Iran.51

However, Iran's delay in obtaining longer-range missiles is seen as a temporary situation. Iran has already invested in the expense of digging extensive tunnel complexes for the protected deployment of Scud and Nodong missile systems at numerous locations along its littorals on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.52 Even if Iran should forego acquisition of the Nodong itself, it is still expected to field a missile system of similar or better capability.

There are unconfirmed reports that Iran is working on the development of some longer-range missile systems. For example, the Zelzal 3 is believed to have been in development for the past 5 years. It is based on a combination of technologies including Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and German; it is expected to have a range of 1000-1500 kms (e.g., Iran may have been involved in the development of China's two-stage 1000-km range M-18 missile, thus giving it access to Chinese missile technology). According to a report in Iran Brief, Iran's Revolutionary Guards hope to have a prototype of their new missile ready for a test launch in 1998.53

Of greater interest, in May 1996 UNCINCCENT claimed that Iran is expected to increase the range of its missiles to make them capable of reaching targets in Europe.54 USCINCCENT's hint seems to lend credence to a December 1996 news report, based on respected German sources, which claims that Iran is developing a 3500-mile (5600-km) missile that will be capable of striking Europe. The technology for this system was cited as coming from Russia and North Korea.55 It is possible that this missile is a Taepodong 2 derivative.

Of more concern for the United States, however, is the potential that Iran could gain access to ICBMs (or "knock-down kits" for their assembly) from countries such as Russia, Ukraine, or China. In considering the possibilities, several factors need to be assessed:

Iran has been shopping in Ukraine and Russia for advanced missile technologies. For example, in 1992, Iran offered to provide Ukraine with oil in exchange for missile technologies.56

Iran's internal economic conditions are weak. If Iran could locate a supplier, it would be more cost effective for it to purchase rather than build an ICBM capability.

As discussed, Russian sources may have already provided an SS-25 to China and offered 45 Topol M ICBMs to India. If so, the taboo on transferring ICBMs may be weakening, establishing a precedent for exporting these systems. The recent reports of Russian SS-4 technology and components being transferred to Iran strengthens this fear.

Some Russian strategists hope to use Iran to check U.S. influence in the Middle East. Iran is viewed as a potential ally. Some future Russian government could find it expedient to provide Iran with an ICBM capability (particularly if Iran already had missiles capable of targeting Russia).

Russia's control over its missile forces is weakening. If political stability in Russia should decline further in the future, some of Russia's ICBMs could find their way to Iran as corrupt officers look to fund their retirement accounts.

Iran, in a bid to become Central Asia's outlet to the sea, built a rail link between Iran and the Central Asian rail system (opened in May 1996) and improved the parallel highway link as well. The new transportation links provide an easy conduit for either legal or illegal export of missiles or their components from the FSU to Iran.

Considering how entrenched organized crime and corruption is in Russia, it is becoming increasingly questionable if the Russian government will be able to control future missile exports, to include ICBM systems.

If the central government in China should weaken further or lose control, more missile exports could be the result. Since Iran is viewed as a friendly state by most Chinese, missile technology transfers might increase over their current levels.

Cruise Missiles. Iran has been acquiring an array of short-range sophisticated cruise missiles, many of which are anti-ship systems. Since 1989, it has also indigenously manufactured HY-1 Silkworm and HY-2 Seersucker cruise missiles,57 and is currently in the process of developing an improved Silkworm system at its Chinese-built plant at Bandar Abbas.58 Allegedly, the Silkworm upgrade is being conducted with Chinese assistance. The improved missile will have a range of 450 kms, giving it the capability of reaching Saudi Arabia and all Persian Gulf states.59 As Iran continues to develop its cruise missile capabilities, it is expected to incorporate GPS into its guidance system, develop improved propulsion systems for longer ranges, and add stealth technologies to reduce the radar cross-section.60 Of particular interest with regard to future cruise missile capabilities is the unconfirmed report that Iran has a U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile which was forwarded to Iran from Bosnia. The report claims the missile was one of three fired at Bosnian targets that failed to explode.61 If this report should prove true, then U.S. cruise missile technology could be reverse engineered. It must also be considered that North Korea, China, Russia, and perhaps Syria and others may also have been given access to that missile.

