The Unfulfilled Promise of GCC Unity
The March 2000 issue analyzes the frustratingly elusive progress on joint defense cooperation among GCC states. Despite the enthusiastic rhetoric in support of unity, the GCC states have done little to create a genuine regional security organization. The persistent failure to move forward on joint military initiatives is puzzling given the combined financial wealth of the Gulf states, |
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America's support for the various GCC-wide defense programs, and the demonstrated existence of threats in the region. Indeed, in spite of the oil price slump in the late 1990s, the Gulf region remains the world's largest arms importer. What then explains this seemingly overpowering indecision on cooperative approaches? The report points to three factors that have impeded GCC cooperation:
1) Fundamental differences in threat perceptions shaped by the ambitions of regional hegemons
2) Deep-seated antagonisms among GCC states
3) Internal anxieties
The report asserts that the inability and unwillingness to provide for a common GCC defense will prolong and perhaps exacerbate longstanding security dilemmas for the Gulf states. So long as discord within the GCC persists, the military imbalance vis-à-vis aspiring regional powers (e.g., Iraq and Iran), competition and mistrust within the organization, and reliance on the United States will remain the predominant features of Gulf security. The deeply ingrained divisions behind the façade of unity will continue to govern inter-GCC relations and security dynamics in the region.
Analysis of Iranian Elections
In February 2000 the Iranian electorate gave President Muhammad Khatami's reformers a triumph of unexpected magnitude. The election was hardly a pristine affair, but the voters' demand for change was unmistakable. While the liberal victory has predictably spurred euphoria in Iran and abroad, a sober reaction to 2nd Khordad's victory is warranted. First, the reform movement is not a united front or an alliance of established political parties, but rather a hodgepodge of factions advocating change. The reformers must transcend their differences and reach a consensus to harness their newfound political clout to produce the concrete reforms they promised during the election campaign. Second, the conservatives continue to dominate the political institutions that wield the state's monopoly of force, such as the armed forces and the security services. Too radical a reform program would be the catalyst for a conservative backlash. Third, "democracy," while it represents a welcome development, is not a cure-all for Iran's aggressive proclivities. Ordinary Iranians, as well as their leaders, are keenly attuned to their nation's proud heritage of regional dominance, as well as their status as the foremost Islamic power. Hence public support for the Islamic Republic's military buildup and assertive regional policy remains strong. The report concluded that while a gradual, long-term mellowing of the Islamic Republic's international conduct will continue, foreign governments should not expect a swift or far-reaching change to Iranian diplomacy.
Iraq and UN Sanctions Update
After a flurry of activity surrounding the UN's deliberations on a new resolution, the furor over Iraq abated and the long-standing deadlock resumed. Albeit in a weak 11-0-4 vote, the UN Security Council managed to pass Resolution 1284, which modified the framework of UN-imposed sanctions and weapons inspections. (China, France, Russia, and Malaysia abstained.) As predicted in the December 1999 quarterly report, Saddam Hussein has refused to comply even with the new, milder international inspections regime. The report notes that even if Baghdad agrees to allow the new inspectors into the country, the new inspections regime, UNMOVIC, will undoubtedly fall prey to the deceptions and intransigence that stymied UNSCOM. Moreover, the increased Security Council oversight mandated by Resolution 1284 means that every action of UNMOVIC will be subjected to intense scrutiny, and possibly to a veto by one or more of the permanent five members.
Questions regarding this report, the reports in general, or the Institute's work on energy security programs can be directed to Andrew C. Winner or Toshi Yoshihara