Iran Conclusions

Assuming current trends continue, Iran will be a nuclear power with IRBMs and long-range cruise missile delivery systems by 2010. Considering Iran's current state of missile development, it is unlikely that it could develop an indigenous ICBM capability within this time frame unless the missile's components were made available as kits by an outside party (a possibility that cannot be ruled out). Similarly, it must also be considered that Iran could acquire an assembled ICBM, such as an SS-25 or a Topol M, especially if the level of disorder and corruption should increase in the FSU. As far as CW and BW systems, Iran should be expected to package them in submunitions for use in theater ballistic missile warheads or in spray tanks for cruise missile employment.


1 "Iran Survey," The Economist, January 18, 1997, p. 11.

2 Ibid., p. 1.

3 Jack Kelley, "Iran's Terrorism Network Grows In Sophistication," USA Today, August 2, 1996, p. 10A.

4 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Iran: A Country Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 115-16.

5 Efraim Karsh, "Rational Ruthlessness: Non-Conventional and Missile Warfare in the Iran-Iraq War," Non-Conventional-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, ed. by Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 36, 41.

6 Ibid., p. 42.

7 Ibid., p. 40; Iranian soldiers sporadically may have employed limited quantities of captured or dud Iraqi artillery/mortar chemical rounds prior to this date.

8 Ibid., pp. 45-47.

9 Quoted by Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: The Next Chapter Begins," Non-Conventional-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, ed. by Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 143.

10 There have been a number of reports that make it clear that Iran hopes to form an alliance of major Asian powers to counter the United States. For example, see "Iran: Velayati Says Afghanistan Key To Control Region," FBIS-NES-96-046, March 7, 1996.

11 "Editorial Sees Need for Asian Alliance to Oppose U.S.," Tehran Hamshahri, translated in FBIS-NES-94-173, September 7, 1994, p. 77.

12 Dale R. Davis, "Iran's Strategic Philosophy and Growing Sea-Denial Capabilities, The Marine Corps Gazette, July 1993, p. 21; and Philip Finnegan and Robert Holzer, "Iran Steps Up Mine, Missile Threat," Defense News, November 27-December 3, 1995, p. 1.

13 "Implications of Iranian Naval Build-Up," Intelligence Digest, August 9-23, 1996, p. 1.

14 Andrew Rathmell, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1995, p. 560.

15 Barbara Starr, "Iran Has Vast Stockpiles of CW Agents, Says CIA," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 14, 1996, p. 3.

16 "Devil's Brew Briefings: Iran," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Internet, http:/www.cdiss.org/cbwnb1.htm, 1996.

17 Ibid.

18 Tony Capaccio, "CIA: Iran Holding Limited Stocks of Biological Weapons," Defense Week, August 5, 1996, p. 15. This article quotes from documents published by ACDA, CIA, and DoD.

19 Starr, "Iran Has Vast Stockpiles of CW Agents, Says CIA," op. cit.

20 Capaccio, "CIA: Iran Holding Limited Stocks of Biological Weapons," op. cit.

21 Ibid.

22 Breg J. Gerardi and Maryam Aharinejad, "Report: An Assessment of Iran's Nuclear Facilities," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1996, pp. 207-213. For a similar article, see David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 1995, pp. 26.

23 Con Coughlin, "London Paper Details Deal," The Sunday Telegraph, transcribed in FBIS-NES-95-166, August 28, 1995, p. 83.

24 Barbara Starr, "CIA Expects Nodong Deployment Next Year," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 11, 1995. Deutch claimed that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in about four years, but that he was not forecasting that this would actually occur.

25 John Deutch, "The Threat of Nuclear Diversion," Statement for the Record to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, March 20, 1996.

26 Iran: A Country Study, op. cit., p. 179.

27 As an aside, according to a Western source who lived in Iran during the days of the Shah, the families who maintain the irrigation tunnels pass the art from father to son. Apparently, an ancient secret is involved in steering the direction and angle of the tunnels underground so as to be able to link an irrigation tunnel to other tunnels at a precise point and grade (key to water flow).

28 "Iran with PRC, 12/13/95" The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1996, p. 113.

29 "Washington Whispers: Tehran's Magic Mountain," U.S. News and World Report, May 1, 1995, p. 24.

30 Coughlin, "London Paper Details Deal," op. cit.

31 Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Iran: Ever More Threatening," National Security Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3, 1993, p. 32.

32 Jonathan Rynhold, "China's Cautious New Pragmatism in the Middle East," Survival, Autumn 1996, p. 107.

33 Bill Gertz, "U.S. Fears Iran's Use of China's Know-How," The Washington Times, April 18, 1996, p. 7.

34 Ibid.

35 Timmerman, "Iran: Ever More Threatening," op. cit.

36 "Brazilian Enriched Uranium to Iran?," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, April 30, 1995, p. 3.

37 "Iran with North Korea and PRC, 11/6/95," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1996, p. 113.

38 There are numerous reports of various Western citizens working on Iranian defense technology programs. For an example, see "Iran With Germany, 3/95," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995, p. 161.

39 Thomas Orszag-Land, "How to Keep Soviet Science Out of the Wrong Hands," The Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 1995, p. 9.

40 "Newspaper Says Iran Got Two Nuclear Warheads from Kazakhstan," AP Wire Service, April 30, 1992, AM Cycle.

41 Coughlin, "London Paper Details Deal," op. cit.; and Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," op. cit., p. 25.

42 For examples, see "Brazilian Enriched Uranium to Iran?," op. cit.; and Gregory Copley, "Crisis Mismanagement," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, June 30, 1995, p. 7.

43 "Iran Survey, op. cit., p. 8.

44 "Briefing: Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 17, 1996, p. 43; and "Missile and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1996, p. 178; and Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, and Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens," Jane's IDR Extra, February 1997, p.1.

45 Ibid. The quantities of Scud Bs held by Iran are cited as being between 200+ and 1000, depending on source.

46 For examples, see Bill Gertz, "China Sold Iran Missile Technology," The Washington Times, November 21, 1996, p. A14.

47 "Missile Threat: Iran," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Internet, http://www.cdiss.org/country2.htm, 1996.

48 Ibid.

49 For some examples, see Richard Latter, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Developing World," Jane's Defence 96: The World in Conflict, January 1996, p. 77; and Greg Gerardi and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1994, pp. 189-90.

50 Ibid.; and "Iran's Tunnels are Missile Sites, Says USA," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 1, 1996, p. 3.

51 Unknown is whether or not Iran received some prototype Nodongs prior to 1996. A few reports also speculate that Iran's version of the Nodong was to have a longer range than that being produced by North Korea (distance from Iran to Israel issue). Unknown is how much Nodong technology is being used by Iran to develop missiles under other names?

52 "Iran's Tunnels are Missile Sites, Says USA," op. cit.; and General J.H. Binford Peay, USCINCCENT, "Middle East/North Africa," Presentation: Fletcher Conference (Cambridge, MA), November 13, 1996.

53 "Special Report: The Zelzal Missile Program," Iran Brief, September 9, 1996, pp. 1-2; Eric Arnett, "Iran's Missile Ambitions Scaled Down, Says SIPRI," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997, p. 16; and "Israel Says Iran, Russia Ground Test Missile," Reuters World Report (wire service), April 13, 1997.

54 "Iran, 5/23/96-5/24/96," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1996, p. 161.

55 "Report Says Iran Developing New Missiles," Reuters, Ltd., December 20, 1996, 11:36 AM EST.

56 Jacquelyn Davis, based on a private conversation with a Ukrainian official in Kiev, 1992.

57 Duncan Lennox, Editor, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, presentation to George C. Marshall Institute, Washington, DC, July 29, 1996.

58 "Missile Threat: Iran," op. cit.

59 Robin Ranger, Humphry Crum Ewing, David Wiencek, and David Bosdet, "Cruise Missiles: New Threats, New Thinking," Comparative Strategy, July 1995, p. 263.

60 Ibid.; and "Iran With PRC, 12/13/95-12/19/95," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1996, p. 143.

61 Anatoliy Yurkin, "B-H Muslims Said to Sell Missiles to Iran Via Russia," ITAR-TASS, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-195, October 9, 1995. 62 For insights into how Iraq originally was able to build its nuclear program, see David Kay, "The Lessons of Iraqi Deceptions," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 85-105